Digital media played a key role in a number of uprisings that later became known as the Arab Spring. Now that this moment of resistance has largely given way to a tumultuous and unsettled regional order, we can ask what role these media forms are playing in the new ecology of the postuprisings Middle East. I would argue that we are witnessing a period of experimentation—journalists are attempting to generate both revenue and dissent under circumstances that range from unsettled (Tunisia) to increasingly repressive (Jordan), while proto-state actors and transnational jihadis are exploiting social media to attract supporters and influence diverse audiences. What is clear is that in many states the digital arrangement that characterized the 2000s—activist bloggers squaring off openly with recalcitrant and often clueless states—is gone. States are now more aware of and careful about the strategies they employ vis-à-vis digital dissent. In places such as Egypt, some of the most vocal activists are in prison. In Jordan, they have returned to producing journalism that skirts the line between tolerated and forbidden. Across the region digital media activists are grappling with disillusionment about the trajectory of the Arab Spring, while digital spaces are sites for transnational contestation, including by the most successful challenger to the state system since Jamal ʿAbd al-Nasir in the 1950s, the Islamic State (IS). ʿAbd al-Nasir famously used radio to breach the information firewalls erected by new Arab states. IS has similarly employed the technologies of the day to execute a plan of even greater ambition and reach—far from reaching out only across national boundaries within the subsystem, IS militants have crafted a transnational media operation of remarkable scope, one that has drawn tens of thousands of recruits not only from the Middle East but also from Europe, the United States, and Asia.
The experiments unfolding across the Arab World are taking place under pressures unique to the region. Everywhere, journalists and activists are trying to figure out how to support themselves as they do their work, while Western journalists are scrambling either to save legacy print media or to pioneer new models of sustainable digital production. Yet the Arab World is several years, if not decades behind in terms of pressures on print media from the Internet, partly due to slower Internet adoption rates and partly due to ongoing authoritarian state support for newspapers.Footnote 1 Might they ultimately return to a much older model of how to pay for valuable goods that are undersupplied by the market?
MULTIPLE PURPOSES
Chicago's Auditorium Building is often referred to as the first building to combine retail, office, and hotel space. Opened in 1889, it featured a world-class theater on the ground floor, a hotel, and an office tower. While unremarkable today, this plan was genuinely radical at the time, and it presaged the way that commerce in the form of advertisements underwrote all kinds of valuable things in the 20th century—TV shows, movies, upscale opinion journalism, and of course, newspapers. The building's architects hoped that the hotel and the offices would be able to pay for the art. The dream, then as now, was to find a sustainable source of funding to finance valuable things.
A similar process is underway today in many parts of the digital media world in the Middle East. Activists who once blogged, tweeted, and organized on the side are trying to pioneer sustainable models of journalism that can continue to challenge authoritarian politics while also generating enough revenue to pay staff and keep the lights on. This is a huge shift from the early days of Arab blogging, when most of the influential voices in the activist public sphere—people such as Issandr El-Amrani of The Arabist and Wael Abbas of Misr Digital—were working alone or with one or two other writers. Many were veteran or freelance journalists, but they were doing something completely different on their sites. Others were doctors, engineers, or lawyers who continued to practice full time. While occasionally they would do original reporting, they often used their platforms to editorialize, organize dissent, and collaborate with other “blogger-activists” who sought to change the structure of power in Egypt and other parts of the Middle East. These “citizen journalists” were just that—citizens committing what Clay Shirky called “acts of journalism” but eschewing the creation of formal organizations that might draw unwanted attention from the state. Doing this work alone, in a loose collaborative network with almost no formal structure, left these activists vulnerable to piecemeal harassment, intimidation, and detention. In a way, they were all running their own miniature Auditorium Buildings, with their work in citizen journalism paid for by full-time jobs doing other things or working for Egypt's then-burgeoning independent print media sphere. The shift that disrupted the model was already underway by the time the Arab Spring arrived, as young activists got older and gravitated toward collaborations and paid work. Just a few years after it had begun, the age of the heroic solo blogger-activist had come to a close.
