As a ‘poet of the religious’, Søren Kierkegaard sets before his reader a constellation of spiritual ideals, exquisitely painted with words and images that evoke their luminous beauty. Among these poetic icons are ideals of purity of heart; love of the neighbour; radiant self-transparency; truthfulness to oneself, to another person, or to God. Such ideals are what the ‘restless heart’ desires, and in invoking them Kierkegaard refuses to compromise on their purity – while insisting also that they are impossible to attain. It is the human condition which makes them impossible, and he is willing to describe this in dogmatic terms as original sin – sin being the refusal and loss of God, and thus also the loss of a self that has its ontological ground in its relationship to God – but he is more concerned to explore it in psychological terms. The human condition is for Kierkegaard characterised not merely by ignorance, but by wilful self-deception.
One of the most striking aspects of Kierkegaard's philosophy of religion is his elucidation of a tension at the centre of Christian teaching: between an insistence on the limits of the human being, and an unconditional command or an irresistible impulse to transcend these limits. This would render the human situation utterly tragic were it not for grace, and indeed the difficulty of recognising and receiving this grace makes it tragic enough. The religious life seems to be a sort of spiritual rollercoaster: the beautiful ideals are glimpsed, and they elevate and inspire; one falls short of them, and despairs; a gift is offered and despair is transfigured; the gift slips away and leaves one empty-hearted. ‘Christianity is as paradoxical on this point as possible’, writes Kierkegaard: ‘it seems to be working against itself by establishing sin so securely as a position that now it seems utterly impossible to eliminate it again – and then it is this same Christianity that by means of the Atonement wants to eliminate sin so completely as if it were drowned in the sea.’Footnote 2
In this essay I want to reflect on the structure as well as the content of the kind of impossible ideals that are invoked in many of Kierkegaard's texts. I want to consider the shape of a life lived in relation to these ideals, to trace the twists and turns of the spiritual path as it gains and loses sight of God. There is perhaps something specifically ‘religious’ about the structure of the ideals in question: on the one hand an absolute impossibility, tied to an interpretation of the human condition as such; and on the other hand an absolute demand, an irresistible claim exerted by these ideals that admits of no compromise. I think that this kind of logic can be found in Buddhist teachings, too, and I suspect that it may be shared by other traditions; Jacques Derrida has found the same paradoxical structure in ideals such as justice, democracy, forgiveness and so on – and it may be that these ideals are in some sense religious, perhaps the apparently secularised residue of a essentially theological way of thinking.
In considering on the structure of impossible ideals, I will try to respond to the important and influential critique advanced by Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche famously criticizes the content of Christian ideals: he regards them as symptoms of ressentiment, and as hypocritical insofar their valuation of pity and compassion masks a covert will to power – but he also criticizes idealism itself as a negation of the world we live in. Put in very general terms, this critique rests on the view that if we live according to ideals that could not be instantiated in this world, then we subject this world to values that are not of it, and when life inevitably falls short of these impossible standards it is, as a whole, denigrated. This is an important aspect of what Nietzsche calls nihilism, the essence of western metaphysics, of idealism, of Platonism, of Christianity: ‘A nihilist is a man who judges of the world as it is that it ought not to be, and of the world as it ought to be that it does not exist.’Footnote 3 In his lectures on Nietzsche during the late 1930s, Martin Heidegger explained that ‘the cause of nihilism is morality, in the sense of positing supernatural ideals of truth, goodness and beauty that are valid “in themselves”. The positing of the highest values simultaneously posits the possibility of their devaluation, which already begins when these values show themselves to be unattainable. Life thus appears to be unsuitable and utterly incompetent for the realisation of these values.’Footnote 4 This Nietzschean analysis should be taken seriously, and one way of responding to it would be to compromise on the purity of moral and religious ideals, and on the desire or demand for them, and thus to find a new and less difficult logic of becoming, for example, a Christian – to straighten out the spiritual path. But this is certainly not Kierkegaard's way, for he seeks to accentuate the difficulties – both intellectual and existential – of Christianity. I want to suggest that Kierkegaard is right to regard the invocation of impossible ideals as an indispensable aspect of Christian teaching, and I also want to argue this does not make it, nor any other teaching that is structured in this way, nihilistic. The Kierkegaardian version of ethico-religious idealism can be interpreted as aiming precisely at understanding and enhancing this life, this world. Setting aside Nietzsche's attack on the content of Christian morality, then, we can read Kierkegaard in a way that addresses the general, structural issue of idealism.
