The cultural upheaval that characterized the so-called “long sixteenth century” was brought on by a crisis of authority. The old traditions—whether they related to religion, philosophy, physical science, geography, or cosmology—could no longer go unquestioned. It is no wonder that René Descartes began his epistemological experiment with doubt; in his age, there was much to doubt. In matters of faith in particular, whatever semblance of social-religious unity previously existed in the medieval consensus was eradicated by the Reformation. Christian Europe was in search of a kind of certainty that would restore the religious unity that had been so quickly and completely undermined.
In this situation, questions regarding religious authority, its nature, and its reliability dominated early modern theology. As such, a prominent feature of the doctrine of scripture in this period was the topic of the perspicuity, or clarity, of scripture, which Michael Legaspi calls “the great question among seventeenth-century interpreters.”Footnote 1 From the beginning of the Reformation, the critical divide on this hotly debated issue was between Roman Catholic and Protestant interpreters, with the latter advocating perspicuity to the individual reader whereas the former upheld the necessary role of the ecclesiastical magisterium in interpreting the Bible.Footnote 2 According to the Jesuit controversialist Robert Cardinal Bellarmine (1542–1621)—at once the bane and muse of the budding Protestant scholasticismFootnote 3—the Protestant opinion that the sense of scripture is clear (clarissimus) is “manifestly false, for Scripture itself presents testimony concerning its own difficulty and obscurity.”Footnote 4 Rather, the church, represented by the Spirit-filled council of bishops and the pope, must interpret scripture and make its meaning plain.Footnote 5 Without the accompanying oral traditions, Bellarmine contends, scripture is not a sufficient rule.Footnote 6 Against such statements, the Protestant doctrine of perspicuity, while acknowledging many difficulties within scripture, ensured that the necessary teachings of scripture could be understood apart from the mediation of the church. The Westminster Confession of Faith (1647) well summarizes over a century of Protestant argumentation: “All things in Scripture are not alike plain (perspicua) in themselves, nor alike clear unto all; yet those things which are necessary to be known, believed, and observed, for salvation are so clearly (perspicue) propounded and opened in some place of scripture or other, that not only the learned, but the unlearned, in a due use of ordinary means, may attain unto a sufficient understanding of them.”Footnote 7
Among Protestant groups in the seventeenth century, no one seems to have emphasized the perspicuity of scripture more than the Dutch Remonstrants. As their very name indicates, the Remonstrants (Remonstrantse Broederschap) in The Netherlands were born from the womb of controversy. Years of dispute over a number of theological loci nourished the young movement. The teaching regarding the nature and interpretation of scripture, however, was not among the principal heads of doctrine debated in the formative years of the Remonstrants, the second decade of the seventeenth century. The theological forebear of the Remonstrants, Jacob Arminius (1559–1609), was not criticized for his doctrine of scripture; indeed, his teaching on this topic seems to have fit comfortably within the bounds of the developing Reformed orthodoxy.Footnote 8 Even the Synod of Dordt (1618–1619), whose delegates took brief note of Remonstrant biblical interpretation,Footnote 9 had nothing to say in its final canons about Remonstrant attitudes toward scripture. It did not take long, though, for Remonstrant theologians to develop a doctrine of scripture that, having gone beyond the emphases of Arminius in important ways, not only caught the attention of opponents, but also reflected and contributed to a trajectory that would lead to the development and hegemony of the so-called historical-critical method.
The main purpose of this essay is to examine the thought of two Remonstrant theologians, Simon Episcopius and Étienne de Courcelles, and to show how their interpretation of scripture illustrates the transition from reformational toward modern biblical hermeneutics in the Dutch Golden Age. With the exception of a recent essay by Kestutis Daugirdas, there has been no substantial examination of the hermeneutics of these Remonstrant theologians.Footnote 10 As Daugirdas has argued, the seventeenth-century Remonstrant contribution to biblical interpretation consists of an increasingly historical approach to scripture interpreted on the basis of right reason, hermeneutical moves that were probably originally inspired by Socinian exegesis.Footnote 11 The present essay aims to confirm and supplement the research of Daugirdas by tracing the related topics of the perspicuity of scripture, the senses of scripture, and their implications in the writings of the first two Remonstrant professors of theology, with a view also toward their development beyond Arminius's thought. Their development of the Remonstrant hermeneutic is an important chapter in the rise of modern biblical criticism, and one that has been overlooked by most histories of exegesis.Footnote 12 Chief among the many points that emerge from reading these Remonstrants is the following irony: the Remonstrant emphasis on perspicuity could not bear the weight of the Remonstrant emphasis on the historical-grammatical sense of the text. Those two values were in tension. Perspicuity inadvertently fostered obscurity, which would eventually detach biblical exegesis from the church and its articulation of doctrine.
