FOREIGN POLICY ADVOCACY, ETHNIC GROUPS, AND THE DISCOURSE OF RIGHTS

Although interest groups are an established actor in American politics, their desirability and purported impact continues to be a source of public and scholarly debate, particularly when the groups under scrutiny are ethnic groups perceived to hold ties outside the United States (Ambrosio Reference Ambrosio2002). At a most basic level, lobbying is seen as a bargaining process between collective groups and government actors where legislators, seeking to reduce uncertainty, exchange some degree of access to points of decision for information (Truman Reference Truman1951; George Reference George1980; Hilsman, Gaughran, and Weitsman Reference Hilsman, Gaughran and Weitsman1987; Hansen Reference Hansen1991; Austen-Smith Reference Austen-Smith1987; Nownes and Freeman Reference Nownes and Freeman1998; Frooman Reference Frooman1999; Grossman and Helpman Reference Grossman and Helpman2002; Holyoke Reference Holyoke2009). However, beginning with Mancur Olson's (Reference Olson1965) classic study on interest-based groups, scholars have greatly expanded upon this “transactional” model of lobbying by examining the origins and maintenance of interest groups, as well as how (material and non-material) incentives, networks, and social capital influence the bargaining process (Hilsman, Gaughran, and Weitsman Reference Hilsman, Gaughran and Weitsman1987; Heaney and McClurg Reference Heaney and McClurg2009; Berardo and Scholz Reference Berardo and Scholz2010).

We know, for example, that selective incentives, leadership, and the ability to secure sources of funding and revenue are key to the initiation and maintenance of interest groups (Salisbury Reference Salisbury1969; Berry Reference Berry1977; Walker Reference Walker1991). Further, while material resources, such as money, labor, and time, are important, non-material benefits, such as leadership, moral engagement, and solidarity are also key to motivating collective action (Salisbury Reference Salisbury1969; della Porta and Diani Reference Porta, Donatella and Diani2009; Wood Reference Wood2003). In addition, more recent studies have also focused on how social networks influence the choices and strategies of interest groups, as well as their ability to influence policy outcomes (McClurg and Philips Reference McClurg and Philips2011; Burris Reference Burris2005; Heaney Reference Heaney2014).

This article seeks to contribute to this literature by examining the foreign policy activism of a newly emerging — and largely understudied — ethnic interest group. Specifically, it asks why Muslim American interest groups have chosen to mobilize around the Palestinian Israeli conflict, and how they are influenced, shaped, and constrained by the policy context in which they operate, and the audiences they attempt to reach.

According to scholars of ethnic lobbying, interest groups play an important role in engendering ethnic solidarity and translating group grievances into legitimate collective demands. A common way through which they do this is by establishing a commonality of concerns between group members and the broader society, and relying on a discourse of historical trauma and/or injustice in order to legitimize their claims (Ambrosio Reference Ambrosio2002). Hence, studying the case of Muslim American foreign policy activism helps highlight the intersectionality of lobbying and ethnic identity formation. This, in turn, allows us to expand the focus of inquiry to include the process through which interest groups acquire, negotiate, and perform their institutional identities, as well as those of the collective groups they aim/claim to represent.

MUSLIM AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY ENGAGEMENT: A “LOST CAUSE”?

While the vast majority of these organizations’ policy efforts are spent on domestic mobilization, foreign policy remains an important aspect of their activism. This is because, for many ethnic interest groups, the line dividing foreign and domestic causes is not clear-cut (Ambrosio Reference Ambrosio2002; Paul and Paul Reference Paul and Paul2008). Specifically, the war on terror and the perception that Muslims inside and outside the United States are targets of U.S. policy means that U.S. foreign policy is not foreign to Muslims, but part of their daily realities and experiences (Barreto and Dana Reference Barreto and Dana2008). Both CAIR and MPAC, for example, are actively engaged in domestic efforts dealing with de-radicalization and countering extremist inspired violence, working directly with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, and law enforcement agencies. However, they are clear to emphasize that counter-terrorism initiatives must consider how U.S. foreign policy helps fuel the appeal of extremist ideologies. Thus, according to CAIR, “any honest discussion about countering the appeal of violent extremism must include a very public component addressing some U.S. foreign policy choices” (Council on American-Islamic Relations 2016).

