In this important work of intellectual history, Roberto Gargarella traces the origins of social inequality in the Americas through an assay of the three most important traditions of constitutionalism in the region. He does not merely recount historical processes but also provides a normative assessment of the merits and flaws of each tradition. The three principal currents that he analyzes are radicalism, conservatism, and liberalism. He finds that despite differences in nationality, “[n]ot surprisingly … liberals, conservatives, and radicals tended to advance similar constitutional projects even when they lived in different countries and at different times” (p. 7). At the end of the day, the author believes that none of the traditions lived up to the “egalitarian” ideal that he prefers. By discussing the shortcomings of the three strands, he points to general problems with constitutionalism, in particular the inability to reach egalitarian outcomes, which were often the intended aim at crucial historical junctures in constitution making. Rife with extensive historical examples, the work is a useful outline of overarching constitutional paradigms. It is a valuable contribution to both comparative constitutionalism and comparative political theory.
The first tradition that Gargarella analyzes is that which he calls the radical or majoritarian model. He also refers to it as the “populist account,” which is not entirely cogent since the term “populism” is vague and ambiguous, and lacks a theoretically robust definition. In this strand, some of the key figures are Rousseau, Paine, Jefferson, and Francisco Bilbao. They advanced a kind of moral populism and promoted the will of the majority. Against figures like Edmund Burke, the radical paradigm places its faith in the intellectual maturity and capacities of the people, such that they are able to govern themselves.
One important component of this perspective is the presence of authoritarian strains. Following Rousseau's understanding of the legislator, a strong figure must be present to promote civic virtues and excise moral vices in a people, most commonly through educational reforms. Economic transformation is also important in this paradigm, as agrarian systems were often preferred in the belief that they were the most likely to support egalitarian political objectives. However, the final word on radical constitutionalism is a pessimistic one: “The history of radical constitutionalism in America is the history of failure” (p. 49). This outcome was often due to either popular restiveness or political repression faced by parties advocating radical aims. Popular upheavals, moreover, served to confirm the suspicion held by many liberals and conservatives that populist movements were inherently destabilizing. The radical tradition, however, frequently played a significant role in the constitutional development of many nations by providing a particular moral and juridical vocabulary.
As for the conservative paradigm, Gargarella sees Burke, Hamilton, and Simon Bolivar as some of leading lights of this tradition. Gargarella identifies conservative constitutionalism with moral perfectionism and political elitism. In order to reach the goal of moral perfectionism, conservatives argue that what is “good” for someone may not always match one's preferences. This view opposes the radical idea that an aggregated body of citizens can best approximate the interests of the people. The Peruvian conservative Bartolomé Herrera, for example, critiqued the Rousseauean ideals in an 1846 sermon, saying that “[t]he power and the people have become the slaves of what is called the will of the people [which is in truth] the will of the demagogues” (p. 96), rather than reaching the desired endpoint. The state must take action to direct the people toward a specific “conception of the good” (p. 92). However, while it is certainly possible to think of Bolivar as elitist and therefore in a sense “conservative,” as Gargarella does, he was also influenced by the popular republicanism of Rousseau and the martial republicanism of Machiavelli, perspectives that do no fit easily with traditional conservative views.
In Gargarella's view, conservatism and radicalism had a common disdain for the principle of individual autonomy. The conservative critique of populism was not grounded on a predilection for the individual over a community. Conservatives also eschewed Enlightenment critiques directed at deconstructing systems of power. Aimed at reaching a kind of moral perfectionism, the conservative view of the nation argued that it ought to rely on those who are best suited to know what is in the best interest of the people.
Gargarella points to a fundamental dislike for constitutions in many conservatives, owing to the disregard for unwritten traditions in the process of constitution making. They also opposed what they saw as excessive constraints on the actions of governments in written constitutions, as well as the organizational difficulties in setting up constitutional conventions. However, faced with populist pressures, conservatives yielded and had to engage in the process of constitution making. Systems like the British legal order, which incorporates elitist elements, were favored by many Latin American conservatives. However, they retained deep distrust of popular legislatures, which led to their support of individual leaders, particularly in the shape of strong executives.
