In his play The Trojan War will not take place (1955), French novelist and diplomat Jean Giraudoux has his protagonist Hector struggle tremendously with convincing both Trojans and Greeks alike to prevent the looming war. Despite coming very close to negotiating a truce, Hector fails in the end owing to the belligerent aspirations of some other protagonists led by the Trojan poet Demokos. Cassandra's famous final line, ‘war cannot be avoided’, comes true and, in contrast to the title of the play, the Trojan War does indeed take place.
Although Giraudoux may have aimed at criticizing the diplomacy that led to World War I and World War II, his play also vividly illustrates a challenge which emperors or military commanders faced in ancient times when trying to convince their comrades or subordinates not to wage war, as we find so often in Greek and Roman texts. In the Roman world, the most prominent case is perhaps the example of Q. Fabius Maximus Cunctator, demonstrating how difficult it could become to advocate for peace without being declared a timid coward.Footnote 1 This phenomenon did not disappear, its implications did not change (if they ever have at all in history), and its traces can also be found in Late Antiquity.Footnote 2 The need to ensure a reputation for being an outstanding imperator, capable of fighting famous battles, striking Roman foes to the ground, and extending the borders of the imperium, which was already established in the Augustan era, remained a constant concern throughout the following centuries for nearly every Roman emperor.Footnote 3
From the beginning of his reign as emperor, particularly when he became sole ruler in 350, Constantius II found himself confronted with a similar challenge. On the one hand, he was expected to wage war against foreign enemies and to prove himself a propagator imperii. On the other hand, the situation in the empire did not allow him to take gambles with high-risk military operations, as various circumstances had significantly changed since the Early Imperial period.Footnote 4 Owing to mighty enemies at its borders, Rome had to resort to other means to keep its frontiers intact: emperors had to take care to preserve the strength of their army, avoiding as many conflicts as possible to be prepared for potential invasions elsewhere in the empire.Footnote 5 But such a strategy apparently contradicted the traditional expectation of being a successful emperor, a mighty propagator imperii, who was not forced to negotiate with Roman enemies, but imposed his will on his opponents.
Constantius thus faced a problem for which I would like to coin the term imperator-dilemma. He was still expected to demonstrate his skills as an imperator who fought battles and won military triumphs.Footnote 6 But the military and strategic circumstances at that time did not allow him to fulfil this requirement without thinking of different ways to achieve the most important goal: protecting the border of the Roman empire.
We can trace the imperator-dilemma and its implications throughout many contemporary sources. In my paper, I would like to present two examples, Ammianus and Themistius, which highlight the presence of the imperator-dilemma in this period, proving its relevance for contemporaries, and illustrating the potential for new insights from the interpretation of these sources in the light of the imperator-dilemma.
I
In Book 14 of his Res Gestae, after a digression on the eastern provinces and their suffering under the Caesar Gallus, Ammianus reports on Constantius’ campaign against the Alamanni in 354.Footnote 7 His account attracts the reader's attention right from the start. Having recounted how the expedition came to a halt at Valentia, as Constantius’ army ran out of supplies owing to heavy rainfall and flooding rivers, Ammianus emphasizes that the troops were indignant and angry about the unusual delay. Ammianus pictures their furious anger vividly with words which are usually linked with descriptions of barbaric behaviour and stereotypes (miles … saeuiebat, feritas, militem … saeuum).Footnote 8 By mentioning their emotional outburst of rage (tumor), Ammianus intensifies the image of a wild, almost ‘savage’, group of soldiers.
Having secured their supplies, the Romans marched on to the Rhine, first struggling with the weatherFootnote 9 and then with their enemies, who prevented Constantius’ troops from crossing the river with heavy attacks from archers. The Romans did not see any opportunity to build a bridge with ships bound together (id impossibile uideretur, Amm. Marc. 14.10.6). However, despite the apparent deadlock, the Alamanni sent envoys to negotiate peace and to beg pardon for their offences.Footnote 10 The Romans discussed the matter for a long time and finally decided to consent. Ammianus reports that the Romans granted peace, because ‘it was asked for on legitimate conditions’ and it was expedient in the present conditions.Footnote 11
Although this decision seems completely understandable when considering the tactical stalemate, Ammianus now has Constantius give a speech in front of his troops, giving his reasons for allowing a peaceful solution of the conflict. Whether Constantius actually held a speech or to what extent the words in Ammianus’ text reflect what the Roman emperor really told his soldiers is not of interest here.Footnote 12 More important is the fact that Ammianus has Constantius address the troops at exactly this point in his text, making it clear that he considered the specific situation of 354 as exemplary and characteristic.