In addition, there is evidence to suggest that Muslim Americans place a higher level of importance on foreign policy when compared to other Americans. Whereas only 11% of the general public deems foreign policy a major policy consideration (Pew Research Center 2010), 92% of Muslim Americans say that foreign policy is very important to them (Council on American-Islamic Relations 2012). This is not only true of foreign-born Muslims, since non-immigrant Muslims — including second-generation and converts — also follow international news disproportionately and show a higher level of knowledge regarding U.S. foreign policy (Barreto and Dana Reference Barreto and Dana2008). Asides from the blurring of domestic and foreign U.S. policy around the war on terror, this can be partly explained by the fact that, going back to the era of Western colonialism, Muslims have been discursively associated with Arabs and the Middle East, something more recently illustrated through the post-September 11 backlash and the discourse surrounding Muslim Americans’ foreignness (Jamal and Naber Reference Jamal and Naber2008). The Middle East also holds religious significance for Muslims “as it is the origin of Islam and houses the holy sites that Muslims are required to visit [Mecca and Medina],” which can lead to a degree of emotional attachment and, therefore, an interest in events and policies perceived to impact the region (Barreto and Dana Reference Barreto and Dana2008).

In particular, Muslim Americans consistently rank the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as important to them. When vetting candidates during the 2012 presidential election, for example, two-thirds of U.S. Muslims said that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was something they considered “very important” in their selection (Council on American Islamic Relations 2012).Footnote ⁴ Similarly, they have strong attitudes regarding the United States’ responsibility toward solving the conflict. The overwhelming majority, 85%, favors a two-state solution and envisions an independent Palestinian state co-existing alongside its Israeli neighbor. Their position seems to be in agreement with that of American Jews, the other American religious group most closely associated with the conflict, 78% of who also support a two-state solution (Pew Research Center 2011, 29).

Though this may seem surprising to those not familiar with the historical and cultural significance of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, it is “not uncommon for a people to have a significant historical experience, intense and painful enough to help shape perception” (Telhami Reference Telhami2013, 73). For many within the Jewish community, for example, the memory of the Holocaust continues to be the lens through which current events and experiences are perceived. Further, for many Muslims, the conflict has come to symbolize the West's greed and deceit, as well as the painful history of failure, defeats, and humiliation Muslims have suffered, not only at the hands of the West, but also because of the corruption and ineptness of their own leaders. Aware of these religious and symbolic attachments, Muslim American interest groups have mobilized around the question of Palestine as a strategy to attract support, secure some degree of group cohesion, and, thus, legitimize their position as the representatives of a collective group.

The remainder of this article is dedicated to examining how, by relying on a discourse of civil, political, and religious rights, Muslim American interest groups have framed the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a rights-based issue, and, consequently, how organizational elites present themselves as the representatives of a minority group making rights-claims (Djupe et al. Reference Djupe, Lewis, Jelen and Dahan2014). To illustrate this argument, the next section examines how the conflict is framed and narrated through CAIR's and MPAC's engagement and how these organizations legitimize their engagement by claiming the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a Muslim American issue

FRAMING THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT

The construction of a shared narrative, imagined past, and collective struggle is key to engendering the emotional attachments that drive individuals to identify with a collective group and mobilize on its behalf. The historical accuracy of a particular narrative is not important; what is important is the process through which the latter comes to be accepted, internalized, maintained, and, when called for, reimagined (Ricoeur Reference Ricoeur, Kathleen and Pellauer1988; Entman Reference Entman1993; Reference Entman1996; Ram Reference Ram1995; Wodak et al. Reference Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart1999). The political science literature on framing provides an important lens through which to examine how collective narratives and claims making emerge and function. As Entman argues, a frame “highlights one feature of reality and obscures others in a way that tells a consistent story about problems, their causes, moral implications and remedies” (Entman Reference Entman1996, 79). Moreover, successful frames tend to present specific claims in a way that resonates with existing cultural and value norms (Zald Reference Zald, McAdam, McCarthy and Zald1996; Benford and Snow Reference Benford and Snow2000; Van Gorp Reference Van Gorp2007).

