This is an excellent piece of scholarship. In his carefully argued and extremely well researched book, Michael Tomz leads the reader through an exploration of the role that reputation plays in the relationship between sovereign borrowers and investors in international money markets.
Tomz argues that investors and sovereign borrowers operate in the context of uncertainty about the prospects of repayment, driven by unpredictable political changes that affect governments' willingness to pay debts. In this context, borrowers develop histories of repayment or noncompliance (default and other actions) that create reputations visible to investors, who use those reputations to evaluate risk. This argument is based on the author's rejection of the idea that repeated play or issue linkage alone can explain investor and sovereign borrower behavior, since coordination among lenders in international money markets is difficult, and issue linkage in the form of military threats appears to be relevant only for early debtor-investor relationships.
Hypothesizing that the role of reputation should be evident in the behavior of investors and the statements of contemporary investment analysts, Tomz uses an incredibly thorough archival research effort to compile evidence capable of testing these implications of his theory. In quantitative and qualitative research spanning the Amsterdam money market of the early 1700s through banking in modern times, he finds convincing support for his argument and generates serious doubts about the competing hypotheses. He takes such care in matching theory with new evidence that I have no doubt that this will become a widely read book in the international political economy literature.
What is most impressive about this book is the scope and depth of the empirical research undertaken by the author and the solid use of mixed methods throughout the chapters. Any single piece of his compilation of new data on bond issues, for instance, could be seen as a major accomplishment in and of itself. In Chapter 3, Tomz uses data that he collected on 577 bonds on the Amsterdam market beginning with a bond issued in 1695 to show that new borrowers in that market paid a risk premium over seasoned borrowers. Information on these bonds required archival research that would do justice to the most experienced historian. Some interest rates, for example, came from a 1772 ambassador's report about the Dutch market stored in Spanish archives. In Chapter 4, Tomz uses a thorough and systematic review of contemporary investment guides from the interwar period, entailing substantial content analysis work, to show that support for his argument is not just available in the form of data on bond yields but is also evident in what experts at the time believed was important when assessing a sovereign borrower's standing.
Throughout the book, Tomz combines concise and clear logical arguments with fascinating historical examples, such as the story of the bond floated on behalf of the completely fictional Latin American government of Poyais, to keep the reader interested. However, Chapters 6, 7, and 8 all focus on disproving alternative hypotheses, with extensive empirical tests that shift the reader's attention too far away from Tomz's ideas about reputation. Although the later chapters certainly provide strong reason to question issue linkage explanations, the space might have been better used to explore other issues.
For example, I would like to have seen more thought on the issue of preference formation among sovereign borrowers. Tomz notes that political change can lead to different preferences regarding repayment of debts, but he does not examine the issue in much detail. Suggesting that governments generally fall into three types of reputations (lemons, stalwarts, and fair-weathers), he notes that governments change types because of various domestic political factors, but drops the issue relatively quickly. He notes that “[t]he exact sources of heterogeneity are interesting in their own right, but are not the focus of this book. For the reputational argument to succeed, we need only accept that preferences are diverse” (p. 17). This seems worthy of more attention. Are certain kinds of governments more or less likely to have preferences that favor repayment? Could such knowledge be available to investors, at least in rough form, allowing some new borrowers to escape a risk premium or permitting some fair-weathers to return to good standing more quickly than others? Democracies, long argued to behave differently than other regimes in several areas of international politics, come to mind as a set of sovereign borrowers that could possibly have shortcuts around the normal reputation-building process.
Another possible substitute for the somewhat long exploration of alternative, issue-linkage explanations would be an equally careful examination of how the broad reputation theory, developed in Chapter 2, could be applied outside of the topic of sovereign debt. As it stands, the title of the book is a bit misleading, as the entire focus of the book is on a narrow range of political and economic interaction. However, the broad theory proposed by Tomz certainly could be applied elsewhere, such as in an examination of the demands made by bargaining partners after the observation of noncompliance with international treaties. Much as investors charge risk premiums to new borrowers or those with fair-weather records of repayment, might they demand greater concessions or safeguards in international agreements when dealing with known fair-weathers? Perhaps it is too much to ask more of a book that already does so much so well, but such an investigation could have gone far in convincing readers that Tomz is offering a generalizable theory, rather than one confined to sovereign debt.
Even without a deeper discussion of preference formation or the application of Tomz's reputation theory to other realms of political interaction, this is a remarkably comprehensive, well-written book. It will be of greatest interest to scholars studying international political economy, but scholars interested in reputation building in other areas of international relations will certainly want to read it, and graduate students should consider this book an exemplar of multiple-method research in the international relations field.
