Animal as thinking subjects

In Western tradition, it is often thought that animals lack consciousness, and this reduces animals to objects rather than living and thinking subjects. R.K. Narayan’s A Tiger for Malgudi deconstructs the dominant anthropocentric “Western I-it dualism” (Ralph, Reference Ralph and Gifford2015, pp. 170–71) by giving the animal protagonist Raja memories and emotions and by making him a thinking subject. Animals are not devoid of language, but human beings demonstrate a reduced capacity of comprehending their language. Ben De Bruyn aptly argues that the “failure in cross-species communication [is] rooted in the poor listening skills of absent-minded humans” (De Bruyn, Reference De Bruyn2020, p. 2). Again, some Indigenous and region-specific relational traditions sometimes recognise forms of interspecies communication that are grounded in non-verbal cues. Therefore, the difficulty is not simply in the inability of human beings to understand animal communication but in the limitations imposed by anthropocentric and Eurocentric conceptions of language and communication. Thus, it is a culturally and epistemologically situated limitation.

The book directly challenges Descartes’ claim “that animals lack language and general intelligence” (Thomas, Reference Thomas2020), and Nayar outlines that “humans have defined intelligence in terms of human language” (Nayar, Reference Nayar2024, p.144). Narayan has also subverted this idea by giving the tiger, Raja, an inner voice, and he says:

Raja asserts animal subjectivity by stating that he has a soul like human beings, with the ability to think, analyse and judge. Here, the posthumanist intervention of the text becomes more evident, as he directly challenges the anthropocentric ideas of consciousness and emotion through these highly subversive lines. He destabilises the hierarchy that places man as the only possessor of a soul and rational thinking