I. Right Reason and the Perspicuity of Scripture
This study of Remonstrant hermeneutics begins with Simon Episcopius (1583–1643). He was a former student of Jacob Arminius in Leiden. Later he became a professor of theology in the same university and the leader of the Remonstrants at the Synod of Dordt. He was the first professor of theology at the Remonstrant Seminary in Amsterdam from its founding in 1634 until his death in 1643.Footnote 13 Overall, Episcopius's doctrine of scripture was typically Protestant. The parts that first came under fire were his comments regarding the perspicuity of scripture. In Episcopius's case, it was not the Roman Catholics but fellow Protestants, the Reformed orthodox, who most vigorously opposed him.
Episcopius first stated what would prove to be a controversial view on perspicuity in his Leiden disputations. In an early public and a later private disputation, he asserted that scripture is clear to all readers and hearers who use their “natural reason,” or, as he also put it, who are “gifted with common reason.” Episcopius does not imply—indeed, he emphatically denies—that all scripture is equally perspicuous. In fact, he would elsewhere admit that there are many passages of scripture that are difficult or absolutely vexing. But the matters that are necessary to know, believe, hope, and do (scitu, creditu, speratu, factu) for salvation “can be easily understood.” Episcopius also specifies that scripture must be engaged without the interference of the affections, which interpose negligence and prejudice. In such a case where the power (vis) of understanding seems to be clouded or suppressed, it is not really the capability (potentia) of understanding that has been impeded, but the will or the act of understanding.Footnote 14 The heart of this controversy would focus on Episcopius's claim that the “power (vis) of apprehending and perceiving” the true sense of scripture is a “natural” power that does not require any “supernatural light.”Footnote 15
By 1616, Episcopius's own faculty colleagues in Leiden, whose suspicions were already on high alert due to his Arminian soteriology, had now flagged his statement on the perspicuity of scripture. Johannes Polyander (1568–1646) wrote an anonymous pamphlet criticizing Episcopius for teaching an optimistic anthropology in his early public disputation on scripture. Polyander observed that the disciple of Fausto Sozzini, Krzysztof Ostorodt (ca. 1560–1611), claimed in his Institutes that scripture can be understood “without the inner illumination of the Holy Spirit,” an opinion contrary to that received among Reformed theologians. Polyander then noted that the same thing was said by Episcopius.Footnote 16 Throughout his polemical treatise, Polyander drew parallels between Episcopius and Ostorodt, implying that Episcopius was dependent on the Socinian. Episcopius's views were the subject of some discussion later at the Synod of Dordt, though they were not listed among the Remonstrant errors.
Shortly after Dordt, Episcopius restated his views on perspicuity in the Remonstrant Confession of 1621, affirming that “common sense” or “right reason” (ratio recta) is sufficient for understanding the Bible's literal sense.Footnote 17 Polyander, this time with the aid of his three Leiden faculty colleagues (sans Episcopius, who had been purged from the Leiden faculty), responded in 1626 with a lengthy Censure contesting the Remonstrant Confession section by section.Footnote 18 As Polyander had done a decade earlier, the Censure accused Episcopius's Confession of Socinianism, but now with slightly less subtlety. The following sentiment stated in the midst of chapter one is typical of the suspicion of Socinianism that permeates the Leiden Censure: “Indeed the sense and sentiment of this section [of the Remonstrant Confession] is orthodox; nevertheless, the words and phrases smell like Socinianism.”Footnote 19 Specifically, on the issue of perspicuity, the Censure opposes the notion that one can read scripture and effect faith and obedience without the preceding illumination of the Holy Spirit; that people can by natural powers understand and fulfill God's law, though grace may help them understand and fulfill it more easily, is nothing but Pelagianism.Footnote 20 In the opinion of the censors, the apparent Remonstrant elevation of human reason not yet (nondum) illumined by the Holy Spirit did not take seriously enough the apostle Paul's claim that fallen reason is blind and distorted.Footnote 21 The doctrine of scripture became a means for attacking Episcopius's theological anthropology.