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The theme of impossible ideals pervades Kierkegaard's authorship as a whole, although it is naturally most prominent in his more explicitly religious texts. In Fear and Trembling (1843) the pseudonym-poet Johannes de silentio expresses his awe and admiration of Abraham, the ‘father of faith’, and repeatedly confesses his own inability to do what Abraham did: ‘The poet or orator can do nothing that the hero does; he can only admire, love, and delight in him… I cannot make the final movement, the paradoxical movement of faith.’Footnote 5 Johannes de silentio suggests that Abraham's greatness consists precisely in the absolutely paradoxical character of his response to God's command to sacrifice his son Isaac; ‘He who expected the impossible became the greatest of all’,Footnote 6 writes the pseudonym in his ‘Eulogy on Abraham’. When a person ‘examines the conditions of his life’, these ‘explain that [faith] is an impossibility’, but the Kierkegaardian Christian is a ‘knight of faith’ who ‘acknowledges the impossibility, and in the very same moment…believes the absurd, for if he wants to imagine that he has faith without passionately acknowledging the impossibility with his whole heart and soul he is deceiving himself’.Footnote 7
Kierkegaard thought that the assumption that one is a Christian easily and as a matter of course was the most pervasive and dangerous malaise within Christendom, and in Fear and Trembling he seeks to challenge this perceived complacency by raising the question of whether faith is even possible. The implicit question posed by his interpretation of the story of Abraham is: Would you, could you do what Abraham did? could anyone? And if not, do you really have faith? could you? could anyone? Johannes de silentio presents the reader with a beautiful ideal of faith, but at the same time he shows it to be so monstrous, so repellent, that it becomes impossible not only to attain it, but even to wish to attain it. ‘Let us then either cancel out Abraham, or learn to be horrified by the prodigious paradox that is the meaning of his life, so that we can understand that our age, like every other age, can rejoice if it has faith.’Footnote 8
The 1846 discourse Purity of Heart of to Will One Thing, written in Kierkegaard's own name, invokes the ideal of a pure heart – and yet most of the text is devoted to detailing all the different forms of impurity of heart. Desire for reward, fear of punishment, pursuit of a personal victory over impurity, and fluctuations in persistence and effort are all variations of the self-interest that prevents a person from willing the good ‘in truth’, solely for its own sake. Kierkegaard emphasises that ‘the separation of sin lies in between’ a person's resolution to live purely and the successful realisation of this ideal: ‘each day, and day after day, something is placed in between: delay, blockage, interruption, delusion, corruption.’Footnote 9 Similarly, in Works of Love (1850) he outlines only to deconstruct a distinction between pure and impure love; between Christian, agapeistic love and preferential, erotic love.Footnote 10
Another important example of the impossible Christian ideal is the characterisation of faith in Kierkegaard's 1849 text The Sickness Unto Death. Here the pseudonym Anti-Climacus insists that faith, rather than virtue, is the opposite of sin, and of the despair which constitutes the spiritual ‘sickness’ of sin. He describes faith as a state in which ‘the self rests transparently in the power that established it’ – that is to say, in God. But Anti-Climacus goes on to suggest that despair is universal, implying that the clear, untainted, self-present, restful state of faith is never actually reached: ‘anyone who really knows mankind might say that there is not one single living human being who does not despair a little, who does not secretly harbour an unrest, an inner strife, a disharmony, an anxiety about an unknown something or a something he dare not even try to know, an anxiety about some possibility in existence or an anxiety about himself…’.Footnote 11 The real author of the text certainly includes himself among those who suffer from despair; this is why the pseudonymous voice of Anti-Climacus is needed, for faith can only be known, and thus described, from this fictional perspective. Kierkegaard, who is named as the editor of The Sickness Unto Death, considered emphasising his distance from his pseudonym by including an editorial note in which he states that the book's description of despair and sin ‘applies to me in many ways… I, the editor, am not the physician, I am one of the sick’.Footnote 12
But why offer a description of faith if such faith is impossible to attain? Why invoke the ideal of purity of heart if this is unrealisable? What purpose is served by these ideals of transparency and purity? What do these ideals accomplish?
