Just like the proverbial books whose contents cannot be read from their title, this book's contents turn out to be much richer than what the title suggests. It explores in great detail the role of the very pregnant term “reason” in the Islamic tradition, raising questions as to whether classical Islam was a system of revelation only, thus a nonrational religion and civilization, or whether the civilization was built on solid foundations of rational thought, be it in philosophy, law, education, or even theology itself. The pregnancy of the term “reason” forces Walbridge to explore its dimensions in classical Greek philosophical texts, in scholasticism as a tool of theology, in the age of Enlightenment and the rational scientific tradition, in its utilitarian form and its concomitant practical rationality, in its relativism, in its Protestant textualism, in romanticism, in the civil war of reason in the West, and finally in Islam and in Western conceptions of reason. In each twist and turn of the prism through which Walbridge examines the concept of reason, readers should be prepared to engage in very sophisticated thought experiments that examine his/her own conception of what constitutes “reason.” Walbridge's connecting the foundation of the term reason to the concept of Greek logos, which becomes almost untranslatable when he further links it, as one should, to the Greek legein, “to speak,” and in turn to such concepts as “word, argument, speech, principle, logic, inner nature, and theory among others” (p. 19), demonstrates why he should have spent an equal amount of time and effort deploying a similar approach to exploring the term kalām in the Islamic tradition (which he treats on p. 117 without exploring it as widely as he does logos). Kalām also means “speech” linguistically (or “talk,” to use Walbridge's term), and on one level could easily echo the Greek legein, with all its shades of meanings and range of applications signaled previously. And just as Greek philosophy, and certainly later Christian theology, can be understood as an elaborate unfolding of logos, much of early Islamic theology and philosophy had its foundations well laid in the discipline of Islamic kalām.
Providing such a learned exploration of such concepts is not the only thing that Walbridge does in this book, although his anchoring the discussion of later developments and rational tendencies in Islamic civilization upon such foundational concepts certainly simplifies his task. What attentive readers can immediately see, once they go beyond the formal discourse of terms and definitions, is the pervasive rationalistic approach that readily unfolds in all aspects of Islamic intellectual life, which is the real message that Walbridge wishes to convey in the book. And he does so brilliantly.
This book should not be read as a simplistic treatment of the confrontation between reason and revelation in Islamic civilization, as one might read it at first glance, although it does explore that dimension. Instead, it should be read as a journey into intellectual realms where reason, in all the manifestations only hinted at previously, is demonstrably ever present in all folds of that intellectual life, even in those folds that bear directly on the nature of revelation and its strong links to law, philosophy, education, and certainly theology, the religious science par excellence.
In addition to the foundational conceptual framework detailed previously, the first part of the book covers such areas as empirical knowledge of God's mind and the various attempts throughout the history of Islamic civilization to synthesize philosophy and religion, singling out the particular failure of al-Farabi's attempt in that regard. The next part is devoted to mysticism, postclassical Islamic philosophy, and the rise and fall of Islamic science. Walbridge also devotes a special section to the concept of the “failure” of Islamic science, in which he contrasts the scientific revolution in Europe with the absence of a comparable enterprise in the Islamic world. Similar to the sources upon which he depends for his argument, such as the works of Edward Grant, Toby Huff, and H. Floris Cohen, Walbridge does not seem to notice that the particularity of the development of European science, during and immediately following the Renaissance, had very little to do with Islam, with which it was in constant contact. Here Walbridge and his sources seem to neglect that in order to understand this contrast properly, one has to compare developments in Europe with those in the rest of the world as well, including among the Chinese and Indian civilizations. The latter two civilizations, along with that of Islam, were at the time legitimate competitors with Europe, as Needham proposed more than fifty years ago. Thus one needs to understand what happened to all those civilizations in contrast to what happened in Europe rather than focus solely on the oppositional comparison between the Islamic and European civilizations. Once the comparison is cast worldwide, the contrast between the European scientific revolution and Islamic science loses its special significance, and one is forced to seek other explanations for the phenomenal rise of modern science, which is still so poorly understood. If Walbridge insisted on isolating Islamic civilization from this worldwide phenomenon, then he should have also isolated the Chinese and Indian civilizations and asked about the “failure” of Chinese science, the “failure” of Indian science, and even the “failure” of Greek science. It seems to me that it would have been more productive to ask what was particular about Europe that produced these revolutions. The answer could, then, easily become a story of “success” instead of an argument of “failure,” with all the implications of these two terms.
The remaining two parts of the book are devoted to “Logic, Education and Doubt” (Part II) and the “Fall and Future of Islamic Rationalism” (Part III). Here Walbridge advances his own answers to the very thorny questions that continue to plague modern Islamic societies, laying the blame on Islamic educational systems, their curricula, their adherence to what he calls a scholastic rationalism, and their ability to set boundaries to the treatment of logic, here using logic as the kingpin of intellectual activity. He concludes the second part with the characterization of the later Islamic educational system as “An Education of Form without Content” (Chapter 8) and moves on to the third part of the book, where he treats “The Fall and the Future of Islamic Rationalism.” It is in this last part that he treats such issues as “What Went Wrong?,” “Collapse of Traditional Education,” “Disagreement in the Contemporary Islamic World,” and “The Great Issues” ahead.
To his credit, and while treating the question of “What Went Wrong?” (pp. 162–69), Walbridge comes very close to the proper diagnosis of the decline of Islamic science (or should one say Islamic rationalism?) through the lens of colonialism. Here he senses the fundamentally destructive dynamic generated by the British occupation of India, the unmasked colonial posture they employed there, and the real disruption of ordinary life they engendered. But alas, he could not see that it is in the very nature of colonialism to utterly destroy native cultures nor could he see that no culture, under colonization, could ever generate new thought or even be inspired by its own history to build a better future. Even cultures under direct occupation or hegemonic subservience, as most of the Islamic world was up until very recently, and arguably continues to be, would meet the same fate as that of India. He sees no connection between the wide-ranging colonial adventures of European powers after the Age of Discovery and the rise of scientific revolutions. In the same way he does not see how this colonial expansion was responsible for the utter destruction of every other culture in the rest of the world. He has the data, well gathered in the exchanges between the “Anglicists” and the “Orientalists” in India, and he should have been able to see the implications of their writings for the people they brutally governed (or should we say “civilized”?), but in this reviewer's opinion Walbridge fails to exploit this data in order to construct a comprehensive vision of the destructive power of colonialism over all aspects of life. Not only did the philosophers fail but also even the jurists, the belletrists, and the religious theorists became occupied minds, and occupied minds simply do not produce innovative ideas.
Yet I suspect this book could become a good textbook if for no other reason than that it may generate multiple discussions in classroom environments, discussions whose outlines are only hurriedly sketched in the very rich material covered in this slim volume.
