Introduction
During the Cold War, China supported revolutionary armed forces in Southeast Asia for various geopolitical and ideological reasons. Communist forces, particularly those operating near Yunnan, benefitted from their favourable geographic location, with Chinese aid fuelling their armed struggle. In 1964, Beijing stepped up its support to Southeast Asian communists. Such large-scale aid (including the construction of infrastructure) undoubtedly required an extraordinarily complex and sophisticated logistics system. The efficiency of logistical supplies greatly influenced the effectiveness of the revolutionary efforts. This article seeks to uncover and analyse this logistics support, which began in the mid-1960s but which had collapsed by the late 1970s.
There has been some research on China’s support and influence on communist movements in Southeast Asia. Enze Han discusses Mao Zedong’s radicalization of domestic and foreign policies since the 1960s, which brought revolutionary changes to China’s border region—Yunnan. This influence extended beyond China’s borders into mainland Southeast Asia, which significantly impacted both the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT).Footnote 1 Andrew Mertha explores the programme of substantial assistance that China provided to the Khmer Rouge between 1975 and 1979, to buttress the fledgling regime.Footnote 2 Chen Jian suggests that Mao used China’s support for the Vietnamese revolution as one way to drive the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s.Footnote 3
Chak Wing David Tsui emphasizes the nexus between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the CPT, highlighting Beijing’s significant hand in Thailand’s armed struggles.Footnote 4 Stanislav Mysicka views China’s assistance to Southeast Asian insurgencies as having been driven by a combination of security and ideological considerations that mutually reinforced one another.Footnote 5 Some representative academic studies on PRC aid to Asian revolutions have been published solely in Chinese, though these have mainly focused on the period before the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution.Footnote 6
Foreign aid disbursed during the Cultural Revolution, ending only with Mao’s death in 1976, presented particular difficulties for researchers due to the limited availability of relevant declassified Chinese documents. Therefore, existing research fails to answer one critical question: how was China’s long-term revolutionary support for Southeast Asia sustained and operated on a practical level? This also leads to a question of research into the relationship between the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) and the Pathet Lao, which has often overemphasized North Vietnam’s influence on Laos while omitting China’s role in logistics support. This has resulted in a lack of attention to China’s logistical support and infrastructure development for Pathet Lao and the PAVN forces stationed in Laos.Footnote 7
To fill this research gap, this article is based on newly discovered materials and conversations with Chinese veterans and staff who once participated in revolutionary support for Southeast Asia.Footnote 8 Centring on Mengla in Yunnan province, the research reveals the transnational logistics system behind the communists of Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand. The primary focus is Troop K370 (also known as Mengla Logistics or the 108th Logistics), which was the main component of the 22nd Branch of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Logistics Department, stationed in Mengla for over ten years. This logistics troop provided supplies to four key groups: the Pathet Lao, the Vietnamese forces in Laos, the CPT, and the PLA in Laos (road engineering troops and air defence force). The 108th Logistics was a central hub and frontline command headquarters for aid in Southeast Asia.Footnote 9
The article argues that to support the communist movements in Southeast Asia, China established a comprehensive logistics system that connected mainland Southeast Asia, which was led by the Kunming Military Region and supported by local governments in a military-civilian collaborative effort. From the mid-1960s to the late 1970s, this system effectively sustained the armed struggles of the Pathet Lao, Thai, and Vietnamese communists, as well as China’s strategic road construction projects in northern Laos. As a result, Yunnan’s once desolate peripheral county of Mengla transformed into a military stronghold under the Cold War dynamics of China’s interactions with Southeast Asia, with the military playing a dominant role. Furthermore, China’s military-civilian integrated logistics support led to the United States paying a high cost on the Indochina battlefield.
Establishing the Mengla logistics troop in 1964
In August 1964, an armed conflict occurred between North Vietnam and the United States in the waters of the Gulf of Tonkin (known as the Gulf of Tonkin Incident). This event led to the direct involvement of the United States in the Vietnam War and intensified China’s fear of the American threat.Footnote 10 The deteriorating circumstances in Indochina led to both the United States and China gradually becoming deeply involved in the affairs of mainland Southeast Asia. Mao Lin explains that Washington believed that Hanoi, with Beijing’s support, was attempting to take over South Vietnam through ‘wars of national liberation’ that would spread to other countries, threatening the United States’ global leadership credibility; this was unacceptable to the Johnson administration. Therefore, the United States viewed China as the primary behind-the-scenes enemy in Indochina.Footnote 11 Starting in the spring of 1965, US troops were officially deployed to South Vietnam, directly participating in the war against the Viet Cong. Even before 1965, a large number of military advisers were already stationed in Vietnam. By the end of 1965, more than 180,000 American troops had been sent to Vietnam, marking the beginning of the Americanization of the Vietnam War.Footnote 12
Simultaneously, China was also deeply concerned about US military power in Indochina. In April 1964, Beijing condemned the United States for causing the turmoil in Laos and demanded the withdrawal of US forces from South Vietnam. Furthermore, China officially declared its support for ‘the people’s just war of national liberation in Laos’.Footnote 13 Seth Jacobs believes that Beijing’s involvement in Laos was passive and a defensive response to American intervention in Indochina in the late 1950s and early 1960s.Footnote 14 Zhang Xiaoming pointed out that Beijing’s policy towards Laos became more aggressive and confrontational in 1964, as the Chinese leadership believed that national security was threatened by the presence of the US military in Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Laos, which encircled China.Footnote 15
To strengthen support for the communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia, the Central Military Commission (CMC) decided in August 1964 to establish a logistics troop under the Kunming Military Region dedicated to assisting Southeast Asia parties. The troop’s station was chosen to be in Mengla, a remote border county located at the southernmost tip of Yunnan, with its eastern and southern borders adjoining Laos and a shared border stretching for 677.80 kilometres (Figure 1).Footnote 16
Geographical location map of Mengla. Source: Map by the author.
