In a thoughtful, erudite and incisive work, Jason Blakely offers a diagnosis of contemporary methodological naturalism, its implications for political culture and practice, and the challenges and alternatives to it provided by the interpretive/hermeneutic theories of Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor. The naturalism he critically examines presupposes and maintains that the methods and forms of explanation found in the natural sciences are the privileged, even exclusive, modes by which political inquiry needs to be conducted. In the process he provides a narrative of how naturalism developed in Anglo-American philosophy and subsequently came to dominate the discipline of political science.
Just as important are the political-practical implications of the rise of naturalism. Far from being a narrowly intellectual or metaphilosophical doctrine, Blakely argues that naturalism issues in a specific type of politics. Its emphases on quantitative methods, statistical research, and technological manipulation of the social environment encouraged administrative and bureaucratic organizations aimed at social and political management. Naturalism became “something much larger than just an intellectual movement in philosophy and social science. It was also a cultural-political form. Its ideas informed institutions and practices. It was a form of power” (23). It not only marginalized alternative forms of philosophical and political inquiry; it took on a bureaucratic and hierarchical form that privileged scientific expertise at the expense of engaged citizenship. It was, and is, antidemocratic.
Facilitating the growth and influence of naturalism was an elaborate network of funding from government and private foundations. The National Science Foundation and the Rockefeller, Ford, Carnegie, and Russell Sage Foundations were eager to invest money with the goal of developing naturalistic social science.
Early in their intellectual development, both MacIntyre and Taylor took aim at naturalistic forms of social science and the political implications of naturalism. Blakely traces their respective attempts to formulate alternatives to naturalism that would, at the same time, acknowledge and encourage deep human agency. Both sought that alternative first in the British New Left's attempt to provide “a more humanistic form of Marxism” (24). Subsequently, they engaged analytic philosophy and drew on ordinary-language philosophy for resources in critiquing naturalism in the form of behavioralism. However, both Western Marxism and analytic philosophy failed to provide the foundations of robust social and political theory on several counts, making them incapable of providing an antinaturalist alternative to naturalism (34–36, 52–54).
In their separate attempts to develop alternatives to naturalism, MacIntyre and Taylor turn to Aristotle and Heidegger respectively, although it is important to keep in mind that Taylor has also identified Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics as important for understanding a properly constituted interpretive theory. In particular, for MacIntyre, Aristotle shows that “human beliefs and actions are not carried out in atomistic, disconnected segments. Instead, they are unified by a contest of goals and desires that related the past, present, and future to one another in a narrative stream” (65), in a way that is unavailable to naturalism. Similarly, Taylor, drawing on Heidegger, argues that a properly constructed social and political theory will draw on the extent to which language constitutes and expresses the possibilities of deep forms of human agency that involve strong evaluation and make human identity possible. In their respective accounts of deep forms of human agency, both MacIntyre and Taylor “establish a philosophic basis for a humanistic study of individuals—that is, one that takes seriously the creative agency and dignity of the human person. … Interpretive social science is thus entwined with a humanistic ethical outlook” (74).
The philosophic foundations of interpretive social science also enable MacIntyre and Taylor to challenge one of the central tenets of naturalism, namely, its claim to value neutrality based on the fact-value dichotomy. Both show that far from achieving a strictly value-neutral account of political life, naturalism issues in support of some political arrangements, specifically a scientific-technocratic approach to political practice, at the expense of others. Although value neutrality may be an important aspiration in some areas of social science research, Taylor and MacIntyre draw attention to the importance of normative aspects that constitute social and political explanation.
In the final chapter and conclusion, Blakely summarizes what he calls the Great Unification, suggesting future directions for interpretive social and political science. This unification involves embracing several principles of interpretive social science research found in the work of MacIntyre and Taylor to explain phenomena and expose the dangers of the bureaucratic rationality of late capitalism (MacIntyre) and the challenges that secularism and the understanding of multicultural societies (Taylor) pose to contemporary polities. Those principles are contingent, nonmechanistic causality (in contrast to the mechanistic causality of naturalism); the importance of narrative description that places phenomena in historical and cultural context; a more comprehensive, comparative view of objectivity achieved through comparing competing alternative explanations of political phenomena; and the recognition that interpretive social science is not value neutral but normatively and ethically engaged (95–97).
Blakely's work reiterates an interpretation of the relationships among the philosophy of social science, forms of political theory, and the prospects for political practice that political theorists have maintained and attended to for some time. That said, Blakeley provides the details of how that connection works, the implications for competing views of human agency, and how the critique of naturalism developed in the work of two of its most important critics. Blakeley also shows that naturalism was not confined to academic circles but that it permeated political and cultural practices, something generally absent from previous accounts.
One weakness of Blakely's book is his claim about the demise of naturalism. As much as I am sympathetic to that idea, I do not think it accurately captures the direction of political science. Some prominent doctoral programs either still do not offer political theory in their graduate curriculum or have deemphasized it. In addition, some prominent programs require entering graduate students, regardless of subfield specialty, to enroll in “methods boot camps,” or intensive training in quantitative methods required often in the summer preceding enrollment in substantive coursework. In still other programs, political theory is at best grudgingly tolerated. These facts highlight a contrast between what one might call third-generation naturalists and original behavioralists. Whatever their flaws, early behaviorists such as David Easton and Heinz Eulau were conversant in political thought and aware of their own indebtedness to the philosophical foundations of their own naturalism as well as the philosophical foundations of their critics. Sadly, I do not think the same can be said of much of the current generation of naturalists in political science.
I also think that Blakely could have spent more time on Taylor's more recent work, for instance, A Secular Age (Belknap, 2008). The latter has had a tremendous impact across disciplines, and a treatment of it would have illuminated how an interpretive political theory can provide a historical, critical, ethical understanding of contemporary political-cultural phenomena.
Finally, Blakely's account of Peter Winch's interpretive social science (89–92) is something of a caricature. Winch did not subscribe to the radical cultural relativism that Blakely and some of Winch's other critics attribute to him.
But these are minor issues. Blakely has provided an erudite and thorough account of how the work of MacIntyre and Taylor challenge the hold that naturalism has on political inquiry. It is a work that will be edifying not only to political theorists but to the more general discipline of political science, to both naturalists and antinaturalists alike.
