Although human rights scholars and activists rarely acknowledge the fact today, moral appeals remain key to the modern human rights project. In my International Human Right class, I teach that the concept of human rights historically grew out of both Judeo-Christian religious and moral traditions and Enlightenment concepts of legal protections for individual liberties. Modern human rights emerged as an attempt to use legal tools to address morally offensive actions. As a professional human rights researcher, I learned quickly that in order to be effective, the human rights reports that I wrote needed good stories. Graphic examples of people suffering human rights abuses served to shock the moral sensibilities of readers in order to inspire them to act to stop the abuses.
The centrality of morality to human rights, however, is now rarely acknowledged. As activists sought to gain global support for international human rights in the period after the Second World War, legal language took precedence. Appeals to religious and cultural traditions seemed to undermine efforts to make human rights more universal, so the focus for human rights activism became the development of international human rights law and the effort to get countries across the globe to sign onto and then enforce these laws. Human rights as a field, thus, has come to be dominated by lawyers and by legal discourse. Even as reports by human rights organizations play on moral sentiments, the emphasis for the organizations’ advocacy is on violations of the law and calls for judicial accountability. The law, not morality, is the central basis upon which human rights is to be built.
Yet as William O'Neill points out in his book Reimagining Human Rights, gaining universal acceptance of human rights remains a major challenge in no small part because the Western legalistic and individualistic approach to rights fails to resonate with many cultures. A top-down approach to rights that focuses only on the state and law limits the ability of modern human rights to address the reality of the horrors they are meant to correct. O'Neill argues instead for a victim-centered approach to rights, one that begins with the narratives of those who have suffered from genocide and other mass atrocities. As O'Neill puts it, in the face of horrors like the Shoah and the genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, “rights talk loses the formally abstract, individualistic patina it has acquired in Western liberal theory” (p. 19).
O'Neill argues strongly against the attempt to make human rights universal by approaching them in a neutral and dispassionate fashion. He contends that in this approach, which grows out of Western liberal thinking, there is ultimately no foundation upon which to build human rights. Instead based in particular on witness testimonies from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South Africa, O'Neill argues for an acknowledgement of the subjective nature of rights. Survivors of rights abuses may not use the language of rights, but, he contends, their narratives express a belief in rights that is deeply rooted in their cultures.
O'Neill, himself a Jesuit priest, makes the case for bringing religion, morality, and culture back into discussions of human rights. His idea of “ethical reciprocity,” in which various religious and moral systems can complement each other in promoting visions of the common good and appropriate means for realizing basic rights, is not unlike the idea of “overlapping consensus” that Jack Donnelly (Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, Third Edition, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013) argues makes human rights universal today. According to Donnelly, “Christians, Muslims, Confucians, and Buddhists; Kantians, utilitarians, pragmatists, and neo-Aristotileans; liberals, conservatives, traditionalists, and radicals, and many other groups as well, come to human rights from their own particular paths” (p. 58). Both Donnelly and O'Neill recognize that not all religious and philosophical traditions support human rights, but O'Neill goes further in arguing that human rights need a moral grounding to be successful.
O'Neill's text is written in conversation with the Western philosophical tradition, from Aristotle to Immanuel Kant to Hannah Arendt to Jürgen Habermas. O'Neill challenges the Western liberal arguments for human rights both by referencing Western critics of liberalism like Alasdair MacIntyre and Richard Rorty (though he challenges their perspectives as well) and also by bringing in voices from the Global South, particularly African thinkers like Wole Soyinka and Julius Nyerere who are likely less familiar to students of classical political theory. The central debate that O'Neill poses throughout the text is between John Rawls’ vision of human rights based on ideas of neutral justice that pushes religion outside public discourse and Desmond Tutu's idea of restorative justice that puts victims needs at the center and is deeply rooted in religious traditions. O'Neill relies heavily on Tutu and the example of the TRC as a basis for his own conception of morally and religiously based human rights.
At times, the overwhelming number of references to philosophers with which the author expects readers to be familiar makes the text a challenging read. The language is sometimes opaque as the level of erudition can make O'Neill's point difficult to discern. Yet O'Neill helps the reader by regularly summarizing and reviewing the points he has developed before moving on to new points. Even without a strong knowledge of the philosophers to which O'Neill is referring, his arguments are interesting and bring an important corrective to ongoing discussions of human rights. With critical and cynical takes by authors such as Samuel Moyn, Eric Posner, and Mahmood Mamdani dominating academic discussions of human rights in recent years, O'Neill's deeply felt defense of human rights is a welcome alternative view.
Referencing Weber's claim that modern society is “disenchanted,” that is, devoid of a sense of the religious and magical, O'Neill calls for a “re-enchantment” of human rights, a return to morality and religion as the foundations. Though many advocates of human rights will reject this defense of religion, in a helpful final chapter, O'Neill shows how his approach could be used to address the problems of race and mass incarceration and of immigration and refugees in the United States. These examples show the potential power of an approach to human rights that focuses on the perspective of victims and the possibilities for reconciliation and social reconstruction as means to achieving rights rather than simply using the punitive power of the state to enforce human rights law.
