FUNERAL PICKETING IN THE UNITED STATES
The death of a family member or friend is a painful experience and can be particularly poignant when the person is relatively young, and has died suddenly and violently. The recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have meant that the families of some forces personnel have experienced just such a loss, and have gathered together to mourn them at funeral and memorial services. Jesus tells us that those who mourn are blessed and will be comforted, but mourning is, as Rutledge puts it, ‘one of the most private and painful of human experiences’ and is one where ‘the emotional impact of death raises the need for privacy’.Footnote 1 It seems highly likely that, if asked, most people would consider that mourners had a right to mourn privately, free from distress caused by protesters or pickets even where the funeral is a public event, such as the funeral of Margaret Thatcher, which was accompanied by shouted comments from protesters as the coffin passed through streets on the way to the funeral service at St Paul's Cathedral.Footnote 2
In recent years a number of funerals in the United States have been subjected to the practice of ‘funeral picketing’ by members of the Westboro Baptist Church (WBC). The WBC has picketed at the funerals of some American forces personnel who have been killed on active service and at other high-profile funerals such as those of the victims of the Boston Marathon bombing and the children killed in the Newtown school shooting in Connecticut. These pickets have caused distress to family members and wide public outrage. The WBC is a small fundamentalist church based in Kansas whose members believe that God is bringing about these deaths as a means of punishing America for its tolerance of homosexuality. WBC funeral picketers typically gather on the route of the funeral cortège or close to the church where the funeral is to take place, singing and carrying placards with slogans such as ‘God hates fags’ and ‘Thank God for dead soldiers’. Despite the death in 2014 of Fred Phelps, the founder and pastor of the WBC, church members have announced their intentions to continue funeral picketing. In carrying out these pickets, the WBC has principally argued that it is exercising its right of freedom of speech, although it has also sometimes argued that it is exercising the right to freedom of religion. Both of these rights are guaranteed by the First Amendment of the US Constitution.Footnote 3
The rights of mourners affected by the activities of the WBC are less clear because the US Constitution does not include an express right to privacy, but the protection of privacy has been regarded as a matter on which states and the federal government may legislate. For example, in Frisby v Schultz Footnote 4 the US Supreme Court confirmed the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance protecting a person from picketing at his home, holding that there ‘is no right to force speech into the home of an unwilling listener’ or to subject a ‘captive audience’ to a targeted campaign which they cannot escape or avoid.Footnote 5 The widespread public condemnation of the activities of the WBC has led to legislation at both a federal levelFootnote 6 and a state level, with over forty states passing legislation which, while not banning funeral picketing, has imposed limits on the time and place where funeral pickets may occur.Footnote 7 Although it has wide public support the legislation has proved contentious, being the source of considerable academic debate and of litigation.Footnote 8
While US law does allow some limits on where funeral picketers may express their opinions, the US Supreme Court has, in Snyder v Phelps,Footnote 9 made it clear that the expression of those opinions, however hurtful or distressing, cannot be the basis of a claim for damages against the picketers. The funeral of Matthew Snyder, who had been killed on active service in Iraq, had been picketed by members of the WBC. His father sued the WBC for damages for (inter alia) intentional infliction of emotional distress and intrusion upon seclusion and privacy. At first instance he was awarded nearly $11 million in compensatory and punitive damages. In subsequent appeal hearings the amount was gradually reduced. Finally the US Supreme Court held by a majority of eight to one that the WBC's right of freedom of speech on matters of public importance shielded the church from any tortious liability arising from its picketing, including actions for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The family was also required to pay the WBC's court costs of $16,000. The decision of the Supreme Court followed a long line of decisions in which it has been held that the right to express opinions on a matter of public interest, even where such opinions are offensive or disagreeable to others, is a ‘bedrock principle’ of US constitutional law.Footnote 10
Although funeral picketing of the type practised by the WBC has not taken place in England, pickets have been threatened on a number of occasions. In 2008 members of the WBC threatened to picket the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland when it met to ratify the appointment of a gay minister, and in 2009 members of the church intended to picket the performance of a play at Basingstoke School.Footnote 11 These pickets did not take place because members of the WBC intending to carry out the pickets were banned from entering the United Kingdom by the Home Secretary. Nevertheless, the issue raises two interesting questions: what action could be taken by police and church authorities if funeral picketing were to take place in England, and what remedies might be available to mourners subjected to the practice?