In terms of the liberal tradition, Gargarella points to the Argentine statesmen Domingo Sarmiento and Juan Alberdi, as well as to Madison, Mill, and Smith as principle paragons. He posits that liberalism promotes itself as an “ideal mediating position” (p. 153). It proposes moral neutrality by the state, especially in terms of religious freedom: “The state should not use its coercive powers in favor of or against any view of the good” (p. 158). For Gargarella, the United States was the best grounds for such a perspective, since the Catholic Church was dominant in Latin America, whereas no particular religious denomination was preeminent in the United States. The view in Latin America among many opponents of liberalism, however, was that the idea of neutrality was merely a euphemism for atheism.
The procedural view, or political neutrality, was also central to the core of liberal constitutionalism. Tyranny by either the majority or minority was to be avoided: “In the end, the countermajoritarian bias of liberalism was reflected in the adoption of antimajoritarian institutions, namely, institutions that retained an opaque role for popular majorities within the decision-making process” (p. 167). Along with this important tenet, liberals favored a laissez-faire economy, reflecting the “parallel they established between the moral, the legal, and the economic order” (p. 172). For some liberals, the role of the state was to merely create the most favorable conditions for the flourishing of private entrepreneurship. Liberals favored rights as a way to provide a space for individuals' pursuit of preferences, rather than as a way to promote strong political rights in the manner of the radicals.
North American liberals rejected the establishment of strict limits on political rights, but at the same time “they did all they could to discourage popular participation in politics” (p. 192), with very similar results in Latin America. Gargarella posits that the strong bias against political participation might be explained by the centrality of the right to private property, which was perhaps the most sacred of those protected by the liberals, and which created space for agreement between liberals and conservatives.
The author argues that all three models ultimately dishonored the egalitarian ideals that he locates at the source of the revolutionary movements that gave birth to the various forms of constitutionalism. Moreover, he prefers the egalitarian ideal as normatively superior to the others. He claims that “the commitment to equality can be deemed the essence of America's social contract” (p. 216).
While the liberal project had some success in the United States, it had less success in Latin America. At times, liberals also found themselves in alliance with the conservative movement in a way that Gargarella suggests threatened the liberal project. In Latin America, the alliance frequently led liberals to gradually become full-fledged conservatives. He seems especially concerned to expose liberals for their failure to maintain equality as the center of their focus, especially for how they gave a minority an equal voice to that of the majority, thereby undercutting the central democratic premise. The core of his critique appears to be that liberalism chose the protection of individual autonomy over the empowerment of the majority, suggesting that the introduction of inequalities into liberalism was not inevitable.
Garagarella articulates his ideal egalitarian point as follows: “[P]ersonal problems should be handled by each individual, and collective problems should be confronted and solved collectively” (p. 230). He believes that each of the three forms of constitutionalism violates this principle in a major way. An egalitarian system, he says, would be more active in securing equality, promote equal distribution, protect both negative and positive rights, and promote majoritarian rule. It is not clear how this egalitarian ideal can be reached through really-existing constitutional mechanisms. It is in this area that the book's argument requires further elaboration.
One important lacuna is the absence of race in Gargarella's juridical framework. Much of the concern with social chasms in the nineteenth century had to do with racial disparities and conflict. For instance, Bolivar famously feared the ascendancy of pardocracia, or rule by pardos (mulattoes), in Venezuela, which was something that guided much of his constitutional thinking. Although Gargarella could have shown more points of contact between racial and ethnic tensions and constitutionalism in the Americas (including the black/white divide in the United States), the book is a major contribution to the literature of comparative constitutionalism, Spanish American political thought, and the juridical foundations of inequality in the Americas. At the same time, his historical lessons are good points of departure for understanding the recent wave of constitutional reforms in twenty-first-century Latin America.
