In his 1917 paper “On the Notion of Cause,” Bertrand Russell decried the ambiguity of the term cause, advocated its abolition, and opined that it was tolerated only because, like the monarchy, it was falsely thought to do no harm. In mid-century, Gustav Bergmann had a similar complaint with a similar recommendation concerning the term content, which he thought confusingly covered both too much and too little.Footnote 1 There is an early-modern term that should be added to this list: indifference. A residue of late scholasticism, it too is a source of confusion and conceptual mayhem. Like the terms “cause” and “content,” and the monarchy, which are with us still, there is not much hope for its abolition, for, after all, it is ensconced in the historical period. Still, it will be useful for us at this point at least to sort out, and retain awareness of, the different meanings it implicitly had at that time. Doing so offers promise of resolving some of the confusion in the literature (both primary and secondary) on free will in the early modern period.
The mechanization of the world picture, in its heyday during the seventeenth century, was perceived to threaten human freedom and responsibility to a degree unprecedented even by Stoic fatalism in antiquity or by predestinarian theories of grace in the Reformation. The threat was represented in the clock of the Strasbourg cathedral, an extraordinary contrivance whose nearly life-size human figures moved with the same mechanical necessity as the hands of the clock, the planets and other stars, the moon and the sun (also represented on the clock), which is to say with a precise regularity that was not just clock-like. Soon, De La Mettrie and others would give expression to what was already sensed, that human behaviour was based on the same principles as the great clock, and on no others.
A block to the deterministic threat was sought under the rubric of a “freedom of indifference,” an expression that recurs throughout the period, but with nothing near the univocality that is almost universally assumed in the recent literature. In fact, there are seven different senses of the term indifference [to be called here: (1) nonchalance, (2) laxity, (3) balance-pan, (4) relative libertarian, (5) absolute libertarian, (6) disengagement, and (7) disinterestedness], and these various senses colour and often confuse discussion in the period. Indeed, only the libertarian senses, absolute and relative, relate directly to freedom as a power. The other senses involve either an affective state (nonchalance, laxity, and disinterestedness) or response to the relative cogency of perceptions (balance-pan and disengagement).
There is no theoretical reason, certainly nothing like a transcendental deduction, why there should be exactly seven senses, which results only from an empirical extraction. Even so, in the narrative flow in which they are presented here, there is a linking among the seven senses that reflects the easy but confusing slides from one to another in the period. What emerges in this presentation is a loosely hermeneutical circle. These results are by themselves worth reporting as an aid to scholars working on the period.
Beyond that benefit, moreover, there is a historical and philosophical bite to the exercise. A suggestion is made that if freedom of indifference was intended as an exception to universal mechanism in the sense that its possession allowed behaviour that, unnecessitated, could have been otherwise, then perhaps the notion is incoherent and, in any case, incapable of clear expression. Perhaps unsurprisingly, it was advanced, most notably, by four bishops: Bramhall, Fénelon, King, and Berkeley.Footnote 2 But many others flirted with the view, confusingly using the term in other ways whose differences have escaped the literature.
The principal victim of this confusion has been Descartes, whose texts, as we shall see, can be read prima facie, but speciously in my view, as invoking all seven senses of the term. The upshot has been that his doctrine of the will has been read as involving a range of difficulties, from heresy (Arnauld, for example, took Descartes to be a Pelagian) to logical inconsistency (Gilson took Descartes’s later views on indifference to involve him in a “formal contradiction”).Footnote 3 The supposition below, however, is that Descartes never uses the term except in one sense, the balance-pan sense, which both spares him these difficulties and grounds a consistent and defensible doctrine of the will. The full defense of this supposition is obviously beyond the scope of this paper, which nonetheless will at least provide, at the end, a representative example of such difficulties, and show how, by recognizing the single use of the term, the difficulty can be avoided. The example comes from Anthony Kenny, the seminal author for the recent English-language interpretations of Descartes as holding that freedom consists in libertarian indifference of the will. In attributing this sense of indifference to Descartes, Kenny creates an incoherence in his theory, which can be eliminated by recognizing only the balance-pan sense of the term. For Descartes, indifference is not freedom itself but a measure of the cogency of our perceptions of the true and the good. The highest degree, which eliminates indifference altogether, is the most perfect degree of freedom.
1. In the first sense, an agent is indifferent just in case the result of what he does causes no affect in him. Given the absence of any such affect, a good term for it might be nonchalance (from the French non-chaloir, a lack of being heated). It recalls the attitude of the Pyrrhonian skeptics. Diogenes Laertius reports that according to Eratosthenes, Pyrrho did such menial tasks as taking poultry to market and dusting things in the house, “quite indifferent as to what he did. They say he showed his indifference by washing a porker.”Footnote 4
The term used by Diogenes for indifferent is αδιαφόρος, a negative adjective derived from the verb διαφέρω (to differ, to be different). Not incidentally, it is the same term used by Descartes in a text that is crucial to his doctrine of the will – the letter of 9 February 1645 to Mesland, where he says that we can act more freely in those cases where we see more good than evil, than in those which are called indifferent, i.e., when the will is not impelled one way rather than another by any perception of truth or goodness.Footnote 5 What is particularly striking is that Descartes uses the Greek term itself, untransliterated, perhaps uniquely in his whole corpus. It is unlikely that Descartes was reading Diogenes Laertius. A more likely source would be Sextus, who uses the term in explaining the skeptics’ slogan ουδέν μαλλóν (nothing more) to mean “I know not to which of these things I ought to assent, and to which I ought not.”Footnote 6 There is an issue about Descartes’s facility with Greek, however, and in any case a more plausible source is Cicero, who uses it in De finibus, also untransliterated: “[I]t has occurred to me that I may use the word ‘indifferent’ [indifferens] to represent [the Greeks’] term αδιάφορον.”Footnote 7 As we shall see below, however, Descartes means by his own use of the term something radically different from the Pyrrhonian use of it. He means not Sextus’s Pyrrhonian version of epoche, but Cicero’s Academic version. This is the third sense of indifference below, the balance-pan sense.
