Journalist-by-trade Blaine Harden encourages us to look backwards into history for keys to understanding perennial North Korea. Specifically, he has in mind this question: from whence comes that tiny country's outsized anti-U.S. pugnacity? Also, as did his prior work on North Korea, Escape from Camp 14: One Man's Remarkable Odysseys from North Korea to Freedom in the West (New York: Viking, 2012), this new book illuminates the vexed mix of pluck, heartlessness, and survival instinct required of those who dare turn their backs on that hellish state.
In pursuit of these themes, Harden juxtaposes the life of the country's most loyal citizen with that of its most celebrated defector. The loyal citizen is Kim Il Sung, North Korea's archetypal, megalomaniacal, autocratic first president, the man most responsible for the Korean War.
The defector is No Kum Sok, a junior North Korean Air Force pilot, who in September 1953 startled the international community by defecting—handing over himself and his Soviet-made MiG-15 fighter jet to the flabbergasted American airmen who, miraculously, had neither shot him down as he approached their airport nor pulverized him on their runway. In doing so, No unwittingly ratified the American view that theirs had been the moral side in the recently stalemated Korean War. Also, his defection in a Soviet fighter jet called attention to the Kremlin's involvement in the Korean War—an involvement that both the Soviets and the Americans had Cold War reasons to wish little publicized.
Harden's account of Kim's insurgent's career in Manchuria in the 1930s draws these several indisputable facts from Kim's largely narcissistic, propagandistic account of his anti-Japanese heroics in the memoir With the Century (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1992): Kim did indeed fight valiantly in the ranks of the Communist Chinese; he and some 1,000 of his ethnic Korean brothers were arrested (500 summarily executed) by their suspicious Chinese comrades in the 1933–36 battlefield purges recalled historically as the Minsaengdan incident; and, lastly, at the Chinese guerrilla outpost called Mount Mann, Kim did free some 100 ethnic Koreans jailed there during the incident. For the rest of their lives, that rescued band of war-hardened warriors would provide Kim with the nuclear group of followers that he would need in executing his ruthless will in North Korea. Also, the incident would forever after put him on guard in his dealings with the Chinese. And, lastly, Harden reminds us that at the end of the 1930s, when the insurgents' cause in Manchuria had largely been lost, Kim fled into the Soviet Union's far east and was lost to history for a time, until, finally, at the end of World War II, he resurfaced wearing a Soviet military uniform, essentially a Stalin vassal.
Meanwhile, in the same decade, the younger No grew up in a Korean household led by a father whose colonial realpolitik urged him to work with rather than against the occupying Japanese. Mastering “all the skills the Japanese wanted in a Korean” (p. 21), No's father secured a relatively good job managing the empire's rail lines in Korea, and he provided well for his family. When World War II broke out, both he and his son were hoping that the Japanese would win.
Harden tells us that both Stalin and Mao thought Kim Il Sung incapable. Still, for reasons each his own, they gave him permission to provoke the Korean War. About the war, Harden's largest thought concerns the Americans' carpet- and fire-bombing of the Korean peninsula's northern half. We Americans too little recall how merciless that bombing was. On Korea, “the Americans dropped more than thirty-two thousand tons of napalm. . . , about double the amount that fell on Japan in 1945” (p. 96). By the war's end, American pilots had “run out of targets to blow up and burn” (p. 6). North Koreans, however, have not forgotten their pummeling, says Harden. How can they? For six decades it has been the Kim dictators' constant theme.
At the end of World War II, when North Korea fell subject to the Soviets and to its own upstart government, a teenaged No understood almost immediately that his willingness to declare at every turn his allegiance to communism and to Chairman Kim would be key to his survival. He did so copiously. Meanwhile, he covertly harbored an urge to defect. An unlikely series of circumstances, as well as his native gifts, eventually installed him in a MiG-15 cockpit. Then, finally, one day, when he saw his chance, his considerations of consequences to family and friends (likely imprisonment or death) were brief before seizing it. It was the chance that mattered, and he took it.
Not everyone will agree with Harden that North Koreans' recollections of their merciless, midcentury bombing are as contemporarily vital as they were sixty, fifty, and forty years ago. And feint are his narrative's intimations—received from No himself—of the enormous psychological challenges that are the DPRK defector's lifelong burden. Still, Harden's informed and well-paced narrative offers the nonexpert reader an absorbing, entry-level introduction into the origins of the Kim regime's determined pugnacity, and offers, too, some insight into DPRK defection's psychological challenges. His book's scholarly apparatus is unobtrusive and yet sufficient.
