It is my contention that events, ideas and policies interact with each other and that bad economic ideas have grave consequences on performance. (Wakatabe Reference Wakatabe2015, p. 3)
Economic theory has a long and, at times, an extremely patchy history. Unfortunately, policies based on modes of economic thought have perhaps an even more dubious past. A remarkable thread in this dismal history is the consistent failure to ever conclusively reject and, for all practical purposes, exterminate an idea. In this one regard, at least, economists have always been in the vanguard of the recycling movement. No theory, no matter how lame or preposterous, has ever been buried once and for all. Old theories return, cleverly refurbished, ready once again to serve as a flimsy rationale for policy decisions. These theories, and their descended policies, roam the shadowy domains of policymakers, zombie-like, feeding off the intelligence of more sensible and logical ideas. Footnote 1 “The biggest lesson of all is that everyone can make mistakes and can learn from them. Nevertheless, the controversy tends to be prolonged: old ideas never die out, and they may gain influence in the time of a crisis” (Wakatabe Reference Wakatabe2015, p. 20).
The problem thus posed in this new volume by Masazumi Wakatabe is why so many economic policies worldwide tend to be irredeemably and woefully inadequate. This perennial failure becomes painfully obvious during any major (or even at times minor) crisis when thoughtful guidance is most needed and when veering off course can be most damaging. The mystery of this process reveals itself in an almost compulsive obligation to repeat failed policies. This cyclical morass prompts the thought that the learning curve defining economic policy may be perfectly flat. The question then posed is what would induce policymakers (and far too many economists) to bid a final adieux to policies (and theories) that are inappropriate, inconsistent, and straight out counter-productive.
To explore this seemingly inexplicable (and at times ineradicable) paradox, Wakatabe immerses himself into the past three decades of almost inexplicable Japanese economic policy. While far too many historians have theorized about Japan’s decades of underperformance and stagnation, few, if any, have closely examined with sufficient thoroughness the policy debates and rationales of what retrospectively can be viewed as a carnival of bad decisions. Unfortunately, at least some of what is now a rather regrettable history has been driven by a dubious mix of ideology and inappropriate moralizing. Footnote 2 Thus, the lessons learned from the Japanese experience seem only to confirm the a priori prejudices of those who claim to investigate that past. Those examining the specifics of the case seem to find exactly what they hoped to discover initially.
However, there was an ideological or a moralistic dimension to the discussions: “Governor Hayami[Footnote 3] emphatically refused to use inflation targeting because he believed that using inflation as a solution was not the route that developed countries should take” (Wakatabe Reference Wakatabe2015, p. 33).
Underwriting and often propelling bad policy is a combination of morality and ideology, which tends to dominate more practical and productive economic analysis. Knowing with a great deal of confidence how the world works a priori may induce practitioners to construct theories, or utilize dubious but convenient ones, which rationalize these pre-existing beliefs and provide a theoretical backbone to what are essentially moral sermons: Footnote 4 “... when the question of the direct purchase was discussed, Hayami shot back: ‘This is not a matter of theory, but a matter of belief’” (Okina, quoted in Wakatabe Reference Wakatabe2015, p. 164n20).
The problem with ideology is that it is in no ways amenable to evidence, as Wakatabe clearly points out. Contrary evidence seems perversely only to strengthen ideological certainties, controlling the direction that such guidance takes. According to the author, such thinking helps to create a ‘bad policy trap.’ Policy based on faulty theory or reasoning leads to contrary, if not outright perverse, results, causing policymakers to double down on their bets: policy failures must (given this mindset) be implementation difficulties rather than inherent flaws in the underlying fundamental reasoning. Moreover, such applications insist on a one-size-fits-all approach, rather than focusing on the specifics presented by each case.
