James Brundage retraces the historical stages of formation of the legal profession in Western Europe during the last centuries of the Middle Ages. The study relies mostly on a careful reading of the legal sources, including the main academic treatises and commentaries on civil and criminal procedure that were produced in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Brundage paints an extensive and compelling picture of the rules and requirements that gradually defined the status of the medieval jurists and the nature of their respective functions. The first three chapters provide a brief but useful presentation of legal practice and training in the centuries prior to the twelfth century's legal revival. The concept of revival commonly used to describe this unique moment in the Western legal tradition might appear incongruous, since Brundage's study clearly shows that the medieval emergence of the legal profession was by no means a rebirth of the ancient Roman jurisconsults, despite the unavoidable reference to Roman law. The widespread but improper use by legal historians of this ambiguous concept of revival does not do justice to the birth of an original legal system. This development occurred in a social and political context that had little in common with ancient Rome. Likewise, the tenuous and often artificial link between Rome and medieval Western Europe does not account for the birth of canonical jurisprudence that significantly contributed to the definition and recognition of the legal profession. In following chapters, Brundage provides a detailed examination of the rules that governed access to the profession and thus contributed to the recognition of lawyers' professional status. He pays particular attention to the practice of canon law in ecclesiastical courts and to the canonists' most influential works on these issues.

By the mid-twelfth century the teaching of Roman and canon law attracted an increasing number of students. It quickly spread outside Bologna to areas where lesser-known schools caught the attention of the local nobility and ambitious new urban elites. This successful expansion contributed to the emergence of a legal culture that provided practical responses to mounting economic, political, and social challenges. In the thirteenth century, legal education was considered an indispensable foundation for many professional ambitions. As Brundage rightfully observes, both ecclesiastical and secular courts required greater numbers of expert lawyers and judges, but the recently introduced Romano-canonical procedure gave pride of place to the parties and their advocates in the judicial process. In public affairs, familiarity with Roman law was a significant but not exclusive component of the formation of qualified officials, counselors, and councilmen who used this knowledge to their advantage in various manorial and royal governments positions. Canon law was equally important in the training of members of the clergy who either sought a career in papal government or assisted bishops in the administration of their dioceses. In private matters, people relied upon the advice and expertise of notaries, advocates, proctors, and counselors, who often enjoyed a position of prestige and power in their communities.

To be sure, the rise of legal professionals was also met with suspicion and some criticism. The more conservative elements of medieval society and members of the traditional order who felt threatened by the consequences of social and political changes bemoaned the increasing litigations fueled by the growing number of lawyers. Writing in the 1180s, English theologian Ralph Niger disparaged the greediness and ignorance of unscrupulous lawyers who used their limited knowledge of the Roman law for the sole purpose of amassing power and money. A few decades later, in 1234, Pope Gregory IX presented his new compilation of pontifical legislation as a necessary cure for the incessant human quarreling and endless lawsuits resulting from twisted interpretations of too many confusing legal rules. Despite these negative perceptions, by the time that Sinibaldo Fieschi, a former professor of canon law at Bologna, ascended to the papacy as Innocent IV in 1243, the legal profession had been accepted as an indispensable component of society. Jurists and practitioners retained a defining influence on the conduct of legal and judicial affairs. As the initial building blocks of the modern state began to form, the emphasis that the Church and secular authorities put on fair justice and good government placed the legal profession under a new and mounting scrutiny. These political concerns imposed a model of professional conduct necessary to meet the requirements of the new legal order. Stricter ethical standards and firmer procedural rules partly addressed the complaints of misbehavior and professional misconduct, but the enforcement of these rules was at best haphazard. Nevertheless, as Brundage persuasively argues, these sets of rules greatly contributed to the transformation of diverse legal practices into a model of the legal profession that remains largely accepted to this day.