Nearly one out of five Israeli citizens is an Arab. For a state that both formally and actually sees itself as “Jewish,” the presence of this growing minority has always posed difficult problems. The ostensible purpose of Hillel Frisch's book is to evaluate the extent to which threats to Israeli security from outside its borders account for the government's domestic policies of surveillance, control, and discrimination. Frisch's argument is that Israel's behavior toward Arab citizens within its borders is admirably generous in light of the hostility toward Israel of the Arabs outside its borders.
The author uses the idea of the “second image reversed” to portray his general position. This phrase, made popular by Peter Gourevitch in a famous article in 1978, is a reference to an even more famous book by Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959). Waltz analyzed three “images” of the causes of war: human nature, aggressive state policies emanating from domestic politics, and the anarchic qualities of the international state system. The phrase “second image reversed” focuses attention on the extent to which war or other aspects of international relations shape domestic politics. Frisch mentions this principle early in the book, and again at the very end, but it is more a gesture toward a political science concept than an effort to systematically measure the weight of international factors against that of domestic factors in shaping Israeli policies toward the Arab minority.
It is worth noting how Zionist leaders used this same kind of linkage, albeit in the opposite direction, prior to Israel's creation. When asked by international commissions of inquiry about how Arabs living in the proposed Jewish state would be treated, David Ben-Gurion and Chaim Weizmann emphasized that under threat from a huge and powerful Arab majority in the Middle East as a whole, the Jewish state would inevitably adopt such liberal policies toward the Arabs in its midst as to put them in a “privileged” position. As Ben-Gurion told the Anglo-American Committee on Inquiry in 1946 (Jewish Agency for Palestine, The Jewish Case: Before the Anglo-American Committee on Palestine as Presented by the Jewish Agency for Palestine [Jerusalem, 1947], pp. 77–78):
When things in Palestine change, the Arabs would be a minority and we would become the majority, but the Arabs here would still be in a privileged position. They would have nothing to fear because they are surrounded by Arab countries that are independent . . . Imagine that in the neighborhood of Poland there was a big State like Russia, with 180 million Jews, then the Jewish minority in Poland would not be persecuted; they would be perhaps in a privileged position. I am sure the Arabs will be in such a privileged position here.
In fact, Frisch's argument is as self-servingly propagandistic and as devoid of analytic bite as was this testimony. But if both are taken seriously, Frisch's book can be seen as an attempt to prove Ben-Gurion wrong. Far from describing generous policies toward Arab citizens in order to curry favor with surrounding Arab states or portraying Arabs in Israel as enjoying privileges not accorded to Jews, Frisch acknowledges that Arabs are not treated equally and argues that this is largely because of the power and hostility of Israel's Arab neighbors. For casual readers with little background on the problem, Frisch may succeed in creating the impression that Israeli policies toward the Arab minority have been substantially driven by security concerns. The three book jacket blurbs suggest as much. But this goes to show that casual readers should be on guard and that one cannot trust book jacket blurbs to do what only a close reading can accomplish.
There are three reasons for the book's failure to present a credible case for understanding Israeli policies toward the Arab minority as mostly, or even importantly, driven by security considerations: 1) less than a third of the book is even indirectly focused on the relationship between military security threats and policies toward Israel's Arab citizens (Chaps. 1 and 2); 2) no evidence is presented that officials in charge of Israeli security or of the affairs of the Arab sector have fashioned policies toward Arab citizens based on such security concerns; and 3) the great bulk of the evidence and argumentation presented is devoted to convincing the reader that Israeli Jews are justified in regarding Israeli Arabs as mostly responsible for whatever problems they have, as generally hostile to the objectives most Israeli Jews hold dear, and as unqualified for full rights as Israeli citizens.
The structure of the book is that of a sandwich made with two different kinds of bread. The first two chapters do discuss the external military security threat, portrayed as an understudied dimension of Jewish–Arab relations in Israel. The topic of “Israeli security” is then largely abandoned until the last substantive chapter, Chapter 9, when the reader's attention is again directed to “Israeli security,” but, as I shall indicate, in a way that dramatically changes the meaning of the phrase.