Right from the beginning of the speech, we are struck by the submissive emphasis with which Constantius tries to win over his audience. The first words are accompanied by a pleading quaeso, and soon afterwards the Roman emperor addresses his troops with commilitones mei fidissimi.Footnote 13 Constantius then does not claim that he himself has to make some sacrifices by abandoning the military operation (for example the opportunity to prove himself an imperator); instead, the whole campaign appears as though it were being undertaken only for the sake of the soldiers. For example, Constantius implicitly conveys the impression that he had been pressed to undertake the campaign by the troops and that it was by no means his decision to wage war against the Alamanni (Amm. Marc. 14.10.11: fiducia uestri ductante barbaricos pagos aduentans).
After that, Ammianus lets Constantius emphasize a clash of interests: the Roman emperor observes that every soldier is likely to pay attention only to his own advantage and benefit, whereas an emperor must keep an eye on the well-being of his army and all his subjects.Footnote 14 By using the term ratio (Amm. Marc. 14.10.12),Footnote 15 Constantius implicitly suggests that the diplomatic solution ranks on a higher scale of reason than the greedy and irrational purpose of pressing ahead with the military campaign. Although the emperor does not blame his soldiers for displaying irrational behaviour explicitly, his arguments reveal such a point of view, hinting at another contrast between the affective conduct of the soldiers on the one hand and the unemotional pragmatic thinking of the emperor on the other.
At that point, the reader realizes that Constantius’ speech, in which Ammianus has the emperor support his plea for meeting the terms offered by the barbarians with a variety of different arguments, is picked out to illustrate a symptomatic issue—the emperor's dilemma of being blamed as a coward if he did not go to war.Footnote 16
This issue remains relevant when Constantius goes on to justify his decision with further arguments in the second part of the speech. The Romans, in his view, should grant the barbarians peace, because the Alamanni entreated the Romans with ‘bowed heads’ (summissis ceruicibus) when asking for indulgence for past events (Amm. Marc. 14.10.14). These actions of submission and regret would meet the request for compensation for the previous invasions. To prove his point, the emperor says that one should never think that only the enemy who has been borne down by weight of arms and strength (in acie pondere armorum oppressus) is defeated. Instead, it would seem far better and safer (multo tutius) if the barbarians chose to pass under the yoke voluntarily without any military actions having been carried out against them. In that way, the Romans would send the message that they would never lack strength and rigour against rebellious enemies (fortitudinem in rebelles), but would show mercy and pardon to suppliant tribes and peoples.Footnote 17
The argument is interesting: as Constantius anxiously lays out his motives, we can feel that he was desperate to counter potential objections from ‘hawks’ amongst his officers and soldiers. He seems to have expected a substantial group to protest against how he had dealt with the barbarians; and that they might also highlight that his soft reaction to the barbarians’ request might encourage the Alamanni to invade Roman territory again very soon after Constantius’ army left the region, since they faced no threat of being punished as long as they bowed to the approaching Roman army just in time. Therefore, Constantius wishes to convince his soldiers that enemies who surrender by their own choice are more likely to be docile than enemies whose violations of contract have been prosecuted by fierce military actions. If the Romans, Constantius continues, accept the barbarians’ plea for peace, it should not be judged as inert negligence or disastrous indulgence. Rather, a mild reaction to their surrender would be a sign of prudence and benevolence.Footnote 18
Nearly the entirety of Constantius’ speech attempts to convince the audience that a peaceful solution will prove better than military action against the Alamanni. Constantius almost implores his soldiers to accept his decision. Alluding to the many obstacles the Romans had to surmount before their encounter with the enemy at the banks of the Rhine,Footnote 19 Constantius emphasizes that only the willingness to negotiate, to accept the terms of the peace offered, and sometimes to forget injustice suffered might break the cycle of violence at the Roman borders along the Rhine and the Danube.Footnote 20
This evidence raises some questions: why did Ammianus portray Constantius in this way? Should we really assume that the historian intended to point to a structural issue within the Roman empire—that is, the manifold expectations which Constantius was confronted with while campaigning abroad and which almost prevented him from prioritizing non-military action over military action? Or should we rather believe that Ammianus wanted to criticize the mild and soft reaction the emperor displayed against the barbarians? This assumption seems to be supported by Ammianus’ comment after Constantius’ speech: Constantius was able to win over his soldiers since they thought him capable only in civil wars but not in military operations against foreign enemies.Footnote 21 Ammianus’ conclusion has been seen as a direct and unveiled reproach against Constantius.Footnote 22
