Introduction
For millennia physicians were admonished to obscure the details of patients’ illnesses and poor prognoses.Footnote 1 The Hippocratic ethic precludes physicians from including patients in medical decisionmaking. That ethic demanded of doctors that they “[p]erform [their duties] calmly and adroitly, concealing most things from the patient … revealing nothing of the patient's future or present condition.”Footnote 2
The advent of informed consent in clinical medicine, about two and a half millennia after Hippocrates lived, reflects the importation of the notion of autonomous individuality into the world of healthcare. That development has reshaped the parameters of healthcare generally and has altered the character of the physician–patient relationship in particular. The ideological shift undergirding this development has transformed a set of social domains in the United States in the second half of the 20th century.
I begin by examining the construction of the informed consent doctrine in the United States during the 20th century. I then situate that development within a far-reaching social transformation that occurred during the same period and that involved the generalization of individualist values in the United States. I then review contemporary understandings of the informed consent doctrine as it is applied to clinical medicine. Finally, I consider a few legal decisions that have elaborated the informed consent doctrine and have imposed a set of disclosure requirements on physicians that may compromise the aims originally justifying the doctrine's development.
Consent, Information, and Autonomous Individuality
A half century ago, it would have seemed peculiar and ill advised to ask patients to participate in treatment decisions. Today it is expected. The shift has been described by the philosopher Gerald Dworkin as the move from “doctor knows best” to “it's my body.”Footnote 3
Early Developments in the Law: The Consent Requirement
Discussions of the legal development of the informed consent doctrine in the United States often refer to a 1914 decision—Schloendorff v. New York Hospital Footnote 4—authored by Benjamin Cardozo, then a judge on New York's highest court.Footnote 5 When judges today invoke Cardozo's decision in Schloendorff, they almost always focus on his justification for requiring that patient consent precede the provision of healthcare. Judge Carodozo wrote:
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.Footnote 6
The story surrounding Mary Schloendorff's case provides a fascinating glimpse at the social history of law and medicine.Footnote 7 Cardozo explained that Mary Schloendorff went to New York Hospital because of what he called “some disorder of the stomach.” In fact, her doctor believed she was suffering from a nervous disorder and gynecological problems. But in the first decades of the 20th century, decent courts preferred not to refer openly to such matters. Schloendorff's story is also interesting because she was a paying patient in a hospital that enjoyed charitable immunity.Footnote 8 She paid $7 for each week that she remained in the hospital.
Schloendorff's physician suggested that she needed what the court referred to as an “ether exam.” The doctor had apparently concluded that Schloendorff (and I quote from testimony) was “too nervous” to be examined while awake. Schloendorff agreed to an ether exam, but stated expressly that she did not agree to surgery. Cardozo explained that while Schloendorff was unconscious a tumor was removed. Apparently, Cardozo's sense of propriety precluded his reporting that in fact, a hysterectomy was performed. Schloendorff suffered a variety of harms after the surgery. She sued, claiming that she had never agreed to surgery. Cardozo described the wrong done to Mary Schloendorff in the language of assault and battery. It was an intentional, offensive touching.