It was Episcopius's turn to go on the offensive. He replied to the Censure with his Apologia pro Confessione.Footnote 22 Here and in his Institutes one can find his mature thoughts on the matter. Just as scripture is sufficient and perfect in its revelation of necessary articles of the faith, so scripture, he claims, is also perspicuous in matters necessary for salvation (ad salutem).Footnote 23 Episcopius then enumerates all the things that are necessary to believe and to do.Footnote 24 He reiterated that special internal illumination is not necessary for understanding the literal sense of scripture; rather, natural grace that is common and universal is all that is necessary and sufficient.Footnote 25 Against the charge of Pelagianism—that one can be saved without prevenient illumination—he wrote that to understand what scripture says is quite distinct from assenting, believing, and obeying unto salvation. “It is one thing to believe,” Episcopius writes, “and another to understand.”Footnote 26 When he says that scripture is perspicuous to natural reason, he does not mean that faith, which is a very different matter, can come without supernatural light. He only means that the words of scripture can be understood, though not necessarily believed and obeyed.Footnote 27 Many passages of scripture are obscure; but if there is any disagreement over the necessary matters, it is due to the “defect (vitio) of the interpreters,” not to the clarity of the scriptures.Footnote 28
Episcopius proceeded to defend his meaning of “right reason”:
For right reason here does not mean the power (vim) by which man reasoning (ratiocinando) from himself can devise or find what is right and agrees with the divine will, but only [means] the power by which he can apprehend the sense clearly and perspicuously revealed by God or elicit from the circumstances of words, from what precedes and follows them, etc., rightly or agreeably (convenienter) to the intention of him who uttered the words.Footnote 29
In short, right reason is simply the faculty on the human side that ensures that scripture will be perspicuously understood. Episcopius's opponents insisted that the Holy Spirit's supernatural, inner light was a necessary prerequisite for understanding the grammatical sense. Episcopius, however, was simply not willing to accept the premise that the grammatical sense could not be understood, and that some spiritual sense or special illumination was necessary before understanding the grammatical sense.Footnote 30
So far, one can conclude that Episcopius emphasized the perspicuity of scripture as much as, if not more than, any of his contemporaries. He certainly opposed what Protestants took to be the Roman Catholic emphasis on the doctrinal obscurity of sola Scriptura, which requires that the church's hierarchy, aided by the Holy Spirit, act as interpreter. And he was evidently concerned with the Reformed who, at best, seemed inconsistent in their support of biblical perspicuity and, at worst, inclined toward a form of enthusiasm and revelation prior to and apart from scripture. However the supernatural illumination of the Spirit was thought to aid biblical interpretation, whether mediated through the church (Roman Catholic) or directly to the elect reader (Reformed), Episcopius resisted the notion. He thus underscored the ability of common reason, not to intuit doctrines about God, but to grasp the necessary points of what God has revealed. Aza Goudriaan, while considering Episcopius on this point, notes that the “Arminian intellect seemed to be adorned with more abilities than the darkened intellect that the Contra-Remonstrants knew.”Footnote 31 This observation seems correct, especially given Episcopius's assertion of the ability to understand scripture without assenting in faith; the intellect is not as bad off as the will and affections.
Étienne de Courcelles (1586–1659) was Episcopius's successor as Remonstrant professor of theology in Amsterdam from 1643 until his death in 1659. Although he was no thorough-going Cartesian himself, he was, nevertheless, a friend of Descartes and probably translated the Discourse on Method into Latin.Footnote 32 In his Institutio, De Courcelles followed the main points of Episcopius on the perspicuity of scripture. De Courcelles does not deny that there are many obscure things in scripture; but, he claims, there is no one, either regenerate or unregenerate, who cannot grasp (capere) the doctrines necessary for salvation.Footnote 33 Unlike Episcopius, De Courcelles does not provide a long list of those necessary doctrines. There may be fewer of them for De Courcelles.
