I am a realist as no one ever was before me.
—Friedrich H. JacobiJacobi's thought … is “entirely new.”
—Leo StraussThe point is not to secure objectivity but to understand it.
—Edmund HusserlPerhaps the most serious challenge confronting the legacy of Leo Strauss is the philosophy of Kant. As Robert Pippin has argued, without an answer to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Strauss's retrieval of classical rationalism may not be of “much philosophic interest.”Footnote 1 It will likely appear to his modernist critics as a relapse into pre-Kantian dogmatism, or into what Charles Larmore has called a “metaphysical conception of reason.”Footnote 2 That is, it will appear as a quest for a “timeless morality,” which, “completely disowning the thought of [its] own time,” is left with “nothing left to go on,” thus fostering the very nihilism that Strauss denounced.Footnote 3
The Kantian challenge turns on a fundamental problem: What is given to us? Whereas post-Kantian rationalism rejects as mythical or ideological the claim that certain experiences are universally “given” to human beings, Strauss appealed to “simple experiences regarding right and wrong” to defend the possibility of natural right.Footnote 4 Whereas Kant conceived of the “given” as “the raw material of sensible impressions,”Footnote 5 Strauss conceived of it as an “articulation of reality” and “a wealth of meaning.”Footnote 6 What Strauss considered essential to respond to nihilism—a return to a premodern philosophy that was “more ‘empirical,’ more in harmony with the ‘given’”—has been understood by his critics as question begging and dogmatic.Footnote 7
This paper addresses the Kantian challenge to Strauss by returning to his dissertation “The Problem of Knowledge in F. H. Jacobi” (1921).Footnote 8 I argue that Strauss's retrieval of ancient rationalism originates in an internal critique of the Kantian legacy. Writing under the supervision of Ernst Cassirer, the preeminent neo-Kantian of the time, Strauss read Jacobi as a powerful critic of Kant whose thought prefigured the phenomenological critique of neo-Kantianism developed, among others, by Edmund Husserl. The upshot of that critique is that Kantian rationalism is insufficiently critical insofar as it does not see, or does not acknowledge, its own presuppositions. Perhaps the most important of them is that knowledge presupposes awareness which, in turn, grows out of a consciousness that is intentionally directed towards a world of meaningful objects. Meaning and intelligibility themselves are granted us by the “form,” “shape,” or “look” of things that organizes our prescientific experience. In short, as Strauss would put it in the 1950s, “there is an articulation of reality that precedes all scientific articulation.”Footnote 9
The broader importance of Strauss's dissertation has three main elements. First, Strauss's unconventional reading of Jacobi as a protophenomenologist suggests the need to reconsider his stance on post-Kantian thought. Strauss has been read as a crypto-Kantian, as a Nietzschean, and indeed as a “Jacobian” for whom philosophy rests on a leap of faith.Footnote 10 Instead, his first work suggests that Strauss began from the phenomenological critique of neo-Kantianism—a critique that would also make possible his later return to classical political philosophy.Footnote 11 Secondly, Strauss's turn to political philosophy is also prefigured in his dissertation in a more strictly political sense. Though less visible in a work on “the problem of knowledge,” Strauss was interested in Jacobi as a famous critic of the Enlightenment because he “dare[d] to keep his eyes on the two poles of human life, religion and government.”Footnote 12 In contrast to the philosophy of pure reason, which conceives of them as provinces of culture or sovereign creations of the spirit, Jacobi understood that religion and government transcend culture as “originary facts” which are experienced as irreducibly given.Footnote 13 Third, Strauss's dissertation points to a way of grounding political philosophy that avoids two extremes: the Scylla of Kantian “autonomism,” which regards man as the only source of truth, meaning, and value, leading to nihilism, and the Charybdis of dogmatic metaphysics, which finds that source in allegedly “given” entities such as “nature” or a “timeless morality.”
Section I in what follows provides an account of Strauss's understanding of Jacobi between 1930 and 1962. Against the view that Strauss understood Jacobi traditionally as a thinker who limited reason to make room for faith, Strauss's writings of the late nineteen-thirties suggest that he understood Jacobi as a defender of reason, whose thought stands for “timeless problems” and for a “radical, i.e., undogmatic” way of thinking that can address them.Footnote 14 Section II discusses the core problem introduced by Jacobi into modern philosophy which is at the heart of Strauss's dissertation—nihilism. I argue that, in Strauss's view, Jacobi's response to nihilism prefigures the phenomenological response to post-Kantian thought. Section III provides a close reading of that response as it is developed in Strauss's dissertation. The basic premise shared by Jacobi, phenomenology, and ancient philosophy is the view that our perceptual capacities are open to an intelligible reality. There is hence no need to posit mental entities or intermediaries, what modern philosophers call “representations,” in order to account for cognition. This all-important premise—that to be human is to be open to a transhuman dimension of meaning and intelligibility—leads to the rejection of the Kantian principle of autonomy. Section IV argues that Strauss's mature understanding of political philosophy as “the first” or ground-laying philosophy can be understood as an attempt to supersede that principle. However, I also note the limits of this argument as it pertains to Strauss's early work, prior to his rediscovery of the Socratic-Platonic grounding of political philosophy.
I. Strauss's Jacobi
According to recent scholarship, the thought of Leo Strauss was heavily indebted to that of Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743–1819)—a thinker of the German counter-Enlightenment who has long been known as an opponent of reason.Footnote 15 Scholars have found a debt to Jacobi throughout Strauss's work: from his early philosophy of religion to the discovery of exoteric writing,Footnote 16 and from his initial framing of the conflict between reason and revelation to the thesis that “rational philosophy rests on a mysterious leap of faith.”Footnote 17 The evidence for such claims, however, is scarce. Indeed, Strauss limited that evidence by repudiating his only sustained engagement with Jacobi—his dissertation—as a “disgraceful performance.”Footnote 18 The consequence, I shall argue, is that the Jacobian problems to which Strauss's work responds have not been fully understood.