Almost a half century passed before the consent doctrine, relying on a cause-of-action in battery was refashioned by a U.S. court into the informed consent doctrine. A few cases are still framed in the language of assault and battery.Footnote 9 These cases pose particular concern for physicians because malpractice insurance may not cover liability for assault or battery.Footnote 10 In most jurisdictions, assault and battery actions now involve only those cases in which no consent was given,Footnote 11 cases in which the procedure performed was very different from the one agreed to,Footnote 12 and cases involving care by a healthcare provider or providers other than those for whom consent was given.Footnote 13
The term informed consent was first used by a California court in 1957 in a case called Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University.Footnote 14Salgo stood between the traditional world of medicine in which both patient and doctor expected the doctor to know best and the contemporary world of medicine in which patients have become active participants in healthcare decisionmaking. In Salgo, the court concluded that “a physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to liability if he withholds any facts … necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed treatment.”Footnote 15 Then, as if the court could not quite believe its own rule, it explained that physicians should enjoy discretion to withhold facts in light of a patient's “mental and emotional condition.”Footnote 16 Dr. Jay Katz described Salgo as a fanciful effort to harmonize two irreconcilable visions of the doctor–patient relationship.Footnote 17 Through a fascinating piece of detective work Dr. Katz discovered that the Salgo court's framing of the informed consent issue was taken verbatim from an amicus brief submitted to the California Court of Appeals by the American College of Surgeons—a group that Dr. Katz thus labeled “informed consent's godparent.”Footnote 18
Within a few decades after Salgo, states widely accepted the informed consent doctrine, largely without Salgo’s ambivalence. The change became evident in the early 1970s. At that time, a federal court in Washington, D.C.,Footnote 19 and a state court in CaliforniaFootnote 20 recognized a sweeping new version of the informed consent doctrine that was soon recognized in one form or another in virtually every state. The doctrine, described in detail in “The Legal Development of the Informed Consent Doctrine in the Last Decades of the Twentieth Century” below,Footnote 21 requires that patients be given the right to consent to or refuse healthcare and that they be provided with all information material to a decision to consent to or to refuse healthcare.
The Generalization of Individualist Values
The development of the informed consent doctrine reflects a broad social transformation that altered the parameters of the world of healthcare in the last half century. That transformation has been grounded in the generalization of individualist values in the United States (and in many other societies). This process has provided the framework for the history of ideas that has, in turn, justified and encouraged the development of the informed consent doctrine and the reshaping of physician–patient relationships, more generally. The same process has altered the scope and meaning of relationships within a wide set of social domains in the United States during the last half century. The shift can perhaps best be illustrated through reference to the social transformation of the family.
The recent history of shifting relationships between healthcare providers and patients resembles that of relationships among family members. A half century ago, each set of relationships was understood in terms that contrasted with the terms that defined relationships in the marketplace.Footnote 22
In the marketplace, as it was forged during the first decades of the 19th century, relationships and the persons who entered into them were understood as putatively equal and essentially fungible. Within the world of the market, autonomous individuals have long been viewed as free to shape and reshape the terms of their relationships. Moreover, those relationships were not presumed likely to last beyond the terms of the bargains that defined them. In comparison, a set of social domains, almost expressly defined in contrast to the world of the market, valued loyalty and grounded relationships on presumptions about fixed statuses and the roles that inevitably attended them. The so-called traditional family is the preeminent example in the United States of that social construction. Within the family of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century, relationships were expected to follow roles set by relatively fixed statuses.Footnote 23 More particularly, family relationships were defined through a hierarchy of statuses based largely on differences in gender and age. The traditional family not only reflected, but valued, hierarchy rather than equality and communal loyalty rather than individuality. That form of family began openly to collapse in the second half of the 20th century. It has largely been replaced, at least with regard to adults in families, with forms that echo values long familiar in the marketplace. Society and the law now define family members (especially adults) as autonomous individuals, free to design the terms of their relationships by exercising choice at home as they have long exercised choice at work.
A similar transformation reshaped the world of healthcare, generally, and the physician–patient relationship, in particular, during more or less the same period. Especially in the first three quarters of the 20th century, physicians enjoyed an enviable, almost unique, professional status. Medical authority was secure, and hierarchy as between physician and patient was generally assumed. Patients were expected to rely on physicians and to remain loyal to them.Footnote 24 Although medicine, unlike families, was always linked expressly to commerce, relationships among physicians and between physicians and patients resembled relationships among family members in that the participants expected and valued hierarchy and trust rather than equality and choice.
That universe survived more or less intact until the last decades of the 20th century. Its collapse was facilitated by a vast set of economic and structural changes that revolutionized the world of medicineFootnote 25 and by the general displacement of “traditional” values in that set of social domains (families, churches, medicine) that previously had been shaped through values that contrasted with those of the marketplace.
The informed consent doctrine, which assumes the autonomy of doctor and patient alike, played a part in effecting, and has reflected, the shifting parameters of the physician–patient relationship. The notion that patients should actively participate in healthcare decisions presumes patient autonomy. That presumption became widespread only in the last decades of the 20th century.
