Rendering an account of international friendship

To theorize international friendship, I will begin by rendering an account of the term. First, in order to make the project manageable, the phrase ‘international friendship’ solely refers to the relationship between states. States will be understood as sovereign entities governing mutual recognized territories and constituted by institutions and practices. The relationships between states are maintained or lost by people who occupy offices and positions. Although these office holders are flesh and blood individuals who have personal relationships with one another, those personal connections exist alongside their public identities as office holders. In acting on behalf of the state, their corporate roles structure and define what counts as a reason for action.Footnote 7 States for which the public realm has become entirely personal are no longer rule-governed institutions but a res privata, a private thing with private reasons for action.

In addition, unlike other terms that are part of the (current) vocabulary of international politics (‘genocide’, ‘human rights’, ‘second-strike’), ‘friendship’ is a term that has a robust life in ordinary interpersonal discourse. Because state actors are never merely office holders, the use of the word ‘friendship’ in international politics often includes its interpersonal elements as well. Sometimes, state leaders, diplomats or other international actors declare one another ‘friends’ in the sense of genuinely liking and trusting one another. Moreover, sometimes those personal relationships play a significant role in the formulation and execution of international decisions and policies. We should, however, be careful to note that whatever the character of friendship that existed between the British former Prime Minister Tony Blair and the American President George W. Bush, our political vocabulary also includes a notion of friendship between the United Kingdom and the United States. Moreover, the latter relationships are not reducible to the former, although they can certainly suffer or flourish in the light of interpersonal relationships. Consequently, clarifying the place of personal relationships can be an important, if understudied, element of international politics, but this article focuses on the latter (perhaps more puzzling) relationship between political associations or states.

It is also important to note that when friendship becomes a part of the practical vocabulary of international politics it sheds its affective connotations: groups, such as states, are ontologically incapable of having feelings.Footnote 8 In contrast, one of the central elements of interpersonal friendship is a set of feelings. One may be cool about many things that matter, but to be indifferent to or lack any feelings whatsoever towards one’s friends is to misunderstand the relationship. Interpersonal friendships are relationships created and sustained by mutual feelings of attraction, trust and openness.Footnote 9

When the term ‘friendship’ is used to describe or recommend a relationship between states or political communities, however, it becomes entirely separable from sentiment.Footnote 10 If the basis of international friendship is not sentiment, then what is it? There are two possibilities. The first is utility as expressed in self-interest or mutual advantage, and the second is the character of the state. To the extent that international friendships are a matter of utility, and there is no question that many, if not most, are utility based,Footnote 11 then the idea of international friendship amounts to nothing more than what would be found in an alliance of security or economic partnership. In these cases, the work done by the words ‘friend’ and ‘friendship’ is no different than these other terms. While attending to the origin, character and demise of these kinds of relationships tells us a great deal about international friendships of utility, ‘friend’ and ‘friendship’ become less interesting than how the interests of states are framed, constructed and advanced. Consequently, when international friendships are based on self-interest narrowly understood, then the ideas of ‘friend’ and ‘friendship’ themselves matter little in such analyses and explanations. For purposes of clarification, friendships of utility are friendships in a subsidiary, but not unimportant, way.

If international friendships based on self-interest do not raise particularly interesting uses of the word friendship, then one may conclude that there really is not much of interest in the idea of international friendship. But it is also worth considering whether similarities of character can somehow serve as the basis for international friendship. In exploring this possibility, it is important to note that one of the core features of friendship is the notion of choice. As far back as the Greeks, the idea of friendship has been contrasted to other sorts of relationships – primarily tribal or familial relationships – that one did not choose. If choice is to remain a central part of international friendship (and there is no reason to think that this is implausible, unless one believes that state actions are wholly determined by forces having nothing to do with reasons for action), then the appeal to the similarities of character would have to show how those similarities provided reasons for choosing a friendship. For example, within the literature on international alliances, a dispute exists over whether birds of a feather really do flock together. In other words, do states with shared ideologies, cultures or significant historical experiences tend to ally with one another more frequently than dissimilar regimes?Footnote 12 Without denying the significance of this kind of question or the answers that it has generated, ideology, culture and history cannot serve as the basis for a friendship unless an argument can be made as to why those features or experiences could serve as a reason for a state to associate. This kind of argumentation, of course, is not inconceivable. Ideologies, such as Marxist Leninism, have called for a kind of international solidarity. To get to this point, however, requires assessing whether those ideological reasons are good reasons for friendship between states. This, then, is a final point to emphasize in rendering an account of the meaning of international friendship: namely, we must be able to provide an account of why the association is a chosen one. The rest of the article defends one such account of international friendship that is based on the minimally just character of states.

