Karsten Stueber’s Rediscovering Empathy: Agency, Folk Psychology, and the Human Sciences is an intriguing, systematic, and careful analysis of empathy, i.e., putting ourselves in another person’s shoes. Over the past two decades, empathy has received considerable philosophical attention thanks to the contemporary interdisciplinary debate regarding the development of folk psychology, specifically between theory-theory and simulation theory. And it’s within this context that Stueber passionately argues that empathy, not theories, play a central role in understanding humans from both a folk psychological and social scientific point of view. Although Rediscovering Empathy offers a wide-ranging discussion of empathy, its main thesis states that “empathy must be regarded as the epistemically central, default method for understanding other agents within the folk-psychological framework” (p. 5). In short, it’s by putting ourselves in another’s shoes that we come to understand human behaviour.
In support of his thesis, Stueber offers readers a clear, cogent, and passionate defence of empathy. Although I am deeply sympathetic to the underlying thesis in Rediscovering Empathy, my major contention with Stueber’s book, and simulation generally, is that it does not offer an accurate account of how humans explain behaviour and how folk psychology develops in children. First, however, a brief outline of the book.
The six chapters of Rediscovering Empathy can be broken down into three distinct sections. The first two chapters are devoted to defending the view that rationality is central to folk psychology. For Stueber, empathy rests on the idea that humans see each other as rational agents motivated by reasons.
Chapters three and four make up the central thesis of Rediscovering Empathy and are the most original and interesting. In chapter three, he outlines the theory of mind debate, which is broken, generally speaking, into two camps: simulation and theory-theory. Stueber outlines the main tenets of both theories along with some of the psychological literature that supposedly backs up each claim. Stueber articulates the main theories nicely and recants the complex development research in a brilliantly clear manner. Following in the footsteps of other notable philosophers, such as Gordon and Goldman, Stueber favours, of course, simulation.
Stueber defends empathy by first making a distinction between basic and reenactive empathy. Basic empathy is “a quasi-perceptual mechanism that allows us to directly recognize what another person is doing or feeling” (p. 147). Supported by research on mirror neurons, basic empathy allows us to recognize other people as same minded. I recognize others to be like me but also recognize myself as being like you. Moreover, without basic empathy, we cannot meet the univocal constraint of folk psychological concepts, namely “that the same mental states are used in first-person reports and third-person ascriptions” (p. 132). The discussion of folk psychological concepts here is confusing and insufficiently argued, but empathy is supposedly necessary to achieve first-person competence of a wide range of concepts. But, as Stueber recognizes, the problem with basic empathy is that it cannot explain our ability to predict behaviour in complex situations. To do this, we need reenactive empathy.
Put simply, reenactive empathy says that in order to understand how a person’s belief could be a reason for their actions we have to imaginatively entertain the belief ourselves, taking into account all relevant differences, and imaginatively identify the thought as our own. For Stueber, “reenactive empathy is central to our understanding of others as rational agents because we have to be able to understand that we would have acted or drawn certain inferences for the same reasons if we were in their situation” (p. 165). It’s reenactive empathy, says Stueber, which allows us to take into consideration another person’s differences and understand them as rational agents within specific context. Moreover, from a developmental point of view, the increased conceptual sophistication between the ages of three and four years of age should be seen as a process, via empathy, whereby children proceed “from a conception of agents as objectively rational or goal-directed agents...to a conception of persons as subjectively rational agents” (p. 171) and, thereby, will come to see others as having different psychological aspects from themselves.
In the final two chapters, Stueber discusses the epistemological question of whether empathy is a properly sanctioned method of knowledge acquisition within the social sciences. In chapter five, he takes issue with critics that argue for a methodology based on theoretical information and psychological generalizations. He also raises a number of objections and limitations of empathy. The most serious of which is that cultural differences may make simulation problematic, if not impossible, if the interpretee’s beliefs and desires are radically different than our own. Stueber considers such objections valid but even so, says Stueber, this does not diminish the centrality of empathy to folk psychology since “reenactment is essential for understanding intentional agency because it is only in this manner that we are able to conceive of agents as situated in certain environments and as responding in a rational manner to the demands of this environment (p. 216).
Although I am sympathetic to Stueber’s thesis, it’s questionable whether empathy is a foundation of our explanatory and predictive strategies. First, Stueber’s claim that mirror neurons support basic empathy is suspect. Mirror neurons can easily be interpreted not as a kind of empathy but as part of the neuronal process that underlines perception. Even Stueber admits that mirror neurons are the “fundamental perceptual mechanism that allows us to directly relate to other human being as like-minded” (p. 170). But it’s a mistake to think that empathy occurs at the neuronal level, since to step inside another person’s shoes requires higher cognitive functions beyond the activation of subpersonal systems. At the subpersonal level, neurons are either on or off; neurons either fire or do not fire, they do not create or model pretend states.Footnote 1
Second, it’s questionable whether we actually make third-person attributions of mental states when giving reasons for another person’s actions. Reasons for acting are often incorporated into a shared understanding of the social world, rather than the simulation of another’s thoughts. Humans often have a shared understanding of the kinds of actions appropriate to specific situations. We don’t need to simulate beliefs because most folk psychological explanations and predictions are against a shared social world in which both parties are competent. We usually don’t understand other people by attributing internal mental states as reasons, but do so “by placing [behaviour] in the contexts of familiar kinds of structured social situation[s].”Footnote 2 If correct, this presumption is enough to explain human behaviour without the need of empathy.
Third, and most importantly, Stueber account of empathy seriously mischaracterizes the development of folk psychology. A child’s ability to pass the false-belief task is not the result of simulation or theory but is socially constructed through cultural interaction and learning folk psychological narrative practices. Social intercourse increases exposure to folk psychological narratives and linguistic competence, which in turn is reflected in the ability to successfully attribute mental states to others; hence, the better results of four-year-olds on the false-belief task. In this way, children gradually begin to speak in the folk psychological ways of their culture, expressed in propositional attitudes. And by adulthood, children have learned how to talk with great subtlety about their actions and those of others in terms of beliefs, desires, hopes, emotions, and intentions, by mastering the culture’s narrative stories. The development of folk psychology is really just a gradual acquisition and coming to understand the reasons why people, and children themselves, behave in certain circumstances through the narrative practices of society—no empathy required.
Stueber’s Rediscovering Empathy makes a passionate case for empathy as being central to our folk psychological practices. Its clear prose and accessible writing style made it a joy to read. However, I am not convinced that empathy, especially in regards to the development of our mind-reading abilities, is plausible. But, for anyone interested in understanding human behaviour, Rediscovering Empathy is essential reading.