The Legal Development of the Informed Consent Doctrine in the Last Decades of the 20th Century
Beginning in the 1970s, the informed consent doctrine was broadly developed by lawmakers and widely applied within medical practice. A survey described in JAMA in 1961 reported that almost 90% of doctors generally refrained from telling patients about a cancer diagnosis.Footnote 26 A study published in JAMA 18 years later (1979), reported that about 98% of doctors generally did inform a patient about a cancer diagnosis.Footnote 27
This section reviews the contemporary dimensions of the informed consent doctrine through reference to Canterbury v. Spence, decided in 1972 by a federal court in the District of Columbia.Footnote 28 The case involved a suit by Jerry Canterbury against Dr. William Spence, a neurosurgeon. Canterbury was 19 and worked as a clerk at the FBI when, complaining of back pain, he went to Dr. Spence. Suspecting a ruptured disc, Spence recommended surgery. When asked whether the operation was dangerous, Spence replied: “not any more than any other operation.”Footnote 29 Moreover, he did not mention a small risk of serious disability. Dr. Spence justified his silence: “[C]ommunication of that risk to the patient is not good medical practice because it might deter patients from undergoing needed surgery and might produce adverse psychological reactions which could preclude the success of the operation."Footnote 30 Canterbury's postoperative story as told to the court was rather confused. But it was clear that, over a decade after the surgery, he was left with difficulty walking, urinary incontinence, and bowel paralysis.Footnote 31
The trial court had not found Dr. Spence negligent.Footnote 32 The appellate court focused on Dr. Spence's having failed to tell Canterbury about the risk of serious disability. The judge explained that “a very small chance of death or serious disablement may well be significant.”Footnote 33 The case is important for expressly requiring that consent be premised on information. Moreover, the court instituted a novel procedure for assessing the adequacy of information communicated to a patient. The court did not rely on rules forged in the context of malpractice litigation. Instead of looking to the standard of practice within the profession, the Canterbury court required a physician to disclose information that a reasonably prudent person would find “material” in deciding whether to consent to a proposed form of care. The Canterbury court did not, however, predicate disclosure on the unique needs of any particular patient. Rather, it looked to the informational needs of a reasonable person in a situation similar to that of the patient. In the court's view, this so-called objective approach provided “suitable leeway for the physician's situation.”Footnote 34
Generally the Canterbury “reasonable patient” approach involves consideration of both the severity of a risk and the probability of its occurring. Interestingly, under this standard, Canterbury ultimately lost his case. When the trial court reentertained Jerry Canterbury's case, it concluded that a reasonable person would have consented to the surgery suggested by Dr. Spence even if that person knew what Canterbury had not been told and did not know—that the recommended surgery posed a small risk of permanent disability.
Today the “reasonable patient” approach to informed consent has been adopted in almost half of the states. New York is not among those states. Statutory law in New York directs state courts to assess a doctor's duty to provide information to a patient through reference to the norms of medical practice.Footnote 35 This is referred to as the “professional standard.” Among other things, it requires a plaintiff to present expert testimony as to what a reasonable physician would have told a patient in a position similar to the plaintiff's. The statute bows to a patient's needs in requiring that the physician communicate information to a patient “in a manner permitting the patient to make a knowledgeable evaluation.”Footnote 36 Interestingly, soon after Canterbury, New York courts adopted the reasonable patient standard delineated in Canterbury, but the legislature later replaced that standard with the professional standard.Footnote 37 As you may guess, defendants prefer this standard to that outlined in Canterbury.