In line with Episcopius, De Courcelles stresses the role of reason in his assertion of scripture's perspicuity. He defines reason as the select faculty of humanity that makes him truly human and constitutes his essence, distinguishing him from inanimate creatures and animate brutes.Footnote 34 In religion, this reason does not function so much to discover things that pertain to divine worship or grasp the mysteries of the faith, as much as it functions to understand and weigh carefully (perpendo) the things that have been divinely revealed.Footnote 35 De Courcelles admits that reason may be corrupted by sin, but no more so in matters of religion than in any other area.Footnote 36 In order to understand, one must bring to the reading of scripture “a mind empty of affections and prejudices, as much as possible.”Footnote 37 We must free ourselves from these impediments and implore the help of the Holy Spirit for the pursuit of piety.Footnote 38
According to De Courcelles, the potential pitfalls of reasoning do not negate the necessity of using right reason in religion. He chides ignorant (imprudentes) theologians who think otherwise, for they attempt to prove the defects of reason by the use of reason and syllogisms, thus openly contradicting themselves.Footnote 39 “For [these] are contradictory things that mutually overturn themselves: to understand, and not to use understanding and reason in understanding.”Footnote 40 Reasoning is inevitable. Furthermore, De Courcelles concludes that the mysteries found in scripture do not contend against reason. Certain concepts may surpass the grasp of human reason and could never enter the mind unless they are revealed by God, such as the resurrection of the dead and return of Christ. If there are any teachings that cannot be harmonized with reason, De Courcelles writes, “it is certain that they are not drawn out from Holy Scripture, which acknowledges as its author the liberal giver (largitorem) of reason.”Footnote 41
De Courcelles's perspective on perspicuity is quite consistent with that of Episcopius; as might be expected, though, the successor seems to take the distinctive points a little further than his predecessor. For example, Episcopius mentioned the need to cast off all hindrances when using reason to interpret scripture. De Courcelles perhaps emphasizes even more the need for objectivity and the ability to “free ourselves from these impediments.” Despite De Courcelles's lip service to the analogia fidei,Footnote 42 the rejection of church tradition is the consequence of getting rid of all “affections and prejudice.” When he calls readers to rid themselves of affections and prejudgments about religion, it is difficult not to hear echoes of his friend Descartes, whose very first epistemological rule in the Method was
never to accept anything as true that I did not know evidently to be so; that is, carefully to avoid precipitous judgment and prejudice; and to include nothing more in my judgments than what presented itself to my mind with such clarity and distinctness that I would have no occasion to put it in doubt.Footnote 43
When De Courcelles strove to read the Bible objectively, perhaps he was simply following the advice of his friend, who sought to apply his rational method “just as profitably to the problems of the other sciences as [he] had done to problems in algebra.”Footnote 44
Furthermore, De Courcelles offers a much longer defense of right reason than does Episcopius. In the course of showing that reason is necessary and has historically been important to the Christian intellectual tradition, he also sidesteps the issue of how important reason has become in his interpretation of scripture. When considering the transition from premodern to modern exegesis, the issue is not whether right reason should be used in interpretation, for Jewish and Christian exegetical traditions have generally affirmed it.Footnote 45 Reason, however, had also traditionally been chastened by a healthy understanding of its limits.Footnote 46 De Courcelles, by contrast, seems to think readers can simply know when they are neglecting or misusing reason. More important, he unambiguously makes reason the final arbiter when he asserts that revelation must be subject to the test of reason.Footnote 47
How does the trajectory of perspicuity look from Arminius to De Courcelles? Like his Remonstrant successors, Arminius had previously asserted that things necessary for salvation can be “perceived” by anyone using reason.Footnote 48 But he went on to say that these senses are “perspicuous” only to those who are illumined by the light of the Holy Spirit.Footnote 49 According to Arminius, one cannot understand scripture's sublime mystery without the illumination of the Holy Spirit.Footnote 50 Whether or not Arminius intended to draw a distinction between perceptibility and perspicuity, his successors were much clearer than he in their emphasis on perspicuity without the light of the Holy Spirit. A. H. Haentjens described the Remonstrant scripture principle as an attempt to gain clearer theological knowledge by replacing the Calvinist testimony of the Holy Spirit with the “scholarly-rational principle of reason.”Footnote 51 More than a development, this marks a point of discontinuity with Arminius, whose thought in this regard is more typical of the mainstream reformers. Moreover, just as Arminius had put up some resistance to the results of confessionalization in the United Provinces, the Remonstrants soon codified their resistance to human confessions in their own confession (an irony which was not lost on them). For the Remonstrants, because it is perspicuous and its necessary contents can be understood by anyone using reason, reliance on the Bible alone is a sufficient basis for Christian faith, practice, and unity. The Remonstrant contribution to this great question was their zealous endorsement of perspicuity through the use of reason. At least this was their ostensible intention.