Global journalism has also undergone a substantial shift recently, as the expensive work of producing news is no longer covered by the advertising and classifieds that were the lifeblood of print journalism, and as print subscription bases have collapsed. In the West, this has left a major public good—investigative journalism and local news—underfinanced, crippling the industry and discouraging many young people from seeking careers in news at all. In the Middle East, journalists are being driven away from existing print media not by economics (at least not yet), but rather by the inability to practice free expression. But some of the experiments we are witnessing are a return to the Auditorium Building model, where a safe economic scheme might pay for journalism rather than journalism paying for itself. In Amman, the digital journalists at a collective called 7iber.org have leased space just off of bustling Rainbow Street and turned it into a multipurpose enterprise, with meeting space for potentially lucrative trainings and a coffee shop designed to generate revenue for journalism. 7iber, which has so far cobbled together financing from a mixture of grants, hopes that this model will lead to a sustainable organization that no longer needs to hop from grant to grant in order to survive. Or as the organization's cofounder Ramsey George put it, “we hope that with the café coming online we have a financial model that makes a bit more sense but also a space where we can do more.”Footnote 2
Unlike with Western journalism, though, experiments in journalism around the Middle East are unfolding under the cloud of authoritarian resurgence. The region also has not yet been hit with the collapse of newspaper revenue, in large part because many newspapers in the region are state owned and thus not dependent on advertising revenue. This means that experiments are being conducted with less pressure from a collapsing sector of the economy, but also with less freedom to maneuver. Restrictions create their own incentives for innovation and experimentation. With the notable and important exception of Tunisia, no country in the region is both more free and more stable than it was in 2011, as the heady optimism of the early uprisings has given way to a cold fatalism about the potential for transformation in the region. In Egypt the flame of dissent is being carried by outfits that look much more like digital magazines than blogs—the most notable of which is Mada Masr. The Mada Masr model operates similarly to that of 7iber—collect a group of talented journalists, many of whom first became prominent in the blogosphere, and set them free to do reporting and opinion journalism in apparent defiance of state crackdowns on free speech. Unlike earlier incarnations of online dissent, Mada Masr is also not explicitly an activist operation. Like traditional news organizations, it is divided into sections, including “lifestyle” and “culture,” that have no direct relationship to politics. Mada Masr is attempting to make money through advertising, and perhaps because English-language content has traditionally drawn less attention from the Egyptian regime, the state has not committed wholesale acts of detention or intimidation against the staff. What the state has done is pressure advertisers not to work with the site.
With other innovators, however, including Egypt's Rassad News Network (RNN), the state has engaged in open repression. RNN was founded in 2010 as a volunteer news organization whose short stories were confined almost entirely to Facebook and Twitter.Footnote 3 It later turned to a promising SMS subscription service to generate revenue before being sold to an investor. In August 2013, the new military government arrested one of the site's founders, ʿAbd Allah al-Fakharany, as well as other members of the staff. Al-Fakharany was accused of “publishing fake news” as well as “defaming Egypt in foreign countries.”Footnote 4 RNN continues to publish, but the detention of its staff highlights how even successful innovation can be undermined by authoritarian regimes increasingly cognizant of the threat that digital media poses to their rule. Unlike in the 2000s, though, that threat comes not just from largely leftist bloggers, but also from new players.