The obvious answer to this question is that ‘resting transparently in God’ presents the reader with a goal to strive after. But surely the profound ‘rest’ of faith must be the opposite of all striving? It is true that Kierkegaard sometimes emphasises the importance of striving. However, if we interpret his ideals as merely regulating a striving for perfection, in the way that Kantian ideals are regulative, this does not respond to the Nietzschean accusation of nihilism – for why should we ‘regulate’ or judge this life according to ideals and standards that can never be found within it?
Kierkegaard's ideals are not just untouchable guiding stars to help us progress from bad to better. The light of these ideals is not a reminder of a remote heaven, but a means of illuminating this world, this life, this human condition. The notion of transparent rest in God, for example, works to bring into relief essential features of sinfulness: the anxiety and restlessness, the concealment and deceit. It is in living with the ideal, in the light of the ideal, that these phenomena of sin come into view – and they need to be uncovered, pointed out, because otherwise the ubiquity and totality of sin, and therefore of its symptoms, hides it from view. (The theological doctrine of original sin conveys precisely these qualities of ubiquity and totality; another way of putting this is to say that the condition of sin, and its concomitant suffering, is ontological rather than psychological.) Kierkegaard suggests in Purity of Heart that the chief reason for practices such as prayer and confession is the exposure of the individual's sinful condition: ‘The all-knowing One does not get to know something about the maker of confession, rather the maker of confession gets to know about himself… The prayer does not change God, but it changes the one who offers it… Much that you are able to keep hidden in darkness, you first get to know by your opening it to the knowledge of the all-knowing One.’Footnote 13 As Kierkegaard observes in this discourse, delusion ‘is unable to check itself.’Footnote 14 Continual anxiety is like a low continuous sound – the humming noise of a refrigerator, for example – that is usually unnoticed until it stops. The concealment inherent in sin deceives itself as well as others. Anti-Climacus' description of rest and transparency serves to expose, by delimiting and rendering recognisable, an inability to rest and to see clearly. In fact, the notions of rest and transparency serve to expose the condition of their own impossibility: the condition of sin. Similarly, the ideal of ‘willing one thing’, crystallized in Purity of Heart, exposes the many different varieties of ‘double-mindedness’ which contaminate even the sincerest attempt to live a good Christian life.
This exposure, this detection of sin, is accomplished by a kind of testing: the ideals of rest and transparency test the anxiety and opacity of sin; the concept of purity of heart tests ‘double-mindedness’. ‘Testing’ here means tapping against something to sound it out for faults and weaknesses, to find whether or not it ‘rings true’ – what Nietzsche, in fact, describes as ‘philosophising with a hammer’ in order to ‘sound out’ idols.Footnote 15 While Nietzsche uses tools such as vigorous critical thinking and, in the 1880s, the doctrine of eternal recurrence to test ideals and values in the name of ‘life’ and ‘affirmation’, Kierkegaard uses ideals to test human life. But the aim of this testing is not to judge life in accordance with a transcendent value, but rather to know life, to gain a more intimate and honest acquaintance with one's own inner life. Both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche exhibit a critical brilliance that has its roots in a much older religious tradition of scrupulous self-examination before God.Footnote 16
To some extent, Kierkegaard's view of ideals echoes Luther's view of the law, which the German reformer presents in his interpretation of Romans 3.20: ‘By the law is knowledge of sin’. For Luther, the law is ‘impossible of attainment’, and thus ‘the entire design and power of the law is just to give knowledge, and that of nothing but sin’. Kierkegaard follows Luther in emphasising the delusion and self-deception that characterize the human condition, and which thus provide the conditions of Christian practice. Luther writes that ‘the Scripture sets before us a man who is not only bound, wretched, captive, sick and dead, but who, through the operation of Satan his lord, adds to his other miseries that of blindness, so that he believes himself to be free… But the work of Moses is the opposite of this – namely, through the law to open to man his own wretchedness.’Footnote 17 Kierkegaard, however, seems to be far more conscious than Luther of the possibility that his writing might be an exercise in testing or sounding out the hidden weaknesses in the reader's inner life, and indeed in his own life too; the impossibility of Christian ideals not only preoccupies his reflections on ‘the task of becoming a Christian’, but often also dictates the style of his texts, especially his use of pseudonyms. As Vanessa Rumble writes, ‘Kierkegaard sets the Christian standard so high that no human could work to attain it and no human consciousness really wish it, so high that…so many of his pseudonymous texts disintegrate into the paired roles of…the observer/poet caught up in submissive wonder before the inaccessible hero of immediacy.’Footnote 18 We have seen how this literary structure is exemplified in Fear and Trembling.