In the context of the United States, few such value norms have acquired the degree of recognition and acceptance that the value of rights seems to hold, leading to a broad degree of acceptance of right-based claims (Djupe et al. Reference Djupe, Lewis and Jelen2016). Thus, groups that are able to frame policy issues — particularly contentious ones — around “rights” can gain a degree of legitimacy for their cause and, most importantly, access to the political dialogue (Djupe et al. Reference Djupe, Lewis, Jelen and Dahan2014; Reference Djupe, Lewis and Jelen2016; Brewer Reference Brewer2007; Epp Reference Epp1998; Domke, Shah, and Wackman Reference Domke, Shah and Wackman2000).

As this article argues, Muslim American interest groups have framed the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (and the U.S.’s involvement in it) as a denial of group rights, or as MPAC's Haris Tarin put it, one of “the great moral failures of our generation.”Footnote ⁵ Through this frame, their mobilization around the conflict is legitimized as a way to rectify a historical injustice and hold the U.S. accountable to its own principles and values of justice and liberty. Both CAIR and MPAC have relied on this pursuit of justice framework as a claims making strategy, while at the same time linking the pursuit of their group rights to the long-term security interests of the United States. This strategic framing is significant because, as shown by other cases, “ethnic minority interests are successful to the extent that they advance policies that are supported by the general public” (Rubenzer and Redd Reference Rubenzer and Redd2010, 760; Uslaner Reference Uslaner2006).

PALESTINE: “THE HEART OF THE MUSLIM UMMAH”

Although polling data measuring the importance of the conflict for Muslim American organizations vis-à-vis other policy issues is lacking, qualitative data here examined highlight the discursive prominence of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. As MPAC's president, Salam Al- Marayati, explains:

Thus, as Al-Marayati puts it, Palestine is “the heart” of the Muslim ummah — its most vital and important part. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a symbol of the long history of Western colonial meddling: its last visible, palpable, unapologetic remainder.

Evidence of the conflict's centrality can be further gauged by examining the discursive emphasis Muslim American organizations grant it vis-à-vis other international issues. On its website, for example, CAIR uses 1,480 words to describe its policy work on the Palestinian-Israeli issue, compared with 415 words for its work on Iraq; 84 words for its policy efforts toward Iran; and 96 words for its advocacy surrounding the U.S. war on Afghanistan (Council on American-Islamic Relations 2010). Thus, compared with other foreign policy issues that arguably have a more immediate impact on the United States, such as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is granted a disproportionate degree of attention. In addition, during the height of the 2014 Gaza-Israeli conflict, CAIR sent more than 400 Twitter messages about the conflict — which accounted for over 50% of their overall Twitter messages.Footnote ⁷ Since the social media spike took place during a time of acute crisis, these numbers cannot be considered representative. Nevertheless, what this seems to suggest is that these organizations consider narrating the conflict to be an important part of their strategy. Their use of social media is intended to not only counter the hegemonic U.S. narrative of the conflict, but to also encourage followers to mobilize in support of their policy efforts.

Similarly, the conflict takes center stage in MPAC's advocacy. On the organization's website, for example, the conflict is the only foreign policy issue to which a specific paragraph is dedicated (MPAC). Further, MPAC has published close to a dozen policy reports on various foreign policy issues, but the only policy report mentioned by title on their foreign policy page is one dealing with the conflict. Perhaps more importantly, institutional elites I interviewed at both CAIR and MPAC specifically highlighted the conflict's centrality. Whereas Al-Marayati directly referred to the conflict as “one of the most important to us.”Footnote ⁸ CAIR's legislative director, Corey Saylor, emphasized its impacts on U.S. national interests, stating that: “we [CAIR] tend to talk about the conflict from the angle of American national interests … if America were to be seen as the party that brought a just and lasting peace to that situation, that would just obliterate one of those arguments that our enemies use against us.”Footnote ⁹ This sentiment is reflective of the broader insight that interest groups view domestic and foreign policy efforts as two sides of the same coin, each impacting and influencing the other (Paul and Paul Reference Paul and Paul2008). Though quantitative data is needed to more precisely measure the weight these organizations give to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the qualitative data here examined suggests that both CAIR and MPAC place greater discursive emphasis on the conflict relative to other foreign policy issues perceived to affect the community.

