This descriptive and theoretical work is another fine book by Lawrence Baum, following on Judges and Their Audiences (2008) and continuing an interest shown in his earlier writing on the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, one of a few extant studies of specialized federal courts. Specializing the Courts is a major contribution to our knowledge of both the federal and state judiciaries, opening up an entire set of courts about which many students of American institutions know little and providing an exploration as to how they came to be and of their effects.
We tend to focus on the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals, with much less attention to the district courts, but all are general-jurisdiction courts. We thus miss specialization in the judiciary, particularly the fact that specialized courts deal with more cases; as a result of the bankruptcy courts and Tax Court, “a significant portion of the work of federal courts is done by specialized bodies” (p. 17).
This book is one of a few to examine both federal and state court systems. Although attention to courts dealing with foreign policy, the military, and government litigation tilts emphasis somewhat toward the federal judiciary, there is much on state courts, particularly as to criminal cases; material on private litigation deals with both systems. There is also some mention of cross-national experience, but it is not a demerit that little attention is devoted to it, as Baum adds so much to our knowledge of US courts.
Three principal questions are examined: the extent of specialization, its causes, and its consequences, including such courts' near permanence. In providing answers, Baum brings to bear a variety of micro and macro perspectives on specialization in government generally, and he draws on many aspects of specialization: its “neutral virtues” of efficiency, quality, and uniformity; policy substance, in which specialized courts' judges immerse themselves; groups' interest and influence, which increases with specialized courts; these courts' organizational missions; and contingent effects.
As Baum explains, there are varying institutional arrangements, with specialization both within and between courts. Many decisions to specialize are legislative (statutory), while the courts themselves make others, reflecting in part judges' self-interest and preferences for being generalists or specialists. Some specialized courts are freestanding, for example, the Court of Federal Claims and the Court of International Trade, while others, such as the Foreign Intelligence Courts, use borrowed judges. Still others, such as the bankruptcy courts, are subordinate courts.
In an important section, albeit the only one somewhat difficult to penetrate, Baum arranges courts on two dimensions: judge concentration (judges dealing with a limited range of cases) and case concentration (cases in a particular field at one court level being heard by a limited number of judges). He locates courts on these axes, showing that the district courts are low on both; bankruptcy courts are representative of courts high on judge concentration but low on case concentration; the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court is low on judge concentration but high on case concentration; and the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims is high on both dimensions.
In connection with case concentration, Baum notes the particularly high level of immigration appeals in the Second and Ninth Circuits, but he does not point out the (specialized) mechanisms both courts have developed, or adapted, to handle them. The Ninth Circuit, which has long had screening panels for lighter-weight cases, with staff attorneys rather than the judges' elbow clerks providing support, now devotes some screening panels entirely to large numbers of immigration appeals; and the Second Circuit, otherwise resistant to giving up oral argument, adopted a screening mechanism in which shifting three-judge screening panels each handle small numbers of immigration cases solely on paper. The latter experience illustrates another of Baum's points, that specialization seen as affecting policy will give rise to opposition: A number of the Second Circuit's liberals, including then-Judge Sonia Sotomayor, are said to have resisted this more “mechanical” way of disposing of appeals in asylum and deportation cases and the rate of affirmance of the administrative agency is extremely high in these cases.
Following a treatment of theoretical framework and perspectives, much of Specializing the Courts is devoted to specific courts under broad subject rubrics. “Foreign Policy and Internal Security,” the area in which “[w]hen policy makers employ specialization to improve outcomes for government, their incentives to make the endeavor successful are especially strong” (p. 61), includes consular courts overseas; military courts reviewing courts-martial but having been extended to civilians as in Hawaii; the ongoing matter of Guantanamo detainees, where it is important to remember the administration's having moved accused terrorists from civilian to military systems in a crucial tug-of-war with the courts; the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance courts; and the Alien Terrorist Removal Court (Removal Court), to be used to deport terrorists but which, as of Baum's writing, had not heard a single case.
Treatment of criminal cases focuses on the states' “socialized courts,” the earliest instances of which—our long-standing juvenile and domestic relations courts—came from the Progressives' use of scientific methods to deal with social problems that appeared in courts. In the present day, they take the form of “problem-solving” courts, of which the best-known instances are drug courts and which also include mental health courts, homeless and veteran treatment courts, community courts, and domestic violence courts.
Baum divides specialization in government litigation into sections on revenue, expenditures, and regulation (the defunct Commerce Court and price control). As to revenue, we find courts that deal with customs and those that deal with the income tax, with litigation over the latter in both general-jurisdiction district courts and the specialized Tax Court. For expenditures, there are the often-renamed courts for claims against the government and other more recently established courts for disputes over veterans' benefits. A key finding of this analysis is that “the level of specialization in economic adjudication is considerably higher in the government as a whole than it is in the judiciary alone” (p. 138).
The considerable specialization found in government litigation is not present with “Private Litigation,” where Baum calls our attention to “[w]hat stands out most … is how little specialization there is in this area,” as most cases go to general jurisdiction courts (p. 205). Here, his treatment is of a mix of federal and state court specialization: patents, corporate governance—with particular attention to the Delaware courts, business courts, and bankruptcy.
As to the last of these, we have appeals from bankruptcy courts either to the new Bankruptcy Appellate Panels, from which cases go to the courts of appeals, or, as before, to the general-jurisdiction district courts and Baum could have given a more extensive treatment of this alternative appeal mechanism. Moreover, the mix of public and private in this economic litigation is affected by a development he does not mention: the increased use of arbitration and of business-sector “Rent-a-Judge” arrangements. Because some arbitration is “court-annexed,” that is, required in order to get one's suit into court, one could have seen here how the public (courts) and private (parties' contractual arrangements) relate to each other.
In his conclusion, Baum reexamines causes and goals, especially whether, and how much, specialization is purposive and he adds discussion of diffusion of specialization and of particular types of courts, looking at design and inadvertence as bases for their establishment. He also briefly treats limitations on and the future of specialization before ending with a return to specialization's neutral virtues and to policy substance.
This is a first-rate volume that one hopes will spur further work on judicial specialization and, more broadly, on the judiciary's complexities.
