INTRODUCTION
This paper reviews the hidden content in Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) (1759) against the background of his earlier work, The History of Astronomy (Smith 1795, posthumous), and their relationship to his biographical details.
Part I discusses the biographical material relevant to Smith’s scholarship, largely from a new perspective, and Part II reviews a selection of his contributions in the Theory of Moral Sentiments, mainly in respect to the many changes in the sixth edition that diluted their theological content. Using this evidence, I describe Smith’s non-religious disposition hidden under a veil of his feigned religiosity, and discuss why he chose to hide his views in this manner.
I explain what Adam Smith was doing in his circumstances, as he drifted away from Christianity from 1744 and found employment as a professor in 1751. He publicly affirmed his Christianity by signing the Calvinist Confession of Faith, having no choice but to do so. He published Moral Sentiments in 1759, which sufficiently conformed to the prevailing religious sentiments of the Glasgow Presbytery, and to the religious sensitivities of his mother.
The 1761 edition of Moral Sentiments contained only minor amendments, but after he left Glasgow in 1764, he made more significant changes in the third edition (1767), followed by minor ones in the 1774 and 1781 editions. In 1784 his mother died, removing his filial constraints, and the final sixth edition, published weeks before he died in 1790, contained the most thorough dilutions of many of its religious statements.
In his careful arrangements for the posthumous publication of his Astronomy essay (1795), and in the long secrecy with which he treated this ‘juvenile’ essay and protected it from the fate of the bonfire of all his other unpublished papers, we see his determination to leave hints to posterity for thirty-one years, though few scholars, so far, have taken account of the hidden chain linking his biography to his texts and these related events. Perhaps this might change in future.
PART I
Knud Haakonssen (1981, pp 13–14) writes: “whatever [Adam Smith’s] personal religious sentiments may have been of which we have no real evidence—he dramatically ignored all traditional religious ideas of conscience as either an inspiration by God or a response to our fear of the might of the deity.” Is it true that “we have no real evidence”?
Evidence is usually presented as demonstrating Smith’s religiosity (variously represented as his Christianity, Deism, Stoicism, Providential beliefs, Natural Religion, or combinations thereof) (Nicholls Reference Nicholls, Heelas and Morris1992, pp. 217–236; Evensky Reference Evensky1993, p. 205; Denis Reference Denis2005, pp. 1–32; Wight Reference Wight2007, pp. 341–58; Fitzgibbons Reference Fitzgibbons1995, pp. 89–90), but these assertions are rarely examined in the context of Adam Smith’s biography or the family and social circumstances in which he lived. For example, Markikosi (Reference Markikosi2002, p. 75, n14) concluded that “The prevailing scholarly conclusion has been that Smith rejected the Calvinist Presbyterianism of his childhood in favour of a natural theology that adopted Stoic features in Smith’s descriptions and understandings of Providence.”
Many scholars examine ideas solely from their relationship to the ideas of other philosophers, ancient or contemporary. In Smith’s case, we know sufficient of his biography to consider how it affected the way he wrote about religious matters. Consider this paragraph from Moral Sentiments:
There seems to be in young children an instinctive disposition to believe whatever they are told. Nature seems to have judged it necessary for their preservation that they should, for some time at least, put implicit confidence in those to whom the care of their childhood, and of the earliest and most necessary parts of their education, is intrusted. Their credulity, accordingly, is excessive, and it requires long and much experience of the falsehood of mankind to reduce them to a reasonable degree of diffidence and distrust. In grown-up people the degrees of credulity are, no doubt, very different. The wisest and most experienced are generally the least credulous. But the man scarce lives who is not more credulous than he ought to be, and who does not, upon many occasions, give credit to tales, which not only turn out to be perfectly false, but which a very moderate degree of reflection and attention might have taught him could not well be true. The natural disposition is always to believe. It is acquired wisdom and experience only that teach incredulity, and they very seldom teach it enough. The wisest and most cautious of us all frequently gives credit to stories which he himself is afterwards both ashamed and astonished that he could possibly think of believing (TMS VII.iv.23 pp. 335–336).
This may reflect the experience of Adam Smith, lovingly believing what his mother, Margaret Douglas Smith, and his male ‘guardians’ (Ross 1995, pp. 12–14) told him about religion. How much was he privately embarrassed later by his childish credulity when he was revising Moral Sentiments?
Young Smith showed prodigious study habits (Scott Reference Scott1937; Ross 1995, pp. 18–22). At the age of fourteen, he matriculated at Glasgow College (University), which was, and remained, thoroughly Presbyterian in a pro-Hanoverian town. At Glasgow, Smith was much taken with ‘the never to be forgotten’ Ulster protestant, Professor Francis Hutcheson, who was of a milder religious disposition than was commonly exhibited at the time. (The Glasgow Presbytery charged Professor Hutcheson with ‘heresy’ in 1739, but he was cleared of the charges.)
Smith’s studiousness prompted his nomination for a much-coveted Snell Exhibition (Addison Reference Addison1901), for which he made a ‘solemn promise’ on graduation from Oxford (Scott Reference Scott1937, p. 42) to be ordained into the Church of England and then to become a minister in the Episcopalian Church in Scotland. For Smith, Oxford was an unhappy experience. The ‘teaching’ regime consisted of twice-daily prayers and twice-weekly lectures (Smith Reference Smith, Mossner and Ross.1977, p. 1: hereafter: ‘Corr.’) delivered by indifferent tutors. Thirty years later, Smith still showed his lifelong, undiminished, and angry contempt for the Balliol faculty (Wealth of Nations [WN] V.i.f.8, p. 761; Anon. 1777).