As with the Pyrrhonians, the basis for the affect might lie either with the mind’s inability to discern a difference that would generate a preference, or in the objective absence of any difference to be discerned, which gives an objective and non-affective but correlative sense to the term “indifference.” Thus Anthony Collins, in his Philosophical Inquiry concerning Human Liberty (1717): “Were liberty defin’d, as it is by some, A power to will or chuse at the same time any one out of two or more indifferent things; that would be no perfection. For those things called here Indifferent or alike, may be consider’d, either as really different from each other, and that only seem indifferent or alike to us thro’ our want of discernment; or as exactly like each other.”Footnote 8 Collins’s definition, or observation, is part of a Lockean critique of freedom of indifference, of which more below. Meanwhile, it might be noted that Locke himself sometimes uses the term in this first sense. Prompted by William Molyneux, who thought he had found a mistake concerning freedom in the first edition of the Essay, Locke adopted a different position after his review of the relevant chapter, “wherein lighting upon a very easy, and scarce observable slip I made, in putting one seemingly indifferent word for another.”Footnote 9 Of this, too, more below.
Meanwhile, it might be not just the mind’s inability to discern that results in an indifference, but its unwillingness to do so. Such was the situation of the Quietists, who in their effort at pure love of God sought to abandon themselves entirely to His will, to the point of testing their love with the “impossible supposition”: suppose, per impossibile, God condemns to eternal punishment precisely those who best observe His command to love Him. Quite apart from the impossible supposition itself, the Quietists were criticized for an implication of the abandon for which it was the test. If only the will of God matters then nothing else does, and everything seems permitted; that is, moral anarchy, or antinomianism, is implied by the indifference cultivated by the Quietists. The Quietists accepted this characterization of their view, but rejected the implication; whether they were able to do so is not clear. In any case, the injection of an implicit moral evaluation connoted by the term suggests a second sense of “indifference.”
2. In the second sense, an agent is indifferent just in case what he does causes no affect in him, although it should do so. So it might called the laxity sense, engaging Pascal’s use of the term in the Pensées to describe the attitude of the morally lax who are culpably ignorant of the immortality of the soul and other truths of religion.Footnote 10 It is an especially slippery sense. Consider Malebranche at the outset of the Search After Truth:
In our present state, we often clearly perceive truths with no reason to doubt them, and hence the will is not at all indifferent in the consent it gives to these evident truths. . . . But it is not the same with goods, of which we know none without some reason to doubt that we ought to love it. Our passions and the inclinations we naturally have for sensible pleasures are confused but very strong reasons due to the corruption of our nature. These passions and inclinations make us cold and indifferent even in our love of God; and thus we clearly sense our indifference, and are inwardly convinced that we make use of our freedom when we love God.Footnote 11
Instead of being warm in our love of God as we ought, we are, in this laxity sense of the term, cold and indifferent. We have the wrong affect.
Notice, not incidentally, how Malebranche, in this very paragraph, uses the term, twice in fact, with very different meanings. The indifference we clearly sense when we love God despite our indifference to Him, is not that cold indifference, but an indifference that the will does not have when constrained to assent in the perception of evident truths. This sense refers not to our affect, which we should overcome, but to a power, as it were, that we exercise – something in any case that involves our freedom, in this case to love God. It is, as Malebranche immediately puts it, a “freedom of indifference by which we can refrain from consenting.”Footnote 12 Of this sense, more later; the point for notice here is the slide, a natural one in the period, that confuses the causal analysis of what we do with our attitude toward it.
A high-stakes instance of the laxity sense of the term occurs in the contest over religious toleration between Bayle and Pierre Jurieu. The long title of Jurieu’s book gives, in a number of ways, the gist; here is a short (sic) paraphrase of it: The government’s rights, against universal toleration of minorities, in extirpating the dogma of indifference in religion.Footnote 13 Bayle had a number of arguments for the toleration of minority religions, one of which goes as follows: If your perceived heresy allows me to persecute you, then your perception of mine allows you to persecute me; and since no one believes himself to be in a false religion, the right to persecute propagates to the point that the true religion, whichever it is, will be persecuted. Moreover, since the sincere conscience, even if mistaken, is the voice of God, God would then be requiring the persecution of His own religion. For Bayle, then, conscience is the inviolable voice of God in the sense that no one should be persecuted for doing what he thinks is right, even if out of inculpable ignorance he does what is objectively wrong.Footnote 14 Jurieu’s retort is that the voice of God would never command, and thus oblige us to do, what is objectively wrong. To put it another way, he sees Bayle as eliminating the concept of heresy by eliminating the concept of objective wrong. One religion would be as good as another, and the choice among them would be, as Jurieu puts it, a matter of indifference.
This second sense of the term is suggested by Descartes when he characterizes indifference as the lowest grade of freedom, one that we ought to overcome. Unlike the Pyrrhonian epoche, it is an imperfection, to be not sought but avoided. This is always the case in moral matters, and in the theoretical domain too, even if in the absence of complete evidence it is permissible, indeed recommended, to contrive doubt (with, for example, the evil genius hypothesis) until complete evidence is found.Footnote 15
3. The third sense is the one referred to by Descartes’s use of the term αδιάφορα in his letter to Mesland. I do care about outcomes, but in a given case I find that incompatible outcomes are equally balanced, and thus I cannot discern a relevant difference between them. Says Descartes: “ ‘[I]ndifference’ in this context seems to me strictly to mean that state of the will when it is not impelled one way rather than another by any perception of truth or goodness.”Footnote 16 Conceivably, Malebranche might be opting for this sense in the text just quoted.Footnote 17 My perception of truth or goodness might not be evident enough for me to be constrained to assent to it, but not so weak as to reject it either. The references by both Descartes and Malebranche to a truth claim as indifferent recalls the skeptics’ epoche. A salient reference to epoche in this context occurs in the first Meditation, where, to combat his habitual opinions, Descartes “turns [his] will in completely the opposite direction and deceives [himself], by pretending for a time that these former opinions are utterly false and imaginary. [He does] this until the weight of preconceived opinion is counterbalanced and the distorting influence of habit no longer prevents [his] judgment from perceiving things correctly [emphasis added].”Footnote 18 He then introduces the hypothesis of the evil genius, which weighs against his former opinions.
