The fact that Kurds in Iraq managed, despite very considerable odds, to create something approximating a state by the first years of the 21st century is one of the most dramatic recent developments in Middle East politics. Ofra Bengio's useful book, The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State within a State, takes up the question of how they did so through an examination of the Kurds’ longtime struggle for autonomy from the central Iraqi state. She focuses in particular on the Kurdish movement's political leadership and both its bargains and battles with Baghdad and the Baʿth Party regime.
Throughout the book, five points stand out as helping to explain Iraqi Kurds’ ability to defy the post–World War I map of the Middle East and to establish, as Bengio puts it, a “state within a state” in Iraq during the first decade of this century. First, Kurdish autonomy did not just suddenly materialize in 1991 or 2003; it involved many decades of struggle. The achievements of the 1990s and beyond rested on institutional, political, and military foundations built, often at significant cost, over the course of many years. Second, Bengio argues that Kurdish success was ultimately linked to the failures of Iraqi state building (see, e.g., p. 273) and the Iraqi regime's inability to establish meaningful authority in the Kurdish north. Indeed, one of the great contributions of the work is its careful attention to Iraqi policies in the Kurdish region and to the dialectic nature of both Kurdish and Iraqi state building and state failure. Here, as elsewhere, her work draws our attention to the fact that Kurdish self-governance was not an inevitable outcome of the ethnic differences between Kurds and Arabs in Iraq but rather the product of decisions, actions, achievements, and missteps in a very specific political and regional context.
Third, Bengio demonstrates how critical both Kurdish wars and bargaining were in facilitating the emergence of a regional government in Iraqi Kurdistan. Kurds in Iraq, in sharp contrast to those in Turkey, obtained significant promises of devolution and autonomy in the 1960s and 1970s. Even if these agreements did not prevent further wars, they laid the normative and political groundwork for Kurdish autonomy in a way that is arguably only today beginning to happen in Turkey. Kurdish wars against the Iraqi regime not only provided Kurds leverage, but also helped build a sense of collective difference and sufficiently destabilized the north so as to limit state penetration of the region. Fourth, Bengio highlights the critical role of external players in the conflict and, despite many setbacks, in ultimately facilitating Kurdish self-governance, both because of deals made between Kurds and states such as Iran and because of opportunities provided Kurds by Iraq's interactions with its neighbors. Indeed, as she notes, a great irony of Kurdish state building was that one of the most calamitous moments in Kurdish history—the suppression of the 1991 uprising and mass exodus of Kurds to Iraq's borders—provoked the international response and creation of the “save haven” that facilitated a new period of autonomy and created a blueprint for governance. Fifth and finally, the book demonstrates how movement actors—exhibiting powerful (if conflicted) leadership, organizational durability, and pragmatic decision making—charmed, pushed, and threatened both regime and society into the Kurdish state-building project. One of the great strengths of the work is the fact that its author does not whitewash these actors, their behavior, or their motives. As she writes on p. 232, for instance, the “aim of the KDP [Kurdistan Democratic Party] and PUK [Patriotic Union of Kurdistan] was not to establish a united Kurdistan, but for each to enlarge its respective sphere of influence and ultimately become the sole power in the region.”
Readers looking for social history or discussion of how ordinary people fit into this narrative will not find much. The book reflects a solidly institutionalist approach and, despite a few important exceptions, confines its lens to the level of party–regime interactions. It is a narrative political history that is organized chronologically and includes only brief references to theory. Throughout the work there is little discussion of the impact that war or Kurdish state-building had on ordinary people, or the ways in which cultural production, economics, or “society”—ordinary people, tribes, women's groups, student associations, and the like—shaped the processes of nation- and state-building.
That said, there is much of value in Bengio's account. In particular, she demonstrates the contested nature of the Kurdish nationalist movement and the ways in which key Kurdish political actors—namely, the KDP and its rival the PUK—struggled for control of the movement. These parties fought against a succession of Iraqi regimes in their attempts to establish authority over the country's Kurdish north, and Bengio demonstrates that in no case was their capacity to achieve such authority a foregone conclusion. One of the most interesting parts of this book is her analysis of Arabic-language sources, particularly Baʿth Party statements and newspaper reports concerning the status of Kurds in the country. Bengio also explores the Iran–Iraq War, arguing that it stemmed more from Saddam Husayn's desire to abrogate the 1975 Algiers Agreement than from Iraqi fears of its own Shiʿi population in the wake of the Iranian Revolution (pp. 169–72). Her attention to the Baʿth Party's multifaceted efforts to suppress the Kurdish nationalist movement is an important contribution to a literature that for the most part focuses almost solely on Baʿthist violence; for instance, her discussion of the regime's use of propaganda aimed at delegitimizing Mulla Mustafa Barzani and the KDP is particularly informative.
Chapters 15 and 16, the final two of the book, offer a thoughtful and comprehensive discussion of Kurdish state- and nation-building after 2003, with an evenhanded discussion of KDP–PUK relations, the problems of KRG governance (as she puts it, the “democratizing experience remains a fledgling enterprise” under the KRG [p. 307]), and efforts by the KRG to build a Kurdish national culture. She also incorporates a much-welcome section on “the social factors in nation building” (pp. 287–90), and, in the last chapter, a brief discussion of more recent developments such as the advent of the opposition Gorran (Change) party. Her observation that the cohesiveness and strength of the Kurdish elite, particularly the Barzanis, distinguished the Kurdish movement from other communities in Iraq (pp. 298–99) is an important one, and it offers valuable comparative insight into other movements in the region. Bengio's depiction of the ways in which outside actors intervened in and manipulated these dynamics is, for the most part, a sober and clear-eyed assessment of self-interested players; an example (as Joost Hiltermann has discussed elsewhere) is the U.S. administration's “rediscovery” of the 1988 Baʿth gassing of Halabja to justify the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
Although occasionally lapsing into offhand or undeveloped comparisons (for instance, comparing the Iraqi Kurdish civil war of the 1990s to the American Civil War [p. 231]) and overstatements (e.g., writing, as she does on p. 185, of the various “rounds of struggle” between Baghdad and the Kurds as if each phase were a zero-sum game), this is overall a solid, accessible, and well-researched account of the political history that helped produce what Denise Natali and others have called the Kurdish quasistate. Whether readers use the book in its entirety or only specific chapters, it offers something for both specialists and those new to the topic, adding a valuable and unromanticized contribution to studies of how determined groups of Kurdish rebels eventually succeeded in obtaining much of what they sought.
