The retaking of Gezi Park by the Turkish police began on June 11, 2013. The government's aim was to “clear banners from the Atatürk Cultural Centre and the statue of Atatürk.” The center, built in Istanbul's Taksim square in the 1960s, in order to advertise the Western identity of the new Republic, after a military coup, is eventually to be replaced as part of urban redevelopment schemes. Whether Atatürk's general legacy is secure in contemporary Turkey is open to debate. The electoral victory of the AKP party in 2002 had weakened the ability of the secular elite to prevent change. Many Gezi Park protestors saw the AKP's legislation as a growing threat to their lifestyles. Yet the AKP's victory was also seen as a vindication of democracy, and it look little time before a “Turkish model” began to be promoted for the Middle East. The Gezi Park protests raise the question of what really has changed since 2002. This article discusses three books. The first studies Atatürk's ideas. The second, focused more on popular culture, traces changes in identities. The third discusses change in the state-society relationship. The concluding section relates them to the question of democracy in Turkey.
Ideas
Of any biography it may be asked what makes the subject worthy of a biography, independent of the source material he or she has left behind.Footnote 1 In Atatürk's case no justification is needed. He was born in Salonika on 19 May 1881 and died on 10 November 1938 in Istanbul. As an Ottoman army officer he led the Turkish independence movement between 1919 and 1923, and then became the first president of Turkey. The name Atatürk, “Father of the Turks,” was granted to him in 1934 and is forbidden to any other person by the Turkish parliament. His photographs adorn almost every public room in Turkey. To his prowess as a military leader, which first brought him fame at Gallipoli, are added achievements as statesman, political leader, and thinker. Unlike the other strongmen who dominated the Europe of the 1930s, his reputation endures.
His life was committed to the creation of a strong, dynamic, and modern Turkish Republic out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. Literally hundreds of books on his life have been written, mostly hagiographic, according to Şükrü Hanioǧlu. The problem is that these tend to present the state that emerged out of the embers of the Empire through the prism of his person, rather than vice versa. Studies of his ideas especially depict “a sagelike dispenser of wisdom endowed with omniscience and wisdom in a variety of fields” rather like a Turkish philosopher king (Hanioǧlu, 3). Atatürk was certainly not short of words: his Nutuk speech to the second congress of his party in October 1927, on the history of the Independence struggle, took almost thirty-six hours, ranging over six days. There is no shortage of sources. Hanioǧlu, a historian of the late Ottoman period, draws on French, German, Turkish, and Ottoman materials.
Intellectual biographies can be organized chronologically or thematically. Hanioǧlu's early chapters discuss Salonica, Atatürk's military training, and the Young Turk revolution, while chaps. 4 and 5 focus on World War I and its aftermath. This chronological principle reflects the author's belief that Atatürk's ideas were not those of an original thinker, but of one who often accepted ideas that served the needs of the moment. Three thematic chapters (“The Secular Republic,” “Nationalism and Kemalism,” and “Turkey and West”) reflect the synthetic quality of these ideas once Atatürk was in position to put them into practice. The main “arrows” of Kemalism were nationalism, republicanism, populism, étatism, secularism, and transformationism. Those committed to them, especially the urban secular elites, would dominate Turkish public life long after his death. Even now military schools consider the “Atatürkist system of thought” an essential part of military education for officers (198). Only in the 1990s was this hegemony lost. Other ideas which interested Atatürk—Turkish blood types, the universal nature of the Turkish language, debates about the Hittites, for example—have long ceased to matter (195).
The title of a BBC radio series from August 2013, Turkey: The New Ottomans, suggested that the current AKP government could assimilate the imperial past into the modern trajectory of the Republic in a way that Atatürk would not do. The first Atatürk statue was erected in 1926 just outside Topkapi Palace in Istanbul, depicting him looking toward Anatolia and turning his back on the imperial palace (185). After 1923 the adjective “republican” was used for governments in order to demarcate them from the past (184). Yet Atatürk's ideas were largely identical with those of the cadres of Young Turk officers who were formed in the stormy milieu of the late Empire. Such men supplied the leadership cadres of the War of Independence and the new Republic. The Dutch historian, Erik-Jan Zürcher, went so far as to suggest that the Young Turk period extended from 1913 up to 1950.Footnote 2 The amalgam of ideas Atatürk absorbed—social Darwinism, nationalism, étatism, scientific materialism, and Durkeimian sociology—attracted the Young Turks as a whole.