If ideals merely served to expose the human condition as it really is, they might yet seem to be nihilistic, to be orientated to the condemnation of life in the name of an impossible ideal. The important question here is the quality, the ‘how’ of this exposure; the attitude or spirit of the testing, the bringing-to-light. If an ideal helps a person to understand herself and others better – and this involves grasping precisely why the ideal is impossible – then this knowledge can promote compassion, toleration, forgiveness, humility… the very ideals that are impossible to realize in their purity. In all its formulations, the Christian ideal is basically the ideal of love: self-love, love for the neighbour, love for God. There must be, then, a kind of ‘double movement’ involved in the invocation of the Christian ideal: first, an uncompromising questioning in the name of a ideal that has to be preserved in its pristine purity; and second, a profound and loving acknowledgement that this is where we are, this is who we are: it is here, now, under these less-than-ideal conditions that one tries to practise justice, or Christianity, or selflessness, and indeed it is these very conditions that invite or even impel one to practise them. Kierkegaard's attack on the complacency of Christendom is certainly harsh and uncompromising, and it is tempting to regard this as evidence of an intolerant refusal to give Christendom a chance. But on the other hand, his insistence that we are absolutely mired in the state of sin, so much so that only a god can save us, means that we are stuck in Christendom and that therefore our ‘practice in Christianity’ has to take place here.
Practising Christian love involves a double gesture: of challenge and forgiveness, of discrimination and open-hearted welcome, of vigilant self-examination and unconditional acceptance. This implies double-mindedness, and thus impurity, only if the first gesture does not already contain the second, and draw its energy and motivation from it. There is certainly a moment of condemnation when the ideal of purity is invoked: in Purity of Heart, for example, Kierkegaard states that ‘the apostolic admonition “purify your hearts ye double-minded” is condemning, namely, double-mindedness.’Footnote 19 However, he also implies that any condemnation (or even testing) in the name of an ideal of pure love violates the ideal, since the judgment exhibits precisely the ‘double-mindedness’ that purity of heart is supposed to exclude. This very scenario is, in fact, described in Works of Love:
With the one ear you hear what he says and whether it is wise and correct and penetrating and brilliant etc., and, alas, only with the other ear do you hear that it is the beloved's voice. With the one eye you look at him, testing, searching, criticising, and, alas, only with the other eye do you see that he is the beloved. Ah, but to divide in this way is not to love the person one sees.Footnote 20
The second moment of the double gesture of testing in the name of the Christian ideal, then, means looking with love on imperfection, on impurity. One can only look with love on what has been made visible, exposed by the first moment of testing. It is important to recognise that this compassionate attentiveness is just as opposed to overlooking faults indulgently as it is opposed to criticism and condemnation.
Sin, for Kierkegaard, is the reality of human life, and as such it has the highest claim on our attention. The purpose of the ideal of purity is to shed light on sin, helping Christians to see it more clearly within themselves. Kierkegaard knew that focusing on the ideal of purity, rather than on the reality of sin, can be one of many ways to overlook – and in overlooking, to avoid – one's own sinfulness. A genuinely Christian ethic, he insists, ‘does not ignore sin, and its ideality does not consist in making ideal requirements, but…in the penetrating consciousness of reality, of the reality of sin… The new ethics…presents ideality as a task, not however by a movement from above down, but from below up.’Footnote 21 According to Kierkegaard, the task of Christianity is not primarily a matter of believing that certain historical events took place, nor even a non-rational confession of faith, but the continual deepening of a person's inward, heartfelt understanding that she is a sinner. This bare self-identification is given by dogmatics, but Kierkegaard's communicative task is to explore more fully the condition of sin: its phenomenology and its psychology; its modes of operation and its effects; its various manifestations and disguises. The self-discovery of sin does not just accomplish greater intellectual truthfulness, but opens up within sin itself the possibility of becoming a Christian, the possibility of faith, the possibility of a loving life – the possibility of loving life itself in its weakness, its blindness, its impurity.