But it is not that simple. If we look at the introduction to the campaign and compare Ammianus’ account to Constantius’ speech, we see that both parts interact closely. For example, the military stalemate which Constantius indirectly mentions is also confirmed by Ammianus, who, in addition, does not downplay the potential risks of a forced raid across the river.Footnote 23 And there are more points of contact between Ammianus’ report and Constantius’ speech. Constantius emphasizes in his address to his soldiers that the peace offer had to be accepted (quam [sc. pacem] … tribui debere censeo). The Roman emperor considered himself obliged—not only for pragmatic reasons—to accept the peace offer. This corresponds to what Ammianus reports before Constantius’ speech: the Romans decided that the peace offer ought to be granted (pacem oportere tribui), since there was general agreement on the point that it was asked for on reasonable conditions.Footnote 24 Additionally, it cannot be argued that the prospect of impending conflict with Gallus forced Constantius to accept a peace offer as soon as possible in order to spare disposable troops for a potential military clash. In what follows, Ammianus makes it clear that Constantius did not wish to resolve the issue with his cousin by force and within a short time-frame, as the Roman emperor withdrew to Mediolanum, where he first contemplated further steps, which were brought to fruition the following year (Amm. Marc. 14.10.16–14.11.5).
All this evidence leads to the following conclusions: Constantius neither wasted an advantageous situation nor sacrificed a promising military campaign to conserve strength in the face of a possible uprising within the empire; nor does Ammianus’ account suggest that the emperor was simply lucky to be relieved from a military challenge which he was not capable of carrying out successfully by a sudden peace offer from the enemy. And if we leave aside Ammianus’ report, setting Constantius’ decision into a historical context, the emperor's choice becomes even more astounding, as Constantius’ campaign against the Alamanni seems to have been undertaken for the purpose of a military victory.Footnote 25
In light of this evidence, we could consider Ammianus’ final remark about Constantius’ success in civil wars not as a compromising comment on Constantius’ military abilities but rather as a portrayal of the emperor's reputation amongst the soldiers.Footnote 26 Ammianus wants the reader to review the soldiers’ perspective against the background of the entire context. And because of Ammianus’ subtly orchestrated interaction between particular parts, the reader realizes that Constantius’ resolution of the matter was pragmatic and reasonable, and guided by rational and prudent principles. This leads us to assume that even Ammianus, despite his usually critical and sometimes ironic position towards Constantius, approved the emperor's decision. There is some further evidence to support this assumption: as has already been outlined, both Constantius’ dealing with the matter and his arguments for peace are described as absolutely rational, whereas the soldiers’ clamour for battle strikes every reader as irrational and impulsive.Footnote 27 In contrast, the deliberation among the Alamanni is depicted as a prudent and sensible procedure of decision-making, although Ammianus had no insight into the exact reasons that caused the Alamanni to surrender.Footnote 28 By characterizing each of the participants with these distinctive features, the only ones to assess the situation adequately were not the Roman soldiers but Constantius—and the Alamanni.Footnote 29
This leads to my final point: the fact that Ammianus picked out this campaign and gave an extensive account of it, even though it could have been narrated much more briefly as it did not lead to any spectacular results, should make us aware that he saw this campaign as a symptomatic example of a recurring situation that deserved closer attention. Constantius’ words give us a clear picture that the peaceful solution was not regarded as an appropriate reaction among most of his soldiers. And Constantius’ reference to prospective counterarguments against his own position offers important insights as well. We realize that the emperor feared criticism for being too soft and mild towards the barbarians. We see that many of his soldiers regarded rigorous actions and a policy of unforgiving punishment as the most efficient method for dealing with the numerous and recurring invasions into Roman territory. And we grasp that the emperor seemed not to be in a position of absolute power, in which he could simply abandon a campaign without justification.
