Beginning in early 2010 and continuing to the present, a series of dramatic events at the highest levels of Algeria's political and economic structures—including corruption charges, judicial proceedings, dismissal of high level executives, reshuffling of cabinet portfolios, shifting of key government personnel, the assassination of a security chief, and the continuing decline in the physical and political health of Algeria's president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika—has reconfirmed and reinforced the deep ties and linkages between politics and economics in the country. Unlike any other state actor, Sonatrach, the country's gargantuan national oil and gas company, has come to represent the instrumentalization of Algeria's political economy. Miriam Lowi's new book provides a detailed agency-based account of how rentierism “impoverishes” politics to the overall detriment of social growth, economic opportunity, and democratic development.
The political upheaval of January 2010 was of national proportions, affecting the highest levels of the Sonatrach senior management team. The president of Sonatrach, Mohammed Meziane, and three of the company's four vice presidents were sacked from their positions as a result of a public corruption investigation initiated by the Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité (still widely referred to by its previous incarnation, Sécurité Militaire), Algeria's top security and intelligence agency headed by the influential General Mohammed “Toufic” Mediène. The charges of alleged public corruption arose from the company's direct awarding of service contracts in the pipeline transportation division to two international consulting and security firms, which would represent a breach of public procurement requirements and related charges. The Algerian authorities have also brought charges of breaching the public procurement laws and misappropriating public funds against senior managers of certain Sonatrach downstream subsidiaries.
Given the direct relationship between Sonatrach's Meziane and his boss, Minister of Energy, Mines, and Industry Chakib Khelil, it was not long after the scandal broke out that Khelil himself was indirectly implicated (although not charged) and removed from his important position in a government reshuffle. Clearly the Sonatrach case affected Khelil's standing given his personal sponsorship of the company's most senior figures and his ultimate responsibility for energy policy. The major shifts in key cabinet appointments followed another significant event with major political consequences, namely, the assassination of Ali Tounsi, the head of the national police, or Direction Générale de la Sûreté Nationale, in late February 2010. For many analysts of the Algerian political scene, however opaque and inscrutable its functioning, these developments pointed to a power struggle at the highest levels of state authority involving the three pillars of the Algerian state: le pouvoir or the military and intelligence agency; Sonatrach, representing the economic engine of the country; and the ruling elite in the governing party (Front de Libération National).
For people unfamiliar with the complexity of the Algerian nexus of oil politics and power, Lowi's book is absolutely essential reading. For those enamored by structural theories of rentier state behavior, Lowi provides a much needed recalibration that gives equal weight to both agency and structural factors in explaining how regime stability is maintained under conditions of economic hardship despite ample oil-generated wealth. Where others point to dependence on subsoil assets to explain the absence of accountable government, this author privileges historically determined state-building experiences and the role of national leadership. The case of Algeria is particularly instructive in this regard, and Lowi does a sophisticated job of interlacing theoretical arguments concerning oil rents and state outcomes with in-depth analyses of Algeria's political trajectory beginning with French colonization in 1830 until the first decade of the 21st century, with the latter receiving the most detailed treatment.
The author's principal goal is to resolve the Algerian puzzle—one that has long perplexed analysts trying to unravel the country's paradoxical conditions—wherein ample hydrocarbon wealth is deepening rather than alleviating state–society cleavages to the point of civil war though without either overthrowing the old order or reconstituting the existing one. Placing Algeria within a broader comparative perspective that includes Iraq, Iran, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia, Lowi successfully demonstrates why political instability exists in certain high-growth, development-oriented oil-exporting countries while not in others. What the Algerian case clearly shows is that this variation in political stability has less to do with the structural imperatives of a rentier economy than with the nature of leadership itself. As she succinctly puts it: “leadership choice is . . . the most consequential variable in the elaboration of political outcomes” (p 15). Although she acknowledges the importance of structures that provide the context within which actors make choices, it is the actors themselves who determine political outcomes.
This then is a book filled with sharp analytical insights that provides a deep understanding of Algeria's oil-based political economy, one that has over the decades generated both great expectations and equally great disappointments among the country's politically disenfranchised populace. It is testimony to Lowi's perspicacity and the profundity of her understanding of the Algerian situation that several years before the eruption of the “Arab spring” of 2011 that has ensnarled but not yet overturned the Algerian state, she predicted that however successful the regime has been in the past at reimposing the political status quo in the face of profound domestic political and economic challenges, “[i]n the absence of political will and astute leadership decisions—alas, the scarcest of resources—in the face of the latest structural challenges, Algeria could plunge back into turmoil. The prospects are chilling” (pp. xiii–xiv).