Descartes’s description of indifference as a “state of the will’’ might suggest that this sense of indifference should be classified with the first two senses, as affective or at least mental. The suggestion would be reinforced by the first Meditation language of deliberate self-deception. But there is a different, better reading, which distances Descartes from the first two senses. The equipoise that Descartes contrives in the first Meditation is unique, because the demon hypothesis on which it is based is immediately defeated by the cogito. That is, the attempt to bring about epoche fails. So, instead of an embrace of the Pyrrhonians, those skeptics who seek indifference in the sense of lax nonchalance, the failure of the demon hypothesis is an indication of, and a reason for, Descartes’s often-expressed contempt for them. Not only do the Pyrrhonians give up the search for truth in favour of “doubt for the sake of doubt,” but their doubt cannot be sustained, even psychologically.
So, how else might the indifference defined in the letter to Mesland be read? One possibility is to read it as fundamentally an evidentiary, normative notion: what matters is not how I feel about the volitional options, but the relative cogency of the options and how I ought to judge as a result. Equipoise in this sense is not the psychological epoche of the Pyrrhonian skeptics but rather the methodological epoche of the Academic skeptics, which, as Cicero puts it, allows them to preserve their power of judgment “uncurtailed” and free of the dogmas of all authorities.Footnote 19 This uncurtailed freedom is the intellectual integrity that leaves all of their views permanently open to revision, a commitment made by Descartes in the fifth Meditation.Footnote 20 The equipoise required for such integrity is illustrated by the contrived counterbalancing of the first Meditation. This sense of indifference might therefore be called the balance-pan model or sense of indifference. In the first Meditation, intellectual integrity is preserved because the weight of habit in one pan is counterbalanced by the weight of the demon hypothesis in the other pan. This is the only sense in which Descartes speaks of indifference; it is an indifference that he thinks we should preserve until forced from it by the weight of complete evidence on one side or the other, as we are forced by the cogito in the second Meditation to admit our own existence as certain.Footnote 21
This sense of indifference is to be found in Pierre Charron, the lawyer, cleric, protégé of Montaigne, who (as Maia Neto has shown) is an important source for Descartes. In his De la sagesse (1603), Charron clearly distinguishes his epoche from that of the Pyrrhonists: “There is a difference between what I say and the recommendation of the Pyrrhonists, although mine does smack of theirs, because I allow consent and adherence to what seems better and more probable, while remaining ready to accept something better should it arrive.”Footnote 22 Unlike the self-indulgent, nihilistic Pyrrhonists, who sustain, or try to sustain, an inauthentic epoche aimed only at the removal of disturbance, Charron seeks the truth and is ready to embrace it if he should find it. This difference is clear from his discussion of the characteristics of the wise man, one of which is
suspension and indifference of judgment, by which man in considering everything coldly and without passion leaps at nothing, obligates and binds himself to nothing, but keeps himself free, universal, and open to everything, always ready to receive the truth should it present itself, adhering meanwhile to the best and most probable such as it appears to him, appropriating for his inner judgment the outer one of the ancients, ita videtur, it seems thus, the appearance is heavily on that side. But if someone says otherwise, he will reply dispassionately, he will be fully able to listen to him, will be open to a stronger argument, swearing to nothing. This is the Academic modesty that is required by the wise man, by which he is always ready for and capable of truth or reason when it presents itself. This modesty and reserved suspension comes from judging all things; for by judging all things without passion, one finds everywhere appearance sufficient to forestall precipitate judgment and to chase passion.Footnote 23
Locke, too, uses the term in this sense while claiming, rather immodestly, his version of Academic modesty. With respect to his change in view in response to Molyneux, he says: “In what I first writ, I with an unbiased indifferency followed Truth, whither I thought she had led me.”Footnote 24 Of this ongoing chase after Locke on indifference, still more below.