II. Authorial Intent and the Senses of Scripture
Another question that arose in the discussion of Episcopius's doctrine of scripture had to do with the senses or meanings of scripture. At least from the time of Andrew of St. Victor (d. 1175) and especially Nicholas of Lyra (ca. 1270–1349), the literal-grammatical sense enjoyed increasing privilege among western biblical interpreters over the three spiritual or mystical senses of the quadriga (namely, the allegorical, tropological, and anagogical senses).Footnote 52 This trend endured in the Reformation, especially in the influential exegesis of John Calvin.Footnote 53 Such emphasis on the literal sense would come at a price and with implications of its own. The evolution of the grammatical sense, as it appears in the writings of Episcopius, is subtler than his stance on perspicuity. The Leiden theologians, however, noticed and raised Episcopius's position in their Censure. Specifically, they accused the Remonstrant Confession of confusing the grammatical, or literal, sense with the spiritual sense of scripture. Instead, Leiden Reformed orthodoxy claimed a distinction between the grammatical sense and the spiritual sense, admitting that one perhaps can understand the grammatical by a natural mode, but not the spiritual sense. The confusion they detected in Episcopius they saw as another mark of Socinianism.Footnote 54 In other words, since Episcopius claimed that matters of salvation can be understood by anyone (that is, in view of his robust view of reason and perspicuity), his adversaries then charged him with collapsing the spiritual or salvific meaning of scripture into the literal meaning.
Episcopius was obviously exasperated with the charge of Socinianism. In his Apologia, he began his response with a lament, writing, “Alas (Eheu)! I believed this section [of the Confession] to be most reformed, and it is Socinian, says the Censor.”Footnote 55 He then asked how the distinction between literal and spiritual senses should be understood, since his opponents merely assert the distinction without defining it. They should explain how the spiritual sense is contained in the literal sense. As far as Episcopius is concerned, the spiritual senses of the quadriga are not properly senses of scripture at all. In the midst of his questioning, Episcopius wonders if his opponents think that every passage of scripture has a twofold sense and that every doctrine taught in the grammatical sense also has an additional, spiritual meaning, a view which he found to be absurd. For example, the doctrine that Jesus is God's Son is derived from the grammatical sense. Episcopius wonders what the additional, spiritual sense of this doctrinal proposition would be.Footnote 56
As he begs for clarification from the opposition, Episcopius does not have anything positive to say about a spiritual sense, but indeed seems to eliminate it or collapse it into the grammatical, as the Leiden theologians suspected. According to Haentjens, “The ‘sensus’ that he [Episcopius] wanted to trace in the words of Scripture was the ‘sensus Grammaticus,’ which he placed against the ‘sensus spiritualis.’”Footnote 57 Episcopius does allow for typology in certain places, however, particularly when it is evident in scripture itself.Footnote 58 For example, he acknowledges the literal sense of Isaiah 7:14, which applies to the time of King Ahaz of Judah, and he also sees a mystical sense or double prophecy that applies to the birth of Christ. But, he is quick to point out, a mystical sense such as this is evident in the literal-grammatical language itself (ipsa litera, sive verba nuda) and in the context of the book of Isaiah. It is confirmed by its application in Matthew 1:22-23.Footnote 59 Discovering “the intention of the one who uttered the words,” revealed in the literal sense, is the task of interpretation.Footnote 60
Like his predecessor, De Courcelles also privileged the grammatical sense. When interpretation becomes difficult, one should study and explain scripture just as one would the writings of any other author, namely, by attending to the scope, literary context (antecedentia, consequentia), and historical circumstances of the passage in question.Footnote 61 The contrast with earlier, traditional exegetes, whose solution for obscure texts was generally to turn to spiritual meanings and other scriptures, is striking. De Courcelles does comment on the various senses of scripture, naming and defining all four senses of the quadriga. He accepts the spiritual senses, but in this qualified way: Every example he gives of a spiritual sense comes from scripture itself, that is, from the New Testament's use of the Old. Such mystical senses are not to be sought easily in scripture, unless they are taught in scripture.Footnote 62 In other words, readers should not discover spiritual senses on their own; only God can do that in scripture. In a consistently Protestant mode, De Courcelles cautions that the mystical sense should never destroy the literal sense, as certain ones do who turn the principal stories of scripture, such as creation and the fall, into “mere allegories.”Footnote 63 All narratives that could be interpreted literally should be interpreted literally.