Interpersonal friendship and self-concern

To set up the argument that follows, I employ Whiting’s Aristotelian explanation of individual self-concern and friendship.Footnote 13 Whiting argues that individual self-concern is reasonable when it is connected to attributes of one’s character that are valuable. What is important to us, she suggests are ‘all those characteristics for which a person might be praised and admired – not only the moral virtues, but also things like artistic and athletic ability, sensitivity to others, patience, industry and so on’.Footnote 14 Those kinds of attributes compose one’s character and to the extent that our ends and purposes advance and improve our characters they are worthy of promotion. Self-concern ultimately turns on questions of character. Presumably, if we fail to embody the characteristics that we see as important we will have less reason to be concerned with our own projects and interests. This position yields four ramifications, each of which I will apply to the notion of international friendship in later sections.

First, this argument not only gives us reasons to be concerned for ourselves, but it also gives us reasons to be concerned for others (although not necessarily the only reasons for concern for others). To the extent that others embody the forms of excellence that we value, we have reason to be concerned for their interests and projects. The attributes referred to by these reasons are worthy of being promoted, whoever happens to possess them – others or oneself. What is especially striking about her view is that it calls into question rational egoism. While the rational egoist is liable to argue that concern for others is justified only to the extent that it is like concern for oneself, Whiting argues that concern for oneself ‘is justified because it is like concern for another’.Footnote 15 As noted above, what should matter in our concern for others is whether they embody the forms of excellence that we value. Similarly, what should matter in our concern for ourselves is whether we embody those same characteristics. The reasoning is the same. The fact that these interests just happen to be my interests does not carry any independent weight. Her position ‘involves rejecting the importance traditionally attached to the distinction between self and other and focus[es] on the character of whomever – oneself or another – is the intended object of concern’.Footnote 16

A second ramification is that even though her position results in the rejection of rational egoism, it does not preclude the possibility that one may have special reasons to secure and advance the interests of oneself and one’s closest friends. Whiting argues that special concern for oneself is pragmatically necessary in order for people to be agents and epistemologically warranted by the fact we may know ourselves fairly well.Footnote 17 What counts in establishing this special concern is not that we see ourselves as unique, but that we are ‘persons of a certain sort’, who happen to know ourselves better than we know many others.Footnote 18 One admires, understands and fully appreciates those (including oneself) who have admirable characters that one knows the best. Because of such special knowledge one may have good reason, ceteris paribus, to prioritize securing the ends of those whom one admires over those one does not admire, one’s known friends over the members of the pool of impersonal friends (see below), and oneself and one’s closest friends over more distant friends.

A third consequence of this argument is that all people of good character compose a pool of what Whiting calls ‘impersonal friends’. The pool of impersonal friends, of course, may be larger than anyone’s ability to befriend all of them. Consequently, Whiting writes:

In some sense, the friends who are most worth having are the ones who embody the characters that we most admire. These character friendships based on forms of excellence give us a reason for seeing the friend like (as opposed to ‘as’) another self. On Whiting’s account, such friendships grow out of a sense of good will and affection to those who possess such virtues and are ultimately instantiated through a set of contingent events or features that actually bring such people together.

A final ramification of Whiting’s position is that it leaves somewhat open how we should respond to those who lack the kinds of characters that we value – those who lie outside the pool of impersonal friends. Given the Aristotelian tenor of the argument one could easily imagine this position being compatible with seeing the central purpose of law and social policy to be the cultivation of virtue and character. There is no doubt that an educative conception of the state may license different forms of restrictions and interventions to engender the virtues. The fact that it is reasonable to be concerned with maintaining and promoting particular kinds of characters implies that it is not reasonable to advance others. Nevertheless, Whiting’s formulation of the argument does not by itself give licence to hinder or actively intervene in the projects of others in order to ‘make them’ be more virtuous. As I understand her argument, friends based on character are friends precisely because they already share a sense of what is good or excellent. The fact that something is a virtue for me is not, by itself, enough to try to promote it for others. It is when I come across others who already recognize the same excellences that I recognize, that Whiting’s argument comes into play.Footnote 20 Moreover, relationships of friendship do not tell us whether we should be civil to those outside the circle of friends, although there is nothing inherent in a friendship that requires incivility to others. They do not tell us very much about our duties of charity or justice to those outside the circle of friends, although it is not unreasonable to suppose that all other things being equal friendships may weigh in decisions to fulfil those duties. Friendship is an important part of our ethical life, but it is not the whole. As we shall see below, when this part of the argument is applied to state interaction, it raises the question of respect for state autonomy and military reform intervention.