Smith had a medical condition bordering on depression (hypochondria) (Barfoot Reference Barfoot1991, pp. 204–221) arising, not from indolence, but from over-studying and insufficient exercise, an affliction that David Hume, a fellow sufferer in his youth, knew as the ‘disease of the learned’ (Mossner Reference Mossner2001, pp. 68–80). Smith also experienced serious life-changing stresses of an intellectual nature, and his religious convictions appear to have weakened; he certainly changed his mind about an ecclesiastical career. In 1744, having completed the requirements for his bachelor degree, coinciding with bouts of illness (Corr., p. 3), he was due to graduate with a BA and prepare for ordination into the Church of England. However, Balliol archives show that Smith used an administrative device (apparently acquiesced to by the Balliol authorities) to avoid ordination by changing to an MA course in Jurista (civil law) (Jones and Sandler 2009, p. 3). By facilitating Smith’s decision, Balliol, which had suffered a drop in student numbers and income, enabled him to continue to receive his annual Snell stipend.
An unconfirmed anecdote claims that Smith clashed with his Balliol tutors, who, when visiting his college rooms, confiscated a book as “unsuitable” (McCulloch [1828] Reference Leslie1863, p. ii, n3). This suggests that his disenchantment with Oxford was more than mere homesickness. Smith’s behavior from 1744 onwards hints of his drift towards the fringes of religious skepticism. In late August 1746, Smith left Oxford (never to return). Coincidentally, Francis Hutcheson died on 8 August, and, once this news reached Balliol, it removed an emotional obstacle to Smith’s leaving Oxford permanently, given his personal obligations to Hutcheson as a Snell Exhibitioner. (The certificate is held at Balliol library and the signature of Francis Hutcheson is prominent in the appropriate place, surrounded by other signatures of the Glasgow faculty.)
Dugald Stewart, ever diplomatic, said Smith returned to Scotland because he did not find “the ecclesiastical profession suitable to his taste,” and “chose to consult, in this instance, his own inclination, in preference to the wishes of his friends; and abandoning at once all the schemes which their prudence had formed for him, he resolved to return to his own country, and to limit his ambition to the uncertain prospect of obtaining, in time, some one of those moderate preferments, to which literary attainments lead in Scotland” (Stewart 1980, p. 272). However, he did not manage to acquire a “moderate preferment” until 1748 (Ross 1995, p. 82). In 1749 he resigned ‘all right & title’ to his Snell Exhibition (Scott Reference Scott1937, pp. 137, 336).
His Mother, Margaret Douglas Smith
The main cause, I suggest, for his lifelong circumspection in religious matters was his deep love for his mother, Margaret Douglas Smith, and his respect for her religious beliefs. He chose not to provoke public controversy by anything he might write on religion that could come to her notice, as it surely would. His boldest risk was public knowledge of his friendship with the controversial David Hume, variously described as a ‘sceptic’ or ‘atheist.’ This imposed judicious discretion in speaking openly about his lack of religiosity, except when in the most intimate circle of his closest friends: “a certain reserve is necessary when we talk of our own friends, our own studies, our own professions … a philosopher is company to a philosopher only; the members of a club, to his own little knot of companions” (TMS I.ii.2.6, pp. 33–34).
He refrained from making explicit his views on religion in his public writings while his mother was alive. Public controversies over religion, especially accusations of atheism, true or false, would have upset her, though she always indulged him. From 1750, he became a public figure, and he had to be careful as there were many visitors to the homes he shared with his mother and Janet Douglas, his cousin and housekeeper, during his years in Glasgow from 1752 to 1764, at Kirkcaldy from 1767 to 1773, and from 1778 in Edinburgh, until their deaths at Panmure House in 1784 (Ross 1995, p. 334) and 1788, respectively (Corr., p. 315).
Of his feelings for his mother, Smith wrote:
I should immediately have acknowledged the receipt of the fair sheets; but I had just then come from performing the last duty to my poor old Mother; and tho’ the death of a person in the ninetieth year of her age was no doubt an event most agreeable to the course of nature; and, therefore, to be foreseen and prepared for; yet I must say to you, what I have said to other people, that the final separation from a person who certainly loved me more than any other person ever did or ever will love me; and whom I certainly loved and respected more than I ever shall either love or respect any other person, I cannot help feeling, even at this hour, as a very heavy stroke upon me (Corr., p. 275).
Note his wording: “the final separation” from his mother, which, while pious in the sense that whether they would meet again in the afterlife was God’s decision, was odd for a Christian believer in the afterlife not to state it as his ‘sure and certain hope’ (from the Benediction at Scottish Protestant funerals) of everlasting life in the company of his mother.
Margaret Douglas “was a very religious person, as a Christian believer” (her portrait in 1778, by C. Metz, is reproduced on p. 310 of Ross 1995). Her “child was delicate” and she “had a hard task in rearing him” (Scott Reference Scott1937, p. 20; cf. TMS I.i.I.12, p. 12), and their lifelong bonds showed. John Rae, his biographer, wrote that she “was from first to last the heart of Smith’s life. He being an only child [his elder step-brother, Hugh, died young] and she the only parent, they had been everything to one another during his infancy and boyhood and, after he was full of years and honours, her presence was the same shelter to him as it was when a sickly boy. His friends often spoke of the beautiful affection and worship with which he cherished her.” Rae added that someone who knew him for the last thirty years of his life reported that “the principal avenue to Smith’s heart always was by his mother” (Rae [1895] Reference Rae1965, p. 4).