Strauss gave Jacobi a central, albeit seemingly accidental, place in the history of modern thought in his 1962 “Preface” to Spinoza's Critique of Religion. By making public Lessing's alleged Spinozism, Jacobi became responsible for the “formal reception” of Spinoza into German philosophy.Footnote 19 The consequences were profound, among them: the rise of the systems of German idealism, which elevated Lessing's claim that “there is no other philosophy than the philosophy of Spinoza” to canonical status;Footnote 20 “a new religion or religiousness which was to inspire a wholly new kind of society”—a society that “emancipated the Jews in Germany”; and a “new understanding of ‘nature,’” which conceives of “everything that is as natural,” and—from that standpoint—as “beyond good and evil.”Footnote 21
Thirty-two years before, in 1930, Strauss accorded Jacobi a similarly central place, yet this time as the thinker who made possible the critique of Spinoza by “lift[ing] the interpretation of Spinoza … to its proper plane.”Footnote 22 From its context, this sole but key reference to Jacobi in Strauss's first book suggests that the “proper plane” for the interpretation and critique of Spinoza lies within the horizon of “good and evil” and the conflict between belief and unbelief, that is, within “the modes of understanding peculiar to everyday life.”Footnote 23 Yet, ironically, scholars have understood the “proper plane” or “ground” (Boden) that Strauss found in Jacobi as, in effect, an abyss.Footnote 24 Strauss is said to have found that the consequences of Spinoza's rationalism could only be avoided through a groundless “leap of faith” into the horizon of belief and good and evil.Footnote 25 This means that, on Jacobian grounds, we must ultimately choose to believe: either in reason and philosophy, of which the only consistent form is Spinoza's atheistic naturalism, or in divine revelation as the only “satisfactory basis for the moral life.”Footnote 26 Other scholars have argued that Strauss's Jacobian framing of the conflict between reason and revelation was limited to his early thought.Footnote 27 As Strauss explained in the 1962 “Preface,” his early critique of Spinoza was “based on the premise, sanctioned by powerful prejudice, that a return to premodern philosophy is impossible.”Footnote 28 By retrieving the Platonic-Aristotelian foundation of philosophy, Strauss is said to have transcended the Jacobian plane of critique, a plane that was limited by “the most powerful prejudice of the time”—historicism.Footnote 29
These accounts shed light on two central aspects of Strauss's critique of modern rationalism. First, the critique of religion is not a consequence of Enlightenment rationalism but its presupposition. Jacobi saw the problem. By questioning the ground of Spinoza's critique in “unbelieving science” he lifted the criticism of Spinoza to a plane in which the conflict between belief and unbelief is not settled in advance.Footnote 30 Strauss followed Jacobi's critique by retrieving that plane in his own critique of Spinoza, thus famously rekindling the conflict between reason and revelation. Second, Strauss found that the Jacobian ground of critique was limited by its appeal to history as the primary source of ethical insight. Ultimately, then, it was not in Jacobi but in premodern rationalism that Strauss found an alternative to the modern Enlightenment.
Yet in tracing the genesis of Strauss's thought to Jacobi, a further—simple but decisive—point must be made: Jacobi critiqued modern rationalism in the name of reason.Footnote 31 His philosophy sought to overcome the nihilistic consequences of modern rationalism by superseding, rather than simply rejecting, it. As Strauss suggested in 1937, Jacobi's philosophy was not essentially historicist,Footnote 32 indeed, it approximates “Lessing's radical, i.e., undogmatic style of thinking”; and it is also “entirely new.”Footnote 33 To provide a more thorough account of what this means—and of Jacobi's significance for Strauss—we must return to the dissertation.
II. Jacobi's Critique of Modern Rationalism: Beyond Kant and Spinoza
Strauss's dissertation confronts us with an aspect of his thought that seems tangential to his concerns as a political philosopher—“the problem of knowledge,” or what appears to be epistemology. Yet, as we shall see, the “problem of knowledge” and political philosophy are connected via the problem of nihilism. In this section I introduce the Jacobian problem of knowledge as a problem of modern rationalism. I argue that the nihilistic consequences of the three main answers to this problem make it necessary to develop a fourth answer—the phenomenological answer developed in Strauss's dissertation.
In its most basic, epistemological sense, the Jacobian problem of knowledge concerns our access to mind-independent realities. Jacobi introduced it in what is perhaps the most influential critique of Kantian idealism. In Jacobi's famous quip: Without the Kantian “thing-in-itself,” he could not enter Kant's system, but with the thing-in-itself he could not remain in it.Footnote 34 That is, without the thing-in-itself, Kant's system cannot claim to provide (as it does) objective knowledge of things outside us. Yet, with it the system oversteps its own boundaries, leading to dogmatism.Footnote 35 In light of this dilemma, Jacobi argued, Kant faced two options. Either he could be a consistent rationalist by confessing his ignorance of the existence of things-in-themselves—thus asserting “the strongest idealism ever professed”—or he could abandon rationalism and return to “natural faith” or the commonsense view that sensibility is genuinely receptive.Footnote 36
Affirming “the strongest idealism” was one answer to Jacobi's challenge—the answer, notably, of Fichte and (in a different way) of neo-Kantians such as Hermann Cohen.Footnote 37 Yet idealism harbored the further threat of “Nihilismus.”Footnote 38 Jacobi understood idealism as a form of “egoism” or solipsism which, in effect, denies the existence of any reality independent of the mind's representations.Footnote 39 Put simply, as a philosophy of appearances in which nothing appears—or nothing we can strictly know—idealism amounts to nihilism.Footnote 40 More precisely, idealism seeks to “explain everything out of … a self-determining intelligence alone.”Footnote 41 It rests on the principle that “we comprehend a thing only insofar as we can construct it.”Footnote 42 This means, however, that wherever the mind goes, from the smallest organism to the farthest star, it will seek out, and find, only its own constructs.Footnote 43 Thus, idealism discharges us from responsibility towards anything that is strictly Other—including God, the Good (in the Platonic conception), and other minds.Footnote 44
A second answer to the Jacobian problem of knowledge was to restore the link between mind and world by conceiving of knowledge as genuinely receptive. Jacobi found this possibility in Spinoza who, as George di Giovanni explains, “considered insight the basic vehicle of truth,” such that “the knower [is] immediately related to the known at the moment of knowledge.”Footnote 45 Yet Spinoza's retrieval of a substantial ground of knowledge only deepened the problem of nihilism. Indeed, his quest for “the truly real” led Spinoza to conclude that “the indeterminate infinite being”—God or Nature—“is the one single true ‘being … beyond which there is nothing.’”Footnote 46 This formula is nihilistic in the literal sense that it turns individuality, or anything that is not part of the one natural substance, into nothing. If, accordingly, “nothing is generated from nothing”Footnote 47—if everything is determined by eternal causes—then there can be no freedom and no moral responsibility. Moreover, if God is the substance or nature that is present everywhere, then he is present nowhere as an “intelligent personal cause of the world.”Footnote 48
Jacobi's answer to this predicament was famously to propose a “salto mortale” (literally, a death-defying leap) back to common sense and away from the nihilistic consequences of modern rationalism.Footnote 49 This is a third answer to the problem of knowledge, which is said to involve an “either/or of intellect and faith” as proposed by thinkers such as Schleiermacher, Kierkegaard, Rudolph Otto, and Karl Barth.Footnote 50 That is, insofar as systematic rationalism undermines the foundations of morality and religion, we must choose, as Frederick Beiser puts it, “either [to] follow our reason and become atheists and fatalists; or … to renounce our reason and make a leap of faith in God and freedom.”Footnote 51 Yet the problem with this answer, according to Strauss, is that the very act of choosing to follow our reason would be fatal to the life of reason, that is, to science or philosophy. For if philosophy cannot establish its own premises, it must concede that alternative choices are equally defensible. The practical result—as Strauss diagnosed it in twentieth-century German thought, notably, in Max Weber—was, again, a form of nihilism understood as the view that the only criteria we possess for distinguishing between good and bad choices are “subjective value judgments or arbitrary preferences.”Footnote 52
That modern rationalism culminates in nihilism has become a Straussian truism which has also been traced to the influence of Jacobi.Footnote 53 Yet, by inverting the order of explanation a different picture comes into view. In its origins, as first diagnosed by Jacobi, the problem of nihilism is not the absence of foundations, as Strauss's critique of Weber suggests, but the quest for foundations where they cannot be found, or where they are not needed. More precisely, the problem is that the rationalist “tendency to prove everything and accept nothing as given”Footnote 54—the tendency epitomized by Spinoza and modern science—paradoxically limits the scope of reason. It does so through a kind of compulsion to grasp conceptually what must first be “seen,” to demonstrate what is evident, and to prove what must be presupposed.
