In her book, Saundra K. Schneider focuses on the following question: Why is there wide variation in governmental performance in response to natural disasters in the United States? According to the argument set forth here, the answer can be found in the gap that at times exists between the bureaucratic norms developed as part of the governmental planning process and the emergent norms that develop among the affected population following individual disasters. In other words, views of government performance in the aftermath of disasters turn on whether there is a match or mismatch between the bureaucratic behavior of government following a disaster and citizens' expectations regarding that performance. When the gap between the emergent norms and bureaucratic norms is large, the argument goes, the response process breaks down and is considered to be a failure. But when the gap is small, public organizations are able to cope with disasters in a successful manner. The book also discusses three implementation patterns that correspond to variations in the gap between bureaucratic and emergent norms: the “bottom-up” pattern (which occurs when the gap is small), the “confusion” pattern (when the gap is moderate in size), and the “top-down” pattern (when the gap is large). Finally, the author utilizes eight case studies, including Hurricane Katrina, the Loma Prieta and Northridge earthquakes, and Hurricane Andrew, to test the proposed framework.

In my view, the main strengths of this book are the importance of the questions it addresses and the inclusiveness of its explanatory framework. Dealing with Disaster takes on a large, complex, multifaceted policy issue. How and why government performs the way it does in disasters is a central question in the literature concerned with low-probability, high-consequence events. A careful and systematic examination of governmental performance following major disasters is particularly relevant as the number and severity of disasters continues to climb. The framework is inclusive in that it attempts to utilize a number of variables (including the magnitude of the event, the degree of administrative preparedness, levels of communication and coordination between and among levels of government, and behavioral patterns of the affected populations) in explaining the expectations–performance gap. This book also provides a clear and comprehensive overview of the evolution and current status of the governmental disaster response system in the United States. Finally, it provides “one-stop shopping” for those interested in descriptive case studies of some of the more noteworthy disasters that have occurred in the last 25 years.

The author is somewhat less successful in the conceptualization and application of her basic framework. For example, the concept of “emergent norms” is at various times used interchangeably to refer to public expectations regarding government performance, attitudes about that performance, and such emergent behavioral patterns as “milling” and “keynoting” that characterize victims' response to disasters (this is the most common meaning of emergent norms in the disaster policy literature). Similarly, the concept of “bureaucratic norms” is used as a catchall category that covers all manner of political activities, including presidential campaigns, that go beyond the behavior of public organizations.

The application of the framework to individual events is also at times problematic. For example, in the case of Hurricane Georges, the experience in Puerto Rico (considered a success story) is coded as an example where the gap between emergent and bureaucratic norms is small but the government response is top-down. We are told earlier in the book (pp. 6–7) that top-down implementation patterns are associated with perceived failures in disaster response. The case of Hurricane Andrew in South Florida (considered a failed response) is coded in the “confusion pattern of policy implementation” (p. 127), which should correspond with a more mixed view of government performance. There also appears to be some cases of mixed implementation patterns. For example, the response to Hurricane Hugo in South Carolina (pp. 96–97) seems to have elements of both bottom-up and top-down activities. The more general problem is that by painting with such a broad brush, some important nuances in these cases are lost. One could easily develop scenarios by which some of the affected populations in the disaster areas are satisfied with some elements of government response and dissatisfied with others. Views of success or failure may also change over time. In addition, prior research has shown that individuals and families that are differently situated with respect to socioeconomic status and community ties experience disasters differently.

A final issue with regards to the application of the framework to the case studies relates to measuring the gap between expectations and performance. The book offers no concrete metrics that can be used to measure bureaucratic norms, and in only one case (Hurricane Katrina) is public polling data used to measure citizen expectations. Instead, the book relies on journalistic accounts and personal anecdotes to measure the expectations–performance gap.

Dealing with Disaster (an earlier version of this book, Flirting with Disaster, was published in 1995) is a good starting point for specialists in public policy with an interest in the politics and administration of disaster. It provides a useful and clearly articulated overview of the disaster-response system and places it in the wider context of policymaking in the United States. It also brings into clear relief an important policy-related problem: how to more closely align the expectations of the American people with the actual array of disaster-response and recovery programs and services available to them. The real problem identified here might be that the American people expect a top-down, federalized response to large-scale disasters but that the current disaster-response system is not equipped to provide it. This leads to the perception of “failed” responses discussed in this book. Given the likelihood of the severity and increasing numbers of large-scale disasters in the years to come, the performance of government in dealing with these events deserves additional attention.