James Hutton
Adam Smith’s personal wariness of the vigilant presence of zealots and the consequential tone of his writings were not exceptional. Consider the experience of another major Enlightenment figure and close friend, James Hutton (1729–1795), who, in contrast to Smith, was always a man of independent financial means. He too researched and published in a new subject area, that of geology. He made an early scientific case that challenged the very heart of revealed religion; namely, the age and origins of the Earth, as taught in Genesis, and widely believed at the time to be only 6000 years old (Ussher Reference Ussher, Craig and Jones1658).
James Hutton, described as the ‘father of geology,’ and the author of a dissertation, The System of the Earth, its Duration, and Stability (1785b), experienced similar problems to Smith’s—how to assuage powerful religious doctrinal sensitivities without inhibiting his commitment to science. Unlike Smith, Hutton was known to be a Deist, but accepted that it was necessary to respect established religious conventions in how he expressed his ideas on geology. In particular, he had the burden of explaining his geological conclusion that the successive cycles of the wasting away and emergence of continents showed there was “no vestige of a beginning, no prospect of an end” (Hutton 1778, cited in Dean Reference Dean1992, p. 29).
His paper, “Examination of the System of the habitable Earth with regard to its Duration and Stability” (in two parts), was presented in the March and April 1785 meetings of the Royal Society of Edinburgh (most fellows of which were members of the Kirk), and was scheduled for the Society’s Transactions. Hutton knew he needed to explain his explicit challenge to Christian orthodoxy by writing a Memorial (preface) to his paper, which in any case was somewhat turgid in style, prior to its publication in the Society’s Transactions. Hutton tried to soften Christian hostilities by asserting:
It belongs to religion to teach that God made all things with creative power … and that nothing was done without the most benevolent intention. But it belongs not to religion to give a history of nature or to inform mankind of those things which actually are; it belongs not to religion to teach the natural order of events which man, in his science, may be able to unfold and, in the wise system of the intellect, find means to ascertain. The object of revelation and that of natural philosophy being thus perfectly different, it must be absurd to suppose that these can truly interfere, as this may only happen in supposing them not strictly adhering to their respective subjects and one or other of them not being just (Deane 1975, pp. 187–193; Deane 1992, pp. 19–24).
William Robertson, Principal of Edinburgh University (1762–1792), Moderator of the Presbyterian General Assembly (1763–1780), and an accomplished historian, offered Hutton advice to help to avert the religious criticism Hutton’s papers might generate. Robertson, a friend of David Hume’s and Smith’s, and a firm Christian believer, was a prominent moderate in the politics of the Church, and he sent to Hutton (uninvited) a revised version of his preface, modifying its tone and “rendering” its style “a little more theological.” Significantly, he also advised Hutton to “consult our friend Mr Smith and on following his advice you will be safe” (Deane 1992, p. 23; cf Jones Reference Jones1984). That Robertson (definitely not a zealot) advised Hutton to consult Smith indicates his familiarity with Smith’s private stance on coping with religious hostilities (he regularly dined with Smith) and with how Smith had successfully deflected theological criticism over many years. Smith was instrumental in persuading Glasgow University to award its Doctor of Divinity Degree to William Robertson (20 0ctober 1758), which, incidentally, was the only occasion that Smith nominated anybody for a doctorate (Scott Reference Scott1937, pp. 184–185).
In this context, authors in the Scottish Enlightenment disseminated their radical ideas and discoveries. They were not entirely paranoid; unless they took great care, they faced real risks of social ostracism. The zealots in the Glasgow Presbytery too easily found heresy in the writings of academics; they hounded the divinity professor, John Simson, until he was suspended from teaching in 1729, and similarly harassed Francis Hutcheson in 1739 (when Smith was one of his students); and they accused William Leechman, Professor of Divinity, of heresy in his sermons in 1743, refusing him membership of the Presbytery (fortunately he was accepted into another) (Kennedy Reference Kennedy, Hook and Sher1995, pp. 56–72).
It should be noted that from 1751 to 1764, Smith’s mother lived with him at the university, which may account for the content and religious style of the first two editions of Moral Sentiments, there being no way that Margaret Douglas would be unaware if her son was suspected of heresy by the zealots of the Glasgow Presbytery. That many scholars fail to appreciate the true nature of Smith’s predicament is disappointing (Leslie [1870] Reference Leslie1879; Kleer Reference Kleer1995, Reference Kleer2000; Hill Reference Hill2002; Macfie Reference Macfie1967; Campbell Reference Campbell1971; Davis Reference Davis1990; cf. Alvey Reference Alvey2004).
Special Treatment of the Astronomy Essay
Throughout his adult life, Smith kept a seventy-page manuscript and refrained from publishing it for over forty years. Such was its sensitivity that David Hume, who had been a close friend since about 1752, did not learn of its existence until twenty-one years later, when Smith revealed (Corr., p. 168) its whereabouts because he wanted Hume to publish it in the event of his death during an absence in London. He left it “entirely” to Hume’s “judgment” whether to publish it posthumously. Smith described it as “a fragment of a great work which contains a history of the Astronomical systems that were successively in fashion down to the time of Des Cartes” (hereafter Astronomy). Smith, of course, did not die in London and the manuscript remained in his bureau until after his death in 1790.