State self-regard

Before turning to how the four ramifications of Whiting’s argument could be applied to the relationship between states, it is first necessary to clarify how her individualistic argument could apply to states. This problem raises a basic question of whether states, as such, can have or be bearers of coherent, overriding interests. One way around this difficulty is simply to presume that, in this regard, states are like individuals and hence can be self-interested actors. Within the social sciences, for example, this presumption is usually justified by its intuitive appeal or by its utility in explaining state behaviour. To those who would call into question the realism of this presumption, however, social scientists usually reply that the presumption is only as good as its ability to account for state behaviour better than competing models. In other words, a defence of the self-interested actor model is its role as a heuristic and not whether it accurately describes a state’s intentions or identity.Footnote 21

From the perspective of international ethics, however, the general problem with the social scientific presumption of state self-interest is that it closes off a fundamental question: is it reasonable or even rational for states to seek to preserve themselves? Raising this question shifts our attention away from explaining or describing state behaviour and directs it towards questions of justification, reason-giving and the quality of the choices that state actors make. Self-interest need not be taken as a fact of nature and if it is not so taken, then we can ask whether a compelling account can be given in support of self-interested action.Footnote 22 Absent such an account, the actor (in this case, a state) may lack a sufficient reason to advance its own interest. Alternatively, the presence of such an account may extend the rational nature of concern beyond the borders of one’s own state.

Now we are back to our initial question: how are we to make sense of the state as having interests in a manner that is analogous to individual interests? Once again, an easy answer may be at hand if we can defend an organic conception of the state or argue that the state is itself an independent source of value. In either case, state self-concern becomes analogous to individual self-concern. In the light of the troubling ontological claims of the former and the anti-individualistic ramifications of the latter, I will bracket these positions and presume that at most the state is an indispensable condition of value.Footnote 23 This approach assumes that the sources of value for individuals and groups are to be found either in the individual or civil society and that these values cannot be protected and advanced without the basic coercive, administrative and welfare institutions that have come to define the state. While there may be some individuals or groups in the world that either seek to self-insure what they value (perhaps certain criminal or terrorist organizations, non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations and the super rich) or have been pushed outside the state (refugees, enemy non-combatants), few entities, for good or for ill, are fully beyond the purview of some state. Moreover, the role of the state as an indispensable condition of value is historically conditioned. There was a time when the state did not play such a role and there may be a time in the future when it will not do so again. The argument presented here, then, rests upon a number of assumptions that need not, and perhaps will not, hold into the distant future.

The first of these assumptions is that as an indispensable condition of value, the value of the state rests upon its capacity to protect more or less successfully what people and groups living under its authority hold dear. A second assumption is that in the modern state, the interests and rights of individuals and groups will inevitably come into conflict with one another. A central value that all members of a state have, then, is that the basic institutions of the state (such as its constitutional arrangements, economy, educational system) seek to balance those competing claims in a fair manner. States and the institutions that compose them are important to us when they establish just processes or just outcomes to the collisions that occur in modern life. When these conditions are met, it is reasonable for individuals and groups to promote and maintain those institutions because they are just or minimally so. If it is reasonable for individuals to promote and protect just institutions, then it is also reasonable for states to be self-concerned assuming that they are fairly balancing competing claims and protecting and securing the values of the individuals within the state. The reasonableness of self-interest at the level of the state rests upon the character of the state itself.

A third assumption is that it is reasonable for members of a state to promote their institutions despite the fact that they are not fully just and may only imperfectly protect their interests and values. For the most part, this discussion will focus on ‘minimally and not fully just’ states. This is a plausible way to proceed, particularly given a fourth assumption that even the best governments remain works in progress; that is, it is not clear that we fully understand the best way to reflect and accommodate all reasonable values and interests. We do not fully understand what justice necessarily requires in all circumstances or what the best institutional system for fulfilling the demands of justice would look like. Pure procedural justice is rare and perfect procedural justice is rarer still. The state as an indispensable condition of value can be understood as a great experiment that is orientated towards justice. This understanding does not mean that we know nothing of what justice requires or the kinds of institutions and policies that are compatible with that pursuit. For example, the rule of law, respect for human rights, political accountability and representation appear to be central to a minimal conception of justice. For the concerns of this article, we can bracket the precise nature of those institutional arrangements and presume that there exist certain broad parameters that permit us to judge when states are failing to live up to the demands of justice. We have certain settled judgments regarding what is unjust, but no government has a lock on what the best institutional structures entail or what a complete vision of justice would mean.Footnote 24

Not your usual rational actor model

The argument that states can have interests in maintaining and promoting their fundamental institutions and that those interests depend on the quality of those institutions opens the possibility that what is important is the character of institutions, whoever happens to possess them. As Whiting frames it, the perspective here is ethocentric and not ethnocentric. A state’s concern for itself is justified because it is like concern for another regime. Our state should see other regimes as admirable, worthy of our concern and, perhaps, emulation, because they are good regimes. What should matter (although not the only thing that should matter) to our own regime in protecting and promoting other regimes is whether the basic institutions of foreign states embody the characteristics that we hold in high regard. Similarly, what should matter to our own government is whether it embodies those same or similar attributes. The relevant question is whether the object of concern is minimally just. The fact that the institutions are the state’s own, by itself, carries no independent weight. The traditional distinction between one state and another, then, becomes less important than the character that the regime possesses. As we saw above, this was the first ramification of Whiting’s position as it applied to individuals.