Furthermore, through their narrative a unifying grievance is constructed — mainly the United States’ biased support of Israel; those culpable are located — U.S. policymakers; and a way to remedy the situation is provided — pressuring policymakers to shift their strategy. What these organizations are seeking is not simply an end to the conflict, but rather its just resolution. Consequently, and as previously argued, the pursuit of justice frame becomes the “master frame” through which Muslim American interest groups engage in claims-making and seek access to the policy process (Snow and Benford Reference Snow, Benford, Morris and Mueller1992). As will be later discussed, this frame helps position Muslim American organizations as rights-based groups working to secure the interests of a targeted community while promoting the long-term interest of their nation.

But how exactly have these organizations framed the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and how has it become a Muslim American issue? Frames are contested processes where actors struggle over meaning and identity (Benford and Snow Reference Benford and Snow2000). They are representations of an organization's identity and “ways in which movement activists seek to construct their self-presentations so as to draw support from others” (Oliver and Johnston Reference Oliver and Johnston2000, 1). Thus understood, the framing of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is primarily a way through which these organizations define and perform their own identities as policy advocacy groups in front of their audience — the U.S. policy establishment.

The policy reports and recommendations produced on the topic provide rich sources of data through which to examine the construction of a shared narrative; a narrative that frames Muslim Americans as a minority demanding their group rights. In a 2007 report titled: Envisioning Peace: A Muslim American Perspective on the Israeli Palestinian Conflict, MPAC

refers to the conflict as “one of the most complicated and intractable of our time,” because it can be alternatively defined as a religious clash, a dispute over land, or the last remnant of colonial policies. This is an interesting way of introducing the conflict, since it presents it as being, in part, a conflict over narrative, meaning, and interpretation. MPAC claims that because there is no basic agreement regarding the nature and root-causes of the conflict, the first struggle is to define, and thus frame, what the conflict is about.

Having established the existence of a number of possible interpretations and perspectives, MPAC defines the conflict as one over territorial rights, arguing that “from the perspective of the Muslim American community … the Israeli Palestinian issue is perhaps most fruitfully understood as a strenuous struggle between the national aspirations of two peoples particularly over land, the same land, Palestine” (Muslim Public Affairs Council 2007, 3). As such, the conflict is described to be fundamentally about the rights of two national groups to resources (land), not a religious and primordial one between Muslims and Jews. The report also claims that American religious communities, including Christians, Jews, and Muslims, play an important role in promoting peace. Thus, while defining the conflict in secular terms, the impact that religious minorities can have is discursively emphasized, serving to legitimize the policy activism of Muslim American interest groups.

MPAC claims that their engagement with the conflict is the arduous path to pursue because it provokes the hostility of government officials, the “Israeli lobby,” and even some members of the Muslim American community. Further, it acknowledges how difficult it is for Muslims to “get past the sense of injustice that accompanies not only the details of the conflict, but also the denigration of Islam and Muslims by some political partisans of Zionism” (Muslim Public Affairs Council 2007, 3).

Accordingly, Jews and Muslims are called on to recognize each other's histories and collective pain. And just as Muslims must strive to understand the history of Zionism and the significance of Israel for Jews, the Jewish community must understand “the importance of Palestine, Jerusalem, and the collective pain our community feels [emphasis mine]” (Muslim Public Affairs Council 2007, 3). The community being alluded to is not the Palestinians, who suffer the denial of their territorial rights, but all Muslims who suffer and feel the collective pain of this injustice. Highlighting Jerusalem, the third holiest site in Islam, serves to further link Palestine with Muslims, thereby making Muslims protagonists in the conflict. Making this linkage is important for two reasons: first, it grants Muslims American interest groups the legitimacy to speak about the issue to policymakers; and second, it helps signal to the broader Muslim American community that the conflict affects, and should therefore concern, them as well.

