While at first glance the title of this fascinating book appears merely to express an obvious tautology, Geoff Eley's larger purpose soon becomes clear. It is to reexamine the crisis in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s for some guidance as to how to we can effectively cope with our differing but comparable and equally menacing present crises, which Eley summarizes as follows:
The brokenness of polities and the collapse of civility; neoliberal transformations of capitalism and transnationalizing of labor markets; widening extremes of social inequality; social calamities and political disorders resulting from global environmental catastrophe; a climate of fear where “security” trumps any other consideration; international rivalries for resources. (p. vi)
Eley's method is historiographical—he provides an excellent, thoroughly annotated review of recent research findings and trends in the literature on Nazism. Certain themes attract his special attention. Not surprisingly, in view of his demolition of the Sonderweg thesis some thirty years ago, Eley continues to reject interpretations that attribute the triumph of Nazism in 1933 to “a deep cultural sociology of backwardness” (p. 2) in German history, an argument recently revived by T. Rohkrämer in A Single Communal Faith? The German Right from Conservatism to National Socialism (2007). For Eley such arguments of deep-cultural continuity distract historians from investigating the political crisis of capitalism in the interwar period as the most important source of fascism.
Eley devotes considerable attention to the vexed question of German acquiescence to Nazism. He is critical of historians who assume the all-pervasiveness of Nazi dominance and fail to address its limits and imperfections. He is particularly critical of Robert Gellately, whose notion of a “consensual dictatorship” in Backing Hitler (2001) failed to give due consideration to the violence on which the Third Reich was founded. Eley dismisses Götz Aly's even more extreme version of a German population allegedly bought off by expanded welfare services in Hitler's Beneficiaries (2007) as “coarse materialist reductionism” (p. 68). The value of Eley's approach lies in his sensitivity to historical complexity and his distrust of simplistic linear causal explanations for major events. In his view, historians too often neglect the “gray zones” in which historical reality typically unfolds. He cites Mark Roseman's microhistory, A Past in Hiding (2000), as a good example of how to deal with the ambiguities and varieties in personal responses to Nazi rule.
Not surprisingly, the longest of his seven chapters deals with the historiography of the Holocaust, which came to be seen as Nazism's defining feature in the 1960s and 1970s, displacing the years from 1933 to the start of the war as the primary focus of historical studies. Eley dismisses the old structuralist-intentionalist debates on the origins of the Holocaust as no longer relevant and lauds Saul Friedländer's two-volume history as a model of integrating victims’ perspectives with the previously dominant emphasis on the perpetrators. He does point out, however, the contradiction between Friedländer's earlier suspicion of Alltagsgeschichte (in his famous dispute in the 1980s with Martin Broszat on the historicizing of National Socialism) and Friedländer's own reliance on diaries and letters to present victims’ voices.
Eley concludes his survey with an effort to come up with a coherent theory of what constitutes fascism and why use of the term might be applicable to the present. An essential precondition for making fascism useful as an analytical concept is “to be as clear as possible that fascism is first and foremost a type of politics, or a set of relations to politics” (p. 214). Another point he stresses—consistent with so much of his earlier work—is that fascism is best theorized “in terms of the crisis that produced it” (p. 209). He ends with several relatively uncontroversial theses about European fascism in the 1920s and 1930s: it was a modernist movement, expressing “the most hubristic potentialities of social engineering, inspired by the promise of technological, managerial, and scientific modernity” (p. 212); it took different forms in Italy and Germany; it appealed to the popular imagination through the emergent “culture industry”; and its main ideological thrust was the drive for war. This briskly written and lucidly argued book will be of value to students and scholars, but it can certainly be recommended to a wider readership among the general public as well.