A second ramification of her position is that even though it calls into question rational egoism, it is still possible to accord special priority to one’s own interests. As we saw, Whiting argues that special priority can be justified at the individual level because it is pragmatically necessary in order for people to be agents and because it is epistemologically warranted. Holding off the applicability of the agency claim to states, there are at least two epistemological reasons to prioritize one’s own state institutions. First, states need to be sensitive to how the contingencies of history, culture, religion and language can affect the ability of institutions to balance off rights or accommodate interests and values. These contingencies help explain why differences may exist in attempting to discern what constitutes a minimally just society. Secondly, if all governments are works in progress and no state has in hand the definitive understanding of what just institutions may entail, then special concern is justified by the local, experimental nature of all institutional structures. In other words, states just happen to be in a better position to know the nature of their circumstances and the character of their on-going experiments in justice. Self-interest hinges upon self-worth, and special concern for one’s self hinges upon understanding how what is worthy applies to a particular context.

The epistemological argument creates a presumption in favour of self-concern, but not an absolute right on the part of states to autonomy and independence. It simply claims that states happen to be more familiar with their own circumstances than outsiders and, consequently, should be permitted to accord some priority to maintaining and promoting their own institutions. In response, it could be argued, that this is not a particularly strong defence of the priority thesis or autonomy and that in the light of the conception of the state as an indispensable condition of value, stronger arguments can be brought to bear on the problem. I wish to consider and respond to two such arguments along these lines. The first is that states have a special responsibility to protect and promote their own institutions simply because the justification of the state is that it serves as an indispensable condition of value for its citizens and not to foreigners. In effect, by protecting and promoting itself, the state is able to protect, promote and balance the interests of its own members. The second argument is that one of the core interests that citizens could have is to place the vital interests of their own state ahead of other regimes and peoples. From this perspective, protecting the interests of its own citizens will of necessity grant priority to the state’s own interests.

The first argument is not without merit. In its clearest formulation it asserts that the ‘first duty of a government is to protect its own people. After that it can try to help whomever else it can.’Footnote 25 What a state may do in the process of protecting its own people may be moderated by claims of justice, but priority should unquestionably be granted to one’s own. Seen in this light, because its first duty is to protect its own people, the state has a pretty strong reason to protect itself. In contrast, the view of the state offered here is somewhat different. As an indispensable condition of value, the state’s first duty is not to protect its own people tout court, but to provide a minimally just set of institutions and policies that protect the values and fairly resolve the disputes of the people and groups living under its domain. If protecting one’s own people is not synonymous with protecting institutions that are worthy of respect (as when the state is unjust), then the reasons for the state to protect itself fall away.Footnote 26 To formulate the position a bit more strongly, it is the duty of the state to establish and protect minimally just institutions not because they happen to protect this or that group of people, but because they are minimally just. The weight of the argument hinges less on the specific interests of a group of people living in a territory, and more on the character of the regime. The self-concern of the state is justified by the character of the state institutions. As we have seen, this does not preclude self-concern, but it does point to the claim that protection of one’s own need not be the starting point.

To sharpen the point, suppose that a state is presented with a choice of either further advancing the interests of its own people or protecting and promoting the just institutions of another state. Even under the relatively thin defence of the priority thesis offered here, states have reason to give priority to the interests of their own people. Nevertheless, because of the general character of reasons surrounding justice they also have reason to support foreign minimally just institutions. A state’s responsibility to its own citizens does not disappear in the light of its justifiable concern for other minimally just regimes and vice versa. It should both protect the interests of its own citizens and be concerned with the institutional interests of other minimally just regimes. If those concerns are in conflict, it is not the case that one should necessarily trump the other. At times advancing the vital interests of another minimally just state may outweigh the protection of domestic interests. The possibility that a state may place the lives of its own citizens at risk in order to defend another minimally just state would be the extreme example of this balancing act.

The second argument bolstering the claim of state self-interest is that citizens can themselves have a fundamental interest in placing their own state ahead of any other. The nationalist or patriotic variation of this argument is that a particular set of institutional arrangements and practices themselves have value solely because they belong to a given group. History, culture, religion and language can be reflected in a set of institutional structures that should be objects of self-concern in and of themselves and not simply for the formal reason that they serve as an indispensable condition of value. Consequently, it is reasonable for a group of people to hold a set of institutions as valuable merely because they value them or see them as their own. Any given nation-state does have an overriding interest in preserving its institutional structures against any other state – even another state that is eminently just.

