In core government and for public tasks hugely sensitive for citizens such as migration governance in Europe, the use of AI systems developed and provided under contract gives migration authorities and private providers the power to keep their deployment secret and to refuse access to their key components. This article explores the complex interplay between public and private drivers of secrecy surrounding procured AI technologies in European migration governance, demonstrating how these forces converge and reinforce one another. It examines AI secrecy as an institutional framework shaped by both public and private law forms of secrecy, applying the spectrum of secrecy from deep (unknown unknowns) to shallow secrecy (known unknowns). Specifically, the paper looks into the sources of ‘political secrecy’ in migration and security authorities, highlighting how migration agencies and authorities keep the existence and use of AI systems from civil society and affected persons (such as third country nationals). Next, it analyses the legal frameworks that sustain AI vendors’ private secrecy, such as trade secrecy, secrecy in procurement procedures and agreements. In examining the various secrecy points, it scrutinises the limited impact of the AI Act in addressing the entrenched secrecy of AI deployment and development in governing migration. Finally, we condense the main takeaways and examine the broader repercussions of AI secrecy beyond the context of border control, touching upon its implications for a new equilibrium transcending the conventional public/private divide.

Since its ruling on the Maastricht Treaty, the German Federal Constitutional Court has developed a doctrine that elevates the fundamental constitutional principles in conjunction with the right to vote to the status of a ‘right to democracy’. In this Article, we explore how plaintiffs draw on the right to democracy in an effort to activate the Court’s self-asserted prerogative of ultra vires and identity review and keep Karlsruhe in the game of adjudicating on the conditions and boundaries of European integration. We assume that the legal opportunities associated with constitutional complaints invoking the right to democracy involve a dynamic, interdependent relationship where (the same) plaintiffs build on existing case law to develop legal arguments and where the Court evaluates, refines and codifies these arguments. To substantiate this interactive process of an expansion of legal opportunities, we draw on a largely untapped data source and use the original pleadings in four cases against the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) and the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) of the European Central Bank, linking these complaints to the respective court decisions.

This article revitalises the debate on European citizenship by redefining its meaning within the EU and contributing to a broader understanding of constitutional transformation under conditions of post-national governance. Moving beyond the comparative method that evaluates European citizenship through the lens of national citizenship, it reorients the analytical focus to the interaction between national and European rights and introduces the concept of European Material Citizenship. This new form of citizenship reflects a normative shift in the regulation of social, political and economic relations within a constitutional order reshaped by European integration. While national citizenship synthesised the normative ideal constituting and regulating the relationship between the nation-state and individuals, European Material Citizenship synthesises the normative ideal governing a far more complex constitutional geometry – composed of European institutions, Member States and citizens.

The mood amongst workers in Western Europe as the 1960s ended was one of frustration and anticipation. From the streets of Paris in May 1968 to the factory floors of Turin in the autumn of 1969, social movements of workers and students demanded a real say over their daily lives and the institutions that shaped them. These calls for economic democracy were picked up by trade unions, national politicians and, eventually, the European Commission. In 1973, having published proposals that included plans for ‘worker participation’, the Commission wrote that if employees did not have a voice, the Commission’s proposals would not ‘satisfy the requirements of society today’. However, the Commission’s interpretation of industrial democracy was criticised by trade unions and socialist politicians, buoyed by the militancy of the workers, for not going far enough. As the Commission tried to persuade labour representatives that the European project was taking their demands seriously, another critique of worker participation crystallised on the right. As Keynesianism lost credibility in Member States, and a neoliberal discourse emerged around the need for Europe to be ‘competitive’ and ‘flexible’, employer groups pushed back against worker participation and undermined a labour movement that had posed a genuine threat to capital’s interests. This paper tells the story of one component of the Commission’s plans: the proposed Fifth Company Law Directive. Using archival material from EC institutions and employer lobby groups, it argues for an understanding of company and labour law harmonisation that takes seriously the political economy of Western Europe during the ‘Long 1970s’.

For as vivid the academic debate around issues of algorithmic bias, discrimination and unfairness has been in the context of EU law, little attention has been paid thus far to the way in which such instances have been dealt with by courts. This article examines from a non-discrimination law perspective how domestic courts of Member States as well as the European Court of Justice have approached cases of algorithmic bias in automated decision-making, by focusing on the judges’ engagement with discrimination-related considerations. For the purposes of my analysis, I propose a taxonomy of judgments dealing with cases of algorithmic bias and analyse a number of examples accordingly to showcase the distinct features of each category. In this regard, a first distinction is drawn between judgments relating to cases of ‘algorithmic discrimination’ and those concerning cases of ‘unfair algorithmic differentiation’. Depending on the extent to which courts take into account any risks of discrimination in the cases falling under the second category, I further distinguish between judgments of ‘discrimination reflection’, those of ‘discrimination awareness’, and those of ‘discrimination silence’. On the basis of this classification, I then attempt to shed more light on how non-discrimination and data protection law may interact with each other in practice in cases of algorithmic bias. Finally, the article concludes with some reflections on the prevailing tendency to address equality concerns through recourse to data protection rules.