MPAC further argues that although it is difficult for Muslims to get past the pain and sense of injustice, too few of them understand the history of European/Christian anti-Semitism that the Jewish people have suffered. Thus, the report acknowledges the suffering of the Jewish community and the importance of the Zionist project in providing salvation to European Jews, while placing the blame for their collective suffering on European/Christian anti-Semitism. The underlying message is that Palestinians and Muslims have nothing to do with this historic injustice for which they are now paying the price.

As all discourse, Muslim American policy advocacy surrounding the conflict is not developed in a vacuum, but relies on intertextuality; the principle that discourse, whether written texts, spoken language, or imagery, incorporates elements from previous discourses, forming an “intertextual chain” (Jorgensen and Phillips Reference Jorgensen and Phillips2002, 73). Thus, meaning is always created through the very process of selection and interpretation. One way to conceptualize this is the way in which writers quote others in order to legitimize the claims they put forth, “chaining’ their thoughts, arguments, and texts with those of previous authors while, in the process, creating something new” (Wodak Reference Wodak, Wodak and Meyer2001, 87). As will be illustrated in the next section, these groups’ policy positions toward the conflict incorporate, and are linked to, three major sources of rights-based discourse: (1) international law and human rights, (2) Islamic jurisprudence, and (3) American values and interests. Muslim American elites legitimize their claims by emphasizing that the same themes of “rights” and “justice” are found across the three main sources that guide their advocacy.

We must bear in mind, however, that intertextuality is a producer of both stability and change. It allows meaning to be (re)created and (re)configured, while also ensuring a degree of stability and permanence of knowledge structures (Fairclough Reference Fairclough1992, 137). In other words, discourse is always in a “dialectical relationship with other social dimensions… [It] does not just contribute to the shaping and reshaping of social structures, but also reflects them” (Jorgensen and Phillips Reference Jorgensen and Phillips2002, 61). CAIR's and MPAC's foreign policy advocacy, particularly on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, is illustrative of this fact. Through the various policy reports, papers, and education campaigns aimed at policymakers, these groups seek to question, influence, and potentially change, U.S. policy toward the conflict. Simultaneously, however, relying on a particular set of practices to access the policy dialogue constrains what they can legitimately demand, thus guaranteeing a degree of stability. It follows, therefore, that just as these groups attempt to shape the policy dialogue, they are also shaped and constrained by the very discourse they rely on in order to make their claims.

RIGHTS-DISCOURSE AS A CLAIMS MAKING STRATEGIES

The most cited tenets of international law by these organizations are the Fourth Geneva Convention, which governs the treatment of civilians during wartime, and United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, which call for Israel's withdrawal from territory captured during the 1967 War, and thus form the legal basis for a two-state solution (Muslim Public Affairs Council 2011). The majority of MPAC's policy reports are written in the first person plural, a tactic that serves to associate the positions being expounded with those of the broader Muslim American community. In its Envisioning Peace report, for example, MPAC claims that “we” acknowledge the existence of Israel as a viable, independent state and support the rights of Palestinians to return based on United Nations Resolution 242. “We” in this case can be construed as both MPAC and the Muslim American community it claims to represent.

Acknowledging the existence of Israel, and its right to exist as a viable state, is also a way for these interest groups to access the political dialogue by positioning themselves as a reasonable and constructive voice in the conflict — a voice primarily concerned with promoting, rather than contesting, the consensus of the international community. In other words, through their espousal of international law these groups become members of the international community and, in the process, differentiate themselves from those that may condemn, question, or dismiss international law and promote armed resistance instead.

Protecting civilians on both sides of the conflict is one of the most emphasized demands made by the organization; a demand it legitimizes based on international laws and on Islamic jurisprudence, arguing that, “the traditional understanding of Islam prohibits suicide and killing civilians” (Muslim Public Affairs Council 2007, 6). By claiming that its policy position is based on the “traditional understanding of Islam,” MPAC is implicitly defining and defending that traditional understanding. Discursively linking the principles of Islamic and international law also serves to repudiate claims as to the purported incomparability between “Islam” and “the West.” There may very well be other interpretations and understandings of Islam, but MPAC is claiming that these other understandings are fringe elements outside any traditional and accepted understanding of the religion.

