That the Oslo peace process collapsed is more or less conventional wisdom, ironically uniting more than splitting activists on both sides of the Israel/Palestinian divide. But why this series of high-level agreements, internationally blessed by most world powers, failed to fulfill its promise to end the Middle East conflict by establishing two states for two peoples is as hotly debated by academicians as by the political operatives charged with making these negotiations work. Expectations on both sides exceeded what political leaders seemed able to offer, and so disappointments not only deepened distrust but also triggered outrage. Each side has its political movements, its journals, its heroes, its enemies, and its own account of the history of this failed attempt to broker an agreement. Still, according to Lev Luis Grinberg, the most problematic conclusion drawn from the failure of the Oslo Accords to meet the high expectations invested in them is the loss of confidence that a path to peace can ever be found.
Politics and Violence in Israel/Palestine is a critical engagement with this despair and the accompanying view of the Oslo process as proving the futility of ever finding a way for Palestinians and Israelis to reconcile their differences. Grinberg examines what the Oslo Accords could reasonably have accomplished given the way in which both sides structured their priorities. By rehearsing the detailed choices made during the years of active Israeli/Palestinian negotiations—and the consequences that derived from these particular decisions—Grinberg reminds us that although the measures taken by political leaders did not produce peace, they did provide lessons for the future. The violence that seemingly killed the momentum for resolving the conflict, Grinberg insists, stemmed from the fateful decision not to define Israel's borders and to offer Palestinians the political space necessary for determining their own national future. Grinberg admits that his overall argument depends on a series of theoretical assumptions, the first about the radical difference between politics and violence and the second concerning the causal relationship between territorial boundaries mapped through consensus and democratic freedoms. But Grinberg is convinced his analytic framework is sound:
The two conditions for political (nonviolent) containment of conflicts—recognized state borders and some balance of power between the conflicting sides—are obviously absent in the Israeli–Palestinian case. . . . The argument is that the Oslo process could be imagined as a peace process precisely because Israelis and Palestinians were able to imagine a border between them and a two-state solution: this is the Green Line that was legally maintained after 1967 by the dual military–democratic regime. (p. 5)
Grinberg insists that these initial decisions imposed burdens for both Israelis and Palestinians and constrained the possibility of creating a politics that would give voice to all:
The strategic trap of Oslo . . . is the result of Rabin's and Arafat's attempt to co-opt the pragmatic opponents of compromise in an effort to neutralize the most extremist opponents . . . The desire to persuade the “moderate opposition” and the opening of internal political space for dialogue and compromise with them concurrently closed the intercommunity political space of Israeli–Palestinian negotiations. (p. 63)
With a peace process increasingly unresponsive to their interests, Palestinians became more and more disposed to embrace a strategy of violence, which at least expressed the pain of their oppression and the dissatisfaction they felt with developments narrowing their options and leaving them with less hope for their future. Grinberg's analysis is unique in that he shows how this violence neutralized political space for Israelis as well as for Palestinians. Unsettled by the suicide bombings that erupted on buses and main streets across Israel, the country's citizens convinced themselves that the critical issues were military rather than political, and so the army was handed decisive authority to control the situation. This had fateful consequences for Israel, which Grinberg describes in stark and judgmental language:
The state of Israel has multiple borders for different purposes. The state includes the Palestinian population of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip for purposes of military and economic control but excludes them legally by maintaining two different legal regimes—the area within the pre-1967 borders ruled by democratic law and elective government, and the West Bank and Gaza Strip under military law. (p. 1)
It is not surprising that both Israelis and Palestinians withdrew—unnecessarily Grinberg argues—into the confrontational positions that had for decades framed and sustained their conflict.
Grinberg's narrative will probably not compel conviction among those skeptical of the possibility of resolving the Middle East conflict, but it should persuade them to acknowledge the wrong steps taken during the all too brief period of meaningful and productive negotiations. Anyone concerned with the persistent confrontation between Israelis and Palestinians must conclude that the Palestinians once showed a remarkable capacity for compromise and an absolute willingness to defer their core issues in an attempt to build solid relationships with Israeli political leaders. One must also recognize the extraordinary capacity of Yitzhak Rabin to guide the process with common sense and clarity. His death at the hands of an assassin fatally wounded the diplomatic process. But Grinberg's analysis also shows that a peace process is worth taking seriously, not simply for the payoffs but rather for the risks avoided. Hence, despite the widespread apocalyptic pessimism about the prospects for peace, the future, if not the fate, of both Israelis and Palestinians is not simply loosely tied together—it is absolutely shared. The more the rhetoric serves to fire up emotions rather than raise consciousness about what can be done to broker an agreement, the more likely the consequences will prove disastrous. As Grinberg's analysis shows, it is not the time to lapse into slogans or expressions of comfortable creeds but instead to create an agenda for building two sound democracies that will live with commonly recognized borders in the Middle East.