The reason why the nationalist argument has any leverage in shoring up a national priority thesis, however, is because it assumes that the state’s function is to protect and promote the interests of individuals and groups living within its borders. An individual’s nationalist preferences piggyback on the interests of a state that themselves piggyback on an original set of citizen preferences regarding the state’s ability to preserve and promote the interests of its members. If these connections did not exist, then citizens could prefer to have ‘their own’ institutions even if those institutions failed to promote or fairly balance their own individual preferences to prefer their own institutions. But such a position would be self-defeating: a ‘nationalist regime’ that was unaccountable or non-representative would not see itself as bound or responsible to take into account the nationalist preferences of the citizenry. At some level, the nationalist argument rests on a regime that is reflective and protective of the interests of the people.Footnote 27

So, the strongest version of the priority thesis associated with the nationalist argument is that the state and its institutions are not only ‘theirs’ (reflecting their culture, language and so on), but that they are minimally just. If this is a plausible nationalist argument, it is not clear how it differs from the defence of the priority thesis already offered – namely, that a state should give priority to itself because it is in the best position to understand the circumstances needed to advance minimally just institutions. The plausible version of the nationalist thesis suggests that states would still have to be minimally just in order to ensure and advance the interests that people have in their national way of life: in short, simply having a set of institutions that are ‘theirs’ is not sufficient to support a claim of priority. If those institutions are both ‘theirs’ and minimally just, then we have a set of reasons up and running that support self-concern. The claim being advanced here is that those reasons can now themselves be linked to other-regarding reasons.

The pool of friends

Turning to the third ramification of Whiting’s conception of friendship, we have seen above that it generates a pool of impersonal friends out of which we befriend some small subset for contingent reasons. There are various explanations why not all those who compose the pool of impersonal friends become actual friends at the individual level. According to Whiting, members of that pool are deserving of our friendship, but because the world is large and our acquaintances are few, we may not even be aware of who is in that pool. In addition, we can speculate that of those people with whom we have some acquaintance, we may not know them well enough to say whether they have characters we admire. Finally, we may know that someone is part of that pool of impersonal friends, but simply lack the time, energy or emotional commitment to befriend him or her. Even though individuals may recognize each other as having the kinds of characters that they value this does not necessarily mean that they will be friends. They become character friends ‘with reciprocal experience, time, and intimacy’.Footnote 28 Prior to this point, impersonal friends have good will towards one another (‘what Aristotle calls eunoia’) insofar as they recognize and value the characteristics a particular individual, even a stranger, possesses.Footnote 29 All recognized members of the pool of impersonal friends are deserving of good will because they are all worthy and merit our respect. Perhaps what this means is that when we hear of such people we should admire them. When we come to learn of their goals and purposes, we should wish them well. When they cross our paths we should be well disposed and friendly towards them. What Whiting does not establish between members of the pool of impersonal friends is a positive obligation to befriend each other and make the other’s project their own. Perhaps if there is a positive obligation involved, it is one of good will and civility. While the pool of impersonal friends is not composed of friends as such, they should certainly be friendly to one another.

Because we are talking about the relationship between states and not specific individuals, all international friendships are, in a sense, impersonal. States, I have asserted, do not have the kinds of affective capabilities that are ordinarily needed for friendship: states can make many kinds of commitments, but emotional ones are not an option. On the one hand, this means that friendship between states will be but a pale imitation of interpersonal friendships. On the other hand, it means that states do not have the same sort of emotional limitations that restrict the scope of interpersonal friendships. In addition, unlike individuals, there are far fewer states in the world and it is easier to obtain information about the character of institutions than about the character of specific individuals who may be complete strangers to us. Finally, states have far greater opportunities for contact and co-operation than individuals do in a large impersonal society. To the extent that contact and co-operation (or doing things together) are preconditions for friendship, then this condition is more easily satisfied in the case of states than of individuals in large societies. All of this means that Whiting’s idea of an impersonal pool of friends is not directly translatable to the relations between states.

Nevertheless, her distinction between a pool of impersonal friends and actual friendships points to the possibility of distinguishing between different levels of interstate friendships. At a level that most closely resembles Whiting’s pool of impersonal friends, one could argue that all states that appear to have admirable characters should at least be friendly towards one another. This pool of friends includes not only stable, on-going minimally just regimes, but also governments that possess admirable institutions but whose stability or durability is questionable. If states have reason to be concerned with preserving other states whose domestic arrangements are minimally well ordered, then the level of concern should be a function of the durability or stability of those domestic institutions. Just as at the individual level, the determination of character must meet the test of time: no one is courageous, just or temperate merely by adopting the intention to be so; the same may be said of a regime. The presumption here is that knowing the character of a regime and whether it is durable also requires passing a test of time. Of course, ‘durability’ is a matter of degree. In broad terms it refers to the regular and peaceful transference of power, respect for the rule of law, and the protection of basic rights and liberties. The question of durability is a significant one in so far as not all fledgling democracies emerging from authoritarian rule succeed. Institutions that at first appear to be fair and impartial may ultimately serve as the cover for emerging oligarchs.

