Compared with public pension systems in other industrial countries, the social security system in the United States has been unusually stable for more than a quarter century. The last notable overhaul of the system occurred in 1983 when the Old-Age Insurance program was unable to pay for all scheduled retirement benefits out of the payroll tax that was earmarked for this purpose. The U.S. Congress permitted retirement benefits to be paid temporarily with funds borrowed from other government trust funds, and the medium- and long-term funding shortfall was remedied with a combination of tax increases, a temporary suspension of the cost-of-living adjustment, and a gradual increase in the age of entitlement for full retirement benefits. The increase in the age of full benefit entitlement from 65 to 67 was phased in over two-and-a-half decades beginning in 2000. The United States was one of the first industrialized countries to schedule an increase in the age for full pension entitlement. In response to fiscal emergencies and the budgetary pressure of aging populations, a growing number of rich countries have adopted similar policies.
The 1983 reforms in social security did not fundamentally change the U.S. public pension system. They boosted payroll taxes modestly, imposed an income tax on part of social security benefit payments, gradually increased the normal retirement age by 2 years, and improved the financial payoff to workers from delaying their claim of social security pensions until after the age of full benefit entitlement. The essential features of the system were left intact. The U.S. program offers defined-benefit (DB) pensions under a formula that is redistributive in favor of workers who have low lifetime wages or who are married to a spouse with low earnings. The benefits are largely financed out of a dedicated tax on labor income, paid equally by employers and employees. The reserves of the system are invested in U.S. government debt, where they earn the same rate of interest paid to other holders of public debt. The United States, like other nations, has seen protracted debate over more fundamental reforms of its basic system. For example, in the 2000 presidential election and again in 2005, President George W. Bush argued for the introduction of a private, voluntary, funded, defined-contribution (DC) pension, financed with contributions that otherwise would have gone into the public pension system. This proposal was widely debated in the business press and in the investment and academic communities, but it aroused little enthusiasm among ordinary voters and was never seriously considered by Congress. Other industrialized countries, including Australia, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and most nations in central Europe, made much more drastic reforms in their national pension systems.
The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) has a long and venerable history organizing and publishing research on population aging and the public and private institutions that finance workers' retirement. Most of the research focuses on the United States, but a sizeable portion considers retirement systems in other wealthy countries. Social Security Policy in a Changing Environment, edited by Jeffrey R. Brown, Jeffrey B. Liebman, and David A. Wise, is a recent volume in this series. It includes 12 excellent papers treating selected issues raised by public pension reform. Each is followed by an interesting commentary by a first-rate discussant. The entire volume is introduced with a clear, concise, and very helpful introduction that provides useful summaries of the papers. The contributors to the volume include leading American and German scholars in the fields of public finance, labor, and financial economics.
One of the appealing features of NBER research on pensions is its solid focus on empirical analysis and practical policy prescription. None of the essays in this volume examines an idealized pension system or reform within a highly abstract model of the economy. Two-thirds of essays consider reforms that have actually been undertaken or that could be adopted to improve the incentives, risk characteristics, or macroeconomic effects of a real-world pension system. The opening essay by John Shoven and two co-authors considers methods of revising the U.S. social security benefit formula to reduce disincentives to work in old age. The disincentives on which the authors focus occur as a result of the redistribution inherent in the basic benefit formula and the limit on the number of years used to calculate a worker's average lifetime wage. The authors suggest and analyze practical reforms to lower these disincentives. In comparison with many national pension systems, the U.S. social security program imposes small penalties on work late in life, but it is helpful to see how the penalties can be reduced.
A number of critics of substituting privately funded DC pensions for part or all of publicly funded DB pensions have argued that the reform would impose excessive financial market risks on workers. Four of the essays in the volume consider ways to reduce this and similar kinds of risks in a reformed system. Martin Feldstein proposes some private ‘no lose’ financial products to minimize the investment risks facing retirement savers. The essential idea is that workers would allocate enough of their annual retirement savings to inflation-protected bonds so that they could be assured that the real value of their total annual contributions at retirement is equal to at least the value of their annual contributions. Any excess of annual contributions above this amount could be invested in equities or other risky assets with a higher expected return. This suggestion depends on the availability of inflation-protected securities with very long maturities that also offer positive (or at least non-negative) real returns. In view of the fact that the longest maturity inflation-protected bonds have durations that fall short of the accumulation phase of a worker's career, it is not clear whether a private firm could credibly offer a ‘no lose’ guarantee. As long as there is reinvestment risk, a private firm faces the possibility that it will earn a lower real return during the later part of a young worker's career than it can promise based on prevailing real returns when the investment product is sold. Even though Feldstein's proposal would be helpful for a planner trying to decide between an unfunded PAYGO pension and funded DC pension before any pension system is introduced, it is less clear as to whether it is helpful after a nation has already adopted an unfunded PAYGO system. Moving from an unfunded to a funded system, even one with very safe investment options, would still require that one or more generations accept some short-term consumption sacrifice so that funds could be accumulated in the system. Still, Feldstein's analysis is helpful for improving financial products offered to workers who are currently enrolled in a DC plan.
Andrew Biggs and two co-authors consider how expensive it would be to privately insure contributors to a DC plan so they are guaranteed a minimum return on their pension contributions. This kind of analysis is useful for considering the public or private costs of assuring DC-covered workers that their retirement incomes will not fall below a specified level. James M. Poterba and three co-authors extend the analysis in the papers by Feldstein and Biggs et al. to evaluate a range of investment strategies for workers enrolled in DC accounts. They consider traditional portfolios as well as life-cycle investment strategies currently offered by mutual fund companies. They are particularly interested in the variation in end-of-career accumulations under different strategies and in the expected welfare of workers choosing alternative investment options. A paper by Andrew A. Samwick considers how investment risks to low-lifetime-wage workers can be reduced in a revamped national pension system that contains both a publicly guaranteed, unfunded pension and a private DC pension component. By increasing the progressivity of the publicly guaranteed portion of the pension, low-wage workers can be protected against the risk of extremely poor outcomes when realized returns on risky assets turn out to be poor. Of course, many defenders of the present social security system think this kind of protection is precisely what the current U.S. pension system provides to covered low- and middle-income workers. Workers and employers can make voluntary tax-preferred contributions to a retirement plan outside of social security, but the public system assures them of a minimal retirement income even if their savings outside the public system earn very poor returns. Samwick and some other contributors to this book might believe that the publicly guaranteed social security benefit is too high while the funded, private and risky portion of retirement income is too small. There is little evidence that U.S. voters agree, however.
The volume also includes fascinating analyses of workers' actual pension decisions when a choice is offered to them. Jeffrey Brown and Scott Weissbenner evaluate the pension choices of state employees who were offered the option of enrolling in one of three retirement plans, including a self-managed DC plan. Workers who did not make an active choice were by default enrolled in the traditional DB plan, which imposed financial penalties on workers who left the employer well before retirement. Most workers did not make an active choice, and hence were enrolled in the traditional plan, even though a large percentage of these workers would have been better off choosing a plan with more portable benefits. In one of the most valuable essays in the book, John Beshears and three co-authors summarize a wide range of evidence on the importance of default options offered to workers enrolled in a pension plan. The evidence shows the huge influence of default options in determining the fraction of workers who enrol in a plan, the level of their voluntary contributions to the plan, and the portfolio choices they make when allocating the contributions to their retirement accounts. Like the other authors in the volume, the authors of this essay keep their analysis focused squarely on how improved pension plan design can boost the well-being of workers.