MAINTAINING ORDER AT FUNERALS AND MEMORIAL SERVICES IN ENGLAND
Some indication of how the police might treat funeral picketing can be given by looking at the response to similar events with the potential to distress mourners which have taken place in this country. For example, in 2010 members of a group calling itself Muslims Against Crusaders interrupted an Armistice Day service by chanting ‘British soldiers burn in Hell’, loudly and repetitively during the two minutes’ silence.Footnote 12 Despite their claims to be exercising their right of freedom of expression, members of this group were arrested and prosecuted under section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986, which makes it an offence to use threatening or abusive words or behaviour or to display any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening, abusive or insulting within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress. Such action was possible because under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) the right of freedom of expression is a qualified right, and states may impose restrictions which are ‘necessary in a democratic society’ in the interests of (inter alia) public safety, the prevention of disorder or crime and the protection of the reputation or rights of others.
Nor would it avail protesters or funeral picketers to assert that in taking part they were manifesting their religious beliefs (as the WBC have claimed) as, although the right to manifest religion is granted under Article 9 of the Convention, this too is a qualified right subject to similar restrictions as the right of freedom of expression. For example, the right of a devout Hindu to have his body cremated in accordance with Hindu religious practice was refused on the grounds of an affront to public decency when it was believed that the practice would take place in the ‘open air’ (although once it was discovered that it would in fact take place within a building the right was upheld by the Court of Appeal).Footnote 13 And in Connolly v DPP Footnote 14 the prosecution of a committed Christian who had sent photographs of dead foetuses to pharmacists in an attempt to dissuade them from selling the ‘morning-after pill’ was held not to breach her Article 9 and 10 rights. However, any limits imposed on the exercise of these Convention rights must be proportionate. In Öllinger v Austria Footnote 15 the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held that the prohibition of a silent demonstration by six people at a war memorial service to SS soldiers killed in the Second World War was disproportionate and a breach of the demonstrators' Article 10 rights, even when the right of the cemetery users to exercise their Article 9 right was taken into consideration.
Although funeral picketing may appear to be a modern practice, it is clear that in the past funerals and burials have been the subject of disruption sufficient for Parliament to legislate for the maintenance of order.Footnote 16 A number of provisions of older statutes remain in force, and might be used by secular and church authorities were funeral picketing to take place. Under section 59 of the Cemeteries Clauses Act 1847 it is an offence for any person to wilfully and unlawfully disturb any persons assembled in a cemetery for a burial. Section 7 of the Burial Laws Amendment Act 1880 makes it an offence to interfere with the decent and orderly burial of a person by any riotous, violent or indecent behaviour, or to wilfully obstruct a burial. Under section 36 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 it is an offence to obstruct or prevent by threats or force any clergyman or minister from celebrating divine service or otherwise officiating in any church, chapel, meeting house or other place of worship, or to prevent such person from the performance of his or her duty in the lawful burial of the dead in any churchyard or other burial place. Finally, and for the purposes of this Journal perhaps the most important of these older statutory provisions, section 2(1) of the Ecclesiastical Courts Jurisdiction Act 1860 provides for the offence of ‘riotous, violent, or indecent behaviour’:
(a) in any cathedral church, parish or district church or chapel of the Church of England;
(b) in any chapel of any religious denomination;
(c) in any place certified under the Places of Worship Registration Act 1855; or
(d) in any churchyard or burial ground whether during the celebration of divine service or at any other time.Footnote 17
The police may be called to arrest those committing an offence under section 2 of the 1860 Act, but section 3 also provides that offenders may ‘immediately and forthwith’ be apprehended by the churchwardens of the parish where the offence is committed.Footnote 18 The repeal of these offences was recommended by the Law Commission, but the Report of the Select Committee on Religious Offences in England and Wales 2003 noted that 60 prosecutions had been brought under the 1860 Act between 1997 and 2002, and they have therefore been retained on the statute book.Footnote 19
In addition to these statutes, under canon law the churchwardens (and sidespersons) of a Church of England parish church are under a duty to ‘maintain order and decency in the church and churchyard, especially during the time of divine service’ and may use reasonable force to turn offenders out of church.Footnote 20 Barber has argued that, in the case of a Church of England cathedral or a non-Anglican place of worship, where there are no churchwardens to act, ‘every person present at such an incident, although not fixed with a duty to do so, is entitled to use reasonable force to remove any person disturbing the decency of the time or place’ and that ‘anyone doing so would not be guilty of an offence under the ecclesiastical law, or of assault and battery’.Footnote 21 This view is supported by the very old case of Lever v Hide Footnote 22 and by the fact that when Peter Tatchell and others from OutRage! interrupted the Archbishop of Canterbury's Easter sermon in Canterbury Cathedral in 1998, the police declined to charge a cathedral steward who admitted attacking Tatchell.Footnote 23
COULD MOURNERS SEEK DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS?