Despite the tentativeness of some minimally just regimes, all apparently admirable states have good reason to work out their differences in a manner that does not put at risk the institutional arrangements that they mutually value and are trying to maintain. Consequently, they should respect their particular projects in pursuing justice, be willing to learn from other states what arrangements will advance that pursuit and have reason to consult one another in times of crisis or war. At minimum, mutual respect for independence and justice means that these states have reason to avoid acting in ways that cripple or prevent the ability of their friends to protect the interests of their citizenry or balance competing claims in a fair manner. The monetary policies, trade imbalances, import restrictions, patent requirements, judicial procedures and forms of punishment of one state may have implications for another state’s ability to enact policies of distributive justice, property protection, health care or criminal law. The familiar litany of the effects of globalization and interdependency create responsibilities to be attentive to the significance of those effects upon the minimally just institutions of one’s friends. For one state within this pool to establish policies that threaten to undermine the pursuit of justice by another state should be cause for concern and consultation. Apparent, minimally just regimes have good reason, simply because of what they are aspiring to achieve, to enter into an entente cordiale.

The broadest conception of international friends includes both tested and untested admirable regimes. A stronger, and one could say deeper, form of international friendship emerges if the character of the regime proves to be durable. Stable, minimally just regimes have reason to extend their commitment to preserve and protect the institutions and orientation towards justice that they mutually hold dear. Here, the norms of international friendship go beyond a willingness to work out differences in a peaceful manner, a presumption of being consulted on matters of mutual concern, a respect for independence of action, a readiness to learn from and not harm each other’s institutional achievements and minimally just institutions (norms that define the entente cordiale) and include an honesty and frankness in communication, a willingness to share information, a sense of mutual trust and reciprocity without the expectation of a quid pro quo, and a willingness to commit resources in the name of mutual defence. The central expectations of international friendship are ones of mutual aid and collective security.Footnote 30 Once again, the central idea here is that the reasons for self-defence – namely that a state is worthy of being defended – argue for defending regimes that possess a similar character. All minimally just regimes have good reasons to defend themselves and therefore have good reasons to defend one another.

Special relationships and internal threats

International friendships based on the mutual recognition of the worthiness of the parties’ domestic institutions are sufficient to support claims of collective security. But regimes also have reason for defending themselves against domestic threats that could fundamentally alter their just character. A minimally just government facing a coup d’état, civil unrest, natural or man-made disaster may have overwhelming reasons to do what is necessary to preserve itself in the face of those risks. Do international friendships also provide reasons for protecting other minimally just states from internal threats? This question, of course, simply goes away if one assumes that once a regime is minimally just it will always be so. Alternatively, it is easily answered if the state that is in trouble or is sliding into anarchy or tyranny asks for outside support to shore up its institutions. The more difficult problem arises if all states are in principle corruptible and may not necessarily ask for outside support. Under these conditions, can the norms associated with international friendship override claims of autonomy even when no outside assistance is being requested?

The argument against a permission to intervene in order to save a state from itself could start with the earlier argument that states happen to be in a better position to understand the nature of their own circumstances and the character of their on-going experiments in justice than outside regimes. The notion that minimally just states have a special relationship to their own interests implies that outsiders, even ones with the best of intentions, do not have a permission to intervene to save a regime from itself. To further support the case against intervention, one could note that international friendships exist only if the friends remain independent states. A permission to violate the autonomy of one’s friend whenever a domestic threat appeared on the horizon would seriously undermine that independence. The recognition of the admirable qualities of another regime may yield reasons for defence against external, but not internal, enemies.

The response that international friendship is trumped by autonomy rests on the force of the special relationship that states have to their own institutions and interests. It is conceivable, however, that within the pool of states that participate in a practice of international friendship some states may be closer than others. Just as Whiting argues that contingent events and desires may bring certain people out of the pool of impersonal friends and into true friendships, it is possible that a set of contingencies can draw minimally just states together into a special relationship of friendship. For example, the historical sacrifice of blood and treasure for another minimally just state may intensify concern for and trust of that state. The sense of the investment in the relationship may strengthen a sense of loyalty and generate a different and deeper level of concern and connection that goes beyond the norms and expectations of collective security. Alternatively, familiarity due to geographical proximity or cultural similarity may increase the mutual understanding of two states’ pursuit of just institutions and the obstacles that they face and seek to overcome. In the light of these kinds of contingencies, it is reasonable for minimally just states to show differential concern for some admirable states over others. Within the pool of international friendships closer and looser ties may exist.

What is the nature of these special relationships that can be established between minimally just states? As with all international friendships, these relationships would be characterized by the expectations and pitfalls mentioned above (i.e., frankness in communication, a willingness to engage in collective security and provide mutual aid, a presumption that the friends will be consulted on matters of mutual importance, an almost unreasonable willingness to support one’s partner’s projects and interests, a willingness to learn from each other, and a mutual trust and reciprocity without the expectation of a quid pro quo). It may also be characterized by a common legal, religious or cultural heritage and understanding of the institutions and policies that define the pursuit of justice. More importantly, special relationships are ones in which a foreign state is seen like another self. The significance of this relationship is twofold. In its more useful and benign formulations it suggests that another regime can serve as a kind of mirror for oneself. All minimally just states should be able to learn from one another, but nations in a special relationship can provide a more adequate account of how one is doing in one’s attempt to secure minimally just institutions and policies.Footnote 31

