These three authors argue for the legitimacy of religious belief and the existence of God based on the fact of religious experience. There is a refreshing clarity and frankness about their positions even if one does not agree with all of them. Their arguments address a range of topics, providing a stimulating and provoking read.
Each explicitly states that they are ‘critical realists’. The main philosophical principles they adhere to are: ontological intransitivity, judgemental rationality and epistemic relativism. The authors assert that these three can be applied hermeneutically to provide a viable argument for God's existence. None of these authors are theologians, two are sociologists and one is a philosopher. It is a welcome event that these scholars in the social sciences and philosophy are trying to introduce questions of God into the secular academy. Moreover, it is also encouraging that they favour alternatives to positivism and current postmodernism.
The book begins with two principal chapters which lay out their philosophical position (chapter 1) and what they mean by God (chapter 2). The subsequent ten chapters, each from the individual authors, are an elaboration of their positions and illustrate some of the differences between them. Since their arguments stand or fall on what they mean by critical realism (chapter 1), and what they mean by God (chapter 2), I will focus on summarising those two chapters.
First, ontologically, objective reality exists, ‘independent of our beliefs about it’ (p. 1). In this way, they affirm the ‘transitive dimension’ of beliefs (opinion) and the ‘intransitive dimension’ of reality (fact) apart from human belief. Second, ‘judgemental rationality’ for the authors allows for the public discussion of the claims about reality and, by way of comparison of opposing viewpoints, enables one to choose the more sound or reasonable option. Judgements are always open to further evaluation and clarification. However, an overwhelmingly convincing argument may be deemed ‘virtually settled’ (e.g. roundness of the Earth). Such certainty refers to an ‘alethic truth’.
The question of God's existence is open to judgemental rationality, public debate and discussion. Rather than seek to determine God's existence as an alethic truth, the authors’ claims are more modest: ‘the equal rationality of belief and disbelief is all we wish to establish about the question of God's existence’ (p. 3). Having started out in the social sciences, I can appreciate this approach, in that one only has to open the window to the reasonableness of God's existence in order to bring the religious/spiritual questions into the social sciences. However, the authors admit to ‘rational’ and ‘irrational reasons’ to believe in God, yet the latter seems like an oxymoron (p. 3).
Third, epistemic relativism affirms that all judgements are socially and historically conditioned. In this way ‘judgements are always fallible’, or perhaps the authors mean to say, possibly open to further revision (p. 4). The social and historical experiences of individuals shape their judgements. The presence or absence of transformative religious experience in one's personal history can condition one's openness to God's existence.
Chapter 2 is titled ‘What do we mean by God?’ They are cautious of traditional arguments for the existence of God. In this way, I think the authors make the same mistake that many people do. They assume that the argument must somehow establish one's faith – that the argument has to be ‘convincing’. However, St Thomas' five arguments were presented to the already converted. The goal of such proofs are more modest, simply to establish that it is reasonable to believe in God, but not to be a replacement for faith or an argument to establish faith.
They continue: ‘The primary source of knowledge of God is religious experience’ (p. 25). While this may be true, it is unclear what they mean by religious experience. But perhaps the more serious problem with the authors’ position which affects Christians is their stance on God's omnipotence. Their theodicy cannot reconcile evil and God's omnipotence so therefore they ‘follow certain trends in process theology that abandon belief in God's omnipotence’ (p. 32).
I am sympathetic with the authors’ attempts to establish a philosophy of God based on religious experience and the use of critical realism as a philosophical basis for doing so. My concern is with their specific use of critical realism and their theodicy. First, it seems that there are different ‘critical realisms’ and each can be very different from the other. My own training in critical realism is by way of the Canadian, Catholic philosopher and theologian, Bernard Lonergan. His tome, Insight: A Study in Human Understanding, presents a formidable attempt to grapple with cognitional theory, epistemology, metaphysics and transcendent being. I find his treatment of judgement more satisfying than the notion of judgemental rationality although I suspect there are similarities. My concern is that judgemental rationality can too easily be reduced to a sophisticated rhetoric where the best argument wins. I think the authors mean more than this, but it is not completely clear.
This short review cannot do justice to the ten essays which follow the introductory positional chapters. There are some clear and stimulating articles from each of the authors which range from topics on secularisation, biblical hermeneutics, religious experience, and the mysticism of John of the Cross and St Teresa of Avila, to name a few. Since I have a personal interest in inter-religious dialogue, I found Porpora's article ‘A Propaedeutic to a Propaedeutic on Inter-religious Dialogue’ a helpful summary of the various approaches and challenges facing inter-religious dialogue. What I think he really means by propaedeutic is that the primary question for Christians today concerns the method of dialogue rather than the dialogue itself.
One must keep in mind that the authors are trying to get the secular academy, especially in the social sciences, to take questions of God more seriously. They are admittedly, ‘unsystematic’ theologians (p. 25). Still, I think their arguments could benefit from engaging a systematic theologian in their ‘clique’ perhaps one with training in the scholastic-Thomistic tradition.
