Heidegger has always been an odd fit in the conversations that constitute political theory. The recent publication of the Black Notebooks, which have confirmed the sincerity of his Nazism and its close connection to the core of this thought, have made that fit even more tenuous. But the greatest thinker of the twentieth century cannot be ignored. Two recent books make very helpful contributions to understanding, once more, Heidegger's place in, or adjacent to, the field.
The first of these, by Mahon O'Brien, is perhaps the most useful introduction currently available on Heidegger's philosophy. In this slim volume (125 pages, including notes and references), he conveys the outlines of Heidegger's “life and thought,” articulates Heidegger's core question, and offers a plausible account of the political trouble posed by his work.
Heidegger's corpus, perhaps more than other great philosophers’, is necessarily situated within the great events of his life for at least two reasons which O'Brien appreciates judiciously. First, contrary to the universalistic rationalism of the Enlightenment and the Western tradition of philosophy more generally, Heidegger insists that the particular and parochial is essential to his thought and the life of the mind as such. In this connection, he claims his own thought is rooted in the highways and byways of Swabian, Black Forest, rural, peasant life. Second, more notoriously, is that Heidegger sought publicly and privately to associate the main lineaments of his thinking with the German revolution led by Hitler in 1933. For a time Heidegger saw himself as the philosophic muse of the National Socialist movement, and even after they had disposed of him, for his entire life it remained the only “positive” affiliation for his antidemocratic, antiliberal, revolutionary reaction and cultural conservatism. O'Brien very ably attends to the character, the notoriety, and the unpleasant personal qualities of Heidegger enough to have them assist the presentation of the problem without ever descending to the gossipy or trivial.
As one would expect of a work that performs the task of a scholarly introduction, much of what O'Brien has to say about the details of Heidegger's writing is cursory or compressed, but this is admirably done. What is most impressive, though, are the occasions where O'Brien is able to offer genuinely subtle and careful readings of a few select passages of Heidegger's work, as he does when he offers an interpretation of the opening chapter of the Introduction to Metaphysics, to capture the thought that guides the question driving Heidegger's entire philosophic career, namely, the question of the meaning of Being. An introduction to Heidegger would be useless if it could not make some headway in explaining the profound, perplexing structure of the question of Being, and O'Brien is admirably clear and intelligible in his exegesis of the Introduction to Metaphysics as itself a gateway to the reading of Being and Time. The treatment of Heidegger's thought is compressed, efficient, and even elegant.
O'Brien's treatment of the secondary literature generally offers an overview, without naming names, though he does single out certain of those interpreters who reduce the entirety of Heidegger's thought to a cartoon of his support for National Socialism. O'Brien focuses on one overarching issue in the scholarly disputes, that is, the dispute about how to read the relationship between Heidegger's later work and his earlier work—what is sometimes referred to as Heidegger I and Heidegger II. Without belaboring the specifics, O'Brien identifies himself as a proponent of an interpretation that stresses continuity rather than rupture. One of the small delights of the book is O'Brien's deployment of Heidegger's own retrospective reflections on the interpretation of his earlier works. It strikes me as apt that readers would be introduced to the interpretation of Heidegger by encountering his first, and perhaps most enduringly interesting interpreter, namely, one Martin Heidegger himself. One expects an introduction to miss out on a thorough treatment of certain aspects of a subject. This volume is a little light on late-Heidegger and on Heidegger's readings of other philosophers.
O'Brien captures the difficult fact that Heidegger's noxious political attachments were indeed an expression of the principles of his most considered thought. He states, with more care and subtlety than any other introductory text, the truth that Heidegger was indeed a convicted Nazi—however idiosyncratic his understanding of that movement was. O'Brien expresses a suitably measured reading of the Black Notebooks, weighs Heidegger's anti-Semitism judiciously, and captures something that this reader has long felt: “For my own part I can't quite see how it took the appearance of the notorious Black Notebooks to convince many Heideggerians that there were serious problems to be faced in terms of the relationship between Heidegger's philosophy and his political views” (77). Even where one disagrees with O'Brien's analysis—as I do concerning the postwar Bremen lectures and Heidegger's notorious comparison of the Holocaust to modern agriculture—he commendably points the way for the reader to form his or her own assessment.