The focus on the historical-literal sense of scripture to the near exclusion of any spiritual-allegorical sense had several predictable results in the thought of Episcopius and De Courcelles, none of which was unique in the early modern period. (No chronological or causal order is implied in the following arrangement; these results were mutually reinforcing.) First, the search for the literal sense and human authorial intent led both Episcopius and De Courcelles to concentrate on original languages and text criticism. Both took for granted that one must go back to the original Hebrew and Greek sources. Returning to the example cited above, Episcopius argued extensively about the controversial meaning of almah in Isaiah 7:14, citing Hebrew and Aramaic etymology and grammatical usage, as well as the Targums and the Septuagint.Footnote 64 By comparison, premodern theologians were decidedly less interested in word studies.Footnote 65 This Renaissance impulse to the original source languages entailed the search for the original texts. De Courcelles sang the praises of contemporary discoveries among Greek, Latin, Arabic, and Syriac codices of the New Testament, proving that the text was mostly uniform, if not for the mistakes committed by ignorant scribes. He optimistically claimed that one “can easily discern the true reading from the false.”Footnote 66 De Courcelles himself contributed to the discipline with his publication of a critical text of the Greek New Testament in 1658, boasting that it “exhibits a gathering of variant readings fuller than any other.”Footnote 67 Again, it is not that the burgeoning discipline of text criticism was unknown among premodern interpreters, but in its further developments it would become the core of biblical studies up through the turn of the twentieth century.
This assumption that Christian readers must grasp the grammatical sense and must return to the sources (the original texts and languages) led to the obvious need for translation. De Courcelles affirmed that “metaphrasis” (that is, translation) is necessary because
all who fear God are obliged (teneantur) to read and meditate on Holy Scripture continually: but most of them today are ignorant of the Hebrew and Greek languages, who cannot do it, unless it is turned into other known and familiar [languages] by men who are themselves experts (peritis) in these [languages].Footnote 68
He then proceeded to prove, from scripture itself, that all God's people are required to read the Bible for themselves.Footnote 69 In other words, the Bible should be read by all, but, if not for the aid of scholars, it would be inaccessible to all.
A final consequence of the focus on the historical-grammatical sense is the increasing significance of contradictions in scripture, the proclivity to harmonize, and the question of infallibility. De Courcelles can be found attempting to harmonize the gospel accounts of the women visiting the tomb of Jesus,Footnote 70 and, along with most of his contemporaries, he has no hesitation in calling scripture “infallible,” especially in contrast to alternative norms for theology.Footnote 71 But these concerns about contradiction are more copiously illustrated by Episcopius. Many of the issues treated in his 64 Questions deal with reconciling different passages of scripture, some within the same book, but most in different books of the Bible. He finds a “very easy (facillima)” solution for most difficulties. A common refrain in this treatise is, “The solution to this question depends on the right understanding of each passage.”Footnote 72 His constant concern is to harmonize and resolve any tension without proposing anything too ridiculous or implausible.Footnote 73 He gravitates to interpretations that are “plain and easy,” and avoids those that seem “too anxious and elaborate” to him.Footnote 74
In Episcopius's discussion of scripture's authority, he considered the objection that scripture cannot be divine because of its absurdities and contradictions. In reply, Episcopius made a distinction between meanings (sensus) that pertain to the “substance of religion itself” and those that do not. Those meanings that reflect mistakes of ignorance or lapse of memory are not about the essence of religion, but are about some circumstance or narrated deed which does not come by revelation, but from the human writer alone, whose memory fades away and perishes:
For, as we concede, nothing forbids the Holy Spirit of God to leave the writers of the sacred books to their human condition and fragility, in describing these things that pertained to the circumstance of a deed (facti), for which intelligent knowing (sensata notitia) and memory was sufficient, although it was liable to lapsing.Footnote 75
Details related to numbers or to names, authors, or circumstances of some time or place all fall outside the substance of religion, and therefore those details may be in error. Episcopius acknowledges that some “pious interpretations” may resolve difficulties, which is also evident in the harmonizations he proposed in his 64 Questions. But by pious interpretations he does not mean “what is exceedingly horrid, crude, violent, forced, and alien from every appearance of truth,” but simply an interpretation that satisfies a pious person.Footnote 76 Otherwise, “it would be enough and complete and less liable to a calumny, freely and willingly to acknowledge a trivial (levem) lapse of memory, lest we manifestly appear to favor absurd and contorted things, than to use an exceedingly absurd interpretation to excuse trivial lapses.”Footnote 77 In other words, if a plausible explanation can be found, go with that; if not, then it is not worth the contorted salvaging of a minor error regarding a trivial matter that does not concern the substance of religion. As might be expected, Episcopius must spend the next paragraph assuring his readers that such lapses never concern more serious matters of the faith.Footnote 78