Thus, chapter 14.10 is a fascinating report about going to war and not going to war. It vividly exposes the imperator-dilemma and all its implications to the reader; it presents in nuce all the arguments for both ‘sides’. And Ammianus’ report makes it clear that Constantius’ decision not to go to war was an astounding act of self-emancipation from the high expectations he was supposed to fulfil, which in this case included attacking the barbarians, retaliating for injuries suffered during the Alamannic invasions, and—perhaps most of all but hardly mentioned—providing the soldiers with the prospect of loot.
II
Before coming back to Ammianus, I need to deal with the question I raised before, namely do we run the risk of overemphasizing Constantius’ refusal to wage war? Was it just a normal incident, or can we trace some elements of a political controversy that lies behind it? In order to prove that the latter is true, we will briefly examine the panegyric of Themistius, which will serve as an iconic text in that matter.Footnote 30
Why Themistius? The imperator-dilemma creates its tension particularly between members of the military elite, the senators and the people on one side and the emperor on the other. These texts were written to address these groups. Thus, Themistius’ speeches are a nodal point: as it must be assumed that Themistius had a close relationship with the court of Constantius and with some of the emperor's confidants, these texts offer some valuable insight into all matters which the emperor might have wished to ‘discuss’ with his audience.Footnote 31
In the autumn of 355, only a short time after Constantius’ operation against the Alamanni, Themistius gave a speech before the Senate of Constantinople, which was sent in written form to the court of Constantius, who was staying in Mediolanum at that time.Footnote 32 In the first paragraphs of the speech, Themistius deals with the official subject of the speech: his election to the Senate of Constantinople by the emperor. But Themistius swiftly switches to another topic: the achievements of Constantius as an emperor without resorting to violence. Themistius seems to consider the issue of Constantius as a peaceful leader an essential and relevant topic, which he assumed would be highly controversial among his audience.
Themistius’ starting point is his principle that the best ruler always acts according to prudence and rationality—logos should be the dominant part in his mind: μάλιστα ἐπιτρέπει τὰ αὑτοῦ πράγματα τῇ τοῦ λόγου ἡγεμονίᾳ, ‘he commits his own affairs to the dominance of his logos’ (Them. Or. 2.36a). Following up on this ‘headline’ of his considerations, Themistius now deconstructs some ‘traditional’ conceptions of a powerful emperor.Footnote 33 In his view, qualities such as strength and authority should not be assessed according to superficial criteria, for example body size or outer insignia, such as a tiara or a golden sabre. Equally, neither should we consider a man to be a great military leader if his wars were fought with costly battles (Them. Or. 2.36c).
Themistius then applies his general considerations to the contemporary case of Constantius: ἐξαρκεῖ δὲ αὐτῷ πολλάκις ὁ λόγος ἀντὶ τῶν ὅπλων καὶ τῶν στρατιωτῶν, ‘for him logos is often more sufficient than weapons or soldiers’ (Them. Or. 2.37a). Here, Themistius refers to the war against Vetranio, which was won by Constantius using his famous eloquence to convince the soldiers of his enemies to change allegiance. In order to frame Constantius’ peaceful approach, which to some may look ‘un-Roman’ and cowardly, as an effective and approved principle, Themistius projects Constantius’ policy onto a general level, citing Euripides and saying that Constantius often achieves more with his logos than one could accomplish with weapons.Footnote 34 In doing so, Themistius wants his audience to accept Constantius’ policy of not waging war on all accounts, as the emperor's measures reflect a universal principle.
Thus, Themistius emphasizes very clearly that neither should a great emperor be valued according to how aggressively and belligerently he led a campaign, nor should one regard as a great military leader only that type of emperor who is absolutely determined to solve all problems by force of arms. Instead, the right emperor—according to Themistius—chooses his actions according to logos; he acts rationally, achieving his goals not only with arms but also with words.