If his utopia was not of his own conception, the question is whether his ideas were so overdetermined that the thoughts even of this extraordinary individual made no difference to the outcome. Citing Robert Tucker's concept of “situationism,” Hanioǧlu suggests that societal conditions largely determine the characteristics of any leader, a view at odds with the cult of personality built around Atatürk since 1923. Atatürk did acquire the power to implement his ideas and his intellectual energy was equal to his political ambitions. Yet the key lay not in the originality of his ideas, but “in the singularity of the opportunity he seized” (228).Footnote 3 There is no doubting his powers of persuasion. Flashes of dogmatism emerge from a man who encouraged the emergence of rival parties only to suppress them. Yet his recognition of when to speak as a Muslim scholar and when as a nationalist ideologue was an essential skill in the 1920s.
Atatürk's main source of inspiration was the large and powerful states of Western Europe, notably the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy. Atatürk did not set foot in Anatolia, the heartland of the Republic, until he was well into his thirties. Like many of the Young Turk elite, he was from the western (Rumelian) part of the Empire. He assimilated into his thought system only what had been demonstrated to work—hence the social Darwinism. As a peripheral intellectual, nationalism was for him a means of national survival and attractive as a mobilizing ideology that would enable the Turks to close the gap with the West. He shared the conviction of the Young Turk Committee of Union and Progress that preserving the European character of Turkey was essential to its survival (201). A strength of this book is the extensive discussion of Islam. Atatürk accepted the Durkheimian arguments of the nationalist scholar Ziya Gökalp, and was open to religion as a source of social solidarity, while convinced of the more fundamental need for modern science. The resolution of the tension came after 1923, when the Islamic Caliphate would be abolished, precisely because it represented an imagined community (the Muslim umma) which could not be monopolized by the state.
The discussion of his democratic ideas is confined to one short paragraph. Clearly Atatürk was no constitutionalist. As argued in Kadro, a journal established in 1932 to promote his thinking, the Turkish revolution was not the product of the victory of ideas but a reaction to the spread of capitalism and Western colonialism. It could not be compared to the bourgeois French Revolution or that of the Bolsheviks, which advanced the claims of a social class and based a political system on its claims. The revolution was rather the first example of the liberation of a technologically backward semicolony (189). For Hanioǧlu, the Atatürkist program was too radical to be democratic. His party was to be the sole agent of historical change and his ideas betrayed a militant impatience with the cultural mosaic of Ottoman society.
His legacy was authoritarian. Turkish constitutional courts have closed parties of every ideological hue, including (temporarily) the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP) he founded. His language reform produced a modern Turkish with a Latin script. So great were the changes that the constitutions of the early Republic had to be translated into Turkish in 1945 (180). Yet linguistic assimilation has created a strong countermovement among the Kurds. For Atatürk the role of nationalism was to provide a more malleable source of solidarity than that of religion. Yet the Republic has continued to rely on religion as a source of social cohesion when in crisis. Indeed, the BBC's suggestion seemed to be that only the AKP's combination of neoliberal economics and religious populism has managed to bridge the tension between materialism and Islam, and reconciled the conservative masses of Anatolia to modernity in a way the Kemalist elite could not do. This would be a claim of some significance in a society which defines democracy as reaching “contemporary standards of civilization.”
The BBC called the Kemalists “year zero men.” Atatürk's desire was for the citizens of Turkey to internalize international culture. Yet some use the word kopukluk/break/rupture to describe the problematic legacy of his reforms. Both “totalitarian” and “corporatist” are used by Hanioǧlu for the single-party regime (1923–1946). The question whether the tendencies toward ideological monopoly on the part of the secular establishment, which hardened after 1938, were the logical consequence of Atartürk's own leadership style, is left open (192). To his defenders the struggle for national sovereignty in the early years of the Republic led naturally to the establishment of the multiparty regime after 1946. The transition took place under the 1924 constitution and was instigated within the RPP. It has been argued that the debate over whether the single-party regime was a kalici (permanent) or transitional gecici regime allowed the “bloodless revolution” of 1950, in which the Democratic Party came to power, to take place.Footnote 4 The competitive multiparty system that emerged still continues.