Against this backdrop, Mengla became an essential hub for China’s support to Southeast Asia allies. At that time, most of the region was covered by tropical forests. The central town was very small, having developed from a Dai ethnic village. A single road, about two kilometres long, ran through the entire city, with various government offices located along both sides of the road. However, in the following years, Mengla evolved into an international revolutionary centre connecting China with Southeast Asian communist movements.
It is undeniable that Mengla was significantly affected by becoming the frontline of resistance against the United States after the Americanization of the Vietnam War. Outsiders travelling to Mengla were required to have a military-issued travel permit. Meanwhile, the local joint defence teams frequently inspected hostels and other locations, checking travellers’ permits and conducting detailed interrogations and screenings.Footnote 17 The deep involvement of the United States in the Vietnam War led China to heavily militarize Mengla, which had a profound impact on the local population. This impact, however, was primarily economic, as local farmers around this area had to supply provisions to the military at prices far below market rates. The Military-Civilian Cooperation policy, which began in 1968, further reinforced this situation. For more details, see the discussion in the following section.
Many veterans who once served in Yunnan referred to Mengla as a ‘military city’. According to their accounts, all operations in this peripheral county revolved around the military. The town housed a large number of stationed and transient troops and the representatives and staff of foreign military forces, while actual civilian residents were few. The militarization of Mengla began in the second half of 1964.
By the end of August 1964, the Kunming Military Region selected a group of PLA cadres from the Simao Military Sub-region and the 14th Army to form the leadership team for the Mengla logistics troop—the 108th Logistics. The troop then received 100 recruits from Guizhou and Kunming, who formed the first batch of personnel during its early establishment. The commander was Li Xiangchen, a lieutenant colonel; the political commissar was Zhang Zongzhi, also a lieutenant colonel.Footnote 18
The main task of the 108th Logistics from its establishment in 1964 until 1968 was to provide aid to the communist parties of Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam.Footnote 19 In 1968, when the PLA engineering troops began entering Laos in large numbers, the 108th Logistics divided its supply tasks into two main parts: one continued to support the communist parties of Southeast Asia, while the other was responsible for the logistical support of Chinese troops stationed in Laos.Footnote 20
In the early days of the establishment, the 108th Logistics comprised a Military Office and subordinate units. The Military Office had six departments: the Political Office, Operations Department, Supply Department, Management Department, Medical Station, and the Guard and Communication Platoon. The subordinate units included the Armory, Fuel Depot, General Warehouse, Food and Fuel Supply Station, General Supply Station, Service Company, Mule Transport Team, and Bicycle Company.Footnote 21
However, due to Mengla’s remote border location and underdeveloped economy, which lacked a proper industrial system, soldiers faced harsh working conditions and environments in the early days. In the second half of 1964, Li Sicong, one of the first recruits of the 108th Logistics, recorded the hardships of those early days:
Living conditions were callous; it could be described as starting from scratch. There were no proper accommodations, so the unit stayed in abandoned thatched huts left by the Yunnan Provincial Highway Bureau, right by the roadside. The roofs leaked everywhere, and the walls let in wind and light. I remember sleeping in these huts on our first night after arriving in Mengla. Heavy rain poured down late that night, soaking our clothes and bedding. We huddled together, using blankets to shield ourselves from the rain. Some of the recruits even started crying … Afterwards, we began building brick and tile barracks by hand while also urgently preparing to start the logistics support tasks for aiding Laos.Footnote 22
In a Kunming Military Region document, the 22nd Branch of the PLA General Logistics Department reflected on the difficulties of providing aid during the early days of the Mengla troop:
Our station [the 108th Logistics] was established in 1964 after the Gulf of Tonkin incident. At that time, the station had only seven subordinate units (two supply stations, two mule transport teams, three warehouses, and one bicycle transport company), with a total staff of fewer than 450 people. The cadres came from various units. We provided military supplies to Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. Mengla is located in the southwestern border region of the country, with a sparse population, mainly consisting of the Dai ethnic minority. The area needed more substantial industrial production, better transportation infrastructure, and an underdeveloped economy, which posed significant challenges to carrying out such a large-scale task and organizing operations at the border.Footnote 23