In practice, however, the two standards are less different than it might seem because the medical profession has integrated the informed consent doctrine into its own understanding of ethical practice. Most professional associations, including the American Medical Association (AMA) and the American College of Surgeons, oblige physicians to provide a patient with enough information, in the language of the AMA's ethical code, “to enable an intelligent choice” by the patient.Footnote 38
Broadly, the informed consent doctrine now requires physicians to disclosure the probability of a bad result, the kind and degree of harm that might follow from a proposed treatment or procedure (including a diagnostic procedure), and to provide information about alternatives. New York's informed consent law delineates “lack of informed consent” as
the failure of the person providing the professional treatment or diagnosis to disclose to the patient such alternatives thereto and the reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits involved as a reasonable medical, dental or podiatric practitioner under similar circumstances would have disclosed, in a manner permitting the patient to make a knowledgeable evaluation.Footnote 39
Courts in a few states have also required physicians to inform patients about the risks of refusing even diagnostic procedures.Footnote 40 California's highest court concluded in 1980 that a doctor who failed to inform a patient about the risks of forgoing a pap smear had breached his duty to disclose enough information so that the patient, in the court's language, “might meaningfully exercise [the] right to make decisions about [her] own bod[y].”Footnote 41
The Code of Professional Conduct of the American College of Surgeons describes informed consent as “more than a legal requirement.”Footnote 42 It is, as well, the Code proclaims, “a standard of ethical surgical practice that enhances the surgeon/patient relationship and that may improve the patient's care and the treatment outcome.” The Code, reflecting the general contours of most states’ informed consent rules, specifically obligates a surgeon to discuss with a patient the patient's condition and the consequences of leaving that condition untreated, the estimated mortality and morbidity of surgery being proposed, and “the more common known complications” so that the patient is aware of the “risks as well as the benefits of the proposed operation.” That discussion should provide information about the likely course of convalescence. Finally, the patient should be told about alternative treatments, including nonsurgical options.
Every jurisdiction recognizes some exceptions to the informed consent requirement. There are several broad categories of exceptions.Footnote 43 Specific rules as to how and when they operate vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.Footnote 44 The most universally accepted exception is the so-called emergency exception. It involves a patient in need of immediate care and unable to entertain the consent process. Exceptions have also been found for cases involving common knowledge, cases involving “patient knowledge” (involving a patient known already to be aware of the relevant information), and for cases involving patients who waive the right to information relevant to healthcare decisionmaking.Footnote 45
Finally, there is still some room for the so-called therapeutic exception,Footnote 46 which allows physicians to withhold information likely to upset a patient so deeply that the patient will be rendered incapable of rational decisionmaking.Footnote 47 This exception is reserved for unusual situations because of its potential to consume the rule.Footnote 48
Elaborations of the Informed Consent Doctrine
Specific rules associated with the informed consent doctrine vary from state to state. Everywhere, however, as the doctrine has developed during the last several decades, it has failed consistently to work as it was intended to work. This failure is a consequence of actual practice, which often differs from the ideal, and it is a consequence of lawmakers having elaborated the parameters of the doctrine. The doctrine was aimed at safeguarding patient autonomy. Yet, often, in practice, the presumptively autonomous patient does little more than opt for or against a proposed course of treatment.Footnote 49 Critics argue that the doctrine has facilitated the move from a trust-centered model of the doctor–patient relationship to one based around legal rules.
That criticism is supported in particular by a few judicial decisions in recent decades that reflect an elaboration of the informed consent doctrine. As formulated in Canterbury and other cases contemporary with it,Footnote 50 the doctrine aimed to empower patients. In later elaborations, the doctrine has been shaped (whether self-consciously or not) so that it disempowers healthcare providers.
A 1996 decision of Wisconsin's highest court—Johnson v. Kokemoor Footnote 51—is illustrative. The plaintiff, Donna Johnson, sued Dr. Kokemoor after he clipped an aneurysm at the back of her brain. Johnson was left with what the court described as incomplete quadriplegia. The result was not attributed to negligence. Rather, the court held for Johnson because Dr. Kokemoor had failed adequately to inform Johnson about the risks of the surgery he proposed; among other things, the court concluded, Dr. Kokemoor was obliged to inform Johnson that the surgery was less likely to result in death or disability if performed by someone with more experience than Kokemoor had had.Footnote 52
The information not revealed in Kokemoor involved a type of information often referred to as “provider specific.” The court's holding constitutes a strange elaboration of the informed consent doctrine laid down in Canterbury. Arguably, it undermines the rule on which it was presumptively grounded.Footnote 53 And at the very least, it would seem unlikely to encourage the sort of relationship between patient and physician on which effectively to ground a productive informed consent conversation.