This book has the virtues of Hanioǧlu's Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire: tight organization, limpid prose, and systematic research.Footnote 5 A limitation is that no summary of recent critiques of Kemalism is given, particularly with respect to the Kurdish issue. Nonetheless, both are first-class studies. Turkey's revolution was one of a series of major revolutions (the Chinese, the Iranian, the Mexican, and the Russian) that occurred on the world's periphery after 1900, the effects of which have taken a century or more to work themselves out. None remained democratic. Yet in Turkey the material reach of the state never matched its ideological commitment. Since the first properly democratic election took place in 1950, the CHP has never gained an electoral majority. After the end of the Cold War the mental isolation which allowed Kemalism to monopolize political life has also disappeared. The next book provides a framework for explaining this change.
Culture
Carter Vaughn Findley's Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity explores patterns of continuity and change over two centuries, applying macro theories of nationalism, modernity, and secularization to the Turkish case. It criticizes the materialist conception of political change that sees the Republic and its future maturation as the product of currents of change inexorably working out their modernizing logic since the nineteenth century. Faithful more to the cultural conceptions of nation-state formation found in Benedict Anderson and Partha Chaterjee the stress is on change as a dialectic process with literacy, print culture, and religious revival key resources. The dynamic tension between the universalizing logic of state building, and the conflicts which ensue when that logic encounters human subjectivities, is a central theme in this analysis of cultural modernization.
A historian of the Ottoman Empire, the extension of Findley's interest in the Republic is welcome. The subtitle, A History, 1789–2007, indicates the time span. Four out of seven substantive chapters are on the late Ottoman period. The three on the Republican period take up only one hundred and fifty-eight out of four hundred pages. The first four chapters cover “The Return towards Centralisation,” “The Tanzimat,” “The Reign of Abdulhamid,” and “Imperial Demise, National Struggle.” The tripartite division of the Republican period into “The Early Republic” (up to 1950), “Turkey's Widening Political Spectrum” (up to 1980), and “Turkey and the World” also reflects conventional regime analysis. Yet this is an account of change beyond the confines of the elite class. Each chapter ends with a discussion of the work of literary authors (ten in total), and detailed analyses are given of three religious awakenings. Findley has been praised for uncovering the hidden religious dimension to Turkey's modernization quest, and covers three religious movements which exerted exceptional influence. These were founded by Mevlana Halid (1776–1827), Said Nursi (1873–1960), and Fethullah Gülen (born in 1938 and recently judged by Time magazine one of the world's most influential thinkers).
This book is a tremendous resource for students since it chronicles change in many spheres of Turkish life. While the attention to literature and religion within this chapter structure can make it unwieldy, the book is original and highly stimulating. Findley begins with the observation that the Ottomans were in “a doubly imperial” situation: ruling over others who wanted independence, but threatened in their own sovereignty. It was towards the resolution of this doubly imperial situation that Atatürk's ideas were formed. As the Empire's territorial and demographic substratum began to fragment in the late nineteenth century, only the idea of the state retained its clarity and purity (Findley, 6). For this reason Turkey is the successor state most directly built on Ottoman foundations. One consequence has been the sacralization of the institutions of rule and the concentration of power at the top.
Yet as the veneration of state power became tied to people's ideals of the future, the pathways chosen by the state retained the potential to polarize. The dialectics of change were shaped by the interaction between “a comparatively radical secularising current, and a more conservative, Islamically committed current” (68). The former provided the leadership for first the constitutional (1908) and then the national (1919–1922) phases of the political restructuring that replaced empire with republic. They then governed Turkey until at least 1950 (19). The alternative current reflects the nationalist scholar Ziya Gökalp's prediction that Turkish nationalists would have to combine ethnicity and religion at the level of “national culture” with modernity at the level of international civilization (18).