In Snyder one cause of action was a claim for damages for emotional distress caused by the picketers. Mourners subjected to funeral picketing might be distressed by the activities of funeral picketers but it is clear from the English case law that an action for damages in respect of any emotional distress falling short of the narrow limits of ‘nervous shock’ would not succeed. Although the classic case of Wilkinson v Downton Footnote 24 was based on the intentional infliction of distress by words, liability for this category of damage was curtailed by subsequent decisions and continues to be treated warily by English courts. In Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust Footnote 25 the Court of Appeal denied a cause of action in tort for distress falling short of psychiatric injury. The decision of the House of Lords in Wainwright v Home Office Footnote 26 also demonstrates the continuing reluctance of the English courts to grant damages for hurt feelings. Lord Scott considered that such distress was ‘no sufficient reason why the law of tort should be fashioned and developed with a view to providing compensation in money to the victim’.Footnote 27 Hewson has commented on the difficulties of allowing legal claims to be brought for ‘outraged sensibilities’, citing the sociologist Furedi, who, having analysed actions for distress, had concluded that the subjective nature of the feeling of ‘victimhood’ was one which would make it difficult to draw any clear definitions about what kinds of encounters or incidents should be compensated in law.Footnote 28
COULD MOURNERS SEEK DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF PRIVACY?
The second major claim in Snyder was for invasion of privacy. Privacy is difficult to define, but at its simplest is what Warren and Brandeis famously called the ‘right to be let alone’.Footnote 29 Moreham has argued that privacy should be defined as ‘the state of desired inaccess or as a freedom from unwanted access’ and that the courts should recognise a right to privacy where a person has a ‘reasonable desire not to be accessed in the circumstances’.Footnote 30 Funerals take place in a public place and are generally open to all wishing to attend, but this does not mean that most mourners would accept that this meant that they could be subjected to unwanted access by funeral picketers.
Under the current English law it is unlikely that mourners subjected to funeral picketing would succeed in an action for damages for invasion of privacy. As the House of Lords has held in Wainwright v Home Office Footnote 31 and Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers,Footnote 32 there is ‘no over-arching, all-embracing cause of action’ for invasion of privacy.Footnote 33 The closest that current English law comes to an action for breach of privacy is an action for breach of confidence. Article 8(1) of the ECHR provides that ‘everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence’ but in Wainwright the House of Lords expressed the view that compliance with the Convention did not mean that a new general tort of invasion of privacy needed to be invented, but simply that existing rules might need to be extended to protect Convention rights. The courts have proved willing to extend the tort of breach of confidence to include wrongful disclosure of information, such as publication of photographs taken at the private wedding ceremony of a celebrity couple in Douglas v Hello! Ltd,Footnote 34 the publication of information about a famous model in Campbell Footnote 35 and the publication of photographs of the claimant purportedly taking part in a ‘Nazi sex orgy’ in Moseley v News Group Newspapers Ltd.Footnote 36 The courts have also dispensed with the traditional requirement of some kind of confidential relationship between the claimant and the defendant, now requiring only that the claimant show what Lord Nicholls in Campbell called ‘a reasonable expectation of privacy’ of the information held to have been wrongly disclosed.Footnote 37 However, this is as far as the courts have yet gone in extending the law of privacy; in absence of disclosure of information about the claimant there would appear to be no cause of action.
COULD FUNERAL PICKETING BE ACTIONABLE AS A NUISANCE?