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I find in Kierkegaard's works an insight into the religious life that is not confined to a Christian context. Or, to put it another way, if this insight is specifically Christian, it expresses a truth that applies to anyone who aspires to live in accordance with ideals that surpass their present human condition. Philosophers outside the Christian tradition, such as Plato and Spinoza, have also recognised that an essential aspect of the task of living in such a way is to bring together love and knowledge, kindness and understanding, acceptance and awareness, compassion and wisdom (philo–sophia). These qualities are like the wings of a bird: they must be equal in size and equal in strength, for otherwise the bird will not fly. Neither knowledge without love, nor love without knowledge will allow what Kierkegaard calls the human ‘spirit’ or ‘inner being’ to grow and flourish.
But doesn't this just present us with yet another impossible ideal? Isn't the perfect balance of awareness and acceptance the narrowest of narrow paths, like a walk along a tightrope that requires super-human precision, delicacy and concentration? Is anything in nature perfectly symmetrical?
From Kierkegaard's point of view, acknowledging the impossibility of such an ideal effects the transition from a merely-human ‘ethical sphere’ of existence to a ‘religious sphere’. In the religious sphere the individual is ‘before God’, and the movement into this sphere is one of surrender and receptivity to God's love. Kierkegaard insists that this movement must be continually renewed, constantly repeated, since sin comes into being afresh at every moment. By oneself, one cannot maintain the balance of knowledge and love – either of oneself or of others – but to exist before God is to be known and loved infinitely, and thus in equal measure. It is in this light that the traditional doctrine of divine omniscience, benevolence and omnipotence comes to life: God knows all, loves unboundedly, and saves what seems irredeemable.
Here, however, we find ourselves in a circle, because this relationship to God, which constitutes the religious sphere, is precisely what is defined as faith – the faith that is impossible, humanly speaking. And how can we speak other than humanly? People sometimes ask me how I can be a Kierkegaardian without being a Christian, and this is not an easy question to answer, but perhaps it is equally difficult to say how one might be a Kierkegaardian and a Christian. Not only does Kierkegaard follow the Lutheran interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount, according to which Jesus does not teach an ethic that we can actually live, here and now, but rather sets an impossible standard that exposes the depth of sin and thus shows us that salvation can come only by faith and by an unmerited gift of grace – but he seems to go even further in accentuating the paradox and impossibility of faith itself. To know and love others is difficult enough, but, according to Kierkegaard, ‘it is far more difficult to receive [love] than to give [it]’.Footnote 22
Faith as Kierkegaard describes it can seem to be an abstract vanishing-point, so highly spiritualised that it is more divine than human. However, his remarks about the practices of prayer and confession, quoted earlier in this essay, indicate a way out of the circle that philosophical thinking alone cannot follow. These practices can bring a person – whether in solitude or in a community – before a knowing, loving God in a more concrete sense, for they involve the whole being in an attitude of the body as well as of the mind, and engage the imagination and emotions as well as the intellect. Likewise, in the Buddhist tradition meditation practices bring together sati (mindfulness) and metta (loving-kindness). For example, the technique of metta-bhavana (cultivation of loving-kindness) meditation involves a kind of attentive well-wishing: the practitioner seeks to channel love to herself, to friends, to those whom she has harmed or been harmed by, to all beings; the technique of vipassana (insight) mediation is the practice of attentive awareness of whatever arises from moment to moment, combined with acceptance of this. In the case of both these techniques, the inevitable failure to maintain mindfulness and metta or acceptance is just another aspect of the self, or just another passing phenomenon, to be observed with understanding and love. The Christian and Buddhist traditions are alike in incorporating very powerful figures of human beings – Jesus and Gotama – who not only symbolise the qualities of wisdom and compassion, but overflow with them in an excess that transcends their historical existences, repeating itself in lineages of teaching, and in liturgical, devotional, and meditative practices.
Kierkegaard writes that ‘in order to pray, there must be a God’, but he immediately adds that (in other words) ‘there must be a self plus possibility’.Footnote 23 Here, a ‘self’ is conceived as determinate, limited, whilst its ‘possibility’ transcends its limitations and yet is in some way related to it. Possibility in this sense is difficult to distinguish from impossibility, that is, from what the individual cannot reach or accomplish by herself. I cannot say what is possible; I do not know what my possibilities might be. I do not even know who I am. But I have encountered in other human beings qualities of wisdom and love that at once reflect back to me my own limitations and show me, with an ephemeral clarity and certainty, that there is much more than I now know beyond them.