The question of tempo naturally arose. For Kemalists the personal rule of the sultan and the religious basis of the society were the main reason the Ottomans could not compete with the West. If the imperative was to catch up, the pace of change should be quick.Footnote 6 A natural assumption would be that religious conservatives would want a slower pace consistent with the preservation of the traditional social fabric. Yet these currents did not change at different speeds. For example, the Gülen movement (a localized one before 1983) has, like the earlier revivals, burst onto the global scene in a compressed time span (21). Print culture allowed religious conservatives to attract followers just as quickly as those close to the state could do. Nursi was born near Bitlis in the east of Turkey in 1873, for most of his life this religious scholar occupied no official position, and he was harassed by the state, censored, and forced into internal exile. Yet his major religious works, known collectively as Risale-i-Nur (Treatise of light), were hugely influential. His fame (a movie about his life was released some years ago) illustrates a basic point: “that the attack on the sufi brotherhoods coincided chronologically with the fluorescence of an Islamic counterpart to the nineteenth century Western print culture” (289). This is dialectical change.
After the victory of the Democratic Party in 1950 Islam became more visible in the public sphere, and Islamic leaders came closer to the seat of power. The Milli Nizam (National Order) party founded in 1970 was the first version of a succession of Islamist parties abolished and refounded as the National Salvation (Milli Selamet, 1972–1980), Welfare (Refah, 1983–1998), Virtue (Fazilet, 1998–2001) and Felicity (Saadet, 2001–) parties. A split within the latter led to the formation of the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkinma: Justice and Development) party, which has governed since 2002. Findley places “the Turkish-Islamic synthesis,” the ideological response of the state to the breakdown of public order in the late 1970s, in the context of “Turkey's widening political spectrum.” Not only Islamicists, but leftists and rightists, had found their voices. Yet Findley remarks that Turkey has still been slow to assimilate the lessons of 1968 learnt elsewhere, which are that people of different ethnicity, belief, and social status can be equal citizens (314).Three military coups (1960, 1971, and 1980) saw restructurings of the political system from above, yet after each the electorate eventually rejected the leaders and parties preferred by the establishment. Kemalist hegemony has been lost.
The AKP's success is explained in familiar terms. Islamic businesses responded better to the opening up of the economy. In the 1980s Turgut Özal, founder of the ANAP party, had demonstrated the electoral appeal of parties that combined Islamic values with economic liberalism. New forms of municipal authority allowed politicians like the current prime minster, Recep Tayip Erdoǧan, to demonstrate their administrative competence. Erdoǧan is presented as a successor to the pragmatic Özal, and the one that succeeded in “mainstreaming” religious Turks politically. In contrast, surging demographic growth and new ideas have made it impossible for the Kemalists to maintain unanimity. Findley's assessment of the AKP is positive: Islamic statesmen excelled in recognizing the value of “a religiously neutral government” as a guarantee of pluralism and in favoring reforms which were required to achieve accession to the EU (420). The application of the “conservative democrat” label to the AKP may be a neat conclusion to the theme of alternating currents of secular and religious reform shaping political development. It is also “jumping the gun.”
State and Society
Some see an ongoing shift in the state-society relationship since the 1980 military coup. Before the state was the main agent of modernization, its ideology was disseminated in a top-down manner, and the imperative was the reconstruction of the Turkish “nation” from above. The shift has been interpreted as a form of democratization. According to Fuat Keyman, this state-centric model failed to generate a harmonious social ethos, so success in the development of formal institutions after 1923 was accompanied by a major cultural failure. In the 1990s the emergence of Kurdish and Islamic challenges to this paradigm suggested an alternative modernity in which the historic failure of the state to base citizenship on mutual rights and freedoms could be rectified by this shift in the state-society relationship.Footnote 7
Both path dependencies (from the Ottoman and early Republican periods) and potentialities for transformation (under the AKP) are stressed in Ahmed Kuru and Alfred Stepan's edited book, Democracy, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey. This volume emerged from a series of conferences and public meetings held in New York and Istanbul between 2008 and 2010. The project was of its time. The introduction discusses constitutional amendments introduced by the AKP in September 2010, and asks whether the ongoing constitutional crisis is a result of a deepening of democracy in this “Muslim-majority country.” Eminent Ottoman or Turkish scholars featured Karen Barkey on the Ottoman past, Hanioǧlu on Kemalism, Ergun Özbudun on constitutionalism, and Ümit Cizre on the military. Others, Stathis Kalyvas, Ahmet Kuru, and Alfred Stepan, are comparativists. One, Joost Lagendijk, is a politician. The standard is high, with some chapters developing important theoretical tools for analyzing this case.