Funeral picketing as practised by the WBC is unlikely to be regarded as a private nuisance. It takes place on public roads and as such would not involve an interference with a claimant's right to enjoy land. A claimant would also lack standing to bring a nuisance action as this is dependent on the claimant having a legal interest in the land affected by the nuisance.Footnote 38 On the other hand it could be argued that, as funeral picketing is a practice which most members of the public are likely to find distasteful or even abhorrent, it could be regarded as a public nuisance. Public nuisance has been described as ‘a rag-bag of odds and ends’ covering a wide variety of activities threatening the public welfare.Footnote 39 Picketing on a public road has been held to be a nuisanceFootnote 40 and in Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter Day Saints and Others v Price Footnote 41 the defendant was held to have committed a nuisance when he repeatedly accosted members of the church outside the church premises and interfered with the activities of church missionaries in a manner which caused offence to church members. Although public nuisance is generally a crime, prosecuted by the Attorney-General or by the local authority,Footnote 42 individual members of a class affected by the nuisance may bring an action for damages in tort if they have suffered special damage which is ‘particular, substantial and direct, over and above that suffered by the public at large’.Footnote 43 This action also has the advantage that, unlike the tort of private nuisance, it is not necessary to have an interest in land.Footnote 44
COMMENT
In England, secular authorities such as the police and Home Secretary would clearly have powers to arrest and prosecute funeral picketers should their behaviour constitute a breach of the Public Order Act 1986. However, most of the statutory powers specifically dealing with the disruption of funerals and burials are likely to be of relatively little use when faced with funeral picketing as practised by the WBC. First, the powers granted under the Ecclesiastical Courts Jurisdiction Act 1860 relate only to offences committed in a cathedral, church, chapel, churchyard or burial ground and the WBC picketers have taken care to ensure that they display their placards and shout their slogans only while standing on public roads through which the funeral cortège is to pass, or in the vicinity of the church, and not in the church or churchyard. Secondly, their activities do not involve threats or force, nor have picketers been violent or riotous. Action under these statutes would only be possible if funeral picketing could be regarded as indecent behaviour. This appears to be a matter for the courts to determine on the facts of the individual case.Footnote 45 In Girt v Fillingham Footnote 46 it was held to be indecent behaviour to shout out the words ‘This is idolatary! Protestants leave this house of Baal!’ during the prayer of consecration.Footnote 47 In Abrahams and Others v Cavey Footnote 48 it was held to be indecent behaviour for protesters objecting to perceived government support for US involvement in the war in Vietnam to interrupt the reading of the lessons during a service held at a Brighton Methodist Church in conjunction with the Labour Party Conference that year.Footnote 49 The convictions in Abrahams were upheld on appeal despite evidence given by the minister of the church that he considered the behaviour of the protesters to be ‘improper’ rather than indecent. The Reverend Lord Soper also gave evidence in defence of the protesters, saying that ‘the spirit of Christian religion and in particular Methodism comprehended active and contentious disputation in church’.Footnote 50 These cases suggest that funeral picketing and similar protests could constitute indecent behaviour.
On the other hand there could be distinct difficulties for churchwardens or sidespersons complying with their duty under canon law to maintain order and decency in the church or churchyard even though they would be unlikely to be charged with assault. It is questionable whether it would be advisable for churchwardens and other church stewards to try to restrain or to detain those taking part in as funeral picketing. Although both canon law and the 1860 Act appear to allow the use of reasonable force, in practice few parochial church councils (PCCs) or other church governing bodies would expect churchwardens or stewards (many of whom are elderly or women) to try physically to restrain or to detain those taking part in funeral picketing, whatever the Canons of the Church of England or the 1860 Act provide. It is also likely that insurers would counsel against such involvement. Christian church authorities might also be reluctant to be seen using these powers against protesters claiming to act in accordance with their religious beliefs, be they Christian (as in the case of the WBC picketers in the United States) or of another religion (such as the Muslim protesters at the Armistice Day service). It would seem much more advisable to rely on the police to exercise their powers of arrest under the Public Order Act 1986.
If the police or church authorities did not take action to prevent funeral picketing, could mourners sue? In X and Y v The Netherlands Footnote 51 the ECtHR held that Article 8 imposes a positive obligation on the state and public authorities to take reasonable measures to stop incursions on the right to family life, home and possessions by private persons.Footnote 52 There might therefore be the potential of an action for damages against the police or the Home Secretary if they failed to take action against funeral picketers. Section 8(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 allows for damages to be awarded against a public authority for an unlawful act if the court considers this to be ‘just and appropriate’.Footnote 53 This action therefore differs from actions in common law torts such as negligence, where damages are available as of right. Although the wording of the 1998 Act speaks of an ‘unlawful act’, it would appear that the positive obligation to take steps to stop incursion into private life would mean that an omission to act could be the subject of an award of damages. When considering whether an award of damages is just and appropriate, English courts might well take into account the need for the authorities to balance the competing ECHR rights of the picketers (to freedom of expression) and the mourners (to respect for private and family life).
