What if the bankers who financed Philip II’s imperial ambitions—and were the recurrent victims of his defaults—were not simply fools mesmerized by the king’s absolutist allure, but instead were engaged in sound business practice? This is the working hypothesis that runs through Mauricio Drelichman’s and Hans-Joachim Voth’s Lending to the Borrower from Hell, a compelling and thoroughly researched study of public finance in early modern Spain. After compiling a database with detailed information on all the short-term debt contracts (the famous asientos) subscribed to by the Spanish monarch between 1566 and 1600, the authors use modern theoretical concepts and statistical tools in order to show that beneath the colorful legend lay a well-functioning and surprisingly stable financial machinery.
The first chapter presents an overview of the conditions that permeated Spanish sovereign debt, emphasizing the risk-sharing arrangements in place. After presenting preliminary evidence that Philip II’s finances did not fare at all badly when compared with similar experiences throughout history, it introduces the four questions that will animate the remainder of the volume: Could Philip pay his debts? Why did he choose to pay, in the absence of a binding enforcement mechanism? Why did bankers agree to lend to him, even after experiencing sovereign defaults? Finally, exactly what happened, from a financial perspective, in the event of a default?
Chapters 2 and 3 prepare the ground for addressing these questions by offering, respectively, a brief portrait of the political and military context surrounding Philip’s empire, and an account of the fiscal architecture that sustained it. The authors imply that Spanish military ambitions were neither unrealistic nor irrational; if anything, they were adequate responses to the challenges at hand. Chapter 3 also presents reconstructed annual series of crown revenues (1555 to 1596) and short-term debt (1566 to 1600), which indicate that the empire relied on a solid and growing fiscal base at the time. Moreover, different political groups supervised and interfered with the allocation of these resources, therefore discrediting the view of the Spanish crown as an unrestricted absolute power.
The sustainability of Philip’s debt is the theme of chapter 4. The evidence sustaining the analysis comes from a national accounting exercise that uses data on military spending and short-term debt service, together with the series from chapter 3, in order to obtain a full set of fiscal accounts for the period 1566 to 1596. Philip failed to run a primary budget surplus only in very exceptional years, and deteriorating fiscal conditions were always associated with extraordinary military expenditure, as in the episodes of the Dutch revolt and the Armada. More formal sustainability tests indicate that Philip’s debt was indeed sustainable, and that debt-to-revenue ratios did not exhibit an upward trend. In the authors’ view, the unfavorable outcome of Spanish military campaigns during the period establishes a lower bound for sustainability assessments: had it emerged victorious in the Low Countries, for instance, Spain’s fiscal position would have improved significantly.
In many ways the centerpiece of the book, chapter 5 focuses on the compatibility of the incentives facing Philip II and his creditors—more specifically, on the reasons why Philip normally chose to honor his debts, instead of behaving opportunistically. After briefly reviewing the literature on sovereign debt, the authors use information from the asiento contracts in order to refute some of the traditional explanations offered for the Spanish case. There was remarkable stability in the set of bankers who offered credit to the crown, therefore undermining explanations that rely on irrationality and banker turnover. Moreover, the effectiveness of attempts to freeze transfers to the sites of military conflict whenever the king failed to honor his debts was limited at best. The hypothesis favored by the authors emphasizes market power and reputation concerns. Genoese financiers, who held a semi-monopolistic position in the market for Spanish sovereign debt, constituted a tight coalition that acted concertedly in order to cut the Spanish crown’s access to further credit in case it behaved inappropriately. The widespread use of syndicated lending among overlapping groups guaranteed the alignment of incentives within the coalition, while a cheat-the-cheater mechanism prevented the entry of new lenders who did not have the resources to fulfill Philip’s financial needs on their own.
Chapter 6 offers a detailed analysis about the profitability of lending to Philip II, using reconstructed cash flows from the asiento contracts in order to estimate rates of return. The overall profitability calculations indicate that short-term lending yielded an average rate of return that was 4.43% above the yield on long-term juros, used as a benchmark for opportunity cost. When aggregated for banking families, the contracts show that very few of them would have failed to earn returns equal to the opportunity cost even in a scenario that involved a default settlement. The authors then present a microanalysis of a few credit operations to illustrate how ramified the system was, and how risk was diluted through several layers of financial intermediation. In the case of a drastic event—such as a default—the structure thus survived unscathed, the several parties absorbing the losses without bringing financial ruin upon themselves. Using comparative data on excess returns to sovereign lending between 1850 and 2001, the authors estimate that lending to Philip II would have been the second most profitable such enterprise in the period—behind only Brazil during 1992 to 2001.
The fourth and last question is the subject of chapter 7: the nature of contracting between Philip II and his lenders. Differently from most of our contemporary experiences, Philip’s debts were usually state-contingent, with an effective risk-sharing structure in place. The several clauses included in asiento contracts provide ample evidence of this. Delays in the arrival of the silver fleet, insufficiency of tax streams, collateral execution, and discretion on both the king’s and the banker’s side were all circumstances that could alter the terms of the original contract in previously specified ways. Sovereign debt was thus more expensive in normal times, but it also provided insurance for bad moments. To the authors, this also offers a rationale for recurring defaults. Provided defaults had been credibly occasioned by unexpected shocks, lenders saw them as unpredictable contingent clauses, and were thus willing to accept them as part of a general round of recontracting.
Finally, in chapter 8, the authors broaden their scope and try to analyze the influence of fiscal determinants on the fortunes of the Spanish empire. Contrary to the standard argument that Spain was an absolute monarchy that abused its power to tax, overstretched its political reach, and thus brought about economic decay, they find that, if anything, Spanish fiscal policy was moderate in comparison with the practices of other European powers at the peak of their might. To them, Spanish decay was not due to excessive power, but rather the opposite: a weak and decentralized governance structure that failed to assert dominance over its domains and eliminate privileges. Social and cultural heterogeneity, on one hand, and the largely extra-political revenues arising from American silver, on the other, had much to do with the Spanish failure to build an effective and centralized state apparatus. The authors thus oppose traditional scholarly interpretations of Spanish decline that rely either on financial folly induced by imperial extravagance, or else on allegedly perverse institutions and absolutist abuses.
Although I found the argument developed in the book generally compelling, there were times when I felt the analysis could have benefited from greater use of qualitative sources, to complement the data series that constitute its backbone. In this sense, the tone set by the examination of the financial ventures of Gio Girolamo Di Negro, presented at the very beginning of chapter 1, was not subsequently followed through. On the few occasions when the authors do resort to more diversified evidence—as in the analysis of the political context surrounding the sack of Antwerp, or when discussing the strategic considerations of bankers during a default—the argument acquires much greater force as a result.
In my opinion, such an approach would have been particularly welcome within the discussion of lender profitability, which partly comes across as a mechanic and anachronistic exercise. Even if Genoese lenders were not puppets in the hands of the almighty Spanish monarch, there was certainly a much deeper political subtext to early modern public finance than the authors imply. Using the English case as a benchmark, the relationship between Elizabeth I and the Merchant Adventurers involved not only loans and repayments, but also a significant amount of trafficking in privileges and political arm-twisting. To say that much is not to deny the “rationality” of the enterprise, but only to recognize its historical depth and complexity.
This, however, is only a minor shortcoming that in no way detracts from the numerous accomplishments of this book, which should be required reading for anyone interested in the intricate problems of early modern public finance.