4. Collins uses the image of a balance in discussing indifference, but he does so in a way to indicate not epoche, but still another, very different sense of the term. That the balance pan, which seems a natural model for the third sense, should be used by Collins to express this very different, fourth sense is an indication of the confusion that we are trying to disentangle. Here is what Collins says: “The vulgar . . . see that they often change their minds; that they can, and do chuse differently every successive moment; and that they frequently deliberate, and thereby are sometimes at a near ballance, and in a state of indifference with respect to judging about some propositions, and willing or chusing with respect to some objects.” The “ballance,” however, is not an equipoise either of affect (the Pyrrhonian view) or of evidence (the Academic view) but of causal powers, as becomes clear when Collins criticizes the vulgar for the inference they draw from such deliberation; namely, that their freedom consists in absence of any causal necessity.Footnote 25
This causal notion is entrenched both in the period and in the secondary literature. A standard reference work defines an action as indifferent “if its agent is able, on the point of performing it, not to perform it, or to perform some other action instead.” And Descartes, in a text to be discussed below, says that “the supreme indifference to be found in God is the supreme indication of his omnipotence.”Footnote 26
The first three senses as stated are non-causal, compatible, for example, with determinism, indeterminism, and fatalism. The next two senses are different versions of which might be called libertarian indifference; one relative, the other absolute. Both are clearly causal, since they involve the denial of determinism. The libertarian notion of indifference was appropriated by seventeenth-century philosophy from late sixteenth-century attempts to reconcile human freedom with divine grace. The key text was Luis Molina’s Liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis . . . concordia (1585, 2nd ed. 1595), which defines the free agent as him who, with all conditions for action satisfied, can act or not act, or can perform an action such that he can still perform a contrary one.” Molina describes the election of one of these two sorts of acts as being performed “indifferently.”Footnote 27 Not incidentally, it is in precisely these terms that Bramhall’s critic Hobbes criticized the view as implying a contradiction: “I hold that ordinary definition of a free agent, namely that a free agent is that which, when all things are present which are needful to produce an effect, can nevertheless not produce it, implies a contradiction and is nonsense; being as much to say the cause may be sufficient, that is necessary, and yet the effect shall not follow.”Footnote 28
The idea is that outcomes might matter to me or not, and my judgment, or the evidence, might be balanced or not, but I can choose however I want. More precisely, in this fourth sense, an agent is indifferent, and thus is free, just in case he can act in at least two different ways under the same circumstances. As we shall see in the next section, it is hard to find an instance of this absolute libertarian indifference being defended. Malebranche, for example, is unequivocal in rejecting it: “[T]here is no pure [i.e., absolute] indifference,” he says in his last published work.Footnote 29 The more usual view, as in Hobbes’s definition, is relative libertarian indifference; there are necessary conditions for bringing about any of one’s volitions, limits between which one can choose. Thus, in the first Elucidation, Malebranche provides an important gloss on his claim at the beginning of the Search, quoted above, that we have an inner sensation of our “freedom of indifference by which we can refrain from consenting.”Footnote 30 Here is the gloss: “When I say that we have an inner sensation of our freedom, I do not maintain that we have an inner sensation of a power determining us to will something without any material motive, a power that some people call pure indifference. Such a power seems to me to contain a manifest contradiction [emphasis Malebranche’s].” For such pure indifference “would grant us a kind of independence of God’s control over us or of the material motives that He produces in us, by which He knows and can make us will and voluntarily carry out everything that He wills.”Footnote 31
Moreover, Malebranche’s rejection of pure indifference as the power to do whatever one wants applies even to God’s will. While it might be true that prior to creation God is absolutely indifferent whether to create or not, and while the volition to create requires nothing incompatible with a volition not to create, given the volition to create only one creation is possible, namely the one that is most perfect (relative to His purposes in creating). God no less than man requires perception of truth and goodness in order to will; otherwise, volition, he says, would be a blind power.Footnote 32 To put it another way: even in the case of God’s freedom, Malebranche is only a relative libertarian with respect to indifference.Footnote 33
5. Clearly, then, the absolute libertarian sense of indifference, our fifth sense, would apply, if it applied at all, only to God, and it would mean, contrary to Malebranche, that absolutely everything is possible to Him. There is a range of possibilities, every one of which is within God’s power. However, as Robert Desgabets in the period, and Alan Nelson more recently, have taught us, this possible-worlds picture misrepresents Descartes’s actualism with respect to modalities; in a language Descartes would understand, God’s power is so great that even possibilities depend on the divine will.Footnote 34 Descartes writes to Mesland: “[F]or the idea we have of God teaches us that there is in him only a single activity, entirely simple and entirely pure. This is well expressed by the words of St. Augustine: ‘They are so because thou see’st them to be so’; because in God seeing and willing are one and the same thing [emphasis Descartes’s].”Footnote 35 Furthermore, it is not obvious just how this actualist version of the absolute libertarian sense of indifference could apply to human freedom. Earlier, Descartes had written to Mersenne: “In God, willing, understanding, and creating are all the same thing, without one being prior to the other, even conceptually.”Footnote 36 Distinguishing different faculties in the human mind is not an obvious task, involving, as it does, only a conceptual distinction (of reason); but however the distinction gets drawn, willing and seeing, or perceiving, are not conceptually identical.
Descartes seems sensitive to this issue of the difference between the divine and the human wills. While it might be the case, as he states in the fourth Meditation, alluding to Genesis 1:27, that “it is above all in virtue of the will that I understand myself to bear in some way the image and likeness of God,” nonetheless, he later replies to the sixth Objections: “[T]he way in which [freedom of the will] exists in God is quite different from the way in which it exists in us.” It differs not only in the accompanying range of power and knowledge, but also in the indifference that for us is an imperfection and for God a perfection that constitutes His freedom.Footnote 37 Our indifference is a matter of ignorance of the truth; in God there cannot be such ignorance because truth depends on His will. To put it another way, the indifference of epoche that immobilizes (or ought to immobilize) us is in God an expression of His absolute power. Said Descartes to Mersenne, 15 April 1630: “Indeed to say that these [eternal] truths are independent of God is to talk of him as if he were Jupiter or Saturn and to subject him to the Styx and the Fates.”Footnote 38
Fénelon was a Cartesian fellow-traveller who bit the bullet on this issue, insisting that God and man have freedom in a univocal sense. For Descartes, the likeness is based solely on the infinite scope of the will. Though we do not have the same knowledge or power that God has, there is nothing that we cannot affirm or deny, pursue or avoid. Fénelon goes further: divine will and human will are exactly alike in always being utterly unmotivated by any perception or motive independent of the volition itself. In the Démonstration, Fénelon is explicit in this univocal sense of will as applied to God and us: “As Scripture represents God, who after creation says, ‘let there be light, and there was light,’ so the inner word alone of my soul, without effort and without preparation, does what it says. I speak that word so inward, simple and momentous, let my body be moved and it moves.”Footnote 39 (The analogical, figurative language seems an indication of an ineffable, perhaps incoherent, view.) Again, as for Descartes so for Fénelon, human free volition is something of a mystery, because though free it is a limited and derived power, dependent upon God, such that it is only “a shade of His.”Footnote 40 But that aside, “I am free in my will as God is in His. It is principally in this that I am the image and resemblance of Him. . . . It is the trait of divinity. It is a kind of divine power that I have over myself.”Footnote 41
Fénelon’s conception of this shared power is indicated by his critique of Malebranche’s view, which he thinks amounts to Spinozism, or at least to the “fatalism of the pagans,” which, he thinks, Descartes had explicitly rejected.Footnote 42 As Fénelon sees it, Malebranche strips God of His freedom in that the greater perfection of the created world over its non-existence constrains God to create it. This world would be necessary not just hypothetically upon God’s volition to create, but absolutely. For Fénelon, by contrast, although created things differ in perfection among themselves, they are infinitely less than God and therefore never have any relatively greater claim to existence: “In this infinite superiority of God, which renders all things equally indifferent to Him, I find perfect freedom.”Footnote 43 Contrary to Malebranche’s view, “relative unity and order are always indifferent to God, and His choice is purely arbitrary.”Footnote 44
Again, Fénelon: “I have an unshakeable inner certainty that I can will or not, that there is in me a choice, not only between willing and not willing, but among volitions over the variety of objects presented to me.” The power to choose is not a function of the attractiveness of what I choose, as it is for Descartes when I choose with the highest level of freedom, of spontaneity. On the contrary, willing is, in a sense, blind. “Objects might entice me to will them with all their pleasures; reasons for willing might be presented to me with their full allure; [God] might draw me with His most persuasive inspirations. But in the end, [despite all this,] I still remain master of my power of willing or not willing.”Footnote 45 As he puts it in a slogan version of the view: “I know of no reason for choosing other than my willing itself.”Footnote 46 Just as God acts without constraint or necessity in creating when He says, “Let there be light,” so we act in our volitions.