The oral histories and written records of the veterans reveal that many young soldiers harboured doubts about assisting Southeast Asian communist parties, sometimes leading to widespread negative sentiment among recruits. Many of them questioned why so many supplies were sent to foreign countries while Chinese people were short of supplies and food. PLA soldier Liu Ji, who participated in aiding the Pathet Lao, recalled that it did not seem to value China’s free aid. He shared an experience at Mengla Logistics, where he saw a basketball court filled with hundreds of brand-new military off-road vehicles provided as aid to Laos:
Our country was impoverished then, yet we were particularly generous in aiding foreign countries. However, a month later, an incident infuriated every Chinese person involved. At Nateuy (Luang Namtha), one off-road vehicle we supplied to Laos drove into our camp. The paint was fresh, but both doors were missing, and one tyre was flat. They moved it on the deflated tyre and requested a replacement.Footnote 24
Many recruits responsible for logistics were particularly dissatisfied with their work, feeling that it was vastly different from what they had imagined a military career would be. They saw themselves as merely performing repetitive tasks in roles such as porter or stable hand. Chen Wancheng, a military veterinarian from the Mule Transport Team, recorded the widespread negative sentiment among the recruits at the time:
Some cadres and soldiers developed dissatisfaction with their assigned duties. This was especially prevalent among the new recruits who joined in August 1965, where ideological issues were more common. They believed, ‘Being a soldier in the mule transport unit means a hard life and exhausting work. Spending all day behind a horse gives us no future and only hardship.’ Some recruits felt they had enlisted with the noble aspiration of serving the country by guarding the borders with rifles but unexpectedly ended up as horse grooms.Footnote 25
Thus, a political and ideological education became a crucial aspect of the lives of the soldiers whose mission it was to support Southeast Asia (Figure 2). The army used political cadres to provide ideological education to the rank-and-file soldiers. The theoretical aspect of this leveraged the widespread personal veneration of Mao Zedong, informing the soldiers that ‘carrying out the mission of aiding Laos is by orders issued by our great leader, Chairman Mao’. Cadres explained to the soldiers that supporting Southeast Asia was a mission entrusted by the ‘Five Greats’—the Great Party, the Great Leader, the Great Motherland, the Great People, and the Great Army—to fulfil the proletarian internationalist duty.
The PLA stationed in Laos conducted ideological education activities. Source: Photo taken around 1972; collection of Wu Aikui.
At the same time, they provided education on proletarian internationalism and the situation in Indochina. ‘American imperialism’ was held up as the primary enemy. After the educational sessions, recruits would express their ambitions in squad meetings and at platoon and company assemblies, declaring their lofty aspirations to heed the call of the motherland and fulfil the proletarian internationalist duty: ‘As long as the world is covered in red, I am willing to shed my blood and write the chapter of my youth!’Footnote 26
The CCP’s company branch organized for all cadres and soldiers of Chen’s Mule Transport Team to study Mao’s works, including Serve the People, In Memory of Norman Bethune, The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains, and On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party. The entire team carried out educational activities focused on recalling, learning, and discussing traditions, along with proletarian internationalism education, aiming to teach the soldiers to keep the motherland in mind while having a global perspective.Footnote 27 A political cadre recorded that his unit in Laos organized five reading workshops and held eight theoretical study sessions throughout the year, with 265 key participants delivering speeches.Footnote 28
Military-civilian cooperation in logistics, 1968
A significant change led to the large-scale expansion of Mengla’s original logistics supply system, as many Chinese engineering troops entered Laos, starting in September 1968. China decided to utilize Mengla’s existing logistics system, which was initially used to support the Southeast Asian communist parties but now also supplied the Chinese forces in Laos. Meanwhile, the war in Indochina intensified, and the CPT also launched armed struggles in Thailand’s mountainous areas, leading to a substantial increase in the demand for supplies by Southeast Asian communist parties. These changes caused the original logistics structure to become inadequate, prompting Mengla’s logistics system to gradually transition towards joint military-civilian (military and local government) cooperation for logistical support, with various units undergoing large-scale expansion.
On 28 February 1968, China and the Lao People’s Party (LPP, later LPRP) signed ‘The Minutes of the Meeting between China and Laos on Road Construction’.Footnote 29 Subsequently, the Kunming Military Region established the ‘Highway Construction Headquarters’ in Mengla as the command centre for the engineering troops in Laos, located in the valley jungle of Shangyong commune (Mohan town) in the south of the county.