The significance of Astronomy is heightened by its early origins and its long survival. His modern editors wrote that it “has been fairly generally assumed that he at least laid the foundation of the History of Astronomy at Oxford; but from further internal evidence he did not finish it there” (Astronomy, eds. Intro., p. 7). In stark contrast to his preservation of Astronomy, from his deathbed he ordered his entire unpublished life’s work to be burned “without any examination” (Rae [1895] Reference Rae1965, pp. 434–435).
Why was Astronomy singled out for posthumous publication? I suggest it was because it had had deep emotional significance to Adam Smith, both as a young man in his twenties and as an older man in his sixties. He was solicitous of Astronomy because it marked his secular epiphany, when, philosophically, the revealed, invisible Judaic–Christian God faded from his life.Footnote 1
Long Struggle against Superstition
Clues to his real views are revealed in Astronomy. He shows how crude explanations by authors from ancient times gave way to increasingly better explanations that had the qualities of good science. Smith’s version of the philosopher’s challenge ends with his typically sardonic comment: “Let us endeavour to trace [philosophy] from its first origin, up to that summit of perfection to which it is at present supposed to have arrived, and to which, indeed it has equally been supposed to have arrived in almost all former times” (Astronomy II.12, p. 46).
Smith’s essay was really about the origins of pagan and heathen religious superstition during the emergence of the philosophical method—astronomy was the handy subject vehicle—and it should be read as such.
“Philosophy,” wrote Smith, “is the science of the connecting principles of nature” (Astronomy II.12, p. 45). The hidden connection of the earth’s orbit round the sun, which took the brightest brains of humankind millennia to unravel, was not helped by religious beliefs that God’s universe orbited the earth. Mathematical attempts to map the orbits of the sun and the planets to comply with false theological prescriptions were frustrated eventually by increasingly precise data of the planetary movements.
Smith asks: what did curious minds do before philosophy? People, he answered, exchanged weird explanations for “all extraordinary and uncommon objects,” all “the rarer phænomena of nature … meteors, comets, eclipses,” everything, in short, with which they were “either little or not at all acquainted” (Astronomy I.2, p. 33). Language, a necessary precondition for science, also spreads absolute nonsense, entrenched by socially enforced credulous ignorance about invisible gods. The subsistence of savages being precarious, and their constant exposure to the rudest of dangers, gave them neither time nor inclination for speculation about nature’s oddities. Only much later did idle but cautious philosophers challenge the superstitious imaginations of mystics and shamans.
Philosophical discovery is not easy. The eclipses of the sun and the moon, which once “excited the terror and amazement of mankind,” now “seem no longer to be wonderful” since the discovery of the connecting chain “which joins them to the ordinary course of things” (Astronomy II.9, p. 43). In an extraordinary outburst, presumably against his aged, Anglican, Oxford tutors, for whom he had only contempt, he claimed that attempts to discover philosophically the connecting chain of events can be dangerous for those “somewhat advanced in years,” because they risk “lunacy and frenzy” (Astronomy II.10, p. 43). Their “imaginations, from being late in applying, have not got those habits which dispose them to follow easily the reasonings of abstract science,” and neither should they try to do so, because they risk becoming “first confused, then giddy, and at last distracted” (Astronomy II.10, p. 43). This was personal; ecclesiastical ministry did not make for good philosophy. Young Smith saw philosophy as “representing the invisible chains which bind together all those disjointed objects” that “disturb the easy movement of the imagination,” and, by introducing “order into this chaos of jarring and discordant appearances,” it allays “this tumult of the imagination” and restores it to “that tone of tranquillity and composure, which is both agreeable in itself and suitable to its nature” (Astronomy II.12, pp. 45–46).
In a significant paragraph, Smith linked earthly phenomena to superstitious myths about the indulgences of the gods among ignorant ‘savages’ and, otherwise educated, heathens, citing the gods Neptune, Ceres, Bacchus, Dryads, and Naiads. “Hence, the origin of polytheism, and of that vulgar superstition which ascribes all the irregular events of nature to the favour of displeasure of intelligent, though invisible beings, to gods, demons, witches, genii, fairies.… And thus, in the first ages of the world, the lowest and most pusillanimous superstition supplied the place of philosophy” (Astronomy III.2, pp. 49–50; cf. TMS II.ii.1.2, p. 94).
After those “first ages,” philosophy gradually revealed the “chain which links them altogether,” and events became less likely to be ascribed to “those invisible beings whom fear and ignorance of their rude forefathers had engendered.” Smith used the analogy of the gap between surprise at an event and the eventual wonder emanating from identifying and later understanding it to illustrate his idea of philosophical linking (Astronomy II.5, p. 40; II.8, p. 42).
Unfortunately, and crucially, the advancement of the understanding of philosophers does not eliminate pusillanimous superstition, even among educated people. Indeed, much of the structure, if not substance, of pagan and heathen “pusillanimous superstition” was carried over into the teachings and practice of modern religious doctrines and rituals. In mid-eighteenth-century Britain, zealous Kirk prosecutors repressed those asking awkward questions and those who were rash enough to risk their lives and comforts for even the most tentative signs of doubt or dissent. The long history of the persecution, even unto death, of dissenters in the ruling Christian churches of western Europe requires no documentation. The last person hanged for blasphemy in Scotland was Thomas Aikenhead, aged twenty, on 8 January 1697, in Edinburgh, and the last so-called witch was burned to death in 1727.
