The impact of political and economic decentralization on authoritarian regimes is one of the central themes in the comparative study of communist and post-communist regimes. According to democratization theories, political and economic decentralization is strongly correlated with the collapse of authoritarian political structures. But perhaps theorists see what they expect to see. Since with rare exceptions, unitary authoritarian regimes which engaged in decentralization saw their authoritarian powers eclipsed, theorists have tended to conclude that decentralization leads to, or even causes, democratization. The Chinese case offers an interesting test of this idea, for in China the emergence of local forms of deliberation and consultation has, by contrast, seemed to have cemented the power of the authoritarian state.

After 1978, Deng Xiaoping, the newly emerged leader of China, undertook bold reforms that included economic, fiscal, and administrative decentralization. Year after year, China specialists, democratization theorists, and scholars of comparative communism alike predicted that decentralization made the collapse of the Chinese Communist Party regime inevitable, indeed, imminent. In Decentralized Authoritarianism in China, Pierre Landry sets out to examine why, after 30 years, this has not yet happened. Based on surveys and considerable data about revenues, expenditures, and the leadership from the provincial through the municipal, county, town, and village levels, he demonstrates how the Chinese leadership has been able to stay in power by maintaining the loyalty of government and party officials. In short, instead of collapsing, China has flourished as a highly decentralized authoritarian regime.

To be sure, China's authoritarian regime may yet collapse. But Landry's study cautions scholars against assuming that such an eventuality would be the result of decentralization. Indeed, his study may encourage scholars to reconsider whether decentralization figured as much in the collapse of communist regimes elsewhere as many have contended. Is it possible that, as Landry argues in the case of China, the sustainability of authoritarian control has had more to do with how the country's communist party controlled government and party officials than with mere economic and administrative decentralization? What distinctive institutional arrangements did the Chinese Communist Party effectively utilize to prevent lower level officials from challenging its central authority in the manner of many post-1989 East European counterparts? Put differently, in the post-Maoist period (beginning in 1978), what replaced ideology and political campaigns as the means to monitor local officials and ensure their loyalty to the center?

Landry's answer is that the Party's ability to enforce its new norms and rules—concerning recruitment, promotion, removal, and retirement of cadres in all party, government, educational, research, organizations, as well as in state enterprises and the military—has enabled it to ensure local compliance with central directives, even as it demands that local cadres generate development in an increasingly market-oriented economy. Further, Landry concludes, Beijing has done all this while simultaneously reducing the political costs and inefficiencies associated with closely monitoring local officials from the center. Political reform Chinese-style has, in short, led not to democratization, but rather to the preservation and even the strengthening of the Party's control.

This is not to suggest that scholars of comparative communism and democratization theory should, as a result of Landry's book, conclude that for other authoritarian regimes, the major independent variable would be the party's personnel system rather than decentralization. For the context and contingencies of China—its leadership, historical and ideological legacies, political culture, remarkable economic growth, and the timing of its entry on the global stage—all have affected the Party's ability to retain a decentralized authoritarian regime.

For those theorists wedded to mainstream ideas about what kinds of participatory institutions can emerge in a unitary authoritarian system without transforming the political system itself, The Search for Deliberative Democracy in China is, like Landry's book, full of insights about China's governance. But whereas Landry focuses on why economic, fiscal and administrative decentralization has not led to democratization in China, Leib and He's edited book investigates why citizen deliberation—another form of decentralizing power—as practiced in authoritarian China may actually allow for greater equality and a more consensual, harmonious society—if not more democracy—than occurs in liberal democratic political systems. At the same time, the authors do not see deliberative and liberal democracy in conflict, as both strengthen civil society and promote citizen participation in decision making on public issues.