In September 1968, road construction troops, comprising three expanded regiments with a total of 12,970 personnel directly involved in construction, entered Laos.Footnote 30 The troops crossed the border at the Mohan port in Mengla and gradually moved to their respective construction sites. Additionally, anti-aircraft troops and some ground combat and security forces were deployed at the construction sites. PLA combat troops did not directly participate in the Laotian civil war; their primary role was to prevent the road construction projects being harassed by General Vang Pao’s Hmong Special Forces, which were trained and supplied by the CIA.
The flourishing of the Mengla logistics system attracted scrutiny from the American intelligence community. On 7 January 1968, four aircraft belonging to the US-supported Royal Lao Government (RLG) suddenly dropped incendiary bombs on the southernmost tip of Mengla, which served as the base for the Mule Transport Team and a storage site for foreign aid supplies. The attack resulted in the deaths of two PLA soldiers. In response, the CMC deployed a regiment (codenamed Troop 7750) from the 65th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division to Mengla to carry out air defence missions and ensure the safety of the logistics line.Footnote 31 No further incidents of aircraft cross-border attacks or reconnaissance were recorded afterwards.
The CIA focused significant attention on the supply routes extending into northern Laos and the presence of Chinese troops in the region. CIA assessments suggested that the PLA’s construction of roads had substantially increased China’s influence in north Laos and ‘poses the threat of a greater communist presence in the Thai border region, and this threat might be exploited to deter a greater Thai role in Laos’.Footnote 32
The number of US bombings in the Pathet Lao-controlled areas of northern Laos peaked in 1969, with an average of 405 sorties per day. From 1964 to 1973, the United States dropped 2,093,100 tons of ordnance during 580,344 bombing missions.Footnote 33 The PLA deployed anti-aircraft troops and ground security forces to address these issues. The total number of PLA personnel exceeded 20,000, and the troops stationed in Laos were rotated every two to three years.Footnote 34
Before 1968, the 108th Logistics had an ammunition warehouse of over 600 square metres, a mixed-use warehouse of around 1,000 square metres, and a fuel storage facility of 700 cubic metres. Its primary role was to handle the receipt, dispatch, and storage of military supplies for the PAVN, Pathet Lao, and CPT. It could not take on full responsibility for managing the receipt, dispatch, and storage of all logistical supplies for road construction in Laos.Footnote 35
To improve logistical supply capabilities, the Yunnan Military Region cooperated with the Yunnan provincial government to establish a set of principles for foreign aid: ‘unified planning, unified coordination, integrating peacetime and wartime efforts, and balancing the needs of both the military and civilians’. Cities across Yunnan subsequently set up Foreign Aid and Frontline Support Offices (102 Office) led by local Party committees. The 102 Office coordinated with the military and provided the necessary supplies to support the needs of the military.Footnote 36 The Office was divided into provincial, autonomous prefecture, city, and county levels.
In particular, the road construction troops needed a steady supply of food, so the local government mainly supplied the troops with staple foods, vegetables, and fruit. For example, the government designated the Dai villages near the county seat of Mengla, including Hongqi commune, Manlie village, Manzhuang village, and Mengha village, as areas for growing vegetables to supply the troops in Laos.Footnote 37 The Grain Bureau in Mengla established the Second Grain Depot that was specifically responsible for storing staple foods, such as rice, flour, oil, and beans. The Commerce Bureau built many warehouses to store supplementary foods. These supplies were continuously transferred from other regions and were provided to the troops aiding Southeast Asia at prices significantly lower than the market rate. At that time, the market price for canned pork was 3.5 yuan per kilogram, but the troops received it for 1.6 yuan.Footnote 38
The deputy director of the Political Office, Tao Wanchang, recalled the scene from Simao (Pu’er) to Mengla:
On September 16 … [on the way] to Mengla [from Pu’er], I saw a continuous stream of convoys … These convoys were speeding south, heavily loaded with aid materials, while some empty convoys were heading north. Along the way, people of various ethnic groups worked hard to meet the needs of the troops supporting Laos. Some diligently grew multiple vegetables, while others loaded harvested produce for shipment abroad. Additionally, fruits such as bananas, pineapples, mangoes, and watermelons were being gathered at stations for foreign aid. Even the relatively impoverished Jino people in the Jino Mountains collected wild bamboo shoots, mangoes, and other wild vegetables and fruits from the deep mountains and forests for transport abroad.Footnote 39
The Yunnan provincial government designated the counties and cities in the Simao and Yuxi areas as suppliers of fresh meat, particularly live pigs, cattle, chickens, and ducks. At that time, the policy required the government to arrange procurement from farmers through allocation or exchange. Farmers had to surrender one head of livestock for every two they raised and could keep and process the remaining one. The collection of livestock and poultry often faced difficulties and could not meet the planned quotas.Footnote 40