Jacobi's response to nihilism was to restore the commonsense view, which was also the view of Spinoza and of ancient Greek thought, that knowledge is genuinely receptive, while also recognizing the finitude of reason. His was the first major attempt, followed notably by Hegel, to throw a bridge between Kant and Spinoza that would restore the link between mind and world. As will be seen in the following section, a central aim of Strauss's dissertation is to trace the impact of Jacobi's attempt on post-Kantian thought, specifically on the phenomenological critique of neo-Kantianism.
III. The Young Strauss's Phenomenological Critique of Modern Rationalism
Strauss argues that “the fundamental problem of Jacobi's doctrine of knowledge is the justification [or legitimation: Rechtfertigung] of the transcendent reality of Being.”Footnote 55 In light of the problematic described above, the claim can be understood as follows. In order to escape the nihilistic consequences of the two main strands of modern rationalism defended by Spinoza and Kant, Jacobi must show that there is a dimension of meaning and intelligibility that transcends the sphere of conceptual understanding. To do this, his doctrine of knowledge must navigate between the Scylla of systematic rationalism, which hypostasizes all Being into “substance” or “nature,” and the Charybdis of an idealism which seeks to “dissolve all Being into processes of consciousness.”Footnote 56
To justify the “transcendent reality of Being” in this sense—that is, to establish our awareness of meaning and intelligibility as the ground of knowledge—Strauss suggests, a renewal of method is needed which, in turn, must lead to a renewal of philosophy. The new method is the phenomenological method of “description.”Footnote 57 The core of Strauss's dissertation is accordingly an interpretation of Jacobi's phenomenology of knowledge. Strauss's interpretation has two main goals. Against the traditional reception of Jacobi as a fideist or irrationalist, Strauss argues, first, that Jacobi understood himself as a “principled realist,” that is, as holding the view that our perceptual capacities are open to the world without mental mediations or representations.Footnote 58 Second, Strauss seeks to show that Jacobi's challenge to Kant has returned in the phenomenological critique of neo-Kantianism. Drawing on Jacobi and phenomenology, Strauss develops a critique of “autonomism” which becomes foundational for his later political philosophy.
Before turning to Strauss's critique, it is essential to introduce his terms and his general critique of the Kantian legacy. “Autonomism,” according to Strauss, is “the principle of modern culture which invokes the independence of religious conscience, of scientific reason, and of moral legislation (sola fides, sola ratio, ‘only a good will’).”Footnote 59 The references to Kantian morality and Protestant faith are evident. Jacobi rejects both on the grounds of a philosophic realism which Strauss reconstructs in the dissertation. As for the independence of “scientific reason,” it too is superseded, as we will see, by a conception of reason that is open to the “transcendent reality of Being.” Much depends, then, on understanding what “transcendence” means in this context. As will become clear, the term refers, following Husserl, to mind-transcendence, that is, to the reality that is outside us, “fundamentally other”—never fully penetrable, and ordinarily believed rather than known.Footnote 60 This reality extends from physical things and other human beings to eidetic forms, nature, and God.
The problem is, accordingly, how one can justify an understanding of reality as transcendent in that sense, i.e., as encompassing “all things,” including what is humanly unknowable. This is a fundamental, or literally foundational, problem in Strauss's thought, for on it depends his lifelong insistence that the human being be understood as open to a heterogeneous and mysterious “whole,” and not, say, to the sum of everything knowable. Strauss's answer has been understood by his critics as a question-begging recovery of a “‘natural’ orientation” that is incompatible with post-Kantian philosophy.Footnote 61 His dissertation shows the opposite. With Jacobi and (implicitly) Hegel,Footnote 62 Strauss begins from the premise that philosophy cannot supplant our commonsense understanding of reality. Yet, beyond Jacobi, Strauss insists that any appeal to common sense—or what he calls, with Husserl, the “‘natural’ attitude”—needs to be justified.Footnote 63 That is, Jacobi must legitimize his appeal to what appears to be “given.” More precisely, he must show that an undogmatic philosophy must begin by acknowledging everything that appears to consciousness as a potential source of authority for knowledge. Jacobi does not do this. Rather it is the young Strauss who attempts that legitimation by reconstrucing Jacobi's doctrine of knowledge with the help of phenomenology.
Drawing on contemporary phenomenological critics of Kant and especially neo-Kantianism, Strauss suggests (1) that knowledge results from the correlation between mind and world or thinking and being. (2) Beyond the mind, knowledge involves the full range of intentional experience—from conceptual understanding, through embodied perception and belief, to rational intuition and the “intelligence of the heart.” (3) Perception is not only sensible but intellectual or noetic. (4) The whole that engages our attention is heterogeneous: it consists of different levels (or strata: Stufen) of intelligibility. (5) Knowledge is in the end based on acknowledgment: it grows out of prescientific forms of awareness which are expressed in the phenomenon of “belief.”