It is unlikely that an action for damages could be brought against a PCC for failure to prevent a breach of Article 8 rights by allowing funeral picketing to take place. In Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council v Wallbank Footnote 54 the House of Lords held that a PCC was not a public authority as its function was not governmental but was concerned with the administration of church affairs. It also rejected the argument that the PCC was performing a public function under section 6(3)(b) Human Rights Act 1998 when it enforced a statutory obligation to repair the chancel of a parish church.Footnote 55 The fact that the PCC was part of the administrative structure of the Church of England was not relevant as, ‘despite the particular recognition which establishment afforded, the Church of England remained an essentially religious rather than governmental organisation’.Footnote 56
Can a case be made for an extension of the law of privacy to allow mourners to sue funeral picketers? The decision of the ECtHR in von Hannover v Germany Footnote 57 suggests that the positive obligation to secure Convention rights could be regarded as including an obligation to provide a means of securing damages from those who invade another person's Article 8 rights. There is some support in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR for the view that these rights extend to burying the dead and to attending funerals. In Girard v France Footnote 58 lack of diligence on the part of the authorities had led to a considerable delay in finding the body of the applicants’ daughter, who had been murdered. The Court held that the right to give their daughter's remains a final burial place was inherent in their right to respect for their private and family life under Article 8. In the earlier case of Hadri-Vionnet v Switzerland Footnote 59 the ECtHR also considered that there had been a breach of the mother's Article 8 rights when, after she had given birth to a stillborn baby while in a centre for asylum seekers, the baby's body had been buried in a communal grave for stillborn babies, without any form of ceremony and in the absence of the mother. Similarly, in Hachette Filipacchi Associates v France Footnote 60 an article in Paris-Match magazine about the murder of a prefect in Corsica which included a photograph of the scene showing the murdered man's body was held to be a breach of the family's rights under Article 8, at a time when they were in mourning. The magazine was required to publish a statement in the next issue acknowledging the distress caused to the family. If causing delay in burying a family member, denying parents the right to take part in a funeral for their child, and mourning free from press intrusion can be regarded as a breach of the right to respect for family life it would seem that taking part in a funeral or memorial service free from outside interference by funeral picketers could also be considered to be a breach of Article 8 rights.
It is difficult to see how the breach of confidence action could be extended to cover invasion of mourners' rights by funeral picketers. However, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR would support the introduction of a novel cause of action into English law allowing an action to be brought by those whose privacy as mourners has been invaded. The difficulty is that the government has made it clear that it does not intend to introduce legislation on the requirements of the ECHR but rather to rely on the judges to develop the law (including the law of privacy) appropriately, a role which Lord Phillips pointed out in Douglas has not been accepted ‘with whole-hearted enthusiasm’ by the courts.Footnote 61 In the absence of legislation there would seem to be little likelihood of a change in the law in the near future.
There are many aspects of this discussion which strike the author as ironic. It is ironic that in English law it appears to be possible to obtain damages for publication of photographs of a person participating in a sex orgy but not where a mourner at a funeral has been subjected to grossly disturbing behaviour at a time when they were particularly emotionally vulnerable.Footnote 62 It is ironic that, in a situation where people have suffered distress while taking part in a private family and religious ritual, their best cause of action might be for special damage in public nuisance, requiring funeral picketing and the distress it causes to be equated with activities as diverse as making obscene telephone calls, laying manure in the street, building a thatched house in the Borough of Blandford Forum, digging up the wall of a church and keeping a tiger in a pen adjoining the highway.Footnote 63 It is ironic that, while they might be comforted by the possibility that picketers could be prosecuted, they would not have the comfort of compensation for their distress. Finally, it is ironic that no-one was able to picket the funeral of Fred Phelps, the pastor and founder of the WBC, who died in March 2014. Members of the WBC consider funeral services to be ‘worshiping the dead’.Footnote 64