The book points to the central difficulty without presuming to do the work of answering the question for the reader, who must think it through independently. Given the evidence that Heidegger's anti-Semitism, his “troubling” “chauvinism,” his “worrisome” or “controversial” political views, are thoroughly implicated in his most profound thoughts concerning the question of Being—how much can the profundity of the latter can be retained without also the details of the former? There may be more to this challenge than this volume implies, perhaps testified to by the fact that perhaps none of Heidegger's greatest students—Löwith, Kruger, Arendt, Strauss, Gadamer—is properly considered a “Heideggerian.” This question surely leads farther than any introduction to Heidegger should be expected to go, and O'Brien does a fine job preparing for further explorations of this and other similarly vast topics.
The variety of responses to Heidegger may be said to be the theme of a new history of the Frankfurt school of critical theory, Toward A Concrete Philosophy: Heidegger and the Emergence of the Frankfurt School. This impressive account by Mikko Immanen leads us into a vanished world of high culture, learning, and urbane civility—and its ruins, as these great European minds fled to the New World when the Nazis seized power in Germany. The title of the book almost fails to capture the drama within it in this respect: Heidegger is not really a presence; he is more felt than seen, a ghost who haunts the narrative.
Under the rectorship of Kurt Riezler, the University of Frankfurt in the 1920s employed the most brilliant representatives of German intellectual life within its walls, giving life to the turbulent debates between orthodox Neo-Kantianism and the great question of what would come next—dialectical theology, materialist socialist emancipation, phenomenology of one description or another? Several figures were deeply engaged in debates surrounding the neo-ontology of Heidegger; others were exploring what Western Marxism might include outside of the terroristic influence of the Soviet Union. Immanen investigates this ferment by focusing on the reaction of figures from this new, Marxian Left to the thought and intellectual influence of Martin Heidegger.
Immanen excavates this much less well-known period of these thinkers’ encounters with Heidegger from behind each of their later and better known criticisms of Heidegger. One reason this is necessary is that Heidegger's notoriety seems to have influenced many later recollections of how salient or meaningful other luminaries of the German academy found his work prior to the events that led to his infamy in 1933. As a result, the book is organized in three main parts. Immanen begins with the person whose intellectual journey was most personally entangled with Heidegger, Herbert Marcuse, then moves a step further away, to Theodor Adorno, whose relationship to Heidegger was less directly influential, then to Max Horkheimer, whose encounter with Heidegger was of the three least influential (though Horkheimer seems to have sat in on one of Heidegger's courses in 1921). We have here, then, a reconstruction of the shared ground on which important stretches of twentieth-century social and political thought would take place, the genesis of critical theory in contestation with the earliest explorations of phenomenology.
The first section, on Herbert Marcuse's intellectual engagement with Heidegger, traces the former's exploration of the thought of Hegel as a valuable correction of Heidegger's existential analytic. Marcuse—as distinct from Adorno and Horkheimer—retains the Heideggerian attention to ontology as necessary for his project. Drawing on Dilthey's interest in reconstructing the elements of meaning, purpose, and freedom in Hegel's thought, Immanen presents Marcuse's return to the philosophy of life in Hegel; in doing so, he had to displace the then-regnant picture of Hegel as a Christian theologian or a metaphysician of world spirit (67). In the lectures on Hegel to which Marcuse gave careful attention as he drafted his own study of Hegel, Heidegger read Hegel as having intuited a function for the imagination in apprehending human finitude, and yet as having retreated from a full appreciation of the questionability of the Greek (i.e., Aristotelian) regard for being as the object of the understanding. Marcuse, though, found a more promising understanding of the social character of human life in the dialectic of master and slave in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. This, Marcuse argued, was the necessary motif for capturing an ontology of labor and supplementing the Marxian tradition which, in his view, had obscured this element. Through labor the “purely thinglike quality of objects is stripped away” and as “products of labor, they are transformed into forms of ‘life.’” In Marcuse's reading, this insight of Hegel is indeed obscured in his mature thought (here echoing Heidegger), but in this earlier moment, Hegel has placed the pragmata at the center of ontology, and in doing so anticipated Heidegger. Marcuse thus appends to Heidegger's situation of the pragmata of the life world at the center of his analytic of Dasein a more robust social-political teaching concerning the work of labor.