The argument seems to be that because God is indifferent in the first sense (nonchalance), He is indifferent in the fourth sense (libertarian). What about us? The answer seems to be that although from our finite perspective things certainly do have relative perfections, the freedom that we have, even with respect to them, is indifferent in the libertarian sense. Moreover, carried over from divine to human freedom would be a choice that is, as Fénelon puts it, purely arbitrary, a way of putting it that suggests a problem with this conception not only of human freedom but of divine freedom as well.
Libertarian indifference, both relative and absolute, is like the Epicurean clinamen. Falling top to bottom through the void, the atoms “at times quite uncertain and uncertain places, swerve a little from their course.”Footnote 47 In a later edition, Ferguson Smith goes somewhat beyond the text but makes an important point when he translates the same passage as follows: “at absolutely unpredictable times and places.”Footnote 48 What Lucretius claimed about this primordial formation of the world applies to libertarian volition. It occurs fortuitously, capriciously, as a surprise even to the agent, and that is not anything that would be described as voluntary; for it just happens, out of the blue. However, something voluntary should not be capricious or fortuitous; it is something for which the agent is responsible, for which he stands up and says, “It is mine; I did it.”
Collins saw the connection between libertarian indifference and Epicurean tychism: freedom from necessity, or determination, is an occurrence without a cause, and thus “the Epicurean System of chance is rendered possible.”Footnote 49 Hume saw this problem with libertarian indifference, and also had the resources for a summary rejection of it: “According to my definitions, necessity makes an essential part of causation; and consequently liberty [of indifference], by removing necessity, removes also causes, and is the very same thing with chance. As chance is thought to imply a contradiction, and is at least contrary to experience, there are always the same arguments against free [i.e., indifferent] will.”Footnote 50 Apart from the alleged contradiction, Hume’s argument against indifference is his argument against miracles, viz. that definitionally the entire weight of experience argues to the contrary. Now, the notion of a miracle in God’s power of creation might be welcome; in the case of every instance of human volition, it is altogether unhelpful.
Hume’s view is that freedom of indifference is “absurd in one sense, and unintelligible in every other.” It is subscribed to, he thought, for three reasons; one is that it is confused with freedom of spontaneity.Footnote 51 The confusion is easy to fall into; or, at least it is difficult to state the difference in clear terms. It is not clear that with his view of freedom as spontaneity Descartes would disavow anything in the attempt by Hume’s editors to state the libertarian view that “the will is free in the sense that it is undetermined by anything but its own choice”; this power of choice is uninfluenced, “indifferent” to external forces and motives.Footnote 52 The Nortons cite the Jesuit Molina as a proponent of the view: the free agent “can act or not, or so perform one action that he is equally able to do the contrary.” But the arch-opponent of the Jesuits’ libertarian freedom of indifference, Arnauld, would agree.Footnote 53
Lucretius himself, of course, appeals to the clinamen to account for how mechanistic control is broken and free will is exercised. An instance of the clinamen occurs in the breast whenever a volition occurs. But Lucretius is not so obtuse as to appeal to the notion tout court. What the clinamen allows is for the will to proceed where pleasure leads us, “not at fixed times and fixed places, but just where our mind has taken us.”Footnote 54 Not as determined by external forces, but not by mere chance, either.Footnote 55
That indifference in the libertarian sense makes of freedom a matter of chance seems a fatal criticism of the view. How could anyone have held it? Did anyone hold it? In addition to Fénelon and the other three bishops, perhaps also the Arminians. In his correspondence with Locke, van Limborch, for example, held that freedom consists “solely in a power by which a man can determine, or not determine, an action of willing.”Footnote 56 And Leclerc held that freedom consists in “ an indifferency of mind while a thing is under deliberation; for, while the mind deliberates, it is free till the moment of action; because nothing determines it necessarily to act, or not to act.”Footnote 57 Collins, who thought the libertarian view confused, criticized Leclerc on three grounds. First, since the mind is determined in its deliberation, it is no less determined in what results from the deliberation. Second, since deliberation is always about the future, nothing we ever do in the present would be free. (The Oratorian Gibieuf argued against the Jesuits’ Molinist libertarianism that it made a man least free precisely when, having deliberated, he finally acts.)Footnote 58 Third, if one is free during deliberation, then the deliberator can be both indifferent and not indifferent. Now, this objection, at least, can be met by the scholastic distinction between possibility in sensu diviso and possibility in sensu composito – the difference between: <>a & <>b, and: <>(a & b). Even while acting, not acting is possible in the first sense but not in the second, which is really only to assert that the action is both contingent and subject to the law of non-contradiction.Footnote 59 But then it is not clear what Leclerc, or any libertarian, is asserting beyond what the determinist holds. (The libertarian at this point typically lapses into the language of self-determination, which is but a form of determinism.)Footnote 60