Between these two slices of bread are chapters whose relationship to the security theme is obscure. Chapter 3, “State Policies toward Israel's Palestinians,” asks whether the State of Israel treats the Arab population fairly. Frisch answers that while some forms of discrimination may have existed, the real causes of gaps in living standards and general dissatisfaction among Arabs in Israel are the primitiveness of Arab social structure, petty clan and religious rivalries, and the absence of civic virtue in Arab localities. In any event Frisch is at pains to insist that “it is not the Jewishness of the state that is at the heart of the matter” (p. 64). The next five chapters provide details about competition between various Arab political movements and parties for Arab votes, infighting among various Arab politicians, the history of Arab political movements, differences in outlooks and behavior of West Bank Palestinians versus those living in Israel, relations between Arab Israelis and the PLO, and the Israeli Arab propensity to identify with Arabs outside the country and to adopt much more critical perspectives toward Israeli government policies and objectives than are prevalent among Israeli Jews. In other words, the requirements of the official argument of the book do not explain the presentation of most of the material it contains. On the other hand, by comparing these chapters to five of Frisch's articles listed in the bibliography, it can be inferred that at least one key purpose of the book was to serve as a vehicle for their republication in somewhat updated forms. Between 1996 and 2004 four of these articles appeared in the journal Israel Affairs; the fifth appeared in Nationalism and Ethnic Politics.
When the phrase “Israeli security” reappears at the end of the book the reader finds that its meaning has radically changed. In Chapter 9, “Israeli Arab Political Demands and Israeli Security,” the term does not to refer to any military or external threat, but to Jewish fears that the demands and demographic prominence of Arab citizens pose serious challenges to the “security of the Jewish majority” (pp. 164, 180) and to “the majority population's wish to a state identity reflecting its predominance” (p. 173). In this way, despite explicitly denying its causal importance with respect to policies toward Arab citizens, Frisch here emphasizes that the question of the Jewish character of the state is located at the center of his argument.
The second reason for the book's failure to establish that security threats drive most Israeli policies toward Arab citizens is the absence of evidence concerning what policymakers actually perceived or thought. For Frisch's argument to be correct, the men and women who designed and enforced those policies need to have had in their minds the worries and concerns Frisch's argument attributes to them. That Israel has been subjected to external hostility and that its Arab minority has experienced discrimination, surveillance, and various restrictions, describes a correlation, not a causal relationship. Process tracing is the technique social scientists use to move from correlation to causation. It would have required the author to conduct interviews, or examine memoranda, archives, and secondary source material, in order to weigh evidence of a pattern in the policymaking process such that external security concerns have dominated all other considerations in the development, refinement, and enforcement of policies toward Israeli Arabs. The hypothesis that security is and has been the dominant force behind Israeli policies toward Arabs inside the country could have been tested. Depending on the data it could have been corroborated, but only if Frisch had undertaken a review of this sort. The fact is that numerous scholarly investigations have conducted this test. These have shown that control policies toward Arabs were actually driven by desires to transfer Arab lands to Jewish use; reduce Arab opportunities to reclaim confiscated land; maintain Arab workers as a low-wage labor reserve that would not compete with Jewish workers; enforce lower prices for Arab produce so as to prevent competition with Jewish farms; manipulate local Arab politics and elite rivalries so as to channel votes toward Zionist political parties; suppress independent forms of Arab political mobilization, cultural development, or education contrary to the requirements of the idea of a “Jewish State”; slow the demographic growth of the Arab population; or interfere with the geographical continuity of Arab settlements in the Galilee or the Negev. Examples of this body of literature, include wonderfully detailed work by Israeli scholars Alina Korn (addressing police and judicial persecution of Arabs) and Geremy Forman (addressing land expropriation policies) has established such factors as determinative, but Frisch fails to consider its implications for his argument.
In one of the only places that Frisch even mentions internal deliberations among top officials, what he says belies the idea that large-scale security concerns weighed heavily on the fashioning and enforcement of policies toward Arabs in Israel. In his discussion of the 1950s, a period in which he claims the security predicament of Israel was generally most acute, he quotes the judgment of two other scholars that responsible Cabinet ministers had a “palpable lack of interest” in the affairs of Arabs in Israel and that they could “count on their fingers the number of times the status of Israeli Arabs appeared on the agendas of meetings” (p. 28).
Instead of documenting the decisiveness of security concerns, Frisch calls upon his reader to accept it as obvious based on correlation alone, as captured in repeated use of the phrase “it was no coincidence” or equivalent wording. For example, Frisch describes the Rabin government from 1992 to 1996 as a period of diminished security concerns, during which “It was no coincidence that . . . Israel's Arab citizens made its [sic] greatest strides” (p. 29; see also pp. 55, 58). The deceptiveness of this practice is exemplified by the fact that Rabin actually justified his relatively liberal and dovish policies toward Palestinians in Israel and in the occupied territories as based on the need for agreements with the Palestinians in light of the increased security threat Israel faced regionally, from Muslims in general and Iran in particular.
