Only three years ago, hardly anyone outside the circles of Middle East specialists and spook agencies had heard of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Then America's mishandling of the aftermath of its “victory” over Saddam Hussein catapulted al-Zarqawi to the top of the most-wanted list of the world's most dangerous villains and terror masters.
Al-Zarqawi made his way to the front pages by brutally beheading, with his own sword, Western as well as Muslim hostages taken in Iraq. His gruesome actions over the past two years were captured on videotapes by jihadists boasting about their terror, footage that proved to be popular either on the Al Jazeera satellite network or on CDs sold openly in street markets in Iraq and neighboring countries.
Little was known about the new guru of terror who adopted the name of Abu Musab, a 7th-century Islamic warrior who became the patron saint of jihadists and suicide bombers. His published profiles were incomplete, and the analysis was inaccurate or based on fanciful assumptions, rumors, and isolated intelligence and police reports. Thus, when Jean-Charles Brisard and his research partner, Damien Martinez, began to trace the roots of al-Zarqawi and his transformation from a local, petty criminal in Jordan into America's number-one enemy in Iraq, they ended with a most comprehensive study, not only of the notorious terrorist but also of the complex phenomenon of a still-evolving Arab/Islamic terror network affiliated to al-Qaءida.
Zarqawi: The New Face of Al-Qaeda is perhaps the most researched and valuable reference on al-Zarqawi existing today. It provides a unique glimpse into the spiderweb world of al-Qaءida and explicates how fundamentalist Wahhabi evangelist priests can brainwash desperate young men into the path of jihadists' violence.
The authors manage to outdo others in examining a set of complex factors that collectively helped to create one of the deadliest threats facing the civilized world today—factors far more complicated than the oversimplifications offered by apologists for Islamic fundamentalism (i.e., the injustice done to the Palestinians and ill treatment of Muslims) or by anti-American leftist intellectuals (i.e., economic and social deprivation and American backing of undemocratic regimes).
The book accurately traces the birth, childhood environment, family origins, and tribal links of Ahmad Fadil al-Khalailah (also listing other used names). Born in Zarqa, Jordan, he underwent a transformation while in prison, making it into his little empire, and then went to Afghanistan, where Osama Bin Laden and his dangerous ideologue, Ayman al-Zawahiri, were pulling the jihadists' strings. Throughout, the book gives an insightful analysis of how the splinter network of terror came to being.
Despite its dry language and lack of color, the book benefits from a factual narration style that is based on documents, interviews, and eyewitness accounts and testimonies. Hence, this scholarly work provides specialists and journalists with immeasurable help in explaining to nonspecialist readers how the hardened terrorist, who does not bat an eyelid as he cuts off men's heads, is a devout Muslim with his own intellectual, although slanted, understanding of the Qurءan. Putting testimonies into context is extremely useful for journalists and academics explaining to readers, viewers, and students how and why al-Zarqawi, as well as his spiritual guides and followers, is more threatening to nonfundamentalist Muslims than he is to Westerners.
Ironically, it was America's own blunders in post-Saddam Iraq that gave al-Zarqawi the chance to turn his decade-old fantasies of fighting his own crusade (and overtaking al-Qaءida) into practical reality. When al-Zarqawi completed his spiritual, physical, and intellectual transformation from a disturbed teenager into an Islamic fundamentalist seeking conquest by the sword, the book reveals, he arrived in Afghanistan rather late. The Soviet army had already pulled out and the mujahedin had established an Islamic regime, depriving him of the taste of a real fight and keeping him insignificant compared with bin Laden. Only when the Americans made their daft decision to disband the Iraqi army did al-Zarqawi get his chance to establish a deadly network in Iraq. Furthermore, the rise to power of Shiעa groups, a worse enemy than America and Israel in al-Zarqawi's belief system, enabled him to recruit angry Sunni men to the cause. The detailed pages on al-Zarqawi's leadership qualities and recruiting skills while in Jordanian prisons provide a useful magnifying lens to understand his easy success in post-Saddam Iraq. The book also documents follies committed not just by the Bush administration but by other governments as well. One case in point is King Abdullah's ill-advised pardoning of prisoners, including al-Zarqawi, as a generous gesture to the Muslim Brotherhood.
Although the book is an essential reference for academics, journalists, and even security analysts (the index provides a “who's who” of Islamist terrorists), it lacks color or gripping story lines to be enjoyed by the general public. Furthermore, I found grouping all footnotes at the end of the book (just before the index) tiresome and irritating. Journalists and commentators prefer footnotes on the same page for easy access and integrating them as references or quotes in their reports. Still, the book is the most valuable read I have come across on the subject in years. What I find fascinating, after finishing the book, is how accurately the preface stated: “Zarqawi is neither a tool of Saddam Hussein, as the Americans have claimed, nor the henchman of Osama Bin Laden, but an extremist exceptionally favored by circumstances” (p. xiv).