The parallels with the passage in Ammianus’ text are striking, which strengthens the case for the existence of a discourse that discussed the consequences of the imperator-dilemma. In Ammianus’ text, Constantius underlines that he must let ratio—in Themistius’ terms logos—govern his thoughts and that he therefore should not be treated like a coward by his fellow soldiers. Constantius also asks his audience to accept his modestia, which corresponds to the πραότης that Themistius brings up as a true sign of the right emperor.Footnote 35 It is thus conceivable that Themistius picked up on a general discourse which was much debated at the time and the traces of which we can also find in Ammianus. Themistius’ eager efforts to defend his emperor's policy prove that he must have anticipated much opposition among his audience concerning this matter.Footnote 36
The evidence I presented for this particular speech can also be spotted in other speeches given by Themistius, which proves that the imperator-dilemma was much debated at court and throughout the empire.Footnote 37 The issue of whether an emperor like Constantius, whose ambition was neither to wage war on all fronts nor to prove his military capability on any account, should be criticized for not ‘adequately’ defending the interests of the Roman citizens, for negotiating peace terms with apparently wild barbarians, and for saving the army's strength for wars to come seemed to be regarded as highly controversial. In the light of this, Ammianus’ chapter 14.10 stands out as a paradigmatic passage, reflecting on one of the most essential problems that the Roman emperor was confronted with at that time.
III
But there are other examples which prove that this imperator-dilemma was an issue that Ammianus wanted to make his readers aware of throughout his text.Footnote 38 One of the most striking (and prominent) passages is Ammianus’ report on Julian's campaign against the Persians in 363. Here, Ammianus conspicuously hints at the emotional character of Julian's plan to go to war.Footnote 39 It seems as if Ammianus is criticizing Julian's decision to go to war with Persia, since it was not based on rational strategic considerations. In light of the fact that Ammianus shows a positive attitude towards Julian throughout the text, particularly in comparison with Constantius II,Footnote 40 we can assume that the historian was perhaps making objections against the consequences of the imperator-dilemma more than blaming Julian for his temper. Ammianus seems to consider Julian's disastrous decision as a result of the fatal pressure that the emperor found himself confronted with;Footnote 41 and Ammianus might even not have been the only one looking at the issue in this way.Footnote 42
Perhaps the best example of Ammianus’ allusion to the imperator-dilemma is his account of the events at Adrianople.Footnote 43 He deliberately begins with a description of Gratian's victory against the Lentienses (Amm. Marc. 31.10.18–19). Immediately thereafter, Ammianus describes Valens as being ‘beside himself’ (exagitatus), when he received many letters reporting excessively about his co-emperor's triumph. For this very reason, he immediately marched off from Melantias, as he was determined to avoid trailing behind Gratian in terms of military success (aequiperare facinore quodam egregio adolescentem properans). Ammianus emphasizes the dynamics that came into play: Valens’ main target—to equal his rival—leads to one of the most devastating defeats in Roman history.Footnote 44
IV
To sum up, this analysis has revealed several aspects. 1) The detailed and subtly orchestrated narrative of 14.10 makes it clear that Ammianus picked this episode to illustrate something which he considered an important phenomenon of his time: the tremendous challenge the Roman emperor was confronted with if he decided to avoid war. 2) It seems as if Ammianus approved of Constantius’ decision to grant peace to the Alamanni despite their previous invasions into Roman territory and despite the potential risk of encouraging the barbarians to violate this treaty in the near future. 3) This assumption can be substantiated by other passages from Ammianus showing that the historian might have been influenced by the events at Adrianople, which could have prompted him to interpret the past strictly in retrospect. Ammianus regarded the imperator-dilemma as a dangerous phenomenon and wanted his readers to recognize its significance while reading his narrative about the past.Footnote 45 4) By consulting other sources, we find that the issue of the emperor as a warlike king was a controversial and hotly debated problem at that time. In comparison with the second speech of Themistius, in which the speaker certainly alludes to the incident of the Alamannic campaign in 354, there are significant congruencies which prove that Constantius also regarded the imperator-dilemma as a serious threat.
The following years were to reveal that Constantius was right. At the peak of the tensions with Caesar Julian, the latter pressed the point of being a ‘true’ Roman emperor. In contrast to Constantius, whose political slogan was ‘words instead of arms’ (ὁ λόγος ἀντὶ τῶν ὅπλων), Julian allowed himself to be characterized as a military leader, preferring ‘arms over words’ (ὅπλων, οὐ λόγων δεῖσθαι τὰ πεπραγμένα, Lib. 18.166). At that time, the war of Augustus against Caesar did take place.