Those educated in the science of past generations, including religious divines, who, from neglect, do not practice the “habits which dispose them to follow easily the reasonings of abstract science,” often reject the new ideas of a “science which pretends to lay open the concealed connections that unite the various appearances of nature” (Astronomy III.4, p. 51). For each celebrated “summit” that a science reaches, its practitioners should remember that a new, more advanced paradigm, which takes science yet further from the “pusillanimous superstition” of the past, also leaves believers in “invisible beings” stuck with the “ignorance of their rude forefathers” (Astronomy III.3, p. 50). Philosophers, Smith asserts, should not indulge such evasions.
The broad facts are straightforward. Adam Smith published Moral Sentiments while at Glasgow University, where he conformed in all public respects as required from professors at the time. For example, in 1751 he publicly committed to being a
Christian Protestant by reading his dissertation, “De Origine Idearum” (“origins of the idea of God”), by signing of the Calvinist Confession of Faith before the Presbytery of Glasgow, and by taking the Oath de Fideli (Scott Reference Scott1937, pp. 138–139; Ross 1995, p. 109). Public opinion in Glasgow at the time (motto: ‘Let Glasgow flourish by the preaching of the Word’; by the “Word” was meant the “Word of God”) was managed rigidly by its Kirk Ministers and, without assurances from his sponsors that he would complete these formalities, Smith would not have been appointed. A deputation of local Glasgow Kirk Ministers vetoed the appointment of David Hume in 1752 to a chair in Glasgow University, though he was eminently qualified academically as the author of the Treatise on Human Understanding, 1739–1740.
Smith considered the teaching practices of Glasgow superior to those at Balliol, and he followed the traditional Glasgow practice of twice-daily public and private lectures, tutorials, and private reading sessions (Scott Reference Scott1937, p. 69) A former student, John Ramsay, reports that Smith (described as a friend of ‘Hume the atheist’) “petitioned the Senatus … to be relieved of the duty of opening his class with a prayer,” (indicative of his attitude to Christian worship) but his “petition” (more likely his expression of his opinion at a Senate meeting, of which he was a member), was rejected (Rae [1895] Reference Rae1965, p. 60). Rae adds: “no record of the alleged petition ... and its refusal remains in the College minutes,” and speculates that it was “but a morsel of idle gossip” and indicated “the atmosphere of jealous and censorious theological vigilance in which Smith and his brother professors were then obliged to do their work (cf. Ramsay Reference Ramsay and Allardice1888, pp. 462–463). Ramsay claims that “his opening prayers” were always thought to “savour strongly of natural religion,” that “his lectures on natural theology were too flattering to human pride.” and that they induced his students to “draw an unwarranted conclusion, viz. that the great truths of theology, together with the duties which man owes to God and his neighbours, may be discovered in the light of nature without any special revelation.”Footnote 2 Smith’s lectures on Natural Religion, with which he opened his course (Stewart [1793] 1980, I.17, p. 274), are now lost, so we cannot assess Ramsay’s veracity; however, his assertions accord with the implicit conflict in several passages in Moral Sentiments between ‘Nature’ and ‘Revealed’ religion (favoring Nature). There was also unrest among former students of Frances Hutcheson, who were offended by the content of Smith’s lectures (Ross 1995, p. 111).
Ross quotes James Wodrow: “I hear he has thrown out some contemptuous Expressions of Mr Hutchinson [sic]. Let the young man take care to guard his Censures.… For there are some of Mr H[ucheso]ns scholars still about the college who perhaps will try to turn the mouth of the cannon against himself.” It may be relevant too that Smith’s original appointment was also controversial among the professors (Ross 1995, p. 110; and Corr., pp. 334–336; Scott Reference Scott1937, p. 66).
The result of the constant presence of overt hostility emanating from the Kirk, its ministers, and enthusiastic adherents towards the slightest signs of free thinking is seen in Smith’s guarded literary dilutions in many relevant passages in Moral Sentiments, and in some ambiguous, if nuanced, passages in Astronomy. My contention, supported by the dilutions to the ‘religious’ passages in his texts, is that Smith remained neither a Christian nor a very obvious Deist. He had an abundance of possibilities available through various possible shades of Deism and Providential orders, each with multiple possibilities to shade his dissatisfactions with all forms of religion (belief and non-belief in an afterlife, an interventionist special providence and a non-interventionist version, and Christian and non-Christian versions of each), which was largely caused by the inability to debate among scholars on the possible, and plausible, alternative explanations for life in the universe compared to those from within theology. Science was still a long way from explaining the world because theology had monopolized the open road for two millennia. I shall return to the issues raised but unresolved by Smith on Natural Religion and Deism in a future paper. For now my focus is narrower in this paper and predicated on the limited room for maneuver open to Smith (and others). He went as far as he could in the circumstances, given the price of transparency in matters of religion in eighteenth-century Scotland.
PART II
Background
Moral Sentiments is the main source for evidence of Smith’s religiosity, varying from his alleged adherence to the doctrines of the Presbyterian version of Christianity, through to Providence (God’s plan), Natural Religion, and to Deism (belief in an unknowable, all-mighty creator) (cf. Coase Reference Coase1976). I examine instances of where he dropped or toned down his original statements in the sixth edition, citing examples that suggest his assumed religious affiliations were compromised by his qualifying expressions and deliberate obfuscations, or omissions. For space reasons, I do not consider contributions asserting Adam Smith’s religiosity (Kleer Reference Kleer1995, Reference Kleer2000; Hill 2001; cf. Macfie Reference Macfie1967; Campbell Reference Campbell1971; Davis Reference Davis1990; Waterman Reference Waterman2002; Alvey Reference Alvey2004), and necessarily limit the number of examples to a few among many.