Conceptual Understanding and Its Limits
The first step of Strauss's phenomenology of knowledge consists in a critique of the power of intellectual understanding (Verstand). Following Kant, Jacobi conceives of the understanding as the principle of consciousness and as a purely formal faculty of concept formation and demonstration.Footnote 64 The understanding gives conceptual form to objects that are given otherwise.Footnote 65 Through the formation of concepts, the understanding can stride away from what is given to sensible intuition, but the “objective content of its concepts depends entirely on [those] intuitive foundations.”Footnote 66 The limits of the understanding are exposed in the attempt to establish it nonetheless as an independent source of cognition. More precisely, the understanding reveals its limits when it is conceived as an essentially spontaneous faculty which functions without any discernible contribution of receptivity.Footnote 67
Jacobi's critique is aimed at Kant but, as Strauss suggests, it also applies to his neo-Kantian successors. Whereas Kant conceived of what is given to the understanding along empiricist lines as the “raw material of sensible impressions,” neo-Kantians began to regard the very notion of the “given” as a prejudice (Cohen) or as a “constructive project” of the mind (Cassirer).Footnote 68 In light of the scientific discoveries of the nineteenth century, allegedly “given” data, such as space, time, force, mass, substances, and species (or “kinds”), came to be seen as constructions of reason.Footnote 69 As Cassirer put it in 1920, the year before Strauss defended his dissertation, the “given” is “simply a representation whose origins in us are unknown to us.”Footnote 70
Thus, neo-Kantianism solved the problem of the Kantian “thing-in-itself” by conceiving it as an “x” standing for the “as-yet-unknown.”Footnote 71 Yet this exacerbated another Jacobian problem—nihilism. Strauss describes the tension as follows. On the one hand, the critique of the given possesses a “deep objective legitimacy” that was “barely noted by Jacobi.” From Plato to Spinoza, through Kant and Fichte, to Cassirer and Cohen, the “philosophizing of pure reason” begins from “the negation of the given, which qua given would remain irrational.”Footnote 72 On the other hand, the “rationalizing tendency of all system-philosophy” is inevitably destructive: it is “forced to destroy natural certainty and what is given in it, without being able … to replace what went lost.”Footnote 73 Given with “natural certainty,” for example, is the equal certainty I have that “I am” and that “there are things outside me.”Footnote 74 Further, we also possess “irrational evidence” of God's existence; or, as Strauss puts it, echoing Karl Barth, a sense that “God is not only ‘in us,’” but “at least as much ‘above us.’”Footnote 75 These “certainties”—the sense that religion is given to man and not produced by him, or that the very “Being and meaning” (Sein und Sinn) of God is to be transcendent—are destroyed by the process of rationalization.Footnote 76
To reverse this tendency and, more importantly, to establish that it leads to the self-undermining of reason, Strauss needs to show that knowledge is after all receptive, or that it presupposes a given articulation of “Being and meaning.” Strauss's argument is based on his reading of Jacobi, but it draws its most powerful support from the phenomenological critique of neo-Kantianism.
Strauss begins by suggesting that intuition is not only sensible as in KantFootnote 77 but also noetic or intellectual. This means that we perceive not only empirical but also essential differences, for example, between colors. It is by virtue of our capacity to “see” such differences that things make sense to us, or that the world does not appear to us as a formless mass but as a “wealth of meaning.”Footnote 78 Strauss begins to make this case indirectly by referring to a lecture by the phenomenologist Adolf Reinach.Footnote 79 “Wholly in the sense of Jacobi,” Strauss writes, Reinach claimed that the neo-Kantian understanding of the given as a “constructive project” has led to great progress in mathematics, yet it has done “more harm to philosophy than can shortly be said.”Footnote 80 The harm lies in the attempt to “‘reduce’ experience to the furthest possible extent”—for example, to reduce the sensibly perceived essence of red to the essence of waves; or to reduce the experience of pardoning to an act of judging or to the “cessation of feeling.”Footnote 81 In doing so, we try to explain something in terms of what is given through other forms of knowledge.Footnote 82 The result is a “hopeless attempt to define something by means of that which it is not.”Footnote 83
So far in Strauss's account, however, no attempt has been made to legitimize the transcendent reality of essential forms, or of a meaning that is presumably “given” in experiences such as pardoning. In order to see further, the understanding must first overcome the “fear” of sensuousness, or what Strauss describes as a Cartesian anxiety to conceptually eradicate what is given to us through sense perception.Footnote 84 This means, however, to confront the “transcendence of irrationality.”Footnote 85 Specifically, there is, first, the sheer givenness of existence, or the fact that man “in his individuality ‘finds himself as this being through an immediate … feeling of his essence, not through knowledge.’”Footnote 86 Secondly, to this irrationality of the “principle” of all knowledge corresponds an irrationality of the “material” of cognition, which begins from “indemonstrable events.”Footnote 87
The Receptivity of Knowledge
Strauss's critique of the spontaneity of the understanding is premised on the phenomenological insight into the intentionality or “directedness” of cognition.Footnote 88 A key blind spot of philosophical idealism, he argues, is that it “do[es] not know or does not acknowledge the force that cognition carries beyond itself and links it to the object.”Footnote 89 Once this directedness is acknowledged, Strauss claims, “a second stage in the knowledge of the transcendence of Being is reached: transcendence as objectivity [Objektivität].”Footnote 90
To introduce Strauss's unusual understanding of the phenomenon of cognition at this stage, it will help to quote him at length:
Cognition is directed at something outside it which first gives it meaning, and to which it conforms. The relative spontaneity, which Jacobi acknowledges in our capacity for abstraction and demonstration, is secondary vis-à-vis the [understanding's] fundamental receptivity. The understanding can only grasp conceptually what is given—it can only prove by pointing to the given. Thus the genuinely “giving” forms of knowledge are: perception [Wahrnehmung] and reason [Vernunft] whose very names—Wahr-Nehmen [literally “to take to be true”] and Vernunft, from Vernehmen [to receive-perceive]—point to a transcendent object.Footnote 91
Strauss goes on to argue that it is not only the content of cognition that is transcendent but also the “form, in the sense of the form of truth.” This form is not “a product of cognition but a transcendent value.”Footnote 92 Strauss's argument rests on Jacobi but, as he notes, it cannot be found in the same terms in Jacobi.