Unlike from Adorno or Horkheimer, Heidegger appears to have learned from Marcuse's reading of Hegel. Immanen's detailed account of the manuscript history of Marcuse's Hegel's Ontology and the Theory of Historicity and Heidegger's comments on its first draft—he was the supervisor of Marcuse's habilitation thesis—and then his 1929 and 1931 courses on Hegel is as fascinating as it is careful. Immanen shows that to dispute Marcuse's reading of Hegel, Heidegger adjusted his focus from the later Science of Logic to the Phenomenology in order to show that this earlier Jena period did not include the pregnant possibilities of a suppressed historical tendency imputed by Marcuse, but instead retained the identity of time with space, under the rubric of the philosophy of nature (76–77). As Immanen recounts, Marcuse's Hegel study had been written in fulfilment of the habilitation, though Heidegger ultimately rejected it. Why? Immanen explores three possibilities: philosophic disagreement, political (anti-Marxist) disagreement, and anti-Jewish bigotry. Each has a large element of plausibility to it. When originally presented with it, Heidegger wrote to Marcuse that it was “very successful” but that “in certain decisive points” he disagreed with the interpretation. On the basis of newly available material from Heidegger, namely the Black Notebooks, which revealed that Heidegger's interest in National Socialism dates back earlier than had been thought prior to their publication, Immanen argues that Heidegger had anti-Marxist and anti-Semitic objections to Marcuse's interpretation of Hegel.
Theodor Adorno is famous for his postwar intellectual rivalry with Heidegger, but this fame has concealed his earlier fascination with and aversion to Heidegger's thought. Immanen explores this principally through his discussions with his Frankfurt colleagues who were more directly engaged in Heideggerian-inspired work.
As Immanen shows, one can see both the fascination with Heidegger and the grounds for rejecting him in Adorno's habilitation thesis on Søren Kierkegaard. In this study, Adorno criticized Kierkegaard—and also the radical appropriation of him by such theologians as Tillich, Bultmann, and Karl Barth—for “hypostatizing the isolated individual from the allegedly inauthentic social world” (132). Adorno would long hold to the view that Heidegger's Dasein is an “individual.” Though Kierkegaard was credited with returning philosophy from the speculative idealism of Hegel to the “concrete historical world,” Adorno found him still to be trapped in this abstraction—and indeed for this abstraction to have captivated the dialectical and Heideggerian theologians among Adorno's contemporaries. Adorno found in Kierkegaard, however, gestures toward the “emancipatory dimension in the aesthetic realm.” Collaborating with Walter Benjamin, Adorno in those years sought to cultivate an appreciation of the liberating possibilities of aesthetic experience. He tried to chart a course that avoided both the Scylla of idealist accounts that would present history as having come to a standstill, failing to appreciate the capacity for meaninglessness in reality itself exposed by the wrenching transformations of capitalist society, and the Charybdis of more orthodox Marxism that valorized labor as such, failing to appreciate the excruciating misery of the workers’ plight and the need for genuine emancipation.
Adorno carried on a debate of sorts with a group dubbed by Immanen the “Frankfurt Heideggerians,” Kurt Riezler, Paul Tillich, and Max Wertheimer, each of whose own intellectual peregrinations circled around the work of Heidegger. Thanks to careful exegesis of several transcripts of discussion fora, and piecing together the timeline of Heidegger's visits to Frankfurt, Riezler's correspondence with Heidegger, and the Davos debate with Cassirer, Immanen reconstructs Adorno's friendly but critical engagements with his more senior colleagues at Frankfurt prior to their emigration upon the ascent of the Nazis. Contrary to Heidegger and what he understood of his influence, Adorno argued against the mythologization of a theory of origins—Ursprungtheoreme—according to which all present historical circumstances must be assessed (140); the attraction of Heidegger, though, was his appreciation of the problem of alienation. Adorno thus understood himself to be offering something of an immanent criticism of Being and Time—of agreeing to its sense of crisis and distress but arguing that these pointed toward the need for social and political emancipation, rather than the imputation to an imaginary origin a lost moment of purity.
The account of Horkheimer concludes the argument of the book. Horkheimer attended some of Heidegger's earliest lectures at Marburg University, where Heidegger was developing the hermeneutics of facticity (by way of introducing the Philosophy of Religion). Immanen reconstructs an amusing event from those early days, where students in Heidegger's course were apparently so distressed at the long, methodological introduction to the study of religion that they appealed to the dean, at which point Heidegger, quite irritated, abruptly canceled all of his introductory discussions and leapt into the interpretation of Paul's letter to the Galatians, promising his impatient students that they were certain to misunderstand everything he said:
Philosophy, as I understand it, is in a difficulty. The listener in other lectures is assured, from the beginning on: in art history lectures he can see pictures; in others he gets his money's worth for his exams. In philosophy, it is otherwise, and I cannot change that, for I did not invent philosophy. I would, however, like to save myself from this calamity and thus break off these so abstract considerations, and lecture to you, beginning the next session, on history; and indeed I will, without further consideration for the starting-point and method, take a particular concrete phenomenon as the point of departure, however for me under the presupposition that you will misunderstand the entire study from beginning to end.
