The 1958 Space Act, which set up NASA, specified two important missions. The first, to give the United States leadership in aeronautical and space science and technology, led to a famous national programme that included, amongst many other achievements, the Apollo Moon landings and the Shuttle. As John Krige, the lead author of this study, notes, the second mission, the ensuring of ‘[c]ooperation by the United States with other nations and groups of nations’, has attracted far less attention from historians. International relations took a variety of forms, and, indeed, moral standards, from intimate and open collaboration to the stealing of documents. NASA in the World is a fine, detailed look at the development of joint projects, and how they were reconciled with NASA's primary, national mission, over fifty years. It is not comprehensive; for example, the role of the United States in collaborating with Indonesia's Palapa, the world's first developing-world satellite system, launched in 1976, merits only a line.
Nor could it be: NASA has joined some four thousand international projects since 1960. But it wisely divides important topics between the three authors, and the result is a must-read for space historians.
John Krige provides an overview and asks just ‘how did NASA reconcile America's conquest of space with its collaborative activities?’ (p. 5). Arnold W. Frutkin, NASA's director of its Office of International Programs from 1959, set out two guiding rules for international projects that the American space agency would break at its peril. The first was ‘clean interfaces’; that is to say, self-sufficient managerial and technological components: by ‘maintaining “clean” technological interfaces, and by regulating knowledge flows across them, NASA was able to protect cutting-edge science and technology to secure American pre-eminence while sharing knowledge and skills that foreign partners still valued’ (p. 12). The second was simpler: no transfer of money.
Therefore many of NASA's international partners were rich, industrialized countries. Krige discusses the projects with Western European allies: the UK, France, Italy and West Germany. The last of these provides good illustrations of the themes: for the United States, cooperation served foreign-policy aims of binding West Germany to the West; for certain politicians, such as Franz Josef Strauss, the deal offered regional (in his case Bavarian) benefits; for German industry the attraction was insight into NASA's innovative management methods. Space cooperation was also a ‘thank you’ for German support for America during the Vietnam War. The bilateral deals, which produced the Azur satellite in 1969 and Spacelab in the following decade, had clean interfaces. But to say there was no transfer of money depends on how the accounting is done. The Helios spacecraft, a pair of mid-1970s German probes that studied the Sun, for example, provided a convenient cover to pay ‘offset’ funds – politically sensitive compensation for the expense of maintaining United States forces on German territory.
Foreign-policy interests can also be seen expressed in US attitudes to other countries' space-launcher ambitions. The US State Department supported, for example, ELDO, the European Launcher Development Organization, because it ‘strongly favored European integration and the creation of an Atlantic community’ strong enough to contain the Soviets (p. 52). ELDO was civil, peaceful and supranational, and would allow Europe to catch up. The alternative was dreaded: proliferating national rocket programmes. However, the other major strategic consideration pulled in the opposite direction. The United States robustly enforced its leadership, outside the East, in communications-satellite technologies. Any international collaborative arrangements to launch non-US satellites on US rockets, or to transfer rocket technology out of the US, had to reckon with fierce regulations that prohibited anything that might cause economic harm to US-led Comsat and Intelsat. This push and pull created tensions between US and Western Europe. Likewise the wrangling over European participation in post-Apollo programmes (the Shuttle, and other systems, not least the benighted ‘space tug’, which Europe was to have provided) was fraught, and eventually led to disengagement. At least the disengagement was not fatal: clean interfaces meant no critical dependency. The outcome was lingering hurt on the European side, and a determination, on the part of the French, to lead an independent Ariane programme.
Likewise, in Ashok Maharaj's accounts of NASA's relationship with Japan and India, key decisions were the outcome of pursuing foreign-policy objectives. In the early 1960s, Japanese space programmes had been hindered by an internal struggle between those such as Hideo Itokawa who desired a purely national (and nationalistic) project, and those such as Kanuro Kaneshige who favoured collaboration. The Chinese nuclear test in 1964 shook the Japanese. By offering the Japanese liquid-fuel rocket technology, in the Thor-Delta deal of 1969, the US hoped to head off a national programme, contain nuclear aspirations (thereby discouraging proliferation), and cement the Pacific alliance (at a level offered to the Europeans), all while benefiting the balance of trade. The Chinese detonation was also critical in spurring the Indian space programme. Maharaj gives a very readable account of India's tracking stations, rockets and satellites, as they were developed under the leadership of Vikram Sarabhai and Homi J. Bhabha. However, even better is Maharaj's fascinating chapter on the SITE experiment, the ‘world's largest sociological experiment’ (p. 235), which brought satellite television to the villages of India in 1975 and 1976.
Japan and Western Europe were post-war allies of the United States. India was a newly independent, non-aligned country that carefully reshaped relations with the West. The Soviet Union, however, was the Cold War enemy that became, as post-communist Russia, a surprising new major partner in space projects. Angelina Long Callahan discusses US–Soviet collaborations, from the mistrust of the 1960s to the symbols of détente, such as Apollo–Soyuz and the less-well-known ‘Biosatellites’ of the 1970s, to the concerns over the crumbling Soviet space empire in the late 1980s. Krige also examines US–Russian space politics in his culminating chapter on the International Space Station, in which the rules of clean interface and no transfer of funds were well and truly trampled, but which was also perhaps the greatest material expression of international scientific and technological collaboration.