In the JURDI case, a French non-governmental organisation invoked Article 265 TFEU to challenge the EU Commission and Council’s inaction towards Israel despite the finding of the International Court of Justice that there was a plausible risk of genocide in the Gaza Strip, in its 2024 orders in South Africa v Israel. This article draws on this case to argue that Article 265 TFEU – originally conceived as an interinstitutional remedy – could constitutionalise the EU’s positive obligations under jus cogens (genocide prevention and respect for international humanitarian law) and under Articles 2, 3, 19, 21 TEU, thereby overcoming the restrictive standing rules inherited from Article 263 TFEU. The case offers an opportunity to reflect on the capacity of the EU courts to acknowledge the mobilising potential of civil society organisations and secure accountability in the case of breaches of EU and international law.

Article 265 TFEU establishes a judicial mechanism to challenge the failure of the institutions of the European Union (EU) to act, yet, its practical relevance has long been constrained by restrictive admissibility requirements and judicial deference to institutional discretion. This article re-examines the scope and constitutional significance of Article 265 TFEU through recent litigation concerning alleged EU inaction in response to the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza. It asks whether meaningful judicial engagement in such cases places unrealistic demands on a procedural framework and judiciary traditionally cautious in matters of external relations. Rather than treating Gaza-related failure-to-act actions as exceptional or merely political, the article situates them within broader debates on EU constitutionalism, accountability, and the limits of legal mobilisation in geopolitically sensitive contexts. It examines how doctrinal requirements—including the need to identify a specific legal obligation to act, the restrictive conception of reviewable inaction, and narrow standing rules—continue to shield institutional inertia from effective judicial scrutiny. It further considers the normative implications of this approach in light of the EU’s commitments to international law, human rights, and humanitarian principles. The article argues that the General Court’s restrained approach reflects not only doctrinal limitations but also deeper structural tensions between law and politics in EU external action. Although Article 265 TFEU may be ill-suited to compel institutional action in foreign-policy crises, its restrictive interpretation risks undermining judicial accountability where claims of legal responsibility are most pressing. Gaza litigation therefore provides a valuable lens for reassessing the limits of EU judicial review and the role of courts in addressing systemic institutional inaction.

This introduction to the Symposium on the (re)turn of activist government in the EU is structured around four guiding research questions: whether the EU’s shift toward state interventionism is structural or contingent; how the emerging forms of state activism relate to the preceding neoliberal paradigm; to what extent these developments align with the existing Treaty framework; and what their implications are for democratic legitimacy. Against this backdrop, the introduction surveys the contributions to the Symposium and offers some preliminary, tentative answers to these questions.

This article suggests that the economically activist tendencies of the European Union are not just a temporary response to exogenous crises, but part of a long-term transformation of the EU into a governance structure that is increasingly equipped for forms of more direct rule over its territory, economy, and citizens, albeit still in an incomplete and contested manner. This transformation hinges on three interlocking processes that feed into each other and accelerate: (i) the rise of EU-level material, financial, and institutional infrastructure; (ii) the significant centralisation of EU power; and (iii) novel narrations about the ‘point’ of the EU that stabilise its authority. This transformation of the EU brings with it new challenges for its authority. Using the work by Charles Tilly, who focuses on the way in which trust networks are integrated in rule, this article distinguishes between the EU’s ability to rule by way of coercion, by way of capital and by way of commitment. It is suggested that while the EU’s ability to rule by way of coercion and capital have grown, it remains difficult to envisage how the EU may stably reproduce commitments structures that would allow it to transition into a stable and democratic structure of governance.

In the past decade or so, the text of the EU Treaties has stayed the same, yet their reading has undergone significant changes. The language of anti-formalism has triumphed over formalism, obviating the need for complex political debates and democratic processes inherent to actual Treaty revisions. This method of constitutional reinterpretation was ushered in by the NextGenerationEU and seems now, in the post-Draghi-Report world, the dominant way for the Commission to address its political priorities. This article explores the invisible side of constitutional change by legal engineering. It will examine the place of Treaty respect in the old vocabulary of EU law and discuss how the NGEU drove a wedge into this established vocabulary. The NGEU experiment demonstrates how reinterpretation of core Treaty provisions may provide solutions to immediate functional needs but tends to result in ill-functioning governance models that fail to provide a stable long-term basis for integration. Further, democratic participation, which lacks an established vocabulary in the EU legal language, is easily overlooked. Yet, it is the democratic process that breathes life into constitutional change. A constitution animated by political opportunism and technocratic reinterpretation rather than broader societal evolution is not a living constitution. At best, it is a puppet constitution, at worst, it is dead.

Since the Global Financial Crisis, the European Union (EU) has gone from crisis to crisis. The chronic growth and productivity problems have been compounded by the poor management of the Eurozone crisis, by the no-longer postponable green and digital transitions, and by the changing geopolitical environment, with the end of the old multilateral order. The European institutions still embed the principles of an old consensus based on market efficiency, and do not allow for macroeconomic and industrial policies for the structural transformation. We discuss possible reforms to realign the EU institutions with the needs and the challenges the bloc faces.