Many policymakers who were worried about the trade deficit in the United States believed in a particular theory, such as the elasticities approach to the balance of payments, which led to the policy of deliberate depreciation of the dollar. The problem was that it did not work, and the U.S. trade deficit persisted. Nevertheless, the failure of that policy further strengthened the effort to depreciate the dollar. (Wakatabe Reference Wakatabe2015, p. 17)
Wakatabe forcefully emphasizes the fact that ideology also becomes muddled with morality-like fables, allowing decision makers to overlook the more important and pragmatic role of devising policies that achieve a degree of measurable economic improvement. Instead, recession and stagnation are transformed into a justified retribution for the transgression of bubble-induced flightiness. Unearned speculative gains must vanish, and those who borrowed careless of their ability to repay must be made to suffer for their sins. Footnote 5
A society which does not reward industrious labor properly is a wrong one. The bubble brought us a wide variety of evils, but the most serious one was that people’s values went mad because of an extraordinary rise in asset prices. Many corporations became too much absorbed in financial transactions, going astray from their proper corporate mission to real estate investment. The assets of those who happened to have land and stocks from the past ballooned to several thousand million yen without effort, while workers in general were put into a situation where they could hardly afford to buy a house to live in even though they work hard. All of these denigrate the integrity of work. (Noguchi, quoted in Wakatabe Reference Wakatabe2015, p. 55)
Added to this mixture of ideology and morality, Japanese policy suffered from the very training and education that many of these Japanese economists and policymakers received. In the decades distinguishing early postwar Japan, academic departments were frequently dominated by Marxists wishing fervently for the ultimate collapse of capitalism. Added to this basic intellectual grounding was the high regard generally accorded the work of Joseph Schumpeter. Thus, we get a veritable witch’s brew of those seeing capitalism as prone to irremediable breakdowns fused to the idea that such collapses provide a valuable opportunity for creative destruction. This scenario could simply be labelled as a belief in a phoenix-like economic cycle, with a new shiny version inevitably emerging out of the ashes of the old.
Masuru Yoshitomi, then director of economic coordination at the Economic Planning Agency, defended the government’s initial policy in 1991. Yoshitomi was instrumental in devising the plan. His defense revealed a common view of what is known as “liquidationism”: he not only defended the government policy from the criticism of doing ‘too little, too late’ but also argued for the necessity of a recession after the boom. Instead what he envisioned was a self-sustaining recovery led by the private sector’s Schumpeterian technological and managerial innovations. (Wakatabe Reference Wakatabe2015, p. 55)
All these rationales have contributed (though to varying degrees at various times) to nearly three decades of bad Japanese policy decisions. But there has also been one consistent theme extending even further back than the stagnation period that has managed to muddle decision-making even more than any misconceived application of fiscal consolidation. Wakatabe traces this tendency back to the expected starting point, the 1986 Maekawa report. Footnote 6 This set of recommendations can be usefully viewed as the commencement of the continuing confusion between macroeconomic policy and structural reform: namely, that issues affecting an economy’s capacity to grow over the long run managed to become somehow identified with those factors impacting an economy’s ability to reach something approaching its current productive capacity. Werner (Reference Werner2003) has in fact argued that the Bank of Japan (BOJ) didn’t desire anything resembling a sustained economic recovery, fearing that such an event would deter corporations from forced restructuring and governments from thoroughly deregulating. Though such strategies, in their estimation, might incur short-run pain, bank bureaucrats viewed these measures as necessary to reclaim a higher growth path for the Japanese economy.