Not incidentally, Locke, in his account of freedom, seems to appeal to indifference in the sense of a possibility in sensu diviso: “[W]herever restraint comes to check that Power of acting according to preference, or compulsion takes away that Indifferency of Ability on either side to act, or to forbear acting, there liberty, and, our Notion of it, presently ceases.”Footnote 61 A necessary condition for freedom in doing x is the possibility of doing non-x, such that one is indifferent in this sense to both. Especially given the slippage, noted above, in Locke’s use of the term “indifference,” one might well ask whether its deployment here signals a slip into some libertarian view. Is Locke guilty of the imprecision to which he famously confesses with respect to an even more important distinction (with the horrendous consequences he has been charged with in that case)?Footnote 62 Clearly not (any more than in the other case). Apart from the perhaps vexed question of suspension and the inquiry we make while suspended, Locke is clear, cogent, and focused in his denial of the need, or the desirability, of libertarian indifference during or before the inquiry. Locke effectively denies that the will has any “ ‘real and positive power to determine itself’ independently of the perception of the intellect.”Footnote 63 Whatever the change he made in response to Molyneux, Locke did not convert to libertarianism.Footnote 64
Near the end of his chapter on power, in a long addendum to the fifth edition of the Essay, Locke addresses those who think that freedom consists in an indifference in the determination of the will. The indifference cannot come before the determination of the will, but after that of thought, because the one follows immediately upon the other. Once I decide that x is better than non-x, I immediately will x. But to construe the indifference as antecedent to the thought is “to place Liberty in a state of darkness, wherein we can neither see nor say any thing of it,” effectively making us incapable of freedom.Footnote 65 Locke is happy to use the language of “indifference,” but only as applicable after thought determines volition. Even while doing x, I am still capable of non-x.Footnote 66
Self-determination, according to Locke, is in fact the opposite of indifference: “[E]very man is put under a necessity by his constitution, as an intelligent Being, to be determined in willing by his own Thought, and Judgment, what is best for him to do: else he would be under the determination of some other than himself, which is the want of Liberty.”Footnote 67 Not to be so determined by thought and judgment would be as great an imperfection and impediment to freedom as being unable to act or not according to the determination, i.e., as not being indifferent in the sense that Locke recognizes:
A man is at liberty to lift up his Hand to his Head, or let it rest quiet: He is perfectly indifferent in either; and it would be an imperfection in him, if he wanted that Power, if he wanted that Indifferency. But it would be as great an imperfection, if he had the same indifferency, whether he would prefer the lifting up his Hand, or its remaining at rest, when it would save his Head or Eyes from a blow he sees coming: ‘tis as much a perfection, that desire or the power of Preferring should be determined by Good, as the power of Acting should be determined by the Will, and the certainer such determination is, the greater is the perfection [emphases Locke’s].”Footnote 68
As Locke sees it, the view that freedom requires independence of determination by thought and judgment leaves mad men and fools the only free men.Footnote 69 For free men in that sense would behave without rhyme or reason, in ways no less a surprise to themselves than to others.
6. The final two senses of our term are non-causal, but not affective, either. The sixth and penultimate sense involves suspension, or perhaps better, disengagement, but in a sense different from epoche. An agent is indifferent just in case he can refuse assent to some apparent truth or good. This is Malebranche’s notion, noticed above, of a “freedom of indifference by which we can refrain from consenting.”Footnote 70 The problem is that Malebranche seems to use the term only because of his confusion of it, particularly, though not only, with the libertarian senses. As we have seen, he introduces the notion of freedom of indifference in the context of a discussion of indifference in the sense of laxity. When distracted by our passions and inclinations for particular pleasures, we are indifferent to the pleasure that God offers. Moreover, we need freedom of indifference because in our present state we often do not have the clear perception that infallibly overcomes our doubt. That is, because we find ourselves in situations of epistemic indifference, we need a freedom of indifference to avoid precipitous judgment and the likelihood of error. But why such a freedom should be called indifferent is not clear.
Here is how Malebranche is led to this use of the term. The will for him is an impulse we have toward good in general. Roughly speaking, we are all impelled to seek nothing but pleasure, the ultimate of which is found only in God. Our freedom is an ability to fix this impulse on pleasing objects in particular, i.e., other than God. But to exercise freedom in this way is wrong; for what we should be doing is following the impulse to that good in general which is God. To avoid doing wrong, we need an indifference of disengagement. We must avoid fixing the impulse on the particular goods by suspending our consent to them, which we do by representing other goods to ourselves (more precisely, by allowing other goods to be represented by “the natural prayer that is always answered” according to Malebranche’s “vision of all things in God”). In suspending consent, he says, we do nothing real, or “physical” to use his term. Only the impulse itself is real, and the distinction between its fixation and suspension is but a moral one. Why does Malebranche insist on the moral-physical distinction? One reason, though not the only reason, is to avoid violating his doctrine of occasionalism, according to which only God ever does anything real.Footnote 71 But the same restriction of causal agency to God is true, to use Malebranche’s paradigm case, of colliding billiard balls, where no concept of freedom applies. For Malebranche, instead, we are free in the roughly Stoic sense that by intellectual representation of an alternative we are freed from the passions and thus able to love God. But that this freedom should be called indifferent seems to confuse an epistemic issue of representation with a libertarian causal view of an ability that we do not have in any case.