Perhaps most notably, both organizations frame their advocacy toward the conflict — and toward U.S. foreign policy in general — around U.S. interests. The argument made is that, as the so-called leader of the free world, the United States has a vested interest in upholding international law and supporting a two-state solution. Not doing so leads to an erosion of U.S. legitimacy, both at home and abroad. Furthermore, MPAC considers Israel's security to be a national interest of the United States, but claims that:

Thus, by framing their advocacy around U.S. national interests, Muslim American interest groups perform their roles as defenders of the nation, driven by their duties as citizens to promote what is in the best interest of the United States. As MPAC's Senior Advisor Maher Hathout put it:

PROPOSALS FOR SOLVING THE CONFLICT: PROMOTING CHANGE, REFLECTING STABILITY

As self-described advocacy organizations, MPAC and CAIR have both proposed a number of specific steps for the United States to bring a resolution to the conflict. As previously mentioned, speaking directly to U.S. policymakers and elected-officials influences the kinds of demands that they make, as well as the tactics they can use to achieve them. Through their performance of a Muslim American stance vis-à-vis the conflict, these organizations are also delimiting what solutions are within the realm of what can be potentially imagined and, therefore, pursued. Closely examining their proposal and demandsFootnote ¹¹ will serve to explain how working from within the policymaking process helps shape and influence their organizational identities.

The most basic and reiterated demand is “mutual recognition” and the creation of a viable Palestinian state along the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital. Hence, these organizations are challenging the discourse that calls for unilateral Palestinian recognition of Israel, calling instead for the international community to recognize both Israel's and Palestine's right to exist. Furthermore, they argue that for a two-state solution to be feasible, the United States must demand the dismantling of all settlements in the West Bank, Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights (Muslim Public Affairs Council 2011, 4).

It is important to emphasize that these groups are acutely aware of the conflict's symbolism and the emotional attachments that U.S. Muslims feel toward it (Wood Reference Wood2003). Presenting current U.S. policy as biased, futile, and dangerous cues their audience to the fact that a grave injustice has been committed and, thus, engenders a sense of moral outrage. This is an important legitimation tactic. Just as emotional incentives can motivate individuals to join movements (Wood Reference Wood2003; Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta Reference Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta2009), they can also motivate them to support the interest groups that claim to be working on their behalf.

There is perhaps no better example of these organizations’ reliance on symbolism and moral claims than MPAC's stance toward the Separation Wall,Footnote ¹² which it condemns as a grave violation of Palestinians’ human rights and an obstruction to any peace prospects. Although Israel and the United States justify the wall as a security barrier against terrorism, MPAC claims that its real purpose is to “annex large tracts of Palestinian land [which] separates people from their land [and] severely breaches their right to freedom of movement, their right to property and their right to gain a livelihood” (Muslim Public Affairs Council 2007, 6). What stronger way to speak as Americans than to echo that most American of sentiments: “that all men are created equal and independent, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” The discursive construction of the wall as a threat to the inalienable rights articulated in the U.S. Constitution, and granted to all men, signals that rather than being a foreign concern, it is one that should concern all Americans.

Though the major policy stances of MPAC and CAIR toward the conflict converge, CAIR pursues a slightly different advocacy strategy, focusing on the more immediate violations of U.S. law, and against American citizens. Acutely aware that the courts, not the legislature, have settled some of the most important political issues of our time, CAIR has used the opportunity to access the judiciary as a means to challenge a wide variety of government policies, including those dealing with the conflict. In fact, according to Corey Saylor, legal advocacy comprises the core of his organization's efforts — an effort for which it employs nearly twenty-five full-time attorneys and legal experts.

Through legal advocacy, CAIR has sought to contest Israel's narrative of victimization and to present Israel not as an indispensible ally of the United States, but as a foreign country pursuing its own interests. Further, it has “repeatedly questioned Israel's apparent violation of America's Arms Exports Control Act of 1978,” arguing that the act requires “foreign governments receiving American weaponry,” to use those weapons only for internal security and legitimate self-defense (Council on American-Islamic Relations 2010). Hence, CAIR frames its opponent as a foreign government potentially violating U.S. law, while at the same time claiming its rightful position as an American organization speaking in defense of American laws and values. Through this narrative, CAIR, Muslim Americans, and those who criticize unconditional U.S. support of Israel are positioned not as un-American, as often charged, but as American patriots seeking what is best for their country.

