Christian Schultheiss's new book is the most sweeping and detailed analysis of China's negotiations on claims and rights to the East China Sea and South China Sea. In both regions, states contend with maritime boundary disputes and associated rights and jurisdiction over offshore oil, natural gas and fisheries, as well as security-related issues, including crisis communication. The author's main argument is that the claimant states involved in maritime disputes over boundaries and ocean resources in the East China Sea and South China Sea have had successes and failures in reaching accommodation due to the nature of the bargaining process in each case. Using a case-study method, Schultheiss carefully documents the disputes and negotiations in both regions. He concludes that the structure of the negotiations and how they unfold influence whether states reach interim agreements that can share resources or effectively manage disputes. To achieve effective cooperation, states must be confident that the bilateral or shared agreement or interim outcome does not expand their opponent's bargaining power in the dispute. This is an original and insightful approach that goes beyond the tired doctrinal debates to focus on how international law and governance are driven by realpolitik. The power disparity between China and the other claimant states is central to the analysis. Japan and South Korea have faced China in the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea. In the South China Sea, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei stand against China individually, although ASEAN has attempted to engage to limited success on a multilateral basis.
The number of case studies in the volume is daunting, and we can thank Schultheiss for developing a framework that collects the data and provides a theoretical lens to make sense of it. The subtitle orients the reader around the disputes over natural resources and how institutions and power relate to them. First, the book explores a model demonstrating how conflict management institutions established to address natural resource issues can be weaponized. Then, chapters analyse this phenomenon in detail in the South China Sea and East China between China and its numerous competitors. In the South China Sea, for example, China, the Philippines and Vietnam negotiated a Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking that was partially implemented in 2008. China and the Philippines reached an impasse from 2011 to 2012 regarding joint development. They developed a memorandum of understanding from 2017 to 2022 on negotiations on seismic research, but it was never implemented. They had also developed a memorandum on fisheries cooperation from 1995 to 2004, but it also was not implemented. China and Vietnam developed sea boundary delimitation and joint development agreements from 1993 to 2004, and they have been implemented. The joint development agreement features limited joint exploration activities and patrols. The two countries have also agreed on fisheries and implemented a joint fisheries committee. But, from 2010 to 2013, China and Vietnam negotiated but failed to reach an agreement on maritime boundary and joint development issues. In short, China and Vietnam agreed on a maritime boundary and joint resource management in the Gulf of Tonkin but failed to do so in the South China Sea. There are other cases in the South China Sea unrelated to China, such as the Philippines–Taiwan agreement on fisheries law enforcement that provides for a one-hour notice before enforcement and the Brunei–Malaysia agreement on boundary and joint development that was implemented in 2009. China and ASEAN member states negotiated a Declaration on Conduct from 1996 to 2002 to practically manage conflict, but it was never implemented through a Code of Conduct. The prospect for a Code of Conduct is just one of a menagerie of agreements between China and ASEAN, which include various non-binding agreements on conflict management, that were negotiated from 2003 to 2016 but have not been implemented. The Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea was negotiated with ASEAN, China and outside states to facilitate communication, navigation procedures and de-escalatory behaviour. Still, it is implemented on a voluntary basis.
In the East China Sea, China and Japan negotiated a principled consensus on joint development and participation of Japanese companies in Chinese projects from 1985 to 2008 but it was not implemented. Likewise, a China–Japan agreement on a joint fisheries committee was negotiated from 1996 to 2000. It was implemented and has been effective in managing incidents within the scope of the agreement. Japan and China negotiated an agreement on joint exploration and exploitation of oil and natural gas in 1974. The agreement was implemented, but no commercially viable resource has been found. South Korea also negotiated a joint fisheries agreement with China from 1993 to 2001, although China has often violated the agreement. Nonetheless, the agreement has been somewhat effective in preventing the escalation of disputes. South Korea has responded forcefully to China's illegal fishing in the Yellow Sea without escalating tensions. Separately, Japan and South Korea also adopted an agreement on a Joint Development Zone for fisheries management in 1999. The agreement has been implemented, although there is continued tension over the allocation of the annual quota. By June 2025, both countries can either declare its termination or let it run through its 50-year validity. If the pact continues through 2028, it will be automatically renewed. Japan and Taiwan have also implemented an agreement on fisheries management.
In contrast to South Korea's firm reaction to China's illegal fishing, responses by claimant states in the South China Sea have resulted in significant escalation and increased tension. Schultheiss's model explains why. The most successful negotiations and agreements isolate issues of practical governance from the underlying maritime boundary disputes in a practical and incremental way. The author demonstrates that shared governance at sea is possible in spite of maritime boundary disputes. Agreements sometimes serve to isolate areas of common interest in avoiding escalating from the broader disputes. The power disparity between China and every other state in the East China Sea and the South China Sea has meant that the claimant states negotiating with Beijing have sought to ensure that agreements do not consolidate or extend China's influence.
The book is fresh and original, and its conclusions are convincing. This is an essential study for scholars and policymakers in the law of the sea, especially maritime boundary delimitation and ocean governance.