Six years after Kokemoor, the New Jersey Supreme Court relied on a modified version of the rule crafted by the Wisconsin court in Kokemoor.Footnote 54 Dr. Robert Healy suggested that Joseph Howard (a victim of two car accidents) undergo neck surgery. Dr. Healy informed Howard that he could be left with serious disabilities, including paralysis, as a result of the surgery. Howard consented to surgery. After the surgery, Howard was indeed left with quadriplegia. Howard brought suit, arguing that he would not have agreed to surgery had the doctor not exaggerated his own skills and credentials. The court refrained from shaping a broad rule that would have required physicians to disclose details about their “background and experience as part of the required informed consent disclosure.”Footnote 55 It did, however, allow Howard to proceed with his case on the ground that “significant misrepresentations concerning a physician's qualifications can effect the validity of consent obtained.”Footnote 56
The rules underlying the courts’ decisions in both Kokemoor and Howard suggest a new frame within which the relationship between patients and healthcare providers will be shaped. These cases seem to foreshadow a universe within which healthcare providers could be required to reveal a wide variety of personal information to patients. Might, for instance, a healthcare provider be compelled to tell a patient that he is going through a difficult divorce and, while competent, may not be able to focus on patient care as completely as he once did or, in another case, that she had not been sleeping well for a week, and might (though competent) resemble her divorcing colleague in being less completely focused than she usually is? That sort of rule would seriously disempower healthcare providers. I do not here intend to suggest either that patients may not want to know or that they should not know about their healthcare providers’ training and skills. That information should be made available to any patient who asks. But to require healthcare providers to outline their own limitations for patients is to undermine the possibility of the sort of conversation on which informed consent is expected to rest.
Indeed, when Kokemoor was decided in 1996, commentators assumed that the decision foreshadowed widespread changes in the law of informed consent. Yet, in fact, the rule proclaimed in Kokemoor has not been widely followed. Generally, physicians must answer questions about their own limitations but need not volunteer such information.Footnote 57 There is, however, some lingering disagreement about the value of the Kokemoor rule. A number of commentators have described Kokemoor's requirement that provider-specific information be shared with patients as a welcome addition to the evolution of the informed consent doctrine. One such commentator concludes simply that a physician's “experience is material.”Footnote 58 In contrast, other commentators have concluded that the Kokemoor rule constitutes a serious stumbling block to the efficient provision of medical care and would, if widely generalized, result in unending calls for “every fact which might conceivably affect performance in the surgical suite.”Footnote 59 In retrospect, it seems clear that the rule put forth in Kokemoor and in a few other decisions that resemble it has served lawmakers as a warning more than as a model.Footnote 60
Conclusion
It is likely that positions about requiring provider-specific information correlate with views about the best use for and purpose to be served by the informed consent doctrine. Prof. Mark Hall suggests, for instance, that courts, in the years since Kokemoor, have crafted a workable compromise that safeguards a trust-based system of medical care while providing for active participation by patients in healthcare decisionmaking.Footnote 61
More generally, what Prof. William Sage has referred to as the “lawyerization of medicine”Footnote 62 has reshaped the contours of the physician–patient relationship by demanding that physicians acknowledge and respect patient autonomy. That process has produced excesses. A rule, for instance, requiring physicians to volunteer provider-specific information to patients extends the informed consent doctrine beyond its original parameters. More specifically, such a rule could easily undermine the possibility of a doctor–patient relationship grounded in even the most minimal forms of trust. Taming such excesses in the context of the informed consent rule depends on the law's refraining from constructing rules that eviscerate trust in the name of autonomy. In short, the informed consent doctrine is most likely to serve its most felicitous ends if doctor and patient can comfortably entertain the informed consent process. When that possibility is rendered real, patient autonomy can be safeguarded and physicians can most successfully effect their essential healing goal.