The recent turn to market activism is transforming the politics around the state and capitalism, while significantly restructuring markets. We focus on one important but understudied element in this development: the securitization of market competition in the European Union. We argue that European political actors are strategically using specific narratives to construct competition policies in a new way, one that implicates the geopolitical standing of the EU and its national security. This contrasts with the longstanding view of EU competition policy as existing in a separate sphere, disembedded from politics, where market efficiency is paramount. To empirically capture this change, we undertake a systematic analysis of DG Competition Annual Reports, using a language-analysis schema over the decade from 2013 to 2023. Our findings demonstrate that this securitization strategy has been consistently increasing over time in the EU, evidenced in the rhetorical use of crises, the linking of markets to a larger set of issues and policy goals, the invocation of geopolitical pressures, and the framing of a need for the consolidation of EU power. We note, however, that this policy turn towards securitization of economic policy brings substantial political tensions given the EU’s limited democratic accountability.

This article applies the concept of economic activism, the theme of this symposium, to explore the ECB’s role within a more interventionist European Union. “Central bank activism” brings together and structures several legal, political, and economic debates on the changing role of central banks. The article focuses on the ECB’s mandate, starting from the premise that both its primary mandate, price stability, and its secondary mandate, support for the Union’s general economic policies, are subject to constitutional contestation as to their limits.The article suggests that these contestations should be situated within two core dimensions of EU constitutional law. The first reflects the principles of democracy and institutional balance, which concern the allocation of authority between independent, non-majoritarian institutions and electorally accountable political bodies. The second is the relationship between public intervention and market mechanisms. The article argues that the Union’s monetary constitution allows a significant degree of interpretive flexibility, but that such flexibility must remain within, and be guided by, the Union’s constitutional core: democracy, institutional balance, and market functioning. This framework helps in thinking about ECB activism within the broader turn towards economic activism in the EU. The article suggests that relying on the secondary mandate, rather than expanding the primary mandate, may offer advantages within this economic, political, and constitutional turn.

The balance sheet of the ECB expanded greatly after the Great Crisis of 2007-9, similarly to other core central banks, but this development does not signify the adoption of a new ‘interventionist’ stance. The expansion of the balance sheet by core central banks reflects a profound change in the framework of monetary policy responding to pressures generated during and after the Crisis. In the case of the ECB, however, the expansion also resulted from attempting to cover the cracks of the fragmented European money market to protect the euro. This fragmentation persists and concern about the euro continues to shape ECB policy. The resurgence of inflation since 2022 led the ECB to contract its balance sheet, again similarly to other central banks, making a new framework necessary for monetary policy. But it is not clear what that would be, given the fragmented European money market. The monetary policy of the ECB is in a quandary reflecting the structural deficiencies of the Eurozone.

Industrial policy is a substantial enterprise that goes to refashioning the structures of economic activity to realise public goals. To that end, it historically relies on a State-industry resettlement that recasts State-industry relations. This resettlement also generates the economic knowledge that is a prerequisite for achieving these goals and sets out new forms of collective action to stymy change. However, until the 2024 reforms incorporating it within the European Semester, EU Industrial Policy was not associated with any such resettlement. This weak institutionalisation meant, inter alia, its goals proliferated in an undisciplined way, industrial knowledge was weakly embedded, and the Commission was more concerned with vetting than cultivating new forms of collective action. If this policy thus centralised considerable power within the Commission, there is good reason to be sceptical about what will be achieved. To that end, this article argues for an Inter-Institutional Agreement that would both temper these problems and ensure this policy is not simply about collective goals but is a more pluralistic and responsive endeavour. This Agreement would commit the EU to realise three principles. Constraint would require institutional power to be justified and exercised with moderation. Integrity would require EU institutions to reflect continually on whether individual measures or processes should be sustained. Responsibility would hold them not only accountable for their actions and omissions but also responsible for discharging the wider public interest that falls within their aegis.

The article traces the trajectory of state activism in the EU and explores the institutional implications of its recent revival. It contends that, within the current European constitutional landscape, there is a strong demoicratic case for pursuing activist policies at the national level, with the EU serving as an enabler. Within the existing treaty framework, however, EU-enabled state activism may assume either an equalising or an asymmetric form. In the equalising mode, the EU helps narrow fiscal disparities among Member States, promoting a more balanced deployment of fiscal and industrial policies across the single market. In the asymmetric mode, by contrast, activist tools remain accessible primarily to Member States with substantial fiscal capacity. Crucially, the choice between these alternatives does not stem from democratic deliberation or political judgment, but rather from extant treaty constraints conceived at a time of subdued state interventionism. As a result, equalising EU-enabled state activism seems possible only in times of emergency, when EU institutions may temporarily loosen constitutional limits on national fiscal and industrial policy, adopt unconventional monetary measures, and muster the political consensus needed to approve significant fiscal programmes. In the absence of such emergencies, however, only the asymmetric form of state activism remains available – a mode of governance that poses serious risks to the integrity of the single market and to territorial cohesion. Thus, only treaty change, coupled with deeper political integration, could place state activism on a firmer footing and allow the EU to realise its equalising potential.