The Atonement Passage
The fifth edition of Moral Sentiments appeared in 1781; his mother died in 1784. When already fatally ill, Smith prepared a final sixth edition in 1789, and his revisions contained prominent excisions of Christian doctrine from the first five editions. He made many similar changes in the early editions, but the sixth edition was a more thorough revision, the changes of which, cumulatively, were significant. If these changes had been made while his mother was alive, and if they had led to public controversy, it would have upset her. The timing, therefore, is significant, and so are its implications.
In editions one to five of Moral Sentiments, Smith gave an orthodox theological treatment of the punishment of sin in the ‘afterlife’ in what is now known as the ‘atonement’ passage (TMS II.ii.3.12, p. 91), which affirms the orthodox Christian doctrine of Christ’s crucifixion and his suffering for sinners and their punishment in the afterlife, upon which terrifying authority the eighteenth-century Kirk held sway over much of the populace of Scotland in the name of the revealed God, as interpreted by Protestant Christians. Many ministers preached hellfire sermons, peppered with harsh phrases and doom-laden threats of their listeners’ fate for the most minor of, and for all major, transgressions, which, though not witnessed by anybody, were never hidden from (the invisible) God. David Hume, in a mocking private letter on the reception of four readers in London to the publication of the first edition, teased Smith gently:
Three Bishops called yesterday at Millar’s shop in order to buy copies, and to ask Questions about the Author: the Bishop of Peterborough said he passed the Evening in a Company, where he heard it extolld above all Books in the World. You may conclude what Opinion true Philosophers will entertain of it, when these Retainers to Superstition praise it so highly (Corr., p 34).
That Hume wrote so freely to his friend suggests that in their private conversations Smith understood, though he may not necessarily have shared totally, Hume’s skepticism (Ross 1995, pp. 178–180; Raynor Reference Raynor1984).
In the sixth edition, Smith made a strikingly brusque, 184-words substitution of the full 673 words in the atonement passage in editions one to five:
For it well deserves to be taken notice of, that we are so far from imagining that injustice ought to be punished in this life, merely on account of the order of society, which cannot otherwise be maintained, that Nature teaches us to hope, and religion, we suppose, authorises us to expect, that it will be punished, even in a life to come. Our sense of its ill desert pursues it, if I may say so, even beyond the grave, though the example of its punishment there cannot serve to deter the rest of mankind, who see it not, who know it not, from being guilty of the like practices here. The justice of God, however, we think, still requires, that he should hereafter avenge the injuries of the widow and the fatherless, who are here so often insulted with impunity. In every religion, and in every superstition that the world has ever beheld, accordingly, there has been a Tartarus as well as an Elysium; a place provided for the punishment of the wicked, as well as one for the reward of the just (TMS, sixth ed.II.ii.3.12, p. 91; and n ‘c-c’).
Apart from its comparative brevity, it is also noticeable for Smith’s use of the classical heathen categories in place of the prevailing Christian doctrine of heaven and hell: ‘Elysium’ was for a chosen few, whom the gods permitted to enter Heaven, and Tartarus was for those who were to be punished for their earthly conduct (cf: 2 Peter 2:4; Luke 8:31; Revelation 20:3). Smith’s vivid heathen language undermines the awesome Christian verities of the certain belief (without evidence) in the existence of heaven and hell.
Note Smith’s qualifying rhetorical style in the atonement paragraph, such as “Nature teaches us to hope, and religion, we suppose, authorises us to expect,” and compare it with the first and second editions, where his statement was unqualified and was altogether more assertive and certain; it read simply: “religion authorises.”
The removal of the atonement passage led to a minor squabble when William Magee, Archbishop of Dublin, quoted Smith on ‘atonement’ in the first 1801 edition of his book (Magee Reference Magee1801), in which he expressed his gratitude that Smith wrote of Christian atonement despite his being a “familiar friend of David Hume.” He reversed the accolade dramatically by the 1809 edition (Raphael Reference Raphael1969) after learning that Smith had dropped the atonement paragraph, from which Magee concluded that Smith’s actions were caused by the “infection of David Hume’s society.” Magee’s intemperate response indicates what Smith could expect if he had been more candid about his religious doubts. Undoubtedly, sanctions would have been applied, as they were against David Hume (Mossner 1980, pp. 159–162, 246–249). Smith knew that if he were known to be skeptical, it would have precluded his election as a professor, and we might never have heard of Adam Smith.
Smith received similar unpleasant treatment from another bishop, Dr. George Horne, Bishop of Norwich, Vice-Chancellor, Oxford University, for his comments about Oxford University and his public comments on David Hume: “Upon the whole, I have always considered him, both in lifetime and since his death, as approaching as nearly as the idea of a perfectly wise and virtuous man, as perhaps the nature of human frailty will permit” (Corr., p. 221; Anon 1777). Smith commented that “a very harmless sheet of paper, which I happened to Write concerning the death of our late friend Mr Hume, brought upon me ten times more abuse than the very violent attack I had made upon the whole commercial system of Great Britain” (Corr., p. 251).
Smith’s Qualifications and Omissions
The following selected examples of Smith’s direct qualifications normally associated with Christian authors (and some Deists) are taken from the sixth edition of Moral Sentiments. They all dilute his original religious content as he aged, and, noticeably, when he became freer of restraint after his mother died.