How does the trajectory of the senses of scripture and the implications look from Arminius to his later successors, Episcopius and De Courcelles? For Arminius, the legitimate sense of scripture is what the Holy Spirit intended, gathered in the grammatical sense.Footnote 79 Yet he openly acknowledged a “double meaning (sensus)” that lies under the same words of scripture.Footnote 80 He does not seem as ready as Episcopius and De Courcelles to marginalize the spiritual senses or only allow them where the New Testament already has. As noted above in the case of reason and perspicuity, there seems to be some development away from Arminius in this case as well, and Episcopius and De Courcelles are part of the story that leads to the rejection of the spiritual sense.
The reformist sentiment expressed by sola Scriptura led to an ever more concentrated examination of the nature of scripture. To be sure, text criticism, the use of original languages, and the attempt to harmonize biblical passages that stand in tension with one another were not new endeavors introduced by Protestant biblical interpreters; they are as old as biblical interpretation itself. But these tasks took on a new sense of urgency in the history of biblical interpretation when the human authorial intention became the touchstone for meaning and allegorical readings were suppressed. The same Protestant emphasis on the historical-grammatical meaning that reinforced the pursuit of text criticism, original languages, and vernacular translations also intensified the search for contradictions and their resolutions, raising the question of biblical fallibility. These trends are exemplified in Episcopius and De Courcelles. There may be nothing unique about their exegetical assumptions, which would eventually sweep through the academic discipline of exegesis, but this account does suggest that the Remonstrants were on the cutting edge of these developments.
Apart from the question of which method of reading has a more legitimate claim to being correct, one advantage for premodern exegetes was their ability to smooth over discrepancies and deflect criticism by appealing to a fuller spiritual sense that goes beyond the limited perspective of the original human author and his alleged intention. By contrast, Episcopius and De Courcelles wanted to know more about the historical-literal meaning. But once the intention of the human author took center stage and spiritual readings were marginalized and allegorical interpretations rejected, the process would lead to studying the fabulous and unintelligible, either accepting it as reasonable or rejecting it as absurd. Both sides of the debate employed the same textual, linguistic, and scientific tools. For one camp the Bible was literal truth; for the other it was literal untruth.
III. The Eclipse of Biblical Perspicuity
What was at stake in affirming the perspicuity of the literal sense, and what were the consequences for the Remonstrants and others who similarly stressed this affirmation? As a rule, all Protestants affirmed the perspicuity of scripture, but the Remonstrants did so to an exceptional degree for two reasons. The first reason for their emphasis on perspicuity was to counter the Roman Catholic attempt to regulate biblical interpretation.Footnote 81 With a perspicuous Bible in hand, the interpretive prerogative of the Roman Catholic magisterium was deemed unnecessary, along with that of the radical enthusiasts, not to mention the Reformed, who held spiritual illumination above reason. Any alert readers of the Bible can understand what they need to know for salvation. The rejection of overwrought spiritual senses was meant to restore clarity to the text's simple meaning. A second reason for emphasizing perspicuity was to promote unity. At the vanguard of Protestant irenicism, the Remonstrants sought to unify Christians on the basis of the Bible only, whose necessary doctrines could be clearly interpreted and applied by the use of common reason. As Episcopius put it, “for where a right and harmonious understanding of the Scriptures has place, there simply is no benefit for other formulae or statements of faith other than those which exist in the Scriptures themselves.”Footnote 82 The later project of Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677), summarized here by Legaspi, is consistent with the Remonstrant project that began a generation earlier:
Spinoza believed that it was possible and, indeed, necessary to set forth a way of interpreting the Bible that would stem sectarian violence. Spinoza set out to accomplish this, first by setting aside theological judgments and confessional frameworks for understanding the Bible, which he regarded as the “prejudices of theologians” and mere “human fabrications” passed off as “divine teachings.” Having disposed of these, the reader must turn to the text itself.Footnote 83