THE ISLAMIC STATE AND THE RISE OF DARK TWITTER
“Social media is just a tool” is one of those nostrums you hear repeated ad nauseum by digital media skeptics and proponents alike at conference panels, but never has it been more true than with the explosion of the Islamic State in Syria and the Levant, now just the Islamic State. The trouble with this assertion is not that it is untrue but rather that it is typically used to commit a category error. What most people mean when they claim that “social media is just a tool” is that social media is a blank canvass that can be filled up with anything, whether dissent, proregime propaganda, or hate speech. While al-Qaʿida was always considered the pioneer of a new media strategy focused on videos, it is the Islamic State that has really changed the way radical groups recruit new members and spread their message online. Steven Johnson argues that, “[a]t the most elemental level, the Internet and its descendants possess this defining property: they make it easier and cheaper to share information.”Footnote 5 Just as social media allow members of diaspora communities to share information, ideas, and demands, they perform precisely the same function for violent jihadist movements such as IS. This is nothing new, of course—al-Qaʿida and its various affiliates have used the social web for years to promote ideology and doctrine. But it is IS that has brought the message to the medium, eliminating the clunky, hour-long sermons of al-Qaʿida and replacing them with clever memetic images, short videos, and Tweets.
Here too though there is an awkward marriage of the new—in the form of shareable videos and images—and the traditional. IS has put out several issues of a digital magazine called Dabaq (Flood), perhaps recognizing that young social media users are not the full extent of their “market.” Dabaq has the staid appearance of a regional magazine, a kind of Raqqa Monthly for older supporters, and is highlighted by unapologetic braggadocio about the group's achievements. And rather than being driven by rogue bloggers, the IS media wing is a tightly run operation that, while it enlists proxies and supporters, maintains sharp control over messaging. Whereas al-Qaʿida would release long videos but leave other matters in the hands of local affiliates, IS presents a more comprehensive vision of the organization.
The IS foray into social media has led to a few twists worthy of the social media age. In December 2014, a jihadi Twitter user going by the handle @shamiwitness was unmasked as a young man in Bangalore with little to no connection to IS. Twitter, for its part, has tried gamely to shut down accounts associated with IS, but lacks the personnel and the will to really clamp down on them. Other accounts openly mock IS, pointing to another feature of social media—the extent to which they lend themselves to satire, mockery, and the exposure of fraud—while some satire accounts were mistakenly shut down by Twitter under the impression that they support IS. All of this conveys the difficulty of determining intent without an actual human being reading posts and interpreting them. These developments in particular have come at a time when massive social media applications such as Twitter are being criticized for their unwillingness or inability to crack down on hate speech, threats, and misogyny, as with the controversy surrounding the female writers who critiqued video game culture in the United States, which became known as #gamergate. More worrisome than the official use of social media channels by IS radicals is the proliferation of fake stories about the group, which have become almost too numerous to recount. One involved a false report that Hillary Clinton's autobiography contained a claim that the United States had funded IS. Another fake story involved IS's alleged forced circumcisions of young women. What ties many of these stories together is that they appear to have been deliberately planted by sympathizers of the group in order to increase perceptions of its brutality.Footnote 6
The IS social media strategy lays bare the way that social media by their nature are transgressive to traditional notions of Westphalian sovereignty and the concept of the nation-state. Despite having nearly the entirety of the Arab state order opposed to the group and its ideas, IS has succeeded in building a movement that is simultaneously postnational and transnational—postnational in that it advances a notion of solidarity that eclipses the imported European model of one state for each ethnic or national group, and transnational in that it invites Sunni radicals from all over the world to join the movement. Social media are not necessary for building such a movement—the absence of Twitter did not exactly prevent the flow of young militants out of Arab states and into Afghanistan in the 1980s—but they certainly make identity transformation cheaper and less hierarchical. In effect, IS has used social media to build an “imagined community” in a matter of months, whereas it took post–World War I Arab statemakers decades to do the same.
IS's media strategy is also, of course, not paid for with advertising, but with another version of the Auditorium Building strategy—looted treasure and illicit oil sales. Digital economies apply to IS in the same way they do to activists and print journalists. Whether the improvised strategies emerging across the region have any staying power is a question that can only be answered in relation to the particular tactics used by regional states to hem in innovators and recapture contested public spheres. The only certainty is that digital media will be at the center of all such struggles.