The transition from Empire to Republic is again treated as decisive. Clearly, the early nation-state was more hostile to pluralism than the Ottomans. Barkey discusses Ottoman traditions for managing diversity. She focuses on the initial stages of the empire, the relationship with Islam (in a state which experienced no serious religious violence comparable to that in early modern Europe) and the millet system of communal autonomy. Yet her conclusion gives no grounds for optimism about the future, citing contemporary scholars who are sceptical about the AKP's inclusiveness (Kuru and Stepan, 28). On the other hand, Hanioǧlu's chapter concludes that the combination of a personality cult and exploitation of religion for political purposes renders Kemalism an anachronism today (56). Cizre's chapter concludes that one legacy of the past has been that citizens are taught to venerate the nation to the utmost extent, but on the level of individual behavior the same citizen easily shifts to criticism of the laws, norms, and codes established by the state (128). Özbudun's title, “Turkey—Plural Society, Monolithic State,” tells its own story.
This book was published as part of Columbia University Press's Religion, Culture, and Public Life series. The treatment of religion, but not democracy, is sophisticated. Traditionally, Turkey has been considered a secular state in a religious society. Yet the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), a ministry founded in the 1920s, promotes religion as the cement of society, and has privileged Sunni Islam to the detriment of other forms of Islam and non-Islamic religions (27). Cizre notes that until 1997 the military also sought to use religion to make pious people venerate the army and military service (128). The Kemalist elites have always made strong claims on the sacred, almost sacralizing the state in the early passages of the 1982 constitution. Part of the preamble (repealed in 1995) uses the adjective “sacred” for the “Turkish state” (152).
The editors outline three approaches to the study of secularism. Özbudun's constitutional analysis is a good example of how “critical theory” can be used to deconstruct discourses of secularism. Study of the Diyanet can provide a “hermeneutic” approach, which aims to grasp the nature of secularism in a specific case (5). The editors' preference is for empirical comparison, and hence for analysis of causal relationships and of institutional legacies on contemporary politics. They compare Turkey's model of laiklik/laïceté to that of France and Senegal. Such regimes, while lacking an established religion, vary in terms of how much the state seeks to dominate the religious sphere. France opts for strict separation, and Senegal chose “a respect all support all” approach. Turkey is not fully separationist, but is still classified as an aggressively secularist regime.
Kuru and Stepan explain the differences historically. When religion was part of the anticolonial coalition, as in Senegal, no aggressive secularism emerged. In France, the Catholic Church had opposed the revolution and an ideological conflict between its defenders and those who championed the people ensued. Such ideological competition exists in Turkey, where Islam was more organically rooted in society. The construction of a secular state thus required more of a break with the past, but the project became vulnerable when multiparty elections were held. Whereas in France, institutions like the presidency and the constitutional court became neutral, Turkey is very similar to the Arab countries in that such institutions have been favored by secularists as brakes on the electoral power of the religious majority. Yet Turkey is different from those countries in that the two currents have coexisted under more stable institutions for longer periods of time.
This book emerged at a critical juncture when the drive for EU accession had slowed down, but winds of change were coming from the Middle East. Indeed the book stresses the possibilities of democratic transformation under the AKP more than the authoritarian regression that has come to pass. The introduction states that what is at issue is whether the AKP can, like the Christian Democratic Party in Germany, maintain some of its roots in religion, but build a welcome addition to the existing models of European democracy (1). Kalyvas states that “it is quite clear that the AKP has put Turkey on a path leading to a more liberal and democratic future” (190). This is precisely what is not clear. He sees the party's absorption of the language of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law as evidence, as with Christian Democracy, of the “astonishing capacity of democratic institutions to absorb their enemies, while expanding” (192). Substitute state institutions for democratic ones in that sentence, and a different process will suggest itself.