The Kunming Military Region and the Yunnan provincial government jointly coordinated the negotiations for logistical support work. At the beginning of each year, the Kunming Military Region, the provincial 102 Office, and the Highway Construction Headquarters convened a meeting, bringing together the 108th Logistics and 102 offices to discuss logistic plans jointly. This meeting established multiple-material quotas and outlined plans for sourcing supplies from the rear. The 108th Logistics served as the final executing units for storage, distribution, and transportation.Footnote 41 Each regiment in Laos sent one or two officers to be stationed in Mengla as resident representatives. Their primary responsibilities were coordinating with the 108th Logistics on matters such as the supply, handover, and materials accounting.Footnote 42
At the same time, the 108th Logistics underwent a large-scale expansion, growing from just a few hundred personnel at its inception to a force of over a thousand.Footnote 43 In 1968, the 108th Logistics established a motor vehicle platoon, which was later expanded into a motor transport battalion. It included 24 vehicles, such as cargo trucks, refrigerated trucks, tow trucks, cranes, and ambulances. However, this motor vehicle battalion primarily served the logistical needs of the 108th Logistics personnel. The logistical transportation for the troops in Laos relied on a motor transport battalion and two motor transport companies (under the command or administration of the 108th Logistics) stationed by the Kunming Military Region at the Mohan border crossing for external transport tasks.Footnote 44
Additionally, each troop stationed in Laos sent its motor transport unit to the Mohan border crossing to collect supplies. Wu Aikui was the company commander in charge of logistics and supply transport for the PLA 15th Anti-Aircraft Division, tasked with anti-air operations in Laos. At that time, the journey from Kunming to Mengla took over a week. When fully loaded with supplies, the convoy’s average speed dropped to 40–50 kilometres per hour. Wu, whose convoy was mainly responsible for transporting supplies from Mohan to anti-aircraft positions in Laos, said:
I lived in Laos for two years, and every week, I would return to Mengla in Yunnan to transport supplies to Laos. We mainly transported beverages, food, canned goods, and other supplies, while a dedicated platoon was responsible for delivering artillery shells. Each platoon had 36 trucks, and when there were ample supplies, we would deploy two platoons with over 70 trucks. Each car carried five tons of supplies, and we made this round trip every week.Footnote 45
However, many construction sites or outposts in northern Laos were located in jungles or mountains that vehicles could not reach, so logistical support had to rely on the Mule Transport Team of the 108th Logistics. At the same time, it also participated in transport missions supporting the communist parties of Vietnam (CPV), Laos, and Thailand.
From May to August 1968, the first branch of the Mule Transport Team deployed 40 mules to transport over 82,000 jin (approximately 41,000 kg) of various supplies, covering a total distance of 3,000 kilometres. Between 1968 and 1976, the Mule Transport Team transported over 920,000 jin (approximately 460,000 kg) of supplies and equipment to Laos, covering a cumulative distance of more than 17,000 kilometres.Footnote 46 At that time, there were approximately 20 logistics support battalions and companies (such as motor transport and pontoon bridge battalions) under the jurisdiction and command of the 108th Logistics. The cooking teams alone had to provide meals for over a thousand people daily.Footnote 47
In addition, the Supply Department of the 108th Logistics, responsible for storing and transferring various military supplies and providing food and provisions to passing troops, was expanded into four divisions. The first division had two camps: at the Mohan port and in Nateuy of Luang Namtha province, Laos. The second division was situated in Nong Khiaw of Luang Prabang, approximately two to three kilometres from the Nong Khiaw Bridge. The third division was in Muang Xay of Oudomxai province, Laos. The fourth division was in the town of Mengla county.Footnote 48 The 108th Logistics set up six radio stations, each staffed with six personnel. These stations took turns working at the supply divisions in Laos and were responsible for maintaining radio communication between the foreign supply divisions and Mengla.Footnote 49
Due to the large number of supply convoys and troops heading to Laos, many of which needed to assemble in Kunming before proceeding to Mengla and ultimately crossing into Southeast Asia via the Mohan port, the Kunming Military Region established five main military supply divisions along the route between Kunming and the Mohan port. These divisions were designed to provide rest places and food for logistics units, engineering troops, and military personnel travelling to Southeast Asia. The five military supply stations were located in Yuanjiang (Yuxi), Mojiang (Simao), Simao city (now Pu’er city), Mengyang town (Jinghong), and Mengla.Footnote 50 These supply stations and those extending into north Laos formed a supply line that tightly connected Yunnan with mainland Southeast Asia.
Mengla and the Southeast Asian communist parties
Mengla served as a revolutionary centre for Southeast Asian parties. As an internationalized revolutionary export border city during the Cold War, it was a microcosm of China’s foreign aid during the Cold War. The communist parties of Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand all established offices here, taking advantage of their geographic convenience, and Mengla became the central link between these parties and China.
