Heinrich von Stackelberg is among the few twentieth-century German economic theorists who are familiar to any economics student today. Paradoxically, even though his oeuvre is acknowledged already during his lifetime as a key contribution to the debates about imperfect competition, and although he is perceived as a shooting star of European economics in the 1930s, it has taken decades to translate into English his masterpiece, Marktform und Gleichgewicht of 1934—the habilitation thesis of a twenty-nine-year-old scholar at the University of Cologne who, despite all his theoretical brilliance, has fallen prey to the temptation of National Socialism. It is the dark side in this part of Stackelberg’s life that has also determined the rather peculiar fate of Market Structure and Equilibrium, so that a look at his vita is in place as an introduction to, and a context of, the volume.
Stackelberg’s youth is one of a refugee. Born in an affluent Baltic family in 1905 and grown up on the Crimea, he flees from the October Revolution and rather precariously reaches Cologne, staying there from 1923 until 1935. His doctoral thesis of 1932—published with Julius Springer in Vienna just as his habilitation was two years later—is concerned with cost theory and is written under the supervision of Erwin von Beckerath. Simultaneously, Stackelberg is involved in anti-democratic fraternities of displaced Baltic aristocrats and joins the National Socialist party in 1931, even becoming the National Socialist lecturers’ leader at Cologne (Senn Reference Senn1996a, p. 10; Niehans Reference Niehans1992, pp. 190–191). Intriguingly, it is a call to the University of Berlin that initiates Stackelberg’s gradual emancipation from the ones in power (Möller Reference Möller, Kloten and Möller1992, pp. 17–24; Konow Reference Konow1994, pp. 160–162). His theoretical interests become more diverse; in 1941 he accepts a call to the University of Bonn and gets in touch with representatives of the Freiburg School, above all Walter Eucken, entailing a further swerve away from National Socialist ideology and policies and towards the incipient ordoliberal ideas (Kolev Reference Kolev and Nienhaus2015, pp. 134–135). In 1943 Stackelberg leaves Germany for Spain, with a premature death in 1946 to terminate this brief, intricate, and highly productive life—whose evolution is depicted by Eucken with a high degree of sympathy in his Economic Journal obituary (Eucken Reference Eucken1948). It is stimulating to learn from recent research that in his only three Spanish years, Stackelberg succeeds in gathering a group of aspiring young scholars and imbues them with ordoliberal concepts, which would become seminal for Spain’s later economic opening and European integration (Ban Reference Ban2012; Pazos Casado, Sánchez Lissen, and Sanz Díaz Reference Pazos Casado, Lissen and Sanz Díaz2015).
Market Structure and Equilibrium is a fascinating book, and this in various ways. It is primarily a treatise in microeconomics, one readable by insiders and—a simultaneous goal of many habilitation theses of the time—also by students and even by citizens interested in the properties of the market system. Outsourcing the mathematics into an appendix constituting a third of the volume’s length significantly contributes to the readability by a wider public. The text is, despite its highly technical character, lucidly composed and characterized throughout by a logical exposition as compelling as deduction can be. Even though Stackelberg is obviously dealing with deepening the theoretical grasp of the market mechanism—his leitmotifs are the existence of equilibrium and its stability—he is keen to constantly underscore that the aim of his research is to make the understanding of the market more realistic as compared with pre-existing theories. Consequently, he does not, as might be expected, singularly focus on oligopoly theory, the area he remains famous for until today. Instead, Stackelberg embeds the oligopoly in his famous general morphology of market structures and spends a lot of energy on methodological issues related to this morphology. As befits a book targeted also at students and laypeople, he starts with a general exposition of “the economic problem” and the basic principles of the market economy (chapter 1), followed by analyses of the possible structures on a single market (chapter 2) and on interrelated markets (chapter 3). Curiously, when dealing with the possible duopoly forms in chapter 4, the now-famous Stackelberg duopoly is declared by its name giver a case that empirically will be rather an exceptional one. Impressive for historians of economics, Stackelberg spends the entire chapter 5 to precisely identify the place of his contribution by embedding it into a detailed outline of the evolution of economic thought regarding oligopoly, starting with Antoine Augustin Cournot and covering the concepts of Joseph Bertrand, Francis Ysidro Edgeworth, Vilfredo Pareto, Joseph Schumpeter, Arthur Cecil Pigou, Arthur Lyon Bowley, Luigi Amoroso, Harold Hotelling, and others. Raised as a polyglot, Stackelberg has no difficulty to quote extensively from books and papers of various European languages. He certainly links his modelling to the most topical imperfect competition debates and to prominent contemporaries like Edward Chamberlin and Joan Robinson.
But why has such a book not become an international scholarly classic, at least of its time? It is not due to missing prominent reviewers: Oskar Lange, John Hicks, Nicholas Kaldor, and Wassily Leontief soon comment on it. Leontief concludes his thoroughly positive Journal of Political Economy review of 1936 with a sentence calling an English translation “highly desirable” (Leontief Reference Leontief1936, p. 559). But this does not materialize—and it is probably due to the economic policy conclusions drawn by Stackelberg in the concluding chapter 6. His overall result is that apart from perfect competition situations, equilibrium is a very infrequent phenomenon, making the “real” market economy a highly unstable system. Consequently, he assigns the state the central task of “safeguarding the equilibrium”; that is, eliminating unstable market structures by imposing on the economy a corporatist structure of compulsory cartels on various markets and then fostering their negotiations, explicitly referring to Italian fascism as a benchmark. This is where Hicks’s 1935 Economic Journal review comes in: Hicks finds Stackelberg’s “rather exaggerated idea of the instability of duopoly” misleading, especially as it induces a “paean to the Corporate State!” (Hicks Reference Hicks1935, p. 336). This ending of Hicks’s review can be seen as a blow to the further reception (and translation) of the book—Stackelberg is represented as a promising theorist, but one with fascist leanings. In a time when still almost everybody in economics reads German, the book of such a contaminated author does not need the particular effort of being translated; when the insights are later incorporated into game theory, the language of scientific discourse is primarily mathematics, so coming back to the German original with its verbal logic outside the mathematical appendix is not seen as worthwhile any more (Senn Reference Senn1996b, p. 18).
Given these superb qualities of the book, the project of Damien Bazin and his team to finally make Stackelberg’s treatise available in English is highly laudable. Bazin’s idea to engage native speakers with a background both in linguistics and economics has proven of great profit to the textual quality. The challenge to translate Stackelberg’s phrases with precision, keeping the specificity of his language and nevertheless transferring the melody of the text into elegant English, is an outstanding achievement. Referring to the original wording at many places where translations might be misleading and using Leontief’s English terms without overburdening the flow of reading are also assets. A lingual curiosity is that the concept of the “Stackelberg leader” (in German: Stackelberg-Führer) known to any microeconomics student is not introduced by Stackelberg, and has, thus, nothing to do with his youthful sins. As one can learn from the interwoven German quotes in the translation, Stackelberg himself uses only the adjective “vorgelagert”; the noun “leader” is introduced in Leontief’s review and becomes prominent only decades later when translating “leader” from the English of game theory into German. It will be intriguing to observe whether this first-rate translation will urge some historians of economics to invest new resources into exploring Stackelberg: unlike his oligopoly contribution, he himself has fallen into oblivion as a person—and deplorably also as a scholar much more prolific than just the stylized representation in microeconomic textbooks.
