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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 May 2004
This book, richly documented and cogently argued, sheds significant light on Sufism as a societal actor in Iran during the 20th century. Its focus on Sufism's varied configurations under the Pahlavi dynasty and Islamic Republic opens a window—hitherto largely closed—on religion and religion–state relations in Iran. The author, an anthropologist, analyzes social and cultural change in two branches—Sāfī-

alīshāhī and Sulṭān-

alīshāhī—of the Shī

ī Ni

māt Allāhī order within a tripartite horizon: internally with other Sufis, laterally with jurists or clerics, and vertically with state rulers. Arguing against previous, more static definitions—especially the Corbinist view of Sufism as trans-historical, perennial wisdom, and the Weberian one as protest against political and clerical power—van den Bos convincingly demonstrates the integration of Sufism into changing socio-political circumstances under the patrimonial and traditional rule of the Qajar monarchy (treated, along with methodological concerns, in part 1); the absolutist and royalist rule of the Pahlavi monarchy (part 2); and the absolutist and clericalist rule of the Islamic Republic (part 3).
Building on and greatly adding to previous studies that show Sufism to have played a vital role in Iranian society and state formation since the Safavid dynasty, van den Bos gives us a detailed and comprehensive treatment within the nationalist period, in which Iranian Sufism has had to adapt to nationalist absolutism, whether royalist (i.e., Pahlavi, 1921–79) or clericalist (i.e., Islamic, 1979-). The author's analysis suggests that it is no longer enough to view Iranian Sufism as opposition and dissent under a clerical or clerically aligned regime, or as support and rapprochement under a monarchy pressing its own claims to rule. Sufism—with its dual emphasis on explicit and implicit religiosity—can accommodate and reflect both clerical and monarchical notions of religious authority—that is, vilāyat-i faqīh and farr-i īzadī, respectively—while generating its own specific claims to authority through the prestige of shaykh and qutb as heir to and representative of the Shi

i imam.
Indeed, antagonism toward Sufism cannot be explained merely in terms of clerical ascendance; it must also account for clerical self-understanding and socio-political circumstances. The absence of centralized rule under the Qajars allowed both Sufis and clerics “autonomous local influence” (p. 54), and it was only with the re-assertion of clerical claims to an exclusivist religious authority—epitomized in the victory of the Usuli over the Akhbari school—that Sufi orders and Qajar rulers related symbiotically. In contrast, Khomeini's ideological definition of clerical authority as the basis of national identity and political rule reduced Sufi orders, like all other groups, to extensions rather than co-existents of the state.
Equally true are the subtleties of Iranian Sufism in relation to monarchy. While identification with Qajar rulers effected little change in Sufism, the Pahlavi drive to modernize Iran contributed greatly to both the suppression of the arcane and antinomian elements of Sufism and its association with intellectual modernism. While Sufism elsewhere has been similarly reshaped by modernity and the modern state (e.g., Egypt), modernization in Iran nearly obliterated Sufi identity itself, especially in the case of the Safi-

alishahi order, whose play to freemasonry and bureaucratized structure —in addition to its close ties to Pahlavi patronage and politics and its coupling with the Society of Brotherhood—effectively did away with traditional forms of ṭarīqa coherence in favor of an elective principle of decision-making. In contrast, the Sultan-

alishahi order, despite one attempt to redefine Sufism as “a modern scientific enterprise” (p. 84) instead of a shaykh-mediated mystical initiation, was able to maintain a genealogical line of hierarchical leadership, define clear rules of a modernized Sufi identity (e.g., Pand-i sālih [p. 89]), and discourage political involvement if religious matters were not at stake.
By highlighting the diverse ways in which Sufism is configured in response to the state, this book will contribute to the comparative study of Sufi–state relations in the Middle East and Asia. For example, the responses of the two Ni

mat Allahi branches to Pahlavi rule may represent broader dynamics within Sufism: Safi-

alishahi affinity with absolutist rule as an embodiment of divine power vested in the physical person of the ruler (cf. Syria), and Sultan-

alishahi quietism that transforms into cautious activism only when a modernizing agenda transgresses the boundaries of religious conscience (cf. Turkey and Soviet Central Asia).
Sultan-

alishahi adaptability to Khomeini's absolutist and clericalist rule is evidence of Sufism's ability to exist alongside even the utopian and revolutionary politics of Islamic fundamentalism (cf. Sufi alignments with the Muslim Brotherhood in pre-1982 Syria). Is this ability merely chance of circumstance and previous affiliation or another example of the resources of Sufi stratagem? While Safi-

alishahi identification with Pahlavi royalty reduced the order to internal bickering and a ceremonial existence with little Sufi content under Khomeini, Sultan-

alishahi re-alignment with clerical rule allowed it to maintain a viable Sufi identity, even if it was in the image of the Islamic Revolution. It was this survival tactic—the long-standing Sufi willingness to compromise on externals—that set the stage for a partial return of Sufism in post–Khomeini Iran. The state's promotion of a post-revolutionary ideology, which includes mysticism, has enabled Sufi orders—especially the Sultan-

alishahi—to reassert the prestige and authority of ṭarīqa mysticism apart from both clerical authority and state-sponsored mysticism (

irfān), even if it continues to emphasize the coherence of shari

a and ṭarīqa. For its part, the Safi-

alishahi order took the opportunity to reassert its particular identity by obtaining a copy of the tafsīr of Safi-

alishah (d. 1899) from one of his granddaughters in 1995.
If, as the author has clearly demonstrated, Sufism can adapt to the demands of state, it is not clear where Sufism's own vision is to be located in this process. Is Sufism nothing more than a strategy for survival and prestige that reacts to the state, or does it have its own goals as a societal actor? Van den Bos does argue in part 4 that the “hidden” concerns of Sufism are essential to its ability to contribute, even if in a limited fashion, to civil society. But does Sufism negotiate and re-negotiate its identity and existence vis-à-vis other societal actors for the sake of an institutional presence alone (i.e., the mystic regime) or for the realization of goals (e.g., preservation and promotion of the human experience of the divine apart from political and clerical regulation that require a viable institutional presence)? Is Sufism's strong emphasis on mystical companionship understood simply as the service of cronyism—that is, preservation of the mystic regime—or is it understood by Sufis themselves as a moral force generating charitable participation in social and national welfare? And if alignment with religious nationalism—whether royalist or clericalist—has been a distinguishing feature of Iranian Sufism in the 20th century, is it more suitable to analyze Sufism within a larger framework of national identity than the framework of state formation? Such questions, which this work neither intends to treat fully nor neglects entirely, are, however, raised by its very admirable treatment of a long “hidden” dimension of Iranian religious nationalism. For that reason alone, this book will be welcomed by specialists in the study of both contemporary Iran and contemporary Sufism and will shape future research on Sufism and politics in Iran.