While the region may have seemed remote and impoverished to most Chinese people, from the perspective of the Southeast Asian parties, it was a crucial source of military supplies and a logistical hub for maintaining armed struggle. Southeast Asian parties also dispatched staff who would take up long-term residency. Every year, on China’s National Day, representatives from these parties would attend celebrations in Mengla. The CPT consistently sent a Central Committee member to these events, underscoring Mengla’s significant role.
At that time, the offices of the Southeast Asian communist parties in Mengla handled matters related to Chinese material aid and managed the reception of their members travelling to China. The CPT office, code-named Office 148, was located in a courtyard about 100 metres long in a valley on the outskirts of the county town.Footnote 51 A significant number of senior cadres of the CPT were stationed in Mengla at the time.Footnote 52 The CPT’s top official in Mengla was ‘Ye Qing’ (the Chinese name for Chao Pongpichit), a Politburo member and a significant military leader stationed at the 148 Office. The Chinese referred to ‘Ye Qing’ with the code name ‘Number 7’ of CPT.
The Operations Department of the 108th Logistics coordinated material aid with representatives from foreign communist parties. To maintain secrecy, they were referred to by code names: ‘No. 1’ for CPV, ‘No. 2’ for Pathet Lao, and ‘No. 4’ for CPT. Additionally, representatives from all three communist parties were permanently stationed at the 108th Logistics headquarters.Footnote 53 The Operations Department had 13 Vietnamese, Lao, and Thai translators.Footnote 54
According to an article published by an officer of the PLA General Staff, in October 1964, the Chinese leadership (Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai) instructed that, ‘We must strengthen our support for the Laos people. China will fully take on the logistics of Laos’s existing patriotic armed forces. However, as the forces expand, China will provide a corresponding amount of supplies.’Footnote 55
Following its establishment in the second half of 1964, Mengla Logistics began operations for the PAVN, Pathet Lao, and CPT. The Fuel Depot, responsible for the storage, loading, unloading, and transportation of fuel, was one of the first units established by the 108th Logistics. It was constructed in August 1964 with the assistance of the Mengla Border Defense Regiment and with the code name Troop 374. The Fuel Depot covered more than 200 mu (about 33 acres) in Mengla’s dense jungle, with only one road in and out of it. At the time, heavy machine gun emplacements were set up next to the depot to prevent air raids.Footnote 56 Due to the smaller scale of its battlefield operations in the mid-1960s, the CPT primarily engaged in jungle guerrilla warfare and thus had a relatively low demand for fuel. Most of the fuel supplies were believed to be provided to the PAVN in Laos.
The Armory was located in the northwest of Mengla, covering an area of 12 hectares. It served as a highly concealed base for storing strategic military supplies designated as aid to Southeast Asia. Established in September 1964, it stored light and heavy weaponry, vehicles, infantry ammunition, and engineering supplies. In addition to the aid point in Mohan, other transfer stations were established within Laos, including Nateuy in Luang Namtha province, Nong Khiaw in Luang Prabang, and locations along the Mekong River near northern Thailand.Footnote 57
China’s supplies to neighbouring communist parties were flexible, increasing in proportion to the strength and development of the local communist forces. From 1964 to 1966, China provided an average of over 3,800 firearms and 4.5 million rounds of various types of ammunition to the Pathet Lao annually.Footnote 58 Throughout the Indochina War, China provided Laos with 110,000 guns, more than 3,700 cannons, 160 million rounds of ammunition, and 2.54 million artillery shells.Footnote 59 From the end of 1967, the number of PAVN in Laos increased annually, reaching approximately 45,000 to 50,000 by 1970.Footnote 60 This timeline coincides with the large-scale expansion of the 108th Logistics.
Following 1968, the 108th Logistics significantly increased its aid to the CPT as its armed struggle entered a very active phase.Footnote 61 In late 1967, the CPT relocated its headquarters from Issan to the Nan province in the north to avoid being encircled by the government military.Footnote 62 Nan’s location, bordering Laos, was highly advantageous in terms of receiving supplies from the Mengla logistics base. At the end of 1968, the CPT established the Supreme Command, which would lead the People’s Liberation Army of Thailand (PLAT) nationwide. They also claimed to have engaged in over 1,000 military battles from the start of their armed struggle in 1965.Footnote 63 By 1969, PLAT had grown to a total strength of approximately 3,300 personnel.Footnote 64
The CPT’s representative stationed in Mengla (Number 7) provided their aid plans or lists to the 108th Logistics. Once each batch of supplies was ready, the relevant department handed them over to the CPT’s receiving personnel, who then transported the supplies to their base areas.Footnote 65 Since the aid provided to the CPT was classified as top secret and remains undisclosed to this day, there are no official records to verify the exact figures or the total amount of China’s assistance. Only through the recollections of those who were involved at the time can we gather valuable fragments of information to help fill in this part of history.
