For many philosophers of the twentieth century, the “Enlightenment”—the eighteenth-century intellectual movement that upheld reason over prejudice, rights over privileges, nature over tradition—actually contained the seeds of great evil and enslavement. Communism under Stalin and Fascism under Mussolini and Hitler worked out the internal logic of the ruthlessly efficient instrumental rationality of the Enlightenment, according to Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno. Isaiah Berlin saw in these same regimes the Enlightenment celebration of the rule of the uniform, rational, general will over our benighted particular, empirical selves. Many scholars have since come to the defense of the Enlightenment against these criticisms, in part by complicating the notion of what the Enlightenment is, or by revealing that Enlightenment thinkers' views of reason, history, and morality were more varied and nuanced than the criticisms suggest. Professor Zeev Sternhell's learned and spirited tome represents the latest in this resurgence of Enlightenment defenders.
Sternhell's strategy is to turn the tables on the Enlightenment's discontents, a group of philosophers he identifies as constituting the “tradition” of his title. He argues that it was not the Enlightenment, but the Anti-Enlightenment—and the “eruption or irrationality” it gave rise to—that was responsible for the terrors of the twentieth century (443). The term “Anti-Enlightenment” was coined late by Friedrich Nietzsche, Sternhell admits, but as an ideological tradition it emerges a century before Nietzsche in the works of J. G. Herder and Edmund Burke (3). This unlikely pair, unified in their opposition to the main Enlightenment views, inspired the thought of their many epigoni in the nineteenth century (Joseph de Maistre, Thomas Carlyle, Hippolite Taine, Jules Michelet, Ernest Renan, Georges Sorel) and the twentieth century (Oswald Spengler, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Charles Maurras, Isaiah Berlin). Sternhell's immense erudition is apparent in every chapter as he closely examines the tenets of the Anti-Enlightenment as developed by Herder and Burke before he impressively documents their reception in this long catalog of Anti-Enlighteners. This work is a tremendous scholarly achievement in its breadth of reflection and historical synthesis.
Sternhell begins by exploring the origin and nature of the critique of the Enlightenment. The Anti-Enlightenment arose, Sternhell contends, in reaction to the destabilizing philosophical and political views of the French Enlightenment. Herder criticized Voltaire and Montesquieu on the grounds that Enlightenment rationalism abstracted from and hence homogenized cultural difference, as “‘cold reason’ took over and chilled ‘fantasy and passion’” (83). Burke also reacted against Enlightenment rationalism, but for a different reason: for him, reason abstracted from particular social, religious, and political traditions was inherently destructive of political order. Human beings are fallen creatures, and hence require stable, civilized traditions and prejudices in order to avoid the natural slide into barbarism.
Chapters 3–6 then take up the different tenets of the Anti-Enlightenment tradition. Whereas the Enlightenment upholds reason's authority and the defense of liberty as the ideals of political order, the Anti-Enlightenment replaces these with tradition and religious authority and with the defense of aristocratic privilege (chap. 3). While the Enlightenment prizes liberating individuals from prejudice, the Anti-Enlightenment affirms prejudices as necessary, even salutary (chap. 4). The Enlightenment stands for natural equality and popular sovereignty, while the Anti-Enlightenment rejects any appeal to nature and posits instead the historical tradition of inequality as the only sure basis for a lasting and powerful polity (chap. 5). Finally, Sternhell pits the Enlightenment defense of individuality and autonomy against the Anti-Enlightenment support of community, nation, and religious tradition. For the Anti-Enlightenment tradition, the nation is like an “organism, a body whose parts are bound through an adherence … to our forefathers … and the relationships between its members are immutable” (188). Individuals can achieve no “pure rational” or autonomous standpoint from which they can critique their own tradition (chap. 6).
Finally, the concluding chapters discuss the consequences of this antirationalist tradition. In chapter 7, Sternhell details the “crisis of civilization” thesis defended by Spengler and others, linking their life and thought to the development of Fascism in Europe. In chapter 8, the author contends that this nefarious tradition extends beyond the two World Wars into the heart of Anglo-American liberal democracy, in particular, into the work of Isaiah Berlin. But the Anti-Enlightenment tradition does not end with Berlin. In this final chapter and the epilogue, Sternhell reveals the unlikely twin contemporary targets of his assault. On the one hand, the “postmodernists” err in following Berlin's rejection of universal truths discerned by reason (373). On the other hand, the “neoconservatives,” led by the “high priestess of American neoconservatism, Gertrude Himmelfarb,” adopt Burke's moralism and seek to extend conservative American culture to combat pervasive “liberal decadence” (429).
As a work of intellectual history, Sternhell's book is immensely impressive. But as a work of political philosophy—which it also aspires to be in its vociferous and sometimes venomous attack on the Anti-Enlightenment—it stumbles. For Sternhell, late modern political philosophers are either heroes or villains in virtue of subscribing to the ideological tenets of pro- or anti-Enlightenment. Yet this Manichean approach does violence to the individual thinkers who were drawn by arguments from both sides. For instance, Alexis de Tocqueville, whom Sternhell assigns to the Enlightenment team, argued that religion is an indispensable means to curb the excesses of equality in the Enlightenment world—a position Sternhell attributes to the other side (435). The Anti-Enlightener Isaiah Berlin was a devoted liberal, and would have been deeply uncomfortable with “Anti-Enlightenment” defenses of nationalism, prejudice, and religion. Furthermore, many of the great political philosophers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries whom Sternhell does not discuss—including G. W. F. Hegel, John Stuart Mill, and Hannah Arendt—incorporated precisely those concerns developed by the so-called Anti-Enlightenment in forming their own theories not classifiable into either camp. Hence Sternhell's approach limits our ability to assess these criticisms of the Enlightenment on their own terms, and teeters dangerously close to Balkanizing political theory into pro- and contra-camps artificially constructed around historically fluid concepts.
Sternhell is also too quick to judge his adversaries Herder and Burke, and in so doing distorts their thought. Sternhell's Herder is a rather worn old fellow from the scholarly past, the Herder accused of introducing nationalism into Europe. Much recent work on Herder has challenged this view—on the grounds that, for instance, Herder sought to promote humanism and cosmopolitanism and restrict the imperialism built into Enlightenment “reason”—and Sternhell unfortunately dismisses this view without much consideration (see 275–77). Sternhell portrays Burke in particularly bloodthirsty terms (see 61), and so overlooks his dedication to moderation, prudence, and wisdom, what Burke took to be the virtues of civilization. Herder and Burke did not reject reason in favor of prejudice or passion; quite the contrary. For them, the notion of reason upheld by the Enlightenment thinkers masked a kind of prejudice and passion that Herder and Burke tried to reveal and replace with a moderated and mature form of human reflection. While Sternhell might be right that the theories they introduced were put to bad uses, the urge to judge them on those grounds prevents a deep philosophical engagement with the problems and limitations of political rationalism so ably articulated by Herder and Burke.