The truth is that human rights and the rule of law (and hence democracy) are insecure. The Republic's political history has been punctuated by coups, which themselves followed regressions to authoritarian practices by governing parties. The difference is that there has been no overt coup against the AKP. Indeed a large minority of the army's top brass is now in jail. The verdicts of the Ergenekon trial were delivered in August 2013, at the end of a five-year legal process. The name is used for a shadowy nationalist organization which allegedly planned a coup against the AKP government. The outcome was hundreds of years of imprisonment for a range of what once were the country's top army officers, journalists, and academics. The AKP heralded the case as a turning point for Turkish democracy. Others claim revenge. Some of these verdicts were then overthrown by the courts in early 2014.
It is no mean achievement of the AKP to make such coups less likely, but the tendency is still toward the monopolization of power. In 2010, well before Gezi Park, the Economist Intelligence Unit had classified Turkey in its Democracy Index as a hybrid regime. Quantitative measures of regime forms, such as those of Freedom House, have consistently considered it a “partly free” country. The ratings were mainly due to the continuing legal repression of journalists, lawyers, and activists within the Kurdish movement, among others. The pressure placed on journalists in particular has intensified after Gezi Park. Traditionally, southern European countries have been passive recipients of models supplied by more developed countries. After the Arab Spring Turkey began to be promoted as a model. The contradictions are evident in the response of the AKP's chief negotiator with the EU, Egemen Baǧiş, to the Gezi protests. In a letter to the New York Times he credited the AKP with the democratic transformation of Turkey. He had earlier suggested that the protestors could be treated as members of terrorist organizations.Footnote 8
It is true that democratization/demokratikleşme is now present in Turkish political discourse to a new degree. Yet the process needs an anchor, such as EU accession, to be consequential. The accession process has had little momentum since 2005. Some hope that the current constitution-making process will provide another anchor. It has brought the four main parties together on an equal basis in a Parliamentary Conciliation Commission, charged with drafting a new constitution. The AKP made a commitment to ileri (advanced) demokrasi in its April 2011 election manifesto. While many fear a power grab by Erodoǧan under a new presidential system (the party's own rules prevent him serving a further term as prime minister), the consensual approach has been unprecedented. Adroitly managed by the parliamentary speaker, Cemil Çiçek, unlike in Egypt and Tunisia, the committee remained relatively insulated from the stormy political atmosphere outside the walls of the parliament. Reportedly on first-name terms, it worked amicably, but slowly. The work of the committee was suspended in September 2014, it having agreed on only a minority of articles.
With the work of this commission suspended, EU relations changing, a peace process with the Kurds underway, and a civil war raging in neighboring Syria, it will take some time before the legacy of the AKP administrations can be assessed. Kuru and Stepan's book is generally optimistic, but whether the crisis of Kemalist modernity has really allowed Turkey to establish what Keyman calls “an alternative modernity” in which the Kemalist regulation of state-society relations has been replaced by something genuinely democratic, remains to be seen.Footnote 9 For the alternative could be one in which one side wins elections, and uses all the instruments of state power, including those introduced after the 1980 coup it denounces, to dominate society. One problem, common in the Middle East, is the belief that democratic legitimacy requires only a majority vote and that opposition to the majority or national will is either an impertinence or treasonous. The attitude is not exclusive to Islamic parties. Indeed the recent trajectory of the AKP is comparable to that of the Democratic Party after 1950, which grew more authoritarian the more it succeeded electorally. The Turkologist Mehmet Fuad Köprülü, a founder of the Democratic Party, pointed out that ever since the two “Constitutional Periods” in the late Ottoman history, periods of decay have followed those of reform. He resigned from the party in protest at the direction it took once in power.Footnote 10
Political Change and Democracy
Ideas can matter in democratic development. The early sections of the current (1982) constitution, inspired by Kemalist ideas, express a constitutional identity some think outmoded. At the time of writing (September 2013) there is no consensus for change, so the AKP may combine with the Kurdish BDP (Bariş ve Demokrasi Partisi) to change these (unamendable) articles . Yet neither is there consensus between the AKP and the BDP on the status of the Turkish language and the definition of the state. Some Kemalist ideas have lost their hegemony, but no general “paradigm shift” has occurred. Indeed the political vocabulary of Kemalism remains central.