In addition, the character of a special relationship intensifies the strength of concern for the other regime. My government should pursue its vital interests because it has the kind of character that is worthy of respect. It has a special relationship to its own interests because it understands its institutions and orientation towards justice in a way that few other states may understand. To the extent that my state has a special relationship to your state, it also has reason to be concerned about the vital interests of your government, not because those interests advance the interests of my government narrowly understood, but because they are the interests of a regime that is minimally just and because we possess a close friendship. In this kind of relationship, the claims of attachment are strengthened and the claims of autonomy are correspondingly weakened. States within a special relationship, because they see the friend like another self, have reasons to be attentive to, address and, possibly, intervene to thwart internal threats to the other regime.Footnote 32 To preserve the friendship, however, any such intervention would have to be done with the aim of restoring the admirable qualities of the regime as well as its independence. This feature of special relationships also intensifies the moral risk associated with loyalty and increases the potential for disputes over how the parties respect and balance the demands of autonomy, justice and friendship. The moral risk here, of course, is that intervening into the internal affairs of a friend increases the chance of conflict, misunderstanding, and the destruction of the friendship. A special relationship therefore stands in opposition to legal and ethical positions that grant a near absolute status to the autonomy of states that are not engaged in aggression or massive violations of human rights.

Inside the circle of friends: absolute versus relative gains

The previous two sections have been exploring how Whiting’s concept of a pool of friends could be applied to an understanding of the relationship between states. I have suggested that Whiting’s concept, which delineates levels or kinds of friendship, can be translated into three different forms of international friendship. Another way to understand the relationship between states within the pool is in terms of how to view the goods and advantages accrued by friends. At the level of individuals, the gain of a friend is, in many respects, like one’s own gain. At the level of states, this question raises the debate surrounding the importance of absolute versus relative gains. The reasoning associated with international friendship suggests that whether and how the gains of other states matter can depend on the character of the regimes and the character of their relationships. The stronger the international friendship (i.e., the closer it comes to a special relationship), the less reason states have to be concerned for the relative gains of their friends. That a gain may not be evenly distributed between friends is less important than that the friendship ensures that some gain is had by the friends. In this way, international friendship is in accord with the view that absolute gains can matter more than relative gains depending on the context.Footnote 33

In contrast, Joseph Grieco argues:

In contrast, the idea of international friendship implies that not all partners are the same because state leaders have reasons to treat them differently. International friendship provides reasons for states to co-operate that stretch state interest beyond a narrow conception of self-interest and survival. Minimally just states have less to fear from other minimally just states simply because they are minimally just. This is not because such states are inherently less belligerent vis-à-vis one another (although the democratic peace literature points in that direction), but because they can recognize the already existing positive reasons to defend and promote the basic institutions and interests of the circle of friends. To be clear, this mapping out of the notion of international friendship shows that from within the reasons supporting state self-interest, one can also find arguments for other-regarding state action. Whether states actually take advantage of those reasons is an empirical question that is not addressed by this discussion of international friendship. I am not seeking to explain current state behaviour, but to expand the possibilities for rational state action – possibilities that are already implicit in self-interested action. This focus does not mean that Grieco’s claim is unimportant. As intentional actors, capable of being motivated by reasons, minimally just states need to be aware that all present partners are potential foes. This warning may be particularly compelling if minimally just states do not recognize reasons to support one another or if their minimally just character is unstable. This adjustment to the realist’s reasons for action is merely another way of saying that relative gains matter less as the friendship becomes deeper.

Outside the circle of friends: partial solidarism

A fourth and final ramification of Whiting’s character-based conception of friendship involves how we respond to those who are outside the pool of impersonal friends. As with an interpersonal friendship, an international friendship serves as a reason to prioritize the claims of one’s friend over the claims of non-friends, all other things being equal. As we have seen, this does not mean that the claims of international friendships always trump all other claims (for all other things are rarely equal), but that the claims of such friendships are defensible and legitimate. For example, it may very well be the case that the reasons for providing humanitarian aid to a corrupt, but destitute, regime outweigh the reasons for using those funds to support one’s friends. Nevertheless, if the claims of both regimes are similar in relevant respects, then the ties of friendship should be given their due.

Can the reasons associated with international friendship do more than prioritize the interests of friends? Do those reasons have implications for the treatment of regimes that fail to live up to the minimal standards of justice? One way to frame the issue is by asking whether the reasons that support international friendship also license reform or humanitarian intervention. To begin to answer this question, it should be clear that international friendship does entail the following position: if the quality of a state’s institutions provides the basis of concern for preserving and promoting a regime, then the absence of that character implies the absence of an important (and perhaps the central) reason for its preservation and promotion. Can we say more? Is the absence of a reason for preserving and promoting a set of institutions the same as the presence of a reason for acting in a manner to reform or transform those institutions? At the domestic level, the answer to this question is ‘yes’. Citizens who are facing institutions that fail to qualify as minimally just institutions do have reasons to change them. The absence of reasons for institutional self-concern is part and parcel of a positive reason to reform or replace those institutions. The existence of these reasons does not determine the means that are going to be used to engage in that transformation. For example, having a reason to change the basic institutions of society may not be enough to legitimize the use of violence and the loss of innocent life. Instrumental rationality and claims of proportionality could make a great deal of difference to how a citizenry replies to unjust institutions. It should be noted that this argument is not the same as claiming that people have an obligation to change their institutions, but it may be enough to support a right to revolution. In any case, the unreasonableness of institutional self-defence vis-à-vis the citizenry is sufficient for the reasonableness of a permission for attempting to improve things.