Confused or not, Malebranche’s view has a prima facie Cartesian plausibility. Franz Burman queried Descartes’s claim, in the fourth Meditation, that while he might not always avoid error by a clear and distinct perception of the truth, he can always do so by withholding judgment. Why not with respect to the good as well? Burman asked.Footnote 72 Here is what Descartes is reported to have replied: “We have inner consciousness [nos intime conscii sumus] of our freedom, and we know we can withhold our assent when we wish. In the pursuit of good and evil, however, when the will is indifferent with respect to each of the two, it is already at fault, since it ought to seek after the good alone without any indifference, in contrast to the situation in theoretical matters.”Footnote 73 Descartes’s answer is to distinguish between the theoretical domain of metaphysical certainty and the practical domain of moral certainty. In the theoretical domain it is permissible to tolerate epoche, or even to contrive it, as in the first Meditation, in order to arrive at metaphysical certainty of the truth, but not in the practical domain, where moral certainty suffices in pursuing the good. One way to read Descartes’s reply is that he appeals, without distinguishing them, to three different notions of indifference, two explicit and one implicit. Through self-consciousness (Malebranche’s inner sensation) I am aware of a libertarian freedom of (relative) indifference, which in moral cases I am able to use in overcoming an indifference of the balance pan (which “others” might call freedom of indifferenceFootnote 74), and unless I do so use this freedom, I suffer from an indifference of laxity.Footnote 75 The reading is plausible, but if Descartes intended it, his account of the will has consequences that are very mischievous for him. We shall see them below.
Meanwhile, here is another reading no less plausible, which avoids those consequences. Descartes deploys the notion of indifference only twice, and does so explicitly, and in the same sense both times. We are conscious of our freedom in the way that we are conscious not just of sensation, but of “everything that is in us,”Footnote 76 and what we are aware of is our ability to affirm or deny, pursue or avoid, according to the competing weights of the balance pan, without any external constraint; this assent can always be withheld (ultimately, by representing a counterbalancing good to be gained by the withholding). This is the epoche that Descartes brings about in the hyperbolic doubt of the first Meditation, where the aim is truth. With respect to the good, however, this withholding is an inappropriate indifference, and should be overcome (ultimately, perhaps in the case of Buridan’s ass, for example, by representing any choice at all as better than none).Footnote 77 Here, metaphysical or absolute certainty is not required; moral or practical certainty is sufficient.
7. There is a seventh sense of the term indifference that, although not as explicit as the others, might lie behind the relevance of all of them. An agent is indifferent just in case he has no positive affect with respect to the result relating to himself. Call it disinterested indifference. I might have the heated affect of investment or not; I might be determined, or free of constraint; the outcome might be in my interest or not. In any case, my act/choice/volition is performed in your interest, with indifference to my interests. The concern for such a notion of indifference lies with the possibility of sacrifice, altruistic behaviour, responsibility, and the general basis of morality, the principal threat to which came not just from determinism, but from egoistic, hedonistic determinism (thus Hobbes among others, including Malebranche and perhaps Spinoza, according to whom the only possible motive we can ever have is our own pleasure or satisfaction).
Once again, there are Cartesian texts in which the notion occurs, if not the term itself. In correspondence with Elizabeth, Descartes recommends self-sacrifice for others, to the point of renunciation of one’s own interests and a passion only for what is pleasing to God.Footnote 78 Later to Chanut, he continues the theme: “Voluntarily joining himself willingly entirely to God, he loves Him so perfectly that he desires nothing at all except that His will be done.”Footnote 79 The very language is suggestive of the Quietist conception of pure love, which was argued by François Lamy as an alternative to Malebranche’s view. For as we have seen, the Quietists forewent all discernment in an utter abandonment to God’s will. As Lamy saw it, Malebranche was committed to the view that all love is selfish love; that is, love of self (amour de soi). Malebranche agreed that because the will is motivated by pleasure, or self-love (amour propre), and the will is the capacity to love, all love of God is indeed interested. Malebranche did not believe, however, that the love of God need be selfish (amour de soi). For he distinguishes between motive and end. The motive of our love of God must be our own pleasure, but the end or object of the volition might be God Himself.Footnote 80 As he sees it, Lamy’s version of indifference annihilates the theological virtues of both hope, for salvation just does not matter, and charity or love, because the will is abandoned to a mystical pure passivity. To put it another way, he thinks that the Quietist indifference amounts to an indifference of laxity and nonchalance, and thus our hermeneutical circle, as it were, is closed.
Fénelon tried to respond to such charges against Quietist indifference by distinguishing it from laxity and nonchalance as a kind of epoche, or perhaps as a suspension, or some version of the libertarian indifference. Holy indifference, he said, is “the state of a soul ready to will or not to will, to will for God all that He wills, and never to will for itself anything not indicated by God’s will.”Footnote 81 Is this will in a state of balance, awaiting the tilt provided by an indication of God’s will? Of passivity in the absence of any interests of its own? Is it supposed to have a power of acting undetermined even by its own satisfaction? This interpretive under-determination of the notional indifference of the Quietist conception of the will suggests at least two conclusions. First, the hermeneutical circle just reached here is in fact more of a tangle. We began with nonchalance and moved in a connected way from one to another sense of indifference, arriving at disinterestedness, which seems connected to nonchalance. But there are many orders or structures of the different meanings that might be given. This conceptual fluidity no doubt contributed to the confusing uses of the term in the period, and continues to do so in the secondary literature. Second, the libertarian freedom of the will as an alternative to the threat posed by determinism is exceedingly hard to express and is perhaps incoherent.
We have already seen difficulties in discerning what is meant in the period by claims about “indifference.” Sometimes the obscurity seems inherent in the intended notion itself (Fénelon); sometimes different notions are confused under the term (Malebranche). Perhaps not surprisingly, these difficulties extend into the contemporary literature. The summary judgment of the seminal work for recent English-language commentary is that “Descartes’ theory of freedom will not do as a philosophical account: [it contains] an incoherence which was present in the theory from the beginning.”Footnote 82 Kenny’s basis for this conclusion is that Descartes has two incompatible notions of freedom, with two different notions of indifference, which vary inversely with the clarity of our evidence or reasons for willing.
The argument that the two notions are incompatible is that when Descartes refers, as he does, to “the power which we have of following the worse although we see the better,”Footnote 83 he cannot mean a balance-pan sense of indifference, in which we always choose according to the weight of reasons, when the evidence is either complete (one pan full, the other empty) or equipoised (balanced pans). Instead, Descartes must have meant that there is an indifference which consists in the possibility of acting against the weight of incomplete but unbalanced evidence. Using an expression nowhere found in Descartes, Kenny dubs this indifference a freedom “of perversion,” which, of course, is at least a relative libertarian indifference. So Descartes cannot claim, as he does, that there is a single scale for measuring the perfection of freedom, with complete evidence as the highest grade and perfect balance as the lowest. On the contrary, the indifference found in the freedom of perversion requires a different scale, one on which the perfection of freedom varies inversely with evidence, and any attempt to combine the two scales produces incoherence. (Also implicated, moreover, are other senses of indifference. Presumably, one must be able to suspend assent to perceived truth and goodness, and in so doing one shows a nonchalance and laxity with respect to them. Overall, the result is a pretty chaotic view of indifference and its relation to the will.)
Clearly, the linchpin of Kenny’s criticism is Descartes’s claim to “the power which we have of following the worse although we see the better.” Kenny reads the claim at face value as indicating a power to act contrary to evidence and thus as referring to a freedom of indifference that cannot be accommodated on the balance pan model. Perhaps Kenny is encouraged in this reading because it occurs in a text in which Descartes is explaining his notion of indifference, and in which he says that we have a power that is always cited by those who attribute a libertarian freedom of indifference to Descartes: “It is always open to us to revoke [revocare] pursuit of a clearly known good, or admittance of a clearly perceived truth.” 84 Although he attributes a libertarian freedom to Descartes in equivocal cases, Kenny himself does not think that we have such a power of holding back from perceived complete evidence, rather only the spontaneous freedom to accept it. But he might nonetheless have been led in this direction by the text. Of this, more in a moment.
The linchpin claim, meanwhile, has recently been identified by C. P. Ragland as a tacit reference to a text of Ovid, cited earlier by Descartes in a letter to Mersenne.Footnote 84 Like Kenny, Ragland interprets the claim as an indication of a freedom of indifference.Footnote 85 But the context suggests otherwise. It seems that Mersenne had objected to Descartes’s argument in the Discourse on the Method that “since our will tends to pursue or avoid only what our intellect represents as good or bad, we need only to judge well in order to act well.” In reply, Descartes drew attention to the scholastic doctrine that “the will does not tend toward evil except in so far as it is represented to it by the intellect under some aspect of goodness.” Now, these are clearly non-libertarian claims, and it is immediately following them that Descartes produces the Ovidian text – not as a retraction of the claims, but as an explanation of how they might be true. The point is that I am distracted from the perception of the true good by some other perception that obscures its goodness: “But the intellect often represents different things to the will at the same time, whence the expression, ‘I see and praise the better, but I follow the worse’.”Footnote 86
The situation is exactly analogous to the revocation of pursuit of a clearly known good or of assent to a clearly known truth, which is possible, says Descartes, “provided that we consider it good thing to demonstrate the freedom of our will by so doing.”Footnote 87 According to Kenny, the libertarian interpretation of Descartes is blocked, at least in the case of such perception, by this proviso. The thought that demonstration of the will’s freedom is a good thing is sufficient to obscure the clarity of the perception, thus tipping the balance against it, leaving it less than clear and thereby incapable of eliciting spontaneous assent. To put it another way, rather than upsetting the balance pan model of indifference, the example presupposes it. Kenny thus takes a position on this case that reflects the balance pan model; but he inexplicably abandons it in all other cases, saddling Descartes with an incoherent theory. Kenny could have applied the balance pan to all cases, construing the diminished clarity and cogency of evidence as a result of the obscuring effect of a supposed demonstration-of-freedom thought. In these additional cases, moreover, the obscuring effect might also be attributed to passion, sensation, habit, and all the other distractions whose removal is the purpose of the Cartesian method of doubt. (When evidence is complete, all such distractions are ipso facto absent, and only the demonstration-of-freedom thought could distract it.) In fact, the latter account, in terms of passion, etc., would be the more usual explanation of why we err, acting against the balance of evidence. Only in the case of initially complete evidence would we ever think to demonstrate the exercise of our will as a good thing by acting in the contrary direction.
Finally, it is interesting to note that Ovid himself did not intend to endorse a libertarian freedom of indifference. The claim is made by Medea, remonstrating with herself over her present inability to pursue her father’s cause against Jason, for whom, instead, she has the hots (pectore flammas]: “Medea, wits are futile / Against this heat. Some god’s bewitched my senses, / Chained my will. Is this called love? . . . Brace up my darling / Be yourself again: O if I could I would / But now against my will an unknown power / Has made me weak: heat sways me one way, / and my mind another: I see and praise the better, but I follow the worse.” In the end, after Medea balances and re-balances conflicting reasons and evidence, finally “daughterly affection, modesty, and right thinking” prevail upon her, and “Defeated Cupid nearly flew away.”Footnote 88 She, like Descartes, was indifferent in only one sense: the balance of competing reasons and evidence, not the libertarian indifference of deciding out of the blue.Footnote 89
