We have reached the point where it is no longer necessary to begin reviews of books on Plato's Laws by lamenting the relative neglect of this dialogue. The twenty-first century is witnessing an ever growing number of excellent works on all aspects of the Laws, the monograph under review being the latest (though others may well have appeared by the time this review does).

The subject of the book is, broadly speaking, the connections between human nature, ethics, politics and aesthetics in Plato's Laws. The particular focus is on the nature and practice of citizenship, and the role of music (μουσική broadly understood) in the proper development of citizens and the practice of citizenship in Magnesia, Plato's second best city. Although the Laws is no longer a neglected dialogue, P. makes it clear that there is still a need for further work on citizenship in the Laws, and particularly on ordinary citizens and the unusual role of music in the formation of proper citizens. This volume fulfils this need admirably.

This is a complex and compact work, difficult to summarise in a way that captures its complexity. After laying out some preliminaries, the bulk of the book is divided into two parts. Part 1, ‘Performing Ordinary Virtue in Plato's Utopias’, consists of two chapters, the first on Plato's conception of the very best city (Callipolis, in the Republic), the second on the second-best city (Magnesia, in the Laws). In the first chapter, what is stressed are the differences between the guardian classes (philosopher-kings and auxiliaries) and the ordinary citizens with respect to their necessary virtue, the music education they receive and the sort of desire that is supposed to produce civic unity (namely philia, eros of a kind being limited to philosopher-kings). In Chapter 2, P. argues that although the society of Magnesia remains ‘deeply hierarchical’ (p. 68), there are significant differences with Callipolis involving the conception of the virtue of ordinary citizens and the music education that aims to achieve it, as well as the prominent role of eros as a motivation to virtue and good citizenship in all citizens. Part 2, ‘Citizenship and Performance in the Laws’, consists of three chapters: the first two add up to the best discussion to date of the choruses in Plato's Laws. Their aim is to examine ‘how choral performances in the second-best city are the primary means to instill and nurture in the citizens’ souls the desire to become a virtuous member of the community’ (p. 192). The third chapter of Part 2, on comedy in Magnesia, describes how comedy (broadly construed) is used to expose citizens in a controlled way to bad behaviour and language. There is an epilogue, ‘On Law, Agency and Motivation’, followed by a bibliography and two indexes.

Throughout, P. deals with numerous important and difficult texts, presented in Greek with English translation, and going through them with her is always worthwhile. I found this especially true of a number of texts in Laws 7: for instance, 817e1–3, on ‘education in choral matters between masters and slaves’ (pp. 62–4); 822e4–823a6, which P. calls the ‘eulogy of the perfect citizen’ (pp. 69–73); 817a2–d8, on tragedians, the passage which famously refers to the second-best city as ‘the truest tragedy’ (pp. 118–28); and 815d4–816c1, on tragic dance and particularly those dances called emmeliai (pp. 173–82). P. also draws fascinating and fruitful parallels between passages in the Republic and Laws, and in ancient Athenian oratory and poetry: for instance, between passages on philia and citizenship in the Republic, and Pericles’ funeral oration in Thucydides 2 (pp. 49–52); between passages on eros and citizenship in the Laws, and the speeches of Demosthenes (pp. 95–100); between Laws 2.666a–c, on the chorus of Dionysus, and the second stasimon of Euripides’ Heracles (pp. 166–73).

I do disagree with P. at times, though in most cases this involves not so much a disagreement about content, but a wish that P. had elaborated on or clarified her views. For instance, in Chapter 1, it would have helped had there been further discussion of the problem (in Aristotle's view, at least: see Pol. 2.5.1264a11–36) of the precise extent of the ‘communism’ of the best city of the Republic and the corresponding education of the citizens.Footnote ¹ Further discussion of Plato's adoption of the Egyptian prohibition against novelty in song and dance (Laws 2.656d–657b; cf. 7.799a–b) would have been helpful: i.e. what does P. believe is its precise nature and what are its implications for Plato's conception of citizenship and particularly his attitude towards ordinary citizens and the nature of Platonic censorship? (P. touches on 7.799a–b on p. 182.) Most of all, I would like to have seen, in the epilogue, some engagement with the secondary literature on the nature of persuasion in the Laws – a topic I believe is central to P.'s project – and particularly with the debate over whether the emphasis on persuasion in the Laws makes it a less authoritarian work than the Republic. I suspect P. would agree with this assessment, given the differences she sees between them; but that is not clear.Footnote ² And this would have been helpful, because in her view the Plato of the Laws regards as important the volition of all citizens (in addition to their being desiring beings) in that they willingly obey the law and feel eros for civic virtue; so discussing these issues further would have let us in on how plausible (psychologically, if not philosophically) P. finds the political philosophy of Plato's last dialogue.

Here are some minor criticisms. On p. ix, P. says that she used Burnet's edition of the Laws (OCT); but the Des Places-Diès edition (Budé) is superior, based as it is on a fuller understanding of the manuscript tradition. On p. 59, P. refers to ‘Saunders’ neologism ἀναγκαιοτάτη σωϕροσύνη’ (an unusual reference) and cites ‘Saunders 1962: 53’; but the bibliography lists a Saunders 1962a and a 1962b. I do not think ‘more advanced’ (education) is a good translation of ἀκριβεστέρα (παιδεία) (p. 68). I occasionally encountered sentences that I could not make sense of (e.g. on p. 7: ‘Secondly, and no doubt because of my personal education as a scholar, I have consciously embraced a reading of the Laws that sees the philosophical and religious discourse as complementary rather than antagonistic’). I noticed few typographical errors: an errant quotation mark (p. 34); a problem with the omicron in εὔρυθμον (p. 36); ‘threatens’ should be ‘threaten’ (p. 91 n. 98); ‘Sauvée’ should be ‘Sauvé’ (p. 187 n. 109); and ‘Loi and persuasion. Sur’ should be ‘Loi et persuasion. Recherche sur’ (p. 248).

Such differences and quibbles aside, this volume is must reading for anyone interested in Plato's political philosophy and aesthetics and/or in ancient Greek conceptions of citizenship.