David Green has written a useful and brief history of the Hundred Years War (1337–1453). While his work is written more from an English than from a French or broader European perspective and is intended primarily for a popular audience as scholarly controversies are avoided, there is usually sufficient documentation to provide interested readers with the opportunity to pursue matters beyond the end notes.

Following an excellent introduction, ten chapters of approximately equal length, and a conclusion, Green's volume is rounded out with a helpful chronology of important events, an exceptionally useful glossary, and brief notes on money and names, as well as two sound royal genealogies. In addition, there are five excellent maps and twenty-three finely executed illustrations, which unfortunately are not effectively integrated into the narrative. Further, the bibliography of scholarly works, though overwhelmingly Anglophone, would seem to meet the needs of Green's projected audience. In terms of its construction, Green's Hundred Years War is a model worthy of being emulated.

The purpose of Green's work is to explore the impact of the war on the people of England and France, broadly conceived, and this is sometimes met. The conceptualization of a “hundred years war,” however, is of dubious value as it is a modern (1855) construction. As Green makes clear, wars had been fought with considerable regularity between the governments of England and France for some two and a half centuries prior to 1337, and warfare continued between these two states long after the French capture of Bordeaux in 1453.

Chapter 1 treats “knights and nobles” in a chivalric context, and Green recognizes that scholars have been unable to craft an epistemologically valid definition of chivalry—that is, a definition that is both necessary and sufficient, which nullifies much of what Green asserts. Chapter 2 deals with the “peasantry,” which also is not defined. Green's aim is to show that these people suffered greatly during the war and in the bargain gained political consciousness. The sources, as Green notes, are notorious for exaggeration, yet he seems to trust them as more or less plain text. England, like France, saw serious revolts but the impact of military action was miniscule in the British Isles as compared to that in France. Most significant changes during the period can be traced primarily to the demographic disaster caused by the plague, not by war.

In chapter 3 dealing with the church, Green clearly demonstrates how the clergy on both sides supported the conflict with pro-government sermons intended to reach the people and encourage their paying for the war. Also, the clergy continued their traditional role of writing history and conjuring up legal arguments to support their principles. However, it is important to emphasize that the church's problems had been greatly exacerbated by the Babylonian Captivity begun in 1309 and by the Great Schism (1378–1417), which ended a generation before the war ended. In short, the rest of Europe also played important roles in the decline of papal authority.

Chapters 4 and 5, dealing with the “making of peace” and “royal power,” depart from the theme of dealing with the impact of war on people. In the former, Green explains why neither truces nor peacemaking were effective: too many interests were involved in keeping the war going. In the chapter on royal power, Green provides an excellent examination of a broad spectrum of theories of kingship developed on both sides of the channel. It becomes clear, however, that insofar as the English kings increasingly heavily relied on Parliament to finance the war as compared to the situation during the thirteenth century, royal power may be seen to have declined by contrast with the French kings’ ability to manipulate the Estates General. This, in part, made it possible for the image of royal power to be enhanced in France despite lengthy episodes of military failure.

Chapter 6, on the whole, is a very useful treatment of many aspects of warfare, from logistics and armament to collateral damage and military organization. Green's major fault here is failing to appreciate the very small role played by knights and nobles as well as the role of heavy cavalry in medieval warfare overall. However, Green provides a worthwhile discussion of the Battle of Agincourt and some data dealing with logistics that readers may find of interest.

Chapters 7 and 8, dealing with “occupation” and “women,” fit together neatly as they both are larded with presentist tendentiousness. In the former, Green gives far too much attention to an occasional tax revolt or riot by those whom he depicts as the victims of colonization, it is well established that chroniclers have exaggerated these matters greatly. A valuable corrective is the fact that the English required very small garrisons indicating that occupied towns and cities were overwhelmingly quiescent. The chapter on women proclaims, using Joan of Arc as a point d'appui, that “the position of women in later medieval society was transformed” (178), but Green spends the next twenty pages backtracking. He shows that royal women did much the same things they had always done and argues that the rest continued to be victims of misogyny. The war as a whole is tendentiously treated as a fight for women's rights against the Salic Law. Of course, the English had settled such matters prior to the death of Henry I in 1100.

Chapters 9 and 10, “Prisoners of War” and “National Identities,” also appear to be presentist in inspiration. The former essentially provides a list, overwhelmingly of Frenchmen, who were held for ransom. Some not very useful observations are made in regard to hostages that do not show how the war impinged upon ransom-taking. In chapter 10, Green discusses various ideas regarding the supposed impact of the war on what has come to be considered the beginnings of “nationalism,” a term, like “chivalry,” that remains undefined. This chapter focuses on language—for example, the growth in importance of English, which Green thinks is of great importance—but there is little to be said (obviously) in regard to a unified French language. It is interesting that the eleventh-century Song of Roland, a frequent scholarly locus classicus for the beginning of French national identity, is not discussed. Green's conclusion is a useful summary of each chapter where his tendency to use a causal model is undermined by the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy becomes rather obvious.