Timothy Mitchell's Carbon Democracy is an important new book that promises to change the way readers think about the relationship between carbon energy sources and democratic politics. Mitchell argues that democracy must be understood in relation to the sociotechnical forces that produce it. Rather than seeing democracy as the unique gift that “Western Civilization” can bestow on backward regions of the world, Mitchell shows how 19th-century labor struggles in the coal mining industry (and other associated industries) of Europe and the United States helped “manufacture forms of agency capable” of democratizing the political systems in those regions (pp. 2–4). In this sense, democracy in the West was built in and through the infrastructural networks and conflicts of the coal industry. This is because industrialization rendered Western economies increasingly dependent upon carbon energy supplies and the labor required to extract them. Workers were consequently in a position to make democratic demands of political leaders and then withhold their labor until those demands were satisfactorily met.
The success of coal workers led Western states to pursue forms of energy—notably, oil— that were less vulnerable to democratic demands. Although labor still plays an important role in the production process, the oil industry relies more on high-tech machinery than on the sweat of workers. As Mitchell shows, coal strikes during World War I and coal union activity later played a key role in compelling first the British navy and eventually the broader European economy to shift from a labor-intensive coal-based energy system to a more capital-intensive one based on oil. Attempts to circumvent the democratic demands of coal workers in the West motivated the development of Middle Eastern oil reserves, which inspired early 20th-century imperialism in much of the region. When it came to oil, the interest of Western empires was generally focused on limiting rather than expanding production.
Mitchell is at his best in analyzing the particular mechanisms for “producing scarcity” (pp. 39–42). Contrary to conventional wisdom, “The main feature of Middle Eastern oil throughout the twentieth century was that there was always too much of it” (p. 43). In order for oil companies to turn a profit, they had to devise elaborate mechanisms for limiting supply. As he shows, oil producers have always sought to minimize competition and profit-killing overproduction through the formation of cartels and other regulatory agencies to “rationalize” investment and production. The oil companies could not, however, do this on their own: “To draw on the resources of well-armed states and government treasuries, Western oil companies began to describe their control over overseas oil as an ‘imperial’ interest of the state, or in later language as a ‘strategic’ interest, and thus somehow beneficial to the public well-being” (p. 45).
The most ingenious mechanism for limiting the flow of oil was the “Cold War.” Mitchell shows how the oil companies attached themselves to the logic of this geopolitical conflict in much the same way that a “parasite . . . feeds off something larger” (p. 45). When U.S. officials seized upon the 1946 “Azerbaijan Crisis” (a contest over oil exploration rights in northern Iran) as an opportunity to globalize American power, the oil companies discovered an opportunity to place their interests in a new “strategic frame” (p. 121). In this way, “ordinary corporate ambition to control resources overseas, in the increasingly difficult context of postwar decolonization and the assertion of national independence, could now be explained by invoking and elaborating this global ‘context’” (p. 122). With the onset of the Cold War, “US officials and oil executives could explain why American oil companies needed to control production in the region by referring to its ‘strategic importance’ . . . without mentioning corporate profits or the need to restrict the supply of oil from the Middle East” (p. 122). Mitchell is critical of analysts who continue to deploy this reified strategic frame to talk about oil.
Mitchell's work goes on to show how abundant low-cost supplies of Middle Eastern oil gave rise to both a Keynesian economics of limitless growth in industrialized countries and the persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle East (Chaps. 3–5). However, oil company collusion with Middle Eastern autocrats engendered nationalist resistance. Nationalist contestation over the control of oil, in turn, presented a crisis by the early 1970s—a crisis that was seized upon to usher in a new mechanism of social control: “the market” (Chaps. 6–7). Indeed, Mitchell shows how rising oil prices, and the tumbling value of the U.S. dollar, served to dismantle the social gains of the previous century and ushered in a new form of capitalist empire that he labels “McJihad” (Chap. 8).
Mitchell uses this term to describe capitalism's lack of a coherent social logic. In order to survive the transformations of the 20th century, capitalism had to attach itself to other logics that it could not directly control. Mitchell traces this pattern to the early history of Saudi Arabia, where American oil companies discovered that they could generate profit by attaching themselves to the social force of Wahhabi Islamists. That is, religious extremists could provide physical and ideological muscle to protect oil company investments. However, this required the agents of capitalist empire to contract with disjunctive local forces, producing messy entanglements with ample opportunity for violent “blowback.” The danger of this kind of blowback only became more pronounced after secular Arab nationalism ran its course by the late 1960s and created an ideological void that was increasingly filled by Islamist political forces. By the time the California-based oil company Unocal expressed interest in building a pipeline across Afghanistan in the 1990s, the Taliban looked like a promising local agent. As a senior U.S. diplomat observed at the time: “‘The Taliban will probably develop like the Saudis did. There will be Aramco, pipelines, an emir, no parliament and lots of Sharia law. We can live with that’” (p. 200).
Mitchell concludes his book by reflecting on ways that the political influence of oil companies contributes to the inability of advanced capitalist states to address the twin challenges of peak oil and climate change. It is interesting to note that while throughout most of the book Mitchell argues that oil scarcity is a myth, in his conclusion, he argues that the threat is now real as many of the world's “super-giant” oil fields are fast approaching depletion (p. 231). While the current boom in unconventional energy production (“fracked” natural gas, tar sands, and shale oil) calls Mitchell's oil scarcity argument into question, the increasingly urgent climate crisis renders his call for a “new politics of energy and nature” especially timely.
Carbon Democracy is an engaging book that employs an array of primary and secondary sources ranging from diplomatic correspondences to the highly technical literatures on geology and international high finance. It is a highly original synthesis of existing scholarship across a broad range of disciplines. One of the work's strengths is its ability to break down and unpack highly specialized literature to make it accessible for a more general readership. The overlapping but chronological organization of the book offers a useful narrative that contributes valuable insights to students of oil history, histories of capitalism and imperialism more generally, democratic theory, and the politics of nature.
Readers familiar with the arc of Mitchell's work will note in this book a continuing trend toward a more structural and materialist form of analysis. Still, Mitchell notes that Carbon Democracy is not simply a “materialist” critique of “idealist schemes of the democracy experts” (p. 7). It is rather an exploration of unstable alliances and connections assembled “to organise the flow and concentration of energy,” to reveal the vulnerabilities and opportunities those connections and alliances present (p. 8). This work is an important intervention in the way we think about oil, political power, and the future of human societies.