Jacobi understands the transcendence of Being, and specifically the dimension of “the true” that gives meaning to knowledge, as follows:
I understand by “the true” something which is prior to and outside knowledge; that which first gives value to knowledge and to the faculty of knowledge, to reason. “Taking hold of” [Vernehmen] presupposes something capable of being taken hold of; reason [Vernunft] presupposes the true; it is the faculty of presupposing the true. A reason that does not presuppose the true is an abomination.Footnote 93
As recent scholarship suggests, Jacobi's understanding of the true as “prior to and outside knowledge” anticipates Heidegger's famous insistence on the ontological difference between beings (Seiendes) and Being (Sein).Footnote 94 Strauss could hardly have been aware of this in 1921. Yet he argues that the consequences of Jacobi's thought coincide with the work of Emil Lask, who, as we know today, exerted a decisive influence on Heidegger.Footnote 95 In Heideggerian terms, to say that the true is prior to and outside knowledge is to insist on the fact that any (ontic) knowledge about beings presupposes an (ontological) understanding of the meaning of Being. Specifically, one could say that every “truth” about beings that can be explained or theorized within a given science presupposes that those beings—from physical objects to mathematical axioms—are intelligible or meaningful. Yet what makes them meaningful or intelligible cannot itself be explained from within any given science. Thus, the meaning of Being or, in Jacobi's terms, the dimension of “the true” that gives meaning and value to knowledge must always be presupposed.
Drawing on Lask, Strauss renders Jacobi's “the true” as “transcendent value” and “form,” or that by virtue of which beings are intelligible to us.Footnote 96 Though the thought of Lask cannot be treated here in detail, the key point for our purposes is that what is given to us in prescientific experience is, in Lask's words, never “an a-morphous formless mass.” Rather, as Lask insists, “the objective realm is in fact articulated!”Footnote 97 or, as Strauss will put it decades later, as previously noted: “there is an articulation of reality that precedes all scientific articulation.”Footnote 98
By interpreting Jacobi's understanding of the “true” as “form” in Lask's sense, Strauss was moving a century away from the standard (Kantian) interpretation of Jacobi as an irrationalist towards a rather bold interpretation of the classic Schwärmer as, in a sense, a classic rationalist.Footnote 99 Thus, for Strauss's Jacobi, the transcendent reality of Being becomes manifest (so far) as “irrationality,” “objectivity,” and what appears to be Aristotelian “form”—interpreted, in postmetaphysical terms, not as an ontic property of things but as the “way of being,” or look (eidos), or surface appearance of a phenomenon.Footnote 100 The rest of the dissertation elaborates this reading of Jacobi as a philosophic realist, and, implicitly, I shall argue, as a defender of a classical understanding of reason against modern rationalism. To this end, Strauss moves from the spontaneity of the understanding to three “giving” forms of knowledge—perception, reason, and the heart.
Perception and Belief
In Strauss's reading of Jacobi, meaning is given to us as part of the structure of reality. In words that echo Lask, and, incidentally, Heidegger's lectures at the time, Strauss writes:
Our knowledge of the sensible world is determined “with commanding force” by the meaning that holds sway over objects [in den Gegenständen waltenden Sinn]. “Reason,” meaning, expresses itself in the sensible world that surrounds us, and this “objective” meaning orders our representations of the world…. Differently put: We must raise ourselves to the meaning of the world that subsists as such, or: We are addressed by the meaning of the world, it discloses itself to us.Footnote 101
These are far-reaching claims, ripe with consequences. Strauss seems to be affirming a particularly strong form of “meaning realism,” in which meaning “holds sway” over objects and not only “determines” our knowledge of the sensible but “orders” our representations. Beyond that: meaning also claims us, or addresses us—and we must respond by, as it were, “measuring up” to its call.
Yet Strauss also makes clear the limits of this understanding of the phenomenon of perception, the first of three “giving” forms of knowledge he considers. Perception—understood as Wahrnehmung or the receiving-perceiving of meaning and intelligibility—gives content and direction to the understanding. As such, it has an all-important function for cognition. But, as Strauss points out, this is as far as Jacobi goes in his description of the phenomenon.Footnote 102 Thus, the apparent ascent we have been tracing from the “transcendence of irrationality” to transcendent “values” and “forms” reaches here an impasse. For the most one can say about the “meaning that ‘holds sway’ over objects” is that it is revealed in the “correlation” between knowing and known, or feeling and felt.Footnote 103 But insight into that correlation or into the structure of acts and what they disclose, does not even guarantee that the objects intended by consciousness in fact exist. After all, a conscious mental act may intend a fiction or a hallucination.Footnote 104
Against such skepticism, Jacobi's answer is his “salto mortale,” which in light of Strauss's analysis appears not as a blind leap of faith but as a return to the “original, prescientific knowledge existing prior to and at the basis of all demonstration, the knowledge of sound commonsense.”Footnote 105 The difficulty in understanding Jacobi's salto mortale turns on the notion of “faith” or belief (Glaube) which Strauss seeks to elucidate phenomenologically.
According to Jacobi, faith or belief is essential to our apprehension of reality. Thus, for instance, Jacobi suggests that simple perceptions have the structure of “revelations,” such that “I experience that I am, and that there is something outside me, in one and the same indivisible moment.”Footnote 106 Yet this immediate revelation, and the certainty that comes with it, is “in a strict philosophical sense … only a faith.”Footnote 107 As Jacobi puts it, faith is “the element of all cognition and action … Without faith, we cannot cross the threshold, sit at table, or go to bed.”Footnote 108
Jacobi's understanding of faith or belief is heavily indebted to Hume.Footnote 109 Strauss, for his part, seems to be interested in both thinkers as precursors of the phenomenology of belief and, in particular, of Husserl's understanding of the “belief” (or doxa) that is the “element” of the “natural attitude.”Footnote 110 In Hume's conception, writes Strauss, “what leads us beyond the sphere of immediately given sensations, is above all the relation of causality.”Footnote 111 But the only evidence we have of causality is an inference based on custom. Inferences, in turn, are characterized by Hume as acts of belief, which themselves are ultimately feelings or psychological operations.Footnote 112 However, there seems to be no way to distinguish such beliefs from fictions that may induce the same kinds of feelings.