By the early 1970s, due to increasing demand, the CPT’s transport team could no longer meet the logistical needs. As a result, the 108th Logistics provided the CPT with a batch of pack mules and four trucks as transportation tools to assist with delivery of supplies.Footnote 66 In addition, the Motor Vehicle Platoon and Mule Transport Team in Mengla also assisted the CPT in completing some transport tasks. Truck driver Tang Shanbei once followed the Motor Vehicle Platoon on a transport mission in Laos, during which he assisted the CPT in delivering over 200 tons of munitions.Footnote 67 Li Siwen, who once worked in the Mule Transport Team, recalled:
When I first joined Mengla Logistics, the Thai Communist Party was already there. We established a mule transport team near the Mengla border then. There were two mule transport teams. Sometimes, after the supplies arrived at our station, we would help them [CPT] by transporting the goods part of the way in the direction they needed, which shortened their overall transport distance.Footnote 68
The General Warehouse in Mengla was a battalion-level unit, and the supplies provided to the Southeast Asian communist parties included quilts, blankets, rice, lard, radio equipment, tobacco, alcohol, tea, sugar, medicine, and medical equipment. Lai Changxue recalled his experience of handing over medical supplies to the CPT:
The handover document was titled ‘Military Aid Agreement of the People’s Republic of China’, with the words ‘(Medical Supplies Section)’ in parentheses below. At the very bottom were the date and time of the transfer. During the handover, the Thai representative and I conducted a face-to-face inspection, checking the contents against the list by type, specification, quantity, and expiration date, ensuring every detail was accurate to prevent any mistakes that could cause international repercussions. After both parties had signed, the Supply Department dispatched personnel to load the goods onto trucks transported across the Mohan border back to Thailand.
Lai also recalled that the CPT representative responsible for receiving the supplies was a third-generation Chinese immigrant from Meixian, Guangdong province, fluent in Mandarin.Footnote 69
According to the recollections of various Chinese personnel who interacted with the CPT at the time, it was commonly noted that the CPT members they encountered were fluent in Chinese, almost like native speakers. In late August 1972, soldier Li Xilin was assigned to escort the CPT’s head of logistics from Muang Xay to Mengla to attend the Chinese National Day celebrations. During the journey, Li became highly curious about the CPT official’s interpreter:
At first, we soldiers were very nervous and didn’t dare to speak. Then, the [Thai] interpreter started singing songs from the Cultural Revolution, such as ‘Sailing the Seas Depends on the Helmsman’ and ‘The Golden Hill of Beijing’. I became curious when he sang those songs since we were all young men, around 18 or 20, who grew up in the Cultural Revolution. The interpreter spoke Chinese with a Fujian accent. I asked him, ‘Are you Thai or Chinese? Your Chinese is so fluent.’ He replied that he had studied at a university in Fujian, China, and after returning to Thailand, he joined the CPT and became an interpreter.Footnote 70
Undoubtedly, the CPT attracted many locally born Chinese in Thailand to join the revolution, and this group, due to their proficiency in Chinese, was extensively utilized in coordinating affairs with the Chinese side and in receiving aid.
There is no doubt that the long-term wars fought by Southeast Asian communist movements, particularly the left-wing armed forces of Indochina, against the United States and the US-backed right-wing regimes, were heavily reliant on China’s extensive logistical support system behind the scenes.Footnote 71 However, after the US withdrawal and the establishment of unified socialist states in Vietnam and Laos, rising tensions between China and Vietnam eventually led to the collapse of the Mengla-centred logistics network that supported Southeast Asian communist movements.
In the late 1970s, both Vietnam and Laos were in the process of rebuilding their economies following the debilitating toll of war. Hanoi was most likely already cognizant of potential challenges from China. Following Vietnam’s increasingly hardline anti-Chinese stance, and although Laos maintained low-level diplomatic ties with China and did not fully follow Hanoi in severing relations, they were subjected to Vietnamese pressure to halt their support for the pro-Beijing CPT.
By April 1978, the last Chinese engineering troops and logistics personnel had withdrawn from Laos to Mengla. The Lao government then ordered the CPT to withdraw within two months, by January 1979.Footnote 72 At this point, the logistical route spanning Laos and connecting to Mengla was utterly cut off. With this, China’s large-scale logistical support for Southeast Asian communist movements effectively ended. Due to the subsequent closure of the border between Laos and China, the CPB played a role in facilitating the transportation of some essential supplies from China to the CPT through Burma.Footnote 73 However, all of these efforts were in vain as they were unable to replicate what Laos did for the CPT.