Does a similar argument apply to international intervention? Is the right to revolution simultaneously a right to engage in reform intervention? If a state lacks reasons for self-concern, then it is also unreasonable for it to defend or protect itself from changes that may lead to a more just state of affairs, even if those changes may emanate from outside itself. But the absence of a moral right to self-defence does not imply that outsiders have a moral permission to intervene into the affairs of a state that lacks such a right, particularly if that intervention would involve the use of military force. However imperfect international law may be, it can, at least in part, be understood as an attempt to regulate the level and scope of violence in the international system. Restricting the justifications for the use of force or establishing a set of institutional mechanisms to regulate the occasions for war can be read as attempts to control violence. Those inside and outside the circle of friends may still participate in a global international society partly constituted by laws and norms that seek to mitigate the breadth and nature of harm caused by the use of force. The circle of friends may have good reason to respect prevailing international norms in their treatment of those outside the circle. In other words, international friendship may be compatible with a pluralist respect for the international law of non-intervention.

Nevertheless, as was noted earlier, international friendship is not entirely compatible with pluralism insofar as the existence of a special relationship (the strongest form of international friendship) could provide a reason for intervention that would not be permitted under current international law. The solidarity of friendship can result in state action beyond what pluralism would deem desirable. In this respect, international friendship appears compatible with solidarism. But the comparison is complicated by the fact that the distinction between pluralism and solidarism can be formulated in different ways. On one formulation, the difference rests on an empirical assessment of the level of international solidarity to enforce the law.Footnote 35 Pluralists believe that there is only enough solidarity for minimal shared international purposes, while solidarists believe in a much deeper reservoir of shared norms and expectations. In contrast to this formulation, international friendship could stand in opposition to both pluralism and solidarism. The partial solidarity of friendship could undermine the impartial enforcement of the law. Perhaps the deeper the international friendship, the stronger the reasons may exist for advancing the interests of one’s friends over the law. The problem becomes enormously complicated when one adds that minimally just regimes may act aggressively or occasionally violate human rights. While friendship is not synonymous with blind loyalty at either the international or interpersonal levels, the expectations of support that are part and parcel of friendship can be enacted by standing ‘shoulder to shoulder’ or by speaking freely, providing frank advice, and respectfully disagreeing. In either case, the reasons of friendship themselves exert a pull that may not support prevailing international norms.

The distinction between pluralism and solidarism, however, can also be formulated in the light of the question of humanitarian intervention. Very generally, ‘pluralism is concerned solely with the minimum goal of inter-state coexistence, whereas solidarism is concerned with the higher goal of the welfare of individual human persons living in separate states’.Footnote 36 Solidarism, then, offers a justification for the collective use of force against governments that violate the ‘cardinal rules and norms of the society of states’ or that fail to protect the fundamental human rights of their members.Footnote 37 As should be evident from what has been said, a favourable attitude towards intervening in the internal affairs of unjust regimes in order to transform them into just regimes is not directly derivable from a relationship of international friendship. More strongly, international friendship does not even require that those states falling outside the circle of friends be considered enemies. Alliances of economic gain and military security with unjust regimes are not precluded by the idea that minimally just regimes have good reasons to support one another. Not all those with whom a nation has friendly relations are relations of friendship. The idea of international friendship does not necessarily generate a Manichean or Schmittean view of the world that is divided into friends and enemies. The position, of course, precludes unjust states from entering into the circle of international friendship, but it does not license making the world safe for democracy. To some degree this parallels an argument that could be made at the individual level. We do not have an obligation or a right to transform those individuals who lack the characters we admire. We are not obliged to be friends with everyone or to make them into the kinds of beings with whom we could be friends.

These last comments, however, suggest one way in which international friendship could be fully compatible with solidarism: Hedley Bull noted that solidarism entails the ‘solidarity, or potential solidarity of the states comprising international society’.Footnote 38 In a world in which all governments were minimally just and hence had reason to promote one another’s fundamental institutions and policies, then international friendship would be synonymous with international solidarity. There is nothing in the theory of international friendship that guarantees or rules out realizing such a possibility. However, short of a world composed of minimally just states, international friendship implies a kind of partial solidarity. International friends share a conception of minimal justice that has consequences for how they treat their own citizens and one another. Solidarity of this sort need not be universal.