In light of the limitations of Hume's explanation of belief—an explanation that reduces belief to other phenomena of consciousness such as a feeling or imagination—Strauss raises the phenomenological question concerning the “essence” (Wesen) or “suchness” (Sosein) of belief as it may be gleaned from Hume's description of the phenomenon. Hume describes belief as a “more vivid, lively, forcible, firm, steady conception of an object, than what the imagination alone is ever able to attain.”Footnote 113 Again, however, there is no essential difference between imagination and belief.Footnote 114
Hume's conception of belief, and his philosophy in general, have been interpreted as a source of German antirationalism.Footnote 115 Against such interpretations, Strauss emphasizes the “positive” aspect of belief as the “consciousness of reality” and as the foundation of other unprovable certainties such as the consciousness of causality and probability.Footnote 116 Indeed, according to Strauss, it is this “positive” aspect of belief that Jacobi radicalizes in his own conception of belief. Thus, Strauss argues, “it becomes possible to vindicate vis-à-vis the specific lived phenomenon—precisely ‘belief’—a specific objective counterpart—reality [Realität].”Footnote 117
Through his analysis of perception and belief, Strauss arrives at a third stage in the justification of the transcendent reality of Being. Belief, understood more as doxa than as pistis (faith), that is, as a “holding-to-be-true” (Fürwahrhalten) and hence also an expectation, constitutes “the act in which the transcendence of reality [Realität] is perceived.”Footnote 118 This is a transcendence that cannot be proved, that is, it cannot be traced back to more evident givens.Footnote 119 Belief is a preconscious decision to hold something to be true, not on the basis of a deduction but of a pre-judgment. Such pre-judgments or prejudices are themselves grounded in the structure of experience as it appears to us by virtue of the fact that we have a body—or, in the Husserlian term used by Strauss, a “lived body” (Leib).Footnote 120
Rational Intuition
The second faculty that provides “matter” and “sense” to the understanding is reason. Whereas perception, “mediated by the corporeality of the lived body,” apprehends “natural reality,” reason, mediated by the “divine part in us, apprehends God, and the values of truth, the good, and the beautiful.”Footnote 121 Thus, Strauss traces a further ascent in Jacobi towards the divine and what appear to be supersensible “ideas” of truth, goodness, and beauty. From a Kantian standpoint, the danger of dogmatism—of a frictionless flight in the void of supersensible cognition—seems imminent. Yet, according to Jacobi, this Kantian critique is suspect: not only does it express the “fear” of anything that might disturb the tranquility of the understanding—in this case, a fear of the supersensible—but it also contradicts the spirit of genuine Platonic-Aristotelian rationalism.Footnote 122
As Paul Franks argues, the key difference between Jacobi's understanding of reason and the modern understanding is that for Jacobi, as for Plato and Aristotle, “reason is not a faculty of inference but of perception.”Footnote 123 It is only because modern rationalism understands reason as a “mere faculty of concepts, judgments, and inferences,”Footnote 124 we could say, that it is “afraid” of perceiving the supersensible—or considers it literally senseless. According to Jacobi, the problem began in the growing tendency since Aristotle to subordinate “immediate knowledge to mediated cognition,” or the “faculty of perception that originally grounds everything” to “the faculty of reflection, which is conditioned by abstraction.”Footnote 125 Once reason is understood as a faculty of explanatory inference that seeks to account for and to justify what common sense believes in, it becomes corrosive of the faith by which we take our bearings in ordinary life. This corrosion of the ordinary is at the heart of what Jacobi understands by nihilism.Footnote 126
Instead of being a faculty of inference, then, reason for Jacobi is “a higher faculty of perception [Wahrnehmung] that is not in need of sense intuition.”Footnote 127 Despite this heterogeneity of principle between reason and sensibility, however, both faculties—qua “giving” faculties—share a common structure. Like sensible perception, reason does not have itself as its object and does not generate its object spontaneously. As the eye is the organ for the perception of the sensible, reason is “the organ with which we are aware of the supersensible.” Like the external senses, reason “does not produce concepts, it builds no system, and does not even judge; instead it … simply reveals, it makes positive proclamations.”Footnote 128 Finally, in the same way that sensible intuition is a genuine source of cognition against which no demonstration counts, “by the same token, no demonstration counts against rational intuition … which gives us objects that transcend nature for our cognition.”Footnote 129 Among these objects are not only the true, the good, the beautiful, freedom, and virtue,Footnote 130 but also—as Strauss indicates—God.
But how do we know this? How do we know that these are transcendent objects and not merely postulates of practical reason, or heuristic fictions, or noble lies? The answer is that we cannot know, if knowing means adducing “empirical evidence” (for these are nonsensible forms or categories). Nor can we know by proving or explaining, for, as we saw, to explain a phenomenon as something or other is to reduce it to what it is not. To “know,” then, must mean to phenomenologically describe as carefully as possible how the true, the good, the beautiful, and God, are “given” in lived experience.
To do this, Strauss elaborates his distinction between different levels of transcendence. Against the attempt to explain everything, he argues (with Jacobi) that concerning “the meaning of God … we only possess as much knowledge as the spirit in us can produce.”Footnote 131 This, in turn, depends on our “living knowledge”—a Pascalian “intelligence of the good” that resides in the “heart.”Footnote 132 Thus, according to Strauss, “here too holds the transcendence of irrationality,” or the Pascalian dictum that “it is necessary to love divine things in order to know them.”Footnote 133
Strauss then seeks to describe more clearly what this means. His framework for understanding different degrees of transcendence is a tripartite distinction between “acts” of consciousness, a transcendent object at which they are directed, and a mediating element linking acts and objects.Footnote 134 Strauss develops this framework in an extremely compressed way for which the following sketch must suffice.