Wrath of God
The inspired writers would not surely have talked so frequently or so strongly of the wrath and anger of God, if they had regarded every degree of those passions as vicious and evil, even in so weak and imperfect a creature as man (TMS II.i.5.9, p. 77).
The “wrath and anger of God” is an ‘inspiration’ of worldly writers, but is not evidence of God’s “wrath and anger,” The phrase “would not surely” appeals to opinion and is not a statement of fact.
Sentiments and the Impartial Spectator
The language on the role of the impartial spectator used in earlier editions is stronger in the sixth edition, and his revisions place the impartial spectator at the core of his philosophy.
Smith added a new, shorter passage to the sixth edition to replace a long section of more obscure meaning by simplifying somewhat its imagery, which Smith added to the second edition, with minor variants in editions three, four, and five, with all of which, presumably, Smith remained unhappy. New paragraphs, 31 and 32, may be taken as Smith’s considered view: “Man has, in this manner, been rendered the immediate judge of mankind” but “he has been rendered so only in the first instance; and an appeal lies from his sentence to a much higher tribunal, to the tribunal of their own consciences, to that of the supposed impartial and well-informed spectator, to that of the man within the breast, the great judge and arbiter of their conduct” (TMS III.2.32, p. 130). These two “jurisdictions” are founded on different principles (TMS III.2.32, p. 131).
Smith’s argument reflects how his concept of the impartial spectator was written to exclude a role for God by the devolution, so to speak, of God’s sovereign role as the ‘great judge’ (editions two to five) of each individual’s behavior, to make “man, if I may say so, the immediate judge of mankind,” by appointing “him his viceregent upon earth, to superintend the behaviour of his brethren” (TMS III. Draft note r: 128). Without its being too obvious to zealots, Smith invented a contrivance in obscure language for apparent theological consistency with the Christian belief (that God is the final arbiter, the ‘much higher tribunal’). Smith’s role of the impartial spectator is also consistent with it being an “immediate judge of mankind” without it being God’s alleged “viceregent upon earth.” Non-believers have impartial spectators too.
The sixth edition drops the pompous theological prose of the earlier editions: “throne of eternal justice,” “the grandeur and importance of so mighty an object,” “fuller revelation of the intentions of providence,” “to tremble and exult as they imagine that they have either merited his [God’s] censure or deserved his applause.” Our “established” judgments are governed according to “certain principles of Nature,” which, “sensible to us, and to every impartial spectator,” are deserving of “merited applause” or “shame” from “condemnation.” With the impartial spectator secularized, so to speak, Smith describes the society we grow up in as the “mirror” by which we learn to judge ourselves (TMS III.1.3, pp. 110–111), because while “we are all very forward to observe” how others affect us, “we soon learn, that other people are equally frank” about ourselves (TMS III.1.5, p. 112).
Smith revises editions two to five by discussing “the man without” who seeks “praise” as the “immediate judge of mankind,” but “only in the first instance,” with an “appeal” to the “well informed spectator” (the “man within” who seeks “praiseworthiness”). If the man within is hesitant in condemning the man without, the man within reflects his partial humanity. But the man without is comforted by belief in the “higher tribunal” of the “all-seeing Judge of the world” [God?]. “Our happiness in this life” is “dependent upon the humble hope and expectation of a life to come,” which is a “doctrine” in all respects “so venerable, so comfortable to the weakness, so flattering to the grandeur of human nature, that the virtuous man who has the misfortune to doubt it [Adam Smith?] cannot possibly avoid wishing most earnestly and anxiously to believe it.” “Belief” in a “doctrine” by others is not evidence of his agreement with the belief. Smith adds that the “most zealous assertors” of the “afterlife to come expose” the “doctrine” to “derision” (TMS III.2.33–34, pp. 130–132).Footnote 3
Moralists
Two different sets of philosophers have attempted to teach us this hardest of all the lessons of morality. One set have laboured to increase our sensibility to the interests of others; another, to diminish that to our own. The first would have us feel for others as we naturally feel for ourselves. The second would have us feel for ourselves as we naturally feel for others. Both, perhaps, have carried their doctrines a good deal beyond the just standard of nature and propriety (TMS 3.8, p. 139).
Smith added the last sentence to the sixth edition, changing the tone of the paragraph from a fairly neutral description of the “two different sets of philosophers” to a critical comment on their mutual extremism.
He describes “those whining and melancholy moralists” as “perpetually reproaching us with our happiness, while so many of our brethren are in misery, who regard as impious the natural joy of prosperity, which does not think of the many wretches that are at every instant labouring under all sorts of calamities, in the languor of poverty, in the agony of disease, in the horrors of death, under the insults and oppression of their enemies.” Commiseration for them “ought, they think, to damp the pleasures of the fortunate, and to render a certain melancholy dejection habitual to all men” (TMS III.3.9, pp. 139–140).
Interestingly, Smith specifically added the adjective “whining” to “melancholy moralists” in the sixth edition. Also, see his critical use of “whining Christian” in relation to the death of David Hume in 1776 (Corr., p. 203; also Ross 1995, p. 298). Smith appreciated what a bout of prosperity meant for the very poor, whereas the Christian moralists, of whom he spoke, considered the poor “impious.”
The Virtue of Benevolence
The “system” based on the virtue of benevolence is “of very great antiquity.” “Benevolence or love was the sole principle of action … and [t]he wisdom of the Deity was employed in finding out the means for bringing about those ends which his goodness suggested, as his infinite power was exerted to execute them.” Morality is derived ultimately from benevolence and the “whole perfection and virtue of the human mind consisted in some resemblance or participation of the divine perfections,” which influenced “all the actions of the deity.” Smith is unambiguous in his assessment of the role of benevolence and in his identification of the conduct necessary to “imitate, as became us, the conduct of God.” By seeking to bring our “own affections to a greater resemblance with his holy attributes,” we may “at last” be able to “communicate with the Deity” (TMS VII.ii.3, pp. 300–301).
It is well to remember that Smith describes, as a philosopher, the “system” that attributes to benevolence these aspects, and does not state his personal views. The supreme role of benevolence, Smith reports, was “much esteemed by many ancient fathers of the Christian church,” and was adopted by “several divines” and “of all the patrons of this system, ancient or modern, the late Dr. Hutcheson was undoubtedly, beyond all comparison, the most acute, the most distinct, the most philosophical, and what is of the greatest consequence of all, the soberest and most judicious” (TMS VII.ii.3.3, p. 301). Dr. Hutcheson’s views, we should remember, are Hutcheson’s views, not Smith’s. Indeed, he regards them as too narrow and defective (TMS VII.ii.14, p. 303). He develops a defence of the moral role of self-love:
The habits of oeconomy, industry, discretion, attention, and application of thought, are generally supposed to be cultivated from self-interested motives, and at the same time are apprehended to be very praise-worthy qualities, which deserve the esteem and approbation of every body.… The mixture of a benevolent motive in an action to which self-love alone ought to be sufficient to prompt us, is not so apt indeed to diminish our sense of its propriety, or of the virtue of the person who performs it. We are not ready to suspect any person of being defective in selfishness. This is by no means the weak side of human nature, or the failing of which we are apt to be suspicious. If we could really believe, however, of any man, that, was it not from a regard to his family and friends, he would not take that proper care of his health, his life, or his fortune, to which self-preservation alone ought to be sufficient to prompt him, it would undoubtedly be a failing, though one of those amiable failings, which render a person rather the object of pity than of contempt or hatred. … Carelessness and want of oeconomy are universally disapproved of, not, however, as proceeding from a want of benevolence, but from a want of the proper attention to the objects of self-interest (TMS VII.3.16, p. 304).
Smith outlines the crux of his critique of Hutcheson’s theology of benevolence in the assumed actions of the Deity: “Benevolence may, perhaps, be the sole principle of action in the Deity, and there are several, not improbable, arguments which tend to persuade us that it is so. It is not easy to conceive what other motive an independent and all-perfect Being, who stands in need of nothing external, and whose happiness is complete in himself, can act from” (TMS VII.ii.3.18, p. 305).
By theological assumption, God the Creator already has the entire universe and all within it at His disposal and, needing nothing from anybody else, He is able to be benevolent in the infinite extreme. No matter how much He gives to all the entities in all His Kingdoms (“In my Father’s house are many mansions”: John 14.2), He has infinite amounts more of everything (benevolent love included) to give away than any man has or could have, and greater amounts in His gift than all the riches and love of mankind put together. To see the religious duty of mankind to imitate the perfect standards set by God sets all men an impossible and utterly unrealistic goal. Smith expresses this cleverly; in extolling the manifest virtues of the Christian God who controls everything in comparison with the puny, weak, and meager human individual, he relieves the individual of the impossible task of being opulent in benevolence.
What, then, of Smith’s alternative? He writes (TMS VII.ii.3.18, p. 305): “whatever may be the case with the Deity,” man’s very many imperfections (many needs and scarce resources?) means that his conduct will of necessity always fall short of the ideal, and, therefore, he “must often act from other motives” besides perpetual and pure benevolence. The very nature of our condition may drive us to act from inferior motives, and, as he points out elsewhere, some of our motives, despite their lack of pure virtue, nevertheless may produce virtuous outcomes.
Nature and Resentment
Smith alludes to the origins of resentment from Nature (which preceded Christianity) and back-projects onto Nature those human behaviors later incorporated into the practice of Christian morality (TMS II.i.3.1, p. 71). Society’s cohesion rests on the impartial resentment of justice, and, by rooting this in Nature, and not the deference accorded to religion, Smith takes a decisive step away from orthodox belief, which he underlines in a later passage without mentioning the Christian God (TMS II.ii.1, pp. 81–83).
CONCLUSION
Adam Smith’s religiosity is enigmatic because of the circumstances in which he worked as a moral philosopher. If these circumstances are ignored, and we work only from his texts, we are bound to be more than a trifle perplexed; from the texts alone, the issue cannot be determined unambiguously. The sixth edition represents his last word, and is, therefore, definitive, and it contains a distinct trend from his first edition with his editing moving in one direction only: to weaken its religious sentiments.
It was published just before he died, when, presumably, as an alleged Christian, Deist, or subject to Providence, he would know he was about to meet his maker, but he didn’t back-track at all, suggesting he was no longer the Christian believer of his youth. Such Deism that he tentatively expressed was almost inevitable given that, as Ronald Coase said:
there was no way of explaining how such a natural harmony came about unless one believed in a personal God who created it all. Before Darwin, Mendel and perhaps also Crick and Watson, if one observed, as Adam Smith thought he often did, a kind of harmony existing in human nature, no explanation could be given if one were unwilling to accept God the creator. His use of the term “Nature” and other circumlocutions was rather a means of evading giving an answer to the question rather than a statement of one. Since Adam Smith could only sense that there was some alternative explanation, the right response was suspended belief, and his position seems to have come close this (Coase Reference Coase1976, p. 539).
