The United States is currently in the midst of a war in Iraq and a broader “war on terror.” What will be the long-term consequences of these conflicts on the American state?
While many nations have increased their state capacities because they have decided that the economic and social benefits outweigh the costs, the trajectories of state development are distinct. The European parliamentary democracies are less ideologically resistant to strong, centralized government, and not surprisingly tend to have some of the most fully developed welfare states in the world. In the United States, state building has been more difficult because, as many have observed, Americans cling to individual liberty, are skeptical of centralized power, and retain a separation of powers system that slows policy change. Of course, America now has a powerful national government; it just had to meet higher ideological and institutional thresholds to be created. Frequently, a crisis like the Great Depression is necessary for major American state building initiatives to be implemented. Necessity, rather than taste, has typically driven U.S. state devlopment. Major wars have often provided the necessary impetus for increasing the national government's power.
Scholars have shed considerable light on the processes of state growth, focusing on key eras such as Reconstruction, the Progressive Era, and the New Deal. However, the attention paid to particular periods makes American state building appear episodic in nature. Such an approach overlooks important connections that have played out over the course of American history. Moreover, scholars writing in this tradition have ignored foreign wars to focus almost exclusively on domestic factors (see Sparrow 1996 for a notable exception).
My research explores foreign wars as engines of state development. Indeed, major American wars have been profound crises demanding massive amounts of personnel, money, and logistical coordination. All of these problems require enhanced state capacities. International conflicts have also brought about such change because their unpredictability frequently casts a spotlight on deficiencies that could otherwise be ignored. In these ways, wars have provided “windows of opportunity” for change (Kingdon 1995). Despite the anti-statism of American political culture, wars have frequently compelled the kind of centralizing activity that would otherwise be highly controversial. In addition, wars have had lasting effects on the American political system. After the war that induces government action is concluded, the state's increased power in domestic affairs remains. In this sense, wartime state building turns into a story of path dependence. Wars force the government's hand, but once action is taken, it does not get reversed, even if its initial reason for being has been resolved.
This process has played out in many of America's foreign conflicts since it emerged as a world power during the Spanish-American War. That conflict led to a vast overhaul of the national security system, the professionalization of the armed forces, and the U.S.'s emergence as an imperial power. World War I's expenditures required increased revenue, leading to the permanent establishment of the income tax. Similar economic constraints during World War II ushered in the mass-based, progressive income tax and the governing administrative institutions to oversee it. The Korean War pushed the federal government into establishing a massive national security state and the new bureaucracies to administer it, which greatly increased the size and presence of the federal government. It also led to the nation's first serious peacetime military draft that ordered society by providing incentives for young people to marry and have children and to pursue higher education and white collar work. Finally, the Korean War saw Congress cede key powers to the office of the presidency.
Since Korea, major wars have been less likely to have the indirect and broad developmental capabilities they once did and have tended to directly affect only war-related and national security operations. By the end of the Korean War the state had reached a level of maturity such that events, even those as profound as major wars or economic crises, could not easily generate the kind of massive change that was possible when the state was smaller. While it remains possible that an extreme security crisis marked by numerous suicide bombings or a nuclear attack could provoke a massive, transformative response in the future, the war-wrought changes to the state since Korea have been largely confined to the national security realm and have not had larger implications for the character of the state as a whole. As such, developments taking place during Vietnam and in the post-9/11 era have had more limited effects in the state building realm. Vietnam, perhaps because it was America's first defeat, actually saw a reduction in state capacities with the elimination of the military draft.
Nonetheless, the “war on terror” has spurred profound developments in the national security state. The most obvious of these has been the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2002 as a means to protect the U.S. and its citizens from terrorist attacks and respond to natural disasters. Law enforcement capabilities were also enhanced through the Patriot Act. Intelligence information has been nationalized with state authorities and agencies such as the FBI and the CIA being compelled to coordinate their activities, share information, and operate less independently than they did prior to September 11, 2001. Sharing and coordination now mark the nation's intelligence infrastructure as opposed to autonomy and inter-agency competition. Finally, black site prisons have been established by the CIA outside of U.S. controlled territory to detain and interrogate suspected terrorists and enemy combatants. While these developments are limited to the state's national security capacities, they are still remarkable expansions of the national government's power; and, if this is a “long war” as many U.S. and allied political leaders suggest it will be, they may have long consequences.
Author Bio
Robert Saldin is the Patrick Henry postdoctoral fellow at Johns Hopkins University. While at the Center he will revise his dissertation |P`War and American Political Development: Parties, State Building, and Democratic Rights Policy|P' for publication as a book.