Despite Horkheimer's early, eager interest in the rigor of Heidegger's attention to the hermeneutics of facticity, his later work is arguably most distant from Heidegger's thought. But Immanen plausibly interprets Horkheimer's materialism as a way to conceptualize human finitude. Horkheimer shared with Adorno—and indeed seems to have urged Adorno in this direction—an aversion to abstract, “metaphysical” formulations of the character of the human being—“a timeless subject”—as these could only be formulated at the expense of obscuring the real, public and social historical conditions which contributed to that human misery which required amelioration.
Immanen's study is an extraordinarily valuable discussion of an overlooked and rich intellectual encounter, one which would have great consequences for the century to come. But one difficulty of the book is the way that the interpretation of Heidegger is offered. Because the study proceeds from most-proximate to Heidegger to least-proximate to Heidegger (Marcuse, then Adorno, then Horkheimer) rather than chronologically, we do not get a clear picture of Heidegger's developing reputation or the relevant developments in his own thought. We begin, as it were, from Heidegger's wrestling with Hegel after the Davos debate with Cassirer in 1929, then Heidegger himself almost vanishes from the account, and then returns in his earlier lecture series from 1920–21. Moreover, what might be called the Frankfurt prejudice in Heidegger interpretation—shared by Habermas as well as the three figures focused on here—namely, that Heidegger is a radical individualist in his formulation of Dasein, generally distorts the account of Heidegger as a whole. As a result, we are presented with a figure whose own distinctive understanding of community, expressed in such existential categories as Mitdasein and Mitsein, culminating in the consideration of the role of heritage and destiny in the constitution of the Gemeinschaft of the Volk in Section 74 of Being and Time, is missing (though see 94–95 for a brief discussion of the communal role of the question of Being in a talk of Heidegger's from 1930), is missing. Late in the book, when the discussion turns to the very origins of Horkheimer's interest in Heidegger, Immanen presents an account of Heidegger's early work. Here, finally, we encounter a figure who cannot be reduced to quasi-religious, metaphysical speculations about the essences of human Dasein, but one for whom all such considerations are, yes, concretely rooted in the experience of “facticity.”
Immanen's study demands that we ask, what was the appeal of Heidegger? Or perhaps to put a different emphasis on the issue, what was the special challenge posed by Heidegger? This comes through most clearly early in the section on Horkheimer—incidentally, that portion of the book where Heidegger's own thought is presented most directly. Heidegger sought, by means of a radically sober, nonenthusiastic, logical rigor, to account for “factical life experience,” that is, the basic ground from which experience, questions, and the historical residue of past doctrines emerged and mingled. In order to understand this ground as meaningfully lived, rather than merely post-facto, Heidegger argued that an altogether new form of thinking, one that could be sensitive to the “historical” as it emerged, was necessary. Heidegger's later thought on the Seinsgeschichte was not, as Immanen suggests, a kind of propaganda for Nazism (276), but his account of how the ground of experience had become obscured in our time, and what a new approach to a philosophic grasp of the whole would entail. In other words, the history of Being and his phenomenology are not two separate endeavors in Heidegger; they are both undertakings on the same path.
If these are in fact two modes of inquiry on the same path, then the following may be adduced: the disputes over phenomenology—over what counts as a sound and fine description of the factical world, of the Ur-stuff from which both phenomena and the conceptual material for describing phenomena emerge—are then disputes over the ground shared by each of Heidegger, Scheler, and Husserl, as well as Marcuse, Adorno, and Horkheimer. What then distinguishes these figures—as well as the recovery of “political philosophy” in the twentieth century, oriented by the “theologico-political problem”—from each other is more of an intramural quarrel concerning which phenomena count as the “key” to unlocking the most relevant or sweeping of accounts. For Heidegger the pathe of anguish becomes the phenomenon that reveals our condition as thrown and projecting beings even in our own attention to the question of Being. One may hold that Existenz so presented rests on an excessively “narrow humanity” and still think the riddle to which it points cannot be ignored. Must it not be asked—of the representatives of the Frankfurt school especially—whether human questions concerning the meaning of Being, of what causes something rather than nothing, can be suspended indefinitely, and whether political societies committed to the suppression of such lived questions can really be as humane as they hoped?