In May 1981, PRC authorities disbanded some Mengla Logistics departments assisting the Southeast Asian parties, with its personnel effectively demobbed and reassigned to other roles. In July, one such individual, the PLAT deputy commander ‘Ye Qing’, who was in charge of logistics and stationed in Mengla, had to return to Thailand. Cadre Li recalled that:
Before the Commander in charge of logistics for the PLAT withdrew to Thailand, he proposed a farewell meal with Lu Chengbao [the director of Supply Depot]. At that time, the First Supply Depot had been disbanded for several months, and Lu Chengbao, myself, and others were idle at home, waiting for alternative employment arrangements. With approval from the Foreign Affairs Department of the Kunming Military Region, Lu Chengbao, as an individual, hosted a lunch at his own home with the Commander of the PLAT. We gathered to discuss Sino-Thai friendship.Footnote 74
Conclusion: Changing and repeating
Researching China’s support for Southeast Asian communist movements presents particular challenges due to archival access and public reporting limitations. For example, the Chinese logistical assistance to Southeast Asia from Mengla, which lasted for over a decade, was mentioned publicly only twice during its mission: once in the 22 April 1972 edition of PLA Daily and again in the 4 October 1975 edition of Yunnan Daily. However, due to secrecy, these reports were primarily focused on ideological propaganda without mentioning specific details.
In recent years, however, many individuals who experienced those events first-hand have started writing memoirs. Some have been unable to publish their work, while others have been released through private publications or presses in Hong Kong. These works provide invaluable historical material for studying China’s relations with Southeast Asia. Yet, gathering them is difficult as most of these publications are privately printed and circulated mainly within small circles of retired veterans. Additionally, due to the lack of official archives, this research relies on the accounts of retired veterans, inevitably leading to an imbalance in available research materials.
Despite these numerous limitations, this article explores the interactions between China’s border cities and Southeast Asian revolutions during the Cold War. Unofficial sources offer researchers valuable insights into China’s vast logistical support system, which accompanied its export of revolution. This article repeatedly demonstrates that the Southeast Asian communist movements relied on China’s extensive logistical backing. This system, though military-led, was built through close collaboration with local governments, creating a comprehensive military-civilian supply network.
When examining the United States’ ultimate defeat in Indochina, it is essential not to overlook how, in part, US power in Southeast Asia was gradually worn down by China’s integrated military-civilian logistics system. This exhaustion was crucial in prompting the United States to reconsider the high costs of maintaining its military presence in the region. The United States enjoyed overwhelming military and economic superiority during this protracted Southeast Asian conflict. However, despite extreme poverty, China had unique advantages due to its geographic position and ability to mobilize resources through its state-controlled system.
The logistical support system had a significant social impact on Mengla. To maintain its operation, governments at various levels in Mengla and the surrounding areas aligned closely with military plans. The local population, predominantly Dai and other minority groups relying on farming, participated in supply efforts under government mobilization, and supplied agricultural products or livestock at low prices to meet military needs.
Due to Mengla’s remote border location at the time, it lacked a comprehensive industrial system and active economic activities. Consequently, it could not support the sudden influx of many soldiers, necessitating the transfer of supplies from other regions. With a prolonged focus on military objectives, the area lacked the conditions and environment to develop its economic and industrial systems throughout the 1960s and 1970s. This situation left the Sent-Down Youth and local farmers in dire and impoverished conditions.Footnote 75
However, from the perspective of CCP leaders, the logistical system effectively integrated Indochina, north Thailand (CPT’s active area), and Yunnan into a cohesive buffer zone against American influence. This geographic advantage distinguished Mengla from other provinces and regions involved in supporting Southeast Asian communist movements. Ideologically, Mengla’s strategic location provided continuous support to staunchly Maoist parties like the CPT, enabling them to sustain their confidence in the Maoist line and maintain their revolutionary fervour.
Over time, Mengla finally shifted from a military stronghold to a critical centre for economic and trade relations between China and Laos. Mohan Port became an essential economic gateway for import and export with mainland Southeast Asia. Today, Mengla is pivotal in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, linking southwest China with Southeast Asia. Many sites where Chinese engineering troops and logistics units were once stationed in Laos have now become significant stops on the China-Laos Railway (Figure 3). Whether during the revolutionary logistics era or in today’s Belt and Road Initiative, one thing remains constant: China’s considerable influence over Southeast Asia and the repeating strategic rivalry between China and the United States in the region.
Maps comparing the China-Laos Railway in 2021 (left) and revolutionary aid supply sites in the 1970s (right). Source: Composite of map published on https://www.indochinatour.com/laos-guide/china-laos-railway.html, [accessed 29 May 2024] (left) and map created by the author (right).
Acknowledgements
The author sincerely thanks the anonymous reviewers of this journal for their insightful comments and constructive feedback, which have significantly improved this article. Special thanks also go to the School of Sinology at Mae Fah Luang University for its support and assistance during the research process.
Competing interests
The author declares none.