Furthermore, their advocacy implicitly links U.S. policy toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to one of the gravest threats to U.S. national security: violent religious extremism. As CAIR's executive director, Nihad Awad, put it, “long-standing conflicts, and particularly the Israeli-Palestinian conflict [are] the main source of Anti-American feelings in the Muslim world” (Awad Reference Awad2009). Drawing on the frame of U.S. national security is important because it serves to challenge perceptions of Muslims as the source of threat and presents them as patriotic citizens working to advance their nation's interests.

Instead, Israel is highlighted as the main source of threat, and American citizens presented as direct targets of Israeli violence. During the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War, for example, CAIR called on the United States to safeguard the lives of more than 25,000 of its citizens living in Lebanon, arguing that, “if a call for the full cessation of attacks on the civilian population of a U.S. ally is too much to ask for, at least we can demand that Israel stop its bombing campaign long enough to evacuate American citizens. The highest duty of any president is to protect the lives of Americans” (Council on American-Islamic Relations 2006). Demanding that the right to safety of American citizens in Lebanon be protected serves to not only challenge the all too common portrayal of Palestinians and Muslims as inherently violent, but also to make Muslim American citizens visible. In other words, claiming that “our” main duty is to protect “our” own citizens against a foreign threat shifts the source of danger from Palestinian (and Muslim) violence, to Israeli violence waged upon American civilians living in the region — decisively asserting the belongingness of U.S. Muslims to their nation.

Although CAIR focuses a great degree of its advocacy toward the conflict on the more immediate violations of U.S. law, both organizations agree upon, and pursue, the major positions espoused by international law: the establishment of a viable Palestinian state alongside an Israeli one, the right of return for all Palestinian refugees and their descendants, and the rights of the occupied to resist their occupiers. MPAC is clear in referring to the right of return as a non- negotiable principle, arguing that, it “recognizes, in accordance with UN resolution 194 the right of return for all Palestinian refugees to the land from which they were expelled” (Muslim Public Affairs Council 2011). Similarly, CAIR describes the right of return as “a common position among those seeking justice for Palestinians” (Council on American-Islamic Relations 2006). Hence, through the pursuit of justice framework the right of return is upheld as a principle at the core of international law, legitimizing their demand on both legal and moral grounds.

Finally, basing its position on the Fourth Geneva Convention, MPAC explicitly supports “the right of occupied people to resist occupation” (Muslim Public Affairs Council 2007, 6). However, its support extends only to what it perceives to be legitimate types of resistance, particularly non-violent resistance, which it promotes as “the most recommended course of action.” In other words, Palestinians have a right, derived from international law, to resist the Israeli occupation, but the kind of resistance recommended by MPAC is, inevitably, reflective of its position as an American institution, embedded in American civil life, and influenced by the narrative of American civil rights movements. This should not be taken to suggest that non-violent resistance is an exclusively American form of resistance. What this does suggest, however, is that the limits of what can be envisioned and promoted as legitimate resistance is determined by the specific institutional context in which these organizations function. CAIR and MPAC are quintessential American institutions working within the American political system and making American policy demands.

As such, the context in which these organizations function limits the kinds of demands they can legitimately make and the degree of change they can legitimately pursue. Although their goal is to change U.S. policy toward the conflict — and, therefore, the status quo — the demands they make are based on a broader framework of understanding that guarantees and reproduces policy stability (Farjoun Reference Farjoun2010, 209). These organizations’ positions as advocacy groups seeking to reach policymakers establishes the limits of what can be reasonably demanded, meanwhile preventing other alternatives from being imagined. They seek to change to status quo, but also re-inscribe the relatively stable proposals for bringing about that change; proposals that revolve primarily around a two-state solution — and that have, alas, proven largely ineffective.