Strauss considers three “objects” of reason: God, values, and “divine things,” by which Jacobi means “virtuous sentiments, inclinations, dispositions, and actions.”Footnote 135 God is perceived through “belief,” the act through which we grasp the “transcendence of reality” (Realität).Footnote 136 God must first “be born in man”—and yet he remains transcendent, that is, “God is not only ‘in us,’ he is at least as much ‘above us.’”Footnote 137 The mediating element linking consciousness to the “supersensible real” must likewise be supersensible—namely, a “sympathy for actuality, life, and truth that are invisible.”Footnote 138 Here it is no longer the “corporeality of the body” that mediates as in sensible perception, but the “immortal part of our ‘essence,’ the divine in us.”Footnote 139
Strauss goes to great lengths to further elucidate Jacobi's understanding of belief. To mention but one point, which underscores the “irrational” and yet essential importance of belief: Jacobi conceives of belief as a natural “instinct” that is as “natural” to man “as his upright position.”Footnote 140 This “instinct” is not limited to the natural, as in Hume; rather, as Strauss writes:
it refers to the whole of human “nature.” The instinctual belief in God corresponds to the “impulse” (Trieb) of the heart, of which Augustine says: Cor nostrum inquietum est, donec requiescat in te. “Human nature,” the “essence” and the basic drives of [this] essence—“natural” and religious instinct—are therefore more comprehensive than nature in the proper sense, they are truly metaphysical.Footnote 141
At this point, Strauss comes closest to describing Jacobi traditionally as a religious thinker. We note, however, that his discussion remains within the limits of a phenomenologically expanded conception of reason. All we know from the phenomenology of religious experience is that human consciousness is intentionally directed towards an “object” experienced as “above us,” or as “wholly Other.” This directedness seems to be grounded in the structure of experience as presupposing “belief,” in its duality as faith/doxa, as well as in a “natural” impulse of the heart. None of this, however, allows us to make claims about the truth of particular religions or revelations, which would amount to “religious materialism” or idolatry.Footnote 142
The “Logic of the Heart”
The third and final form of “giving” knowledge originates in the “logic of the heart,” an allusion to Pascal's logique du coeur which can be understood as the affective source of knowledge of the good.Footnote 143 Strauss seeks to show that ethical knowledge is governed by the same “formal structure” in Jacobi as knowledge of nature and knowledge of God.Footnote 144 As a “giving” form of knowledge, the “logic of the heart” stands “outside the understanding,” or “before it,” in a fundamentally receptive relation to a transcendent reality—the “system of ends.”Footnote 145 Just as knowledge of God is knowledge of an “irrational” transcendence, which is nonetheless a real transcendence, Strauss argues that the “objects” (Gegenstände) of the heart stand in the “transcendence of irrationality,” and yet remain real—and binding—givens.
Strauss's aim is to articulate Jacobi's philosophically “realist” ethics, that is, an ethics that is grounded on “reflection on Being.”Footnote 146 Since to reflect on Being means to reflect, on the one hand, on transcendence and, on the other hand, on natural “instincts” and “impulses,” the result will be a tension-ridden ethics; that is, an ethics that hovers between supernaturalism and naturalism, or between a transcendental “ought-ethics” and eudaimonism.Footnote 147 An ethics thus grounded on “reflection on Being” will also amount to a principled rejection of “autonomism” as a source of normativity—again, however, without fully embracing heteronomy.Footnote 148 To clarify Strauss's dense exposition, it will help to divide it into the following five theses.
The first thesis is that there is a parallelism between Jacobi's epistemology and his ethics. According to Jacobi, “the basic mistake of a rationalistic ethics is that it sets out from the understanding, or rather from a reason that is conceived too ‘analytically,’ and that … it attempts to provide a rational foundation for ethical truths.” This attempt necessarily falls short since—“as all true givens”—ethical truths are “inaccessible to the understanding.”Footnote 149
The second thesis is that, since the understanding “does not have its light, and its life, in itself,” Jacobi rejects autonomy as the principle of ethics. In particular, he rejects an ethics that is grounded on an autonomous will. For an autonomous will is not only empty: its quest for a “universally valid and rigorously scientific system of morality” must also tear conscience “from its living root, which is the heart of man, up to the last fiber.”Footnote 150 As a result, the law of a universally valid ethics “can never become the heart of man and truly elevate him above himself.”Footnote 151 Indeed, not only is the heart the “living root”—and, as such, a principle—of ethical action but every free action, Jacobi claims, is “combined with pleasure.”Footnote 152
According to Strauss's third thesis, this leads us to the heart of Jacobi's ethical teaching, which stands “between the ethics of transcendence and eudaimonistic ethics—not as a mediation without force, but as an absolutely independent position.”Footnote 153 The tension between these two types of ethics is expressed in Jacobi's claim that every ethical action is accompanied by pleasure, which means that it does not occur (only) for the sake of pleasure. Jacobi's historical model is Aristotle, for whom even the highest sublimations of ethical consciousness are linked to the faculty of desire.Footnote 154 Indeed, there is, as Jacobi writes, “no grounds [Erkenntnisgrund] for knowing the good except our faculty of desire.”Footnote 155
And yet, the result is not a naturalistic ethics, as one could say of a Freudian ethics grounded in sublimated drives. Strauss argues as follows. Since “the faculty of desire is the principle of both ‘natural’ and moral desire, and since morality stands outside of nature strictly speaking”—presumably since it can command nature—“the faculty of desire must be metaphysical”:
Morality is comprised in “human nature” in the Jacobian sense. As a consequence, Jacobi's ethics is separated in the clearest way from a naturalistic ethics, while on the other hand it also differs fundamentally from a transcendental ought-ethics by virtue of its reflection on a Being [Sein].Footnote 156
The remainder of Strauss's discussion of the “heart” as a faculty of knowledge examines this tension. On the one hand, Jacobi must guarantee the intrinsic value of morality vis-à-vis happiness and other natural ends and desires.Footnote 157 Yet, on the other hand, Jacobi's cryptic suggestion that “destiny has to be privileged over the pleasurable” cannot be proved.Footnote 158
Strauss's fourth thesis is, consequently, that “the ends of morality, the objects of the heart stand in the transcendence of irrationality.”Footnote 159 Yet again Strauss insists that this “cannot possibly be the true meaning of Jacobi's ethics.”Footnote 160 This follows from Jacobi's “decided realism and objectivism.”Footnote 161 Thus, Jacobi “stresses explicitly that in the moral feelings and with them ‘something independent of them’ is perceived.”Footnote 162 Strauss adduces similar claims by Jacobi in order to drive home the point that, even if one cannot prove the existence of an independent moral order, Jacobi's “principled realism also dominates in his ethics.”Footnote 163
This leads to a fifth and final thesis—perhaps the most remarkable in Strauss's dissertation insofar as it prefigures much of his later thought. In Jacobi's “principled realism lies also the grounds for his rebellion against the principle of autonomism.”Footnote 164 “Autonomism,” Strauss writes, is “the ethical form of universal doubt, of the principle of modern culture which invokes the independence of religious conscience, of scientific reason, and of moral legislation (sola fides, sola ratio, ‘only a good will’).”Footnote 165 Against this, Jacobi insists, in Strauss's words, that
in ethical matters, it is simply unnecessary for the acting subject to understand the norm and to affirm it out of his own insight. It is not the case that insight precedes and obedience follows, but precisely the reverse: only out of obedience, as a result of following the norm, from the penetration of the norm into the center of our lives as a consequence of obedience, does ethical insight emerge.Footnote 166
IV. From the Phenomenological Critique of Modern Rationalism to Political Philosophy
Strauss considered his dissertation “disgraceful,” as we saw. Yet recent scholarship suggests that he was right about Jacobi, who, far from being an irrationalist, developed a response to Kant that remains powerful today.Footnote 167 As I have argued, the dissertation also prefigures Strauss's later thought, in particular, the quest for the prescientific grounds in the “natural attitude” from which the conflict between belief and unbelief can be adequately addressed; the lifelong quest to articulate what is “given” to us; the premise that there is an “articulation of reality that precedes all scientific articulation”; and the critique of “autonomism,” or the view that “all meaning, all order, all beauty, originate in the thinking subject, in human thought, in man.”Footnote 168 Against the charge that Strauss's quest for a “‘natural’ orientation” is incompatible with post-Kantian philosophy,Footnote 169 I have tried to show that it is post-Kantian in the decisive respect: there is for Strauss no unmediated access to “nature” or to “the given” or to a “permanent whole.”Footnote 170 What is foundational is rather an awareness or openness to meaning and intelligibility—in Husserlian terms, a “correlation” or “harmony” between thinking and being. It remains to be shown how that foundational premise relates to Strauss's mature understanding of political philosophy.
According to Strauss, in its original Socratic form, political philosophy is “the core of philosophy or rather ‘the first philosophy.’”Footnote 171 Though Strauss was rarely explicit about his debt to Husserl,Footnote 172 there is a striking continuity between the phenomenological premises of his dissertation and his mature understanding of Socratic political philosophy. The latter understands man as open to the “mysterious character of the whole,”Footnote 173 that is, to a whole that is in principle intelligible but never fully penetrable. The whole is heterogeneous, both sensibly and noetically. In the terms of the dissertation, it consists of different levels of intelligibility: some things are known “irrationally” or indemonstrably, in “immediate feeling” (e.g., individuality); others are known by virtue of their “‘objective’ meaning” or “form” (e.g., the essence of pardoning); still others must be believed or “presupposed” in “knowledge of ignorance” (e.g., the being of God).Footnote 174 Thus, knowledge of totalities, political or cosmological, must be renounced: as finite beings, we only see parts of things—yet we intuit whole things. Prior to knowing conceptually, that is, we live in the “forms” or “looks” that meaningfully organize our world, allowing us to make essential distinctions. Cognition is not primarily spontaneous but receptive. It is drawn by the “form” of things which, far from being value neutral, elicits a response, a preconscious affirmation or rejection manifested as belief or opinion (doxa).Footnote 175 Opinion is, accordingly, our primary access to reality.
Yet here a crucial caveat must be introduced: Strauss understood his mature thought to be a superior alternative to phenomenology. As Richard Velkley has argued, Socratic political philosophy seeks not only to descriptively save the phenomena but to dialectically expose “the fissures and perplexities in the prephilosophic understanding.”Footnote 176 Prephilosophic understanding, moreover, is not simply available. Indeed, Strauss took distance from phenomenological attempts to retrieve an allegedly prephilosophic or “commonsense” understanding that in fact presupposed the validity of modern philosophy and science.Footnote 177
Thus we return to the problem posed at the outset: the limits of modern rationalism and the possibility of a phenomenological alternative that is “more in harmony with ‘the given.’”Footnote 178 The limits can be summed up as follows. As Jacobi saw, and as the historical research of the late Husserl and Heidegger confirmed, modern rationalism has transformed common sense to such an extent that what Platonic-Aristotelian thought considered evident has become incredible. Philosophically, post-Kantian thought no longer considers reason to be a faculty of perception. Morally and politically, we no longer believe—or we can no longer justify—the commonsense view that our feelings of the good or of respect and awe perceive a reality independent of them.Footnote 179 As Weber memorably put it, who—“aside from a few big children in university chairs”—still believes in the intelligible reality of “the beautiful, the good, or … of bravery, of the soul”?Footnote 180
Strauss began his career by questioning the neo-Kantian premises that Weber accepted. His allies included Husserl and Heidegger, among others, who agreed with Kant that the substantial ground of knowledge in eternal causes is unavailable to human reason, while rejecting the view that reason has insight only into what it produces. Yet Strauss also moved beyond the phenomenological premises as he discovered the possibility of a return to premodern rationalism. Thus on the Socratic-Platonic plane of his mature thought, every “fundamental experience” is a partial vision of the “self-subsisting truth” of the whole, whose divination requires (or cannot exclude) the use of hypothetical assumptions.Footnote 181 Thus, on the all-too-human assumption that there could be an eternal cause unavailable to reason, Strauss seeks to ground philosophy on the “fundamental problems … that are coeval with human thought.”Footnote 182
Let me conclude, however, by suggesting that even this insight into “fundamental problems” may have resulted from an internal critique of Kant, that is, from Strauss's quest for a “truly critical philosophy.”Footnote 183 Neo-Kantian thought elevated the rationalist tendency to “accept nothing as given” to unprecedented heights.Footnote 184 Yet Kant himself, along with his most important successors, took Jacobi's challenge seriously.Footnote 185 The basic challenge is that something must be given for thinking to be possible.Footnote 186 What is given—the irreducible phenomena—I suggest, are the “fundamental” or “foundational” problems. Jacobi turned away from the philosophy of the subject to find those problems in the irreducible phenomena of “religion and government,” “the two poles of human life.”Footnote 187 Through that turn, epistemology cedes its role as the modern “first philosophy” to “political philosophy.” Philosophy becomes linked to the problems of moral praxisFootnote 188—a first fundamental problem arising from the givenness of society. A second problem arises from the givenness of (our own) finite existence—the problem of “facticity” or “historicity” or “the status of ‘individuality.’”Footnote 189 A third problem is the givenness of a plurality of essential “forms,” which makes a total view of “the political” impossible. Finally, there is the problem that results from the givenness of perceptual “wholes,” namely, that each of our perceptions is an act of belief that affirms more than we strictly know. The eternal problem of belief or unbelief thus seems to be built into the very structure of experience.
This post-Kantian genealogy of the fundamental problems that give rise to the need for political philosophy remains, of course, inconclusive. But I hope to have shown that it is not without grounds. If so, the central effort of this essay—to point to an understanding of sources of meaning and normativity in the groundless grounds of fundamental problems—would be justified.