The third factor undermining the persuasiveness of Frisch's argument is that the book's sustained and organizing purpose is not to test the hypothesis that external threats drive stringent policies toward Israel's Arab minority, but to justify unequal treatment of Arabs. This purpose is quite clear in the book's rhetoric, which implies an audience thinking mainly about who is to “blame” or which side is more “worthy.” For instance, Arab politicians are repeatedly criticized for not balancing their complaints about Israel with discussion of Palestinian shortcomings, while Jewish political rhetoric is never analyzed for the balance it displays between self-criticism and attacks on opponents. The strain of this kind of effort is apparent when Frisch takes to task the (mostly Arab) Israeli Communist Party for its “brazen” support of civil marriage, by noting that “only Turkey (of all states in the Middle East) has so far placed personal law matters such as marriage and divorce under the exclusive jurisdiction of civil law” (p. 74). On the last page of the book, Frisch declares that when compared to the “democratic deficit [that] is almost universally characteristic of Arab states,” and if his security argument is accepted, “Israel's record toward its ethno-national minority would probably be judged as outstanding . . .” (p. 182).
In pursuit of his objective Frisch misrepresents data, omits mention of topics that would be impossible to square with his argument, avoids discussion of material he does present that would tend to compromise that objective, and applies systematically different criteria to the actions of Arabs and those of Jews. For example, Frisch discusses Egyptian policies toward infiltration into Israel by refugees in the 1950s as “partially rooted in regional and international affairs” (p. 21), but does not indicate the relative weight of these considerations compared to the escalating consequences of Israeli reprisal as documented by Benny Morris and others. By describing in detail the tiny al-Ard movement's attempt to form an Arab political party, which was outlawed in the mid-1960s, Frisch seeks to make “extraparliamentary” activity by Arabs sound ominous. But this can only be achieved by omitting any discussion of the immensely more consequential extraparliamentary movements and organizations of Jews—including the Gush Emunim movement and its various successors, which have spearheaded settlement of the West Bank and carried out violent attacks on both Arabs and Jews. Treating Israel's period of rule by military administration over its Arab citizens (1948–66) as if it were a policy response to security threats, Frisch mentions Menachem Begin's opposition to the policy (p. 23), but attributes that opposition to Begin's liberal sensibilities, rather than to his party's outrage at the systematic use of the military administration to ensure Arab votes for the ruling Labor Party and its puppet lists. Blaming low levels of economic and infrastructural development in Arab localities on Arab tax delinquency relative to tax collection rates among Jews, Frisch never mentions the crucial role played by huge infusions of free capital flowing only to Jewish localities from the development arms of the World Zionist Organization.
Frisch is extremely well informed, and that knowledge base appears to have made his task much more difficult than it would have been had he been less well acquainted with the detailed record of Arab–Jewish relations in Israel. For the sophisticated reader, it is quite stimulating, in a strange sort of way, to see how Frisch fashions prose to avoid blatant contradictions with facts he is clearly aware of. But sometimes the distortions are simple and direct. Frisch announces his desire to help readers “understand why the Israeli state and the predominant community perceive[d] themselves to be threatened by . . . foreign-funded NGO's” (p. 102). To that end he provides a lengthy quote from the home page of The Arab Center for Applied Social Research al-Karmal (MADA) in Haifa. The first sentence of this lengthy quotation refers to the organization's desire to “advance the national rights and the social, political and economic conditions of Palestinian citizens in Israel, and to craft new social policies toward this indigenous minority” (p. 103, emphasis added). Frisch comments on the passage by urging his reader to “reflect on the political (if not separatist) nature” of MADA's objectives (p. 103). Ignoring the explicit reference to “Palestinian citizens of Israel” included in this text, Frisch accuses MADA of “intimating that Arabs in Israel are not necessarily citizens within the established state” and claims this to be an example of threatening “extraparliamentary” mobilization (p. 103).
In sum, Frisch systematically avoids the details of most previous scholarship on the mechanisms and motives of Israeli policies toward Arab citizens. He uses elaborate conceptual and rhetorical circumlocutions and distorted accounts of well-known events to create unjustified faith in his general argument. He displays no interest in evidence running counter to his thesis. These practices are necessary to avoid detracting from the impression he strives to create, that Israeli Jews should be seen as justified in treating Arab citizens as generally despicable, mostly responsible for whatever problems they have, and unqualified for full rights and recognition as citizens of the Israeli republic.
There was no analysis or evidence behind the testimony Ben-Gurion and Weizmann presented to international commissions about how Arabs in the future Jewish state would benefit from the threats that other Middle Eastern Arabs would pose to Israeli security. It was obviously propaganda. Though its argument is opposite to theirs, this book must also be read primarily as apologetics, not analysis. As such it can be a fascinating read for those who know the subject well. For all others, caveat emptor.