Hanioǧlu has argued that the fate of the Ottoman Empire was determined not by the logic of ideas but by structural factors, and that non-Kemalist thought systems could also have prevailed.Footnote 11 Likewise, the increasing globalization of Turkey, not conceptual innovation, has rendered étatism, transformationism, and populism out of date. The Kuhnian view of scientific change is that as anomalies accumulate a new paradigm is formed, and a battle takes place between the followers of the new paradigm and the defenders of the old ideas. Political change, in contrast, tends to conform to the insight of the philosopher Rudolf Carnap, who observed that questions about the adequacy of particular conceptual schemes represent choices rather than discoveries.Footnote 12
The two arrows left for the parties to fight over, nationalism and secularism, are at the heart of the divide between the AKP and the CHP. The battles are not over the truth content of Kemalism, but reflect different attitudes to the early Republic. To give an example, Erdoǧan has declared that his party is the real Republicans, for they, not the Kemalists, actually represent the people. (The Republicanism arrow can obviously be subsumed under the remaining two). Such battles can be assimilated into the model of change provided by Findley. Indeed since this dialectic relationship between two currents can produce both convergence and polarization, it is no surprise that the basic vocabulary has not changed. In general one would not learn much about the Kurdish conflict from these books. Hanioǧlu does not discuss this issue at all, and Kuru and Stepan have no chapter on it. For Findley the defining conflict is also over religion. The Kurds are outside any consensus based on a reconstruction of Kemalism. In contrasts, the Kemalists could not deny the claims of Islam, as they did for Kurdishness, for it was always the prepolitical source of unity in society.
Kuru and Stepan also make analogies with “the war of the two Frances” and culture wars between rival secularist and religious groups in the United States (10). The question is why the polarization continues. Some argue that the absence of elite consensus, which helped the southern European transitions, is critical.Footnote 13 This view is shared by Özbudun, and many hope that the new constitution can produce “a societal consensus,” yet the recent constitutional moment in Turkey was not produced by the need felt by all sections to repudiate the past in the wake of despotic rule or of catastrophe, as in South Africa or West Germany. Instead democratization has proceeded through intense struggles within state institutions.Footnote 14 One consequence is that foundationalist rhetoric remains salient. This rhetoric is rooted in the view of 1923 as a kopukluk/rupture which has left a permanent rift between reformists and traditionalists. The rhetoric makes long-term memory more important than recent memory, giving the public a sense of foundations being revisited. The result is polarization. After all, the problem with a foundation is that it always seems possible to slip another one underneath it.Footnote 15
In The Nation as a Zone of Conflict Hutchinson argues that cultural wars often mark nations whose foundational events leave long memories and that there can be no final definition of national identity in such cases.Footnote 16 The foundationalist rhetoric suggests this is so. Yet the cultural wars (and the sense of crisis) could be transitional, a symptom of a rebalancing of state and society in progress since the 1980s. Perhaps the identity politics can be superseded through the formation of new functional or associational civic identities. In place of the unity imposed by the Kemalist state would come that of civil society. One study of the period since 1980 is entitled “From Junta to Civil Society.”Footnote 17 There has been a strong growth in civil-society organizations in Turkey, stimulated by legal changes introduced to bring EU accession forward. Many of these, perhaps more than fifty percent, resemble organizations outside the country. A report published in 1997 counted 2,700 foundations, 50,000 associations, and 1,200 unions, cooperatives, and professional associations. The growth was heavily concentrated in the three western cities of Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir.Footnote 18
This development seems to justify an interpretation of change as a rebalancing of the state-society relationship. Yet if these organizations are assimilated into the traditional divisions, polarization will continue. As the private sector grew in the 1980s business recognized the fact that political instability was the most important block on economic and social development. Yet there are two (not one) large business organizations. One, Tüsaid, was established by the Istanbul-based elite in 1971. It has since been a strong supporter of the attempts to write a civil constitution. Indeed it defines democracy liberally (in terms of human rights, freedom of enterprise, belief and thought, civil society, Atatürk, and modern civilization).Footnote 19 The political influence of Müsaid on the AKP has been stronger. A larger and more representative body, including much more small-scale enterprises, it helped ensure that Erdoǧan remained committed to the EU, fiscal discipline, and export-led growth.Footnote 20 As early as 2000, in its report on democratization and the need for constitutional amendments, the importance of establishing a societal consensus for future development was stressed.Footnote 21