In fact, Wakatabe could easily trace back this fundamental belief to the previous decade, when the Japanese economy ceased growing at double-digit rates. Key members of the BOJ concluded that sustained future growth required Japan to move closer to the US economic model. Though Wakatabe does not state this as explicitly as Werner (Reference Werner2003), the evidence he does present remains consistent with this obstructionist view. Such an approach (almost touching on the borders of a conspiracy theory) would at least start to explain the Bank of Japan’s seeming refusal to learn from past mistakes. With very few departures from such a perverse objective, bank policy consistently, for more than two decades, has acted to thwart, in a most unforgiving manner, any chance of encouraging a sustained economic recovery. Footnote 7
Underlying this inexplicable behavior is a basic lack of accountability by decision makers for the policies they adamantly advocate and enforce. No matter what damages to the economy ensue, the governor of the Bank of Japan is nearly impossible to remove. Footnote 8 This is especially unfortunate, since Japanese bureaucrats have traditionally been accorded too much undeserved respect. Perhaps Koichi Kato, long a powerful Liberal Democratic Party politician, summed it up:
After the War up to the present time, we thought that macroeconomic management was left to someone else to contemplate. We used to have a vague trust in the bureaucrats. Perhaps, apart from us politicians, someone like administrative vice minister of the MOF [Ministry of Finance], governor of the BOJ, or administrative vice minister of the Ministry of Trade and Industry got together, in the night somewhere like the BOJ’s Hikawa guesthouse at Akasaka, to come up with a brilliant plan, and informed us later. We were to modify a little bit and implement it. That kind of trust began to collapse after the burst of the bubble. And there was an outcry that politicians should exercise leadership, but we were not prepared for it. (Naikakufu Keizaishakai Kenkyusho, quoted in Wakatabe Reference Wakatabe2015, p. 48)
Wakatabe hints at the distorted incentives central bankers faced without making this point sufficiently explicit. As he does emphasize, however, to fully understand why bad policies are often suggested and repeatedly enacted, we must understand what motivates these decision makers. Surely one consequential factor has to be the risk attached to any set of actions. This dictum represents basic economic reasoning. Without any downside risk attached to their personal status or well-being, central bankers are free to essentially indulge their prejudices, pet theories, or even whims. If such bankers stubbornly persist in pursuing outright destructive policies, the penalties subsequently paid are negligible. The previous governor of the BOJ, Masaki Shirakawa (2008 to 2013), followed a course that virtually throttled the economy when it desperately required easy credit. He remained completely unrepentant and stridently defensive about the course he pursued. Footnote 9 Yet another graduate of the University of Tokyo, his major positive contribution to Japanese monetary policy seems in retrospect to have been his decision to retire from his post three weeks early. Footnote 10
However, a very useful section of the book does point out succinctly how central bankers, haunted by past history, employ distorted versions of those events to support their own preconceived conclusions. As indicated, this exercise in futility seems to ensure that virtually no learning occurs. Footnote 11 Thus, the economic lessons drawn from Japan’s all too eventful and at times violent interwar years are pointedly mistaken and seemingly deliberately contrived. Added to this wilfulness is also an overwhelming bureaucratic yearning not to take risks, with passivity often the preferred option.
Wakatabe’s book, then, is more than just a way to come to grips with Japan’s economic malaise. The volume provides valuable insights into how policies go wrong. The usefulness and parallels to other regions should become abundantly clear, especially in these days when many people puzzle over the strange birth and subsequent consequences of the Eurozone.
As in any such work, there are points where I cannot completely concur with the author. For instance, I’m not convinced about the almost magical powers with which the author imbues reflationist policies, especially when presented as a single strategic device. Footnote 12 The author, at least at moments, seems to be a bit too sanguine about the ability of policymakers to manipulate expectations. Neither is there any simple mechanism connecting money supply to high-powered money. But it is hard to argue that a restrictive monetary policy is anything but a bizarre course to follow during a deflationary trough. In the same sense, I cannot commit to the same level of enthusiasm that motivates Wakatabe to so openly welcome the advent of Abenomics, or at least how it has been applied in practice. Given Abe’s general disinterest in economics, the policy seems to be more a marketing ploy than a valid program. When examined at this stage, Abe’s three arrows seem to consist largely of the monetary weapon of quantitative easing, the easiest of the three to implement. However, these are minor disagreements in what is easily a valuable contribution to an age-old question: Why are so many bad policies persistently made? “The time of crisis is a time of controversy. Bad economic ideas are contained as long as the macroeconomic situation is going well, while they tend to be resurrected during crisis time” (Wakatabe Reference Wakatabe2015, p. 158).