Without implying any direct influence, one may recognize in Spinoza's famous exegetical project the culmination of a long trend that was articulated and exemplified earlier in the seventeenth century by the lesser known Remonstrants. This “turn to the text”—the philological enterprise thus freed from confessional frameworks—became the genius of modern exegesis. It is this attempt to attain scientific and precise clarity regarding the grammatical sense and its pre-history, and the concomitant transition away from spiritual senses, that separates the premodern from the modern use of scripture.Footnote 84
At the same time, the focus on the allegedly clearer grammatical sense and human authorial intention, together with a “Bible only” brand of sola Scriptura, led to ever-increasing fascination with the Bible, spawning infinite research into and scrutiny of the Bible as a historical document. How were the people, who were obliged to read the Bible regularly, supposed to cope? The same philologists who told them to read the Bible could not provide a firmly established text. Nevertheless, like De Courcelles, they cheerfully published texts with a dizzying array of variant readings. The same biblical scholars who told the common people to read this uncertain text said it must be done properly in languages they could not read. Fortunately, as De Courcelles noted, the “experts” have produced translations. But whose translation, with which expert's annotations, was correct? And what about the authors' memory lapses and the historically fallible parts of scripture? Moreover, how was the Protestant church to apply and gather relevant doctrines from scripture if it was not written for them, but only for the ancients? The literal-historical sense alone, apart from the spiritual senses, would appear to be burdened with the impossible task of serving as a foundation for doctrinal meaning and a defense for traditional dogma.Footnote 85 Even if the ordinary Christian was not aware of all these tensions, the results of rejecting the spiritual senses inevitably filtered down.Footnote 86 The more these historical matters were pursued, the less people seemed to know about the Bible, which was as obscure as ever.Footnote 87 For a supposedly perspicuous set of scriptures, there was very little that was clear. But if only the matters necessary for salvation needed to be perspicuous, then perhaps more latitude and fewer doctrines deemed necessary meant that very little of scripture needed to be perspicuous. The hermeneutical hallmark of Remonstrantism, namely, the proposition that “Scripture is perspicuous” (with the help of reason), needed so many qualifications that it rang hollow. To borrow a line from Antony Flew, “a fine brash hypothesis [in this case, perspicuity] may thus be killed by inches, the death by a thousand qualifications.”Footnote 88
In a revealing passage, De Courcelles writes:
The interpretation of Scripture is of two kinds. For the one [interpretation] merely and simply describes (enarrat) its true sense; but the other [interpretation], in addition, elicits some doctrines from this, which [doctrines] it applies to the use of the hearers and readers. For the most part, professors in the schools are occupied with the former [interpretation]; but preachers (Concionatores) employ the latter in the church and for the people.Footnote 89
The movement that, above all others, endorsed perspicuity was now relegating the study of scripture to the halls of academia. The descriptive mode of interpretation occupied professors in schools because they were the only ones who could do it. And if scholars were the only ones who could describe scripture's true sense, then meaningful perspicuity had been eclipsed. The consequence of endorsing perspicuity through reason, even if accidental, nevertheless became certain. What Jonathan Sheehan said about Luther became the early modern Protestant legacy: “The prophet Luther was a figure overshadowed by that of the scholar Luther.”Footnote 90 Professor De Courcelles's quotation, like the whole hermeneutical program, left the church to its own devices, which meant the church paid even less attention to the scholars. Historical-grammatical description was now for scholars; doctrinal interpretation was for churchmen.
There were three implications of this emerging situation, of which the Remonstrants are one early and important link in the chain. First, as the methods of scholarly biblical study became detached from and even hostile to the handling of scripture in the church, it reinforced the increasingly antagonistic relationship of the university (once the handmaid of the church, but increasingly the handmaid of the state) versus the church. Second, in the hands of scholars no less than in the hands of the churches, biblical study did not foster unity but created more diversity and fragmentation among Christians. Corporate unity would be sought less in communities of faith and more in national identity. Finally, whether one was Roman Catholic or Remonstrant, still the Christian who paid any attention depended on a professional class to make scripture perspicuous. Episcopius and especially De Courcelles simply replaced one magisterium with another.