The authors first discuss the Western theory of deliberative democracy, which originated in the 1990s as an alternative to the rational choice view of how self-interested individuals' preferences are aggregated. Discussing some of the problems that deliberative democracy addresses—such as the public's lack of information and competence to deal with complex public policy issues, and the practical obstacles to large numbers of citizens actually participating in deliberation—the authors propose a variety of deliberative democratic forms, and suggest these can be mixed in with other participatory forms. They thus never argue that a large complex society such as China could be governed only by such deliberative forms. But they do focus on the contributions of deliberative forms to the functioning of the Chinese system.

Deliberative Democracy focuses on populist (not elitist or representative) forms of deliberation. The authors postulate that citizen deliberation in China at the local level may lead to more just decisions for the community than result from national multi-party elections in liberal democratic countries whose electorate lacks knowledge of most current public policy and political issues. The problem is that in China, as elsewhere, participatory deliberation is difficult to implement and, overall, it is inefficient in terms of the allocation of time, human resources (experts, and informed but “neutral” leaders to guide the discussions) and other social resources. The authors in this edited volume disagree on whether the public at large, rather than the informed elite and experts, should participate in deliberation; and if the former then they also disagree on the methods for choosing which members of the public will participate so as to ensure fairness and broad representation.

The contributors also disagree about the effectiveness of local deliberation in China. Theorists of deliberative democracy assume that individuals are equally able to understand the views of others, and to relinquish self-interest for the sake of overarching community interests. In deliberative democracy's idealized form, those with wealth and power would have no more influence than the poor. Yet in China's current system of market socialism, such egalitarian governance is unlikely to occur. Further, although China is home to more than 200,000 associations, which play a crucial role in governance, they do not necessarily play a significant role in actual political deliberation.

Still, in spite of a wariness of public participation that is grounded in the experience of forced political participation and mass mobilization during the Maoist period (1949–1976), both the Party and some of China's leading theorists think deliberative institutions may be more suitable for China than the institutions of liberal democracy. They view deliberation as more likely to lead to collective decisions that have wide community approval and help produce effective governance and a “harmonious society.” China's political culture still prioritizes collective over individual interests, and participatory deliberation is seen by many as a means to promote social order rather than individual autonomy. In this regard China's political culture continues to shape the formation and operation of deliberative institutions.

Some may be surprised to learn that an authoritarian regime would even consider forms of deliberative democracy. But China's leaders have learned that widespread opposition to policies at the local level will lead to serious political problems. This is the main reason the regime, beginning in the 1980s, promoted village and then urban district elections. In today's China, liberalizing reforms have given citizens more rights, and these have led to rapid economic growth; but they have also led to the polarization of wealth, increasing crime, social instability, and the undermining of certain substantive rights (such as guaranteed housing, jobs, education, and medical care). The leadership has realized it cannot rely on an ossified, unchanging administrative and political system to manage these new problems and to avoid the anger that erupts in public protests against economic enterprises and local officials. It has also learned that community involvement in decision-making can help save money, avoid mistakes, and result in better local governance.

So, in addition to decentralization of the party-state, the leadership has increasingly resorted to consultative meetings or public hearings on issues of public concern, such as the building of new roads, factories, housing, and sewage plants; and issues surrounding property rights and budgetary issues. National legislation actually requires deliberation before public policies on such issues are implemented, though this is often perfunctory.) At the same time, local forms of deliberation are widely used to monitor the conduct of local officials, to determine their bonuses and promotions, and to control corruption. Citizen mediation, a traditional Chinese form, has become more formalized now to address local conflicts. Such local forms of deliberation help explain why decentralization of administrative control over officials has been successful, and, as Landry noted, assures central authority through improved governmental capacity.

What we learn from these two books is that if it is not “democratizing,” China is nonetheless modifying authoritarianism through a wide variety of practices, institutions, and policies that have led both to greater decentralization of control and greater citizen participation. These reforms represent a pragmatic blend of democratizing and authoritarian elements. The democratic elements are not intended to promote liberal democracy, but rather to promote more effective governance. And, by incorporating appropriate democratic elements, the leadership has thus far succeeded in making China's party-state both less authoritarian and even more secure.