Nietzsche's Untimely Meditations has an odd history. It is Nietzsche's second book after The Birth of Tragedy, consisting of a series of four essays written between 1872 and 1876. At several points during its composition, however, Nietzsche planned on churning out 12–13 Meditations. Only after Nietzsche's disgust at Wagner's Bayreuth festival in 1876—which he had hoped would renew German culture—does he write to his publisher and declare the series “dead.” After Nietzsche's death, one essay, “On the Use and Disadvantage of History for Life,” would become one of the most influential texts in his whole corpus, inspiring thinkers as diverse as Martin Heidegger, Leo Strauss, Michel Foucault, and Paul de Man. The three other essays were mostly dismissed as juvenilia.
When scholars have analyzed the Meditations, they have tended to study the essays in isolation, independent of their relation to one another. At first glance, this approach seems reasonable, given the vastly different themes and approaches of each essay: “David Strauss, Confessor and Writer” is a polemical hit piece on a famous left Hegelian, while “Richard Wagner in Bayreuth” is an unusually adulatory biography of Wagner just as their relationship was beginning to cool. Nevertheless, as Shilo Brooks rightly points out in a new book devoted to the Meditations, Nietzsche himself considered these essays to constitute parts of a whole work. Given that Nietzsche wrote his texts with such care, it is unfortunate that no scholar has published a study examining the unity of the Meditations.
Or rather, no scholar has until now. In his excellent book, Brooks persuasively argues that the Meditations are unified in advancing a “Culture War” that Nietzsche wages against our modern scientific age. The first half of Nietzsche's book (the essays on Strauss and on history) amount to the negative or destructive campaign, while the second half (the essays on Schopenhauer and Wagner) comprises the positive effort to reshape the “ethical nature” of modern culture.
Previous scholars have examined Nietzsche's early view of culture and cultural criticism, especially his critique of the “cultural philistines” from the “David Strauss” essay and of the excess of historical knowledge from the “History for Life” essay. Brooks contributes to this literature in several ways. First, he offers a running commentary of every section of the essays, providing insightful close readings of even the more obscure parts of the book. Second, he contextualizes Nietzsche's “culture war” in the context of Germany's unification under Otto von Bismarck. In his introduction, Brooks describes Nietzsche's intervening in the cultural conflict between Bismarck's modern, secularizing efforts and the Catholic Church's attempt to maintain a religious sensibility in modern culture. For Brooks, Nietzsche seeks to retrieve the lessons of the ancients for modern culture, especially the model of Plato's Republic with its rule of the philosopher and the commitment to human excellence.
A third important contribution is that Brooks demonstrates the importance of the three types of history in “History for Life” for understanding the argument of the Meditations as a whole. Given the centrality of this account for Brooks's book, I will focus on his treatment of these three types of history.
As is well known, in sections 2–3 of “History for Life,” Nietzsche distinguishes between three traditional types of history—monumental, antiquarian, and critical. Monumental history narrates events according to the deeds of great or exemplary individuals. On Brooks's view, this type of history is most needful in our age of small souls. Indeed, this history serves as the foundation for Nietzsche's positive efforts. Whereas it seems that monumental history disappears after “History for Life,” Brooks demonstrates instead that it is reborn in Wagner and his Bayreuth festival, a Wagner who can reshape and rejuvenate modern culture in his image.
Antiquarian history, by contrast, focuses in its narration on the everyday features of a people—the practices, institutions, and character of a nation. Brooks highlights the dangers of this type of history, that it cannot distinguish between the higher and lower in culture. In this way, antiquarian history leads ultimately to modern scientific history, which refrains from making any value judgments and treats history like a museum to preserve life but not to inspire it.
Finally, critical history demonstrates the arbitrary or contingent character of historical change. The institutions and practices of a nation—Nietzsche uses the example of a class system—are shown by critical history not to be the result of a necessary, natural process, but rather the result of the arbitrary power of a particular faction. Critical history has the effect of destroying a people's attachment to its history, and paving the way for a new epoch. Brooks sides with several other scholars in arguing that Nietzsche acts as a critical historian against modern scientific culture, and provides good evidence throughout the Meditations of his critical stance.
Brooks is right, I think, to understand these types of history as in some sense fundamental to the overall argument of the work. However, I do not think that Nietzsche advocates a simple return to these traditional types of history, as Brooks suggests. Nietzsche presents these forms of history early in the essay as premodern types, supplanted by the modern scientific approach to history. A return would be, first of all, impossible. It is difficult to make sense of the idea of a conscious willing of illusion or myth in our reflective age. Yet, second, such a return is undesirable, Nietzsche implies as well. Surprisingly, a section Brooks overlooks is Nietzsche's remarkable discussion of justice in section 6 of “History for Life.” Here, Nietzsche points out the advantages of modern scientific culture, that modernity affords us a universal or comprehensive perspective on humanity, whereas premodern cultures were mired in myth and injustice. Nietzsche suggests near the end of section 6 that monumental history can be retrieved, but only as filtered through modernity's universal horizon. It is striking, for instance, that Brooks makes little mention of the “disadvantages” of monumental history, which in my view modern culture can address. In modern culture, then, monumental history becomes no longer a form of “hero worship”—as is so often suggested by Nietzsche's readers, including Brooks—but rather a reflective endorsement of and self-conscious commitment to human excellence.
Similarly, consigning Nietzsche's efforts to critical history is unduly restrictive. Of course, Nietzsche's critical approach—which prefigures his late-period genealogy—is present, but Nietzsche also limns in section 1 the limits of the historical perspective in general, and describes an alternative “suprahistorical” perspective. This perspective identifies and draws on enduring types in history to promote life. In enumerating different types of history in “History for Life” and of exemplary individuals in “Schopenhauer” and “Wagner,” Nietzsche incorporates a suprahistorical perspective as well.
These are minor quibbles with an otherwise illuminating interpretation of this important early text. My recommendation is that as soon as anyone cracks open the Meditations—a first-time reader or scholar—she should have Brooks by her side.