Too much should not be made of civil society. A period of democratization could be said to have begun with the election of Özal's ANAP party in 1983, after which democratization or the transition process became slogans. Yet about half of the Republic's history has been spent under extraordinary laws. While many see 1983 as portending a transition just as significant as that in 1946, the military regime which lasted up to 1987 and the state of exception which existed between 1984 and 1995 are very recent. They help explain undemocratic happenings in a country where no one claims not to be a democrat.Footnote 22 Civil society has accordingly been acclimatized to this mood, and many important civic organizations supported a security-driven approach to the Kurdish and Islamic movements in the 1990s. The existence of a state of emergency was not seen as a problem of democracy.Footnote 23 The fetishization of the state, the definition of opposition as internal or external enemies, and the application of broad antiterror laws have returned with the AKP.
An opposition between state and society is characteristically made in the Western liberal tradition. The distinction could be “isomorphic” in the sense that one vocabulary of politics may not have the same meanings or range of meanings in another political culture.Footnote 24 Taha Parla has shown the strong influence of corporatist social thinking (which abjures such a distinction) on Atatürk and on Turkish political culture generally. The anthropologist Yael Navaro-Yahsin published a study of the public sphere in the 1990s that stressed how difficult it was to see where the state ended and society began. The peculiarity of Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s may not have been the linear development of civil society mentioned above, but rather the appropriation of the concept into the language of a state-revering culture (153). In their critique of liberal, Islamic, and postliberal conceptions of democracy in contemporary Turkey, Erdoǧan and Üstüner argue that the use of state and society as polarities obscures the key role of the state as an agent of change.Footnote 25 This applies especially to the 1980–1983 period.
Political change cannot be understood through the use of state-versus-society binaries. With respect to secularism Kuru and Stepan explore not separation, but the mutuality between religion and the state: the various ways Islam has been and can be nested in the structures of the state. Turkey remains a state-centric society. The state tradition still influences how law is applied by Turkish judges. Yet when it comes to democracy many authors assume models of democratization based on a selective and idealized reading of European history. This is characteristic of much of the work on constitutionalism. These largely liberal perspectives necessitate a rejection of the early Republic in toto, for they suggest that almost everyone was a victim of the state. Yet the state tradition is not only negative. In the Arab countries, people respect that the Turkish state has been strong enough to maintain its sovereignty, provide for economic development, and maintain a predictable platform for fifty years of electoral competition and parliamentary rule. Which comparative perspective (the west European or Middle Eastern) is more important?
Such is the prevalence of the state-versus-society approach among democratization scholars that only the current and early Republican periods are considered illustrative. Yet there have been distinct stages prior to the current one: (1) from the Tanzimat of the 1870s to the Republic, (2) political modernization after the Republic was founded (1923–1946), and (3) political modernization between 1946 and 2000.Footnote 26 They did not constitute a one-hundred-year process of “democratization, but the struggle for democracy, state reform, and the centralization of the state were arguably inter-related.”Footnote 27 Such a development has not taken place in the Arab countries. Indeed it may be that the process of state centralization will actually continue. Unless Turkey opts for a federal or consociational democracy (both unlikely), many of the demands now being placed on the state will also require more state power, as with the health-system reforms under the AKP. Alternatively, in a world more influenced by concepts of freedom and human rights, it must be accepted that the transitions above are no longer sufficient, and the failure to reach contemporary standards of democracy will only produce more Gezi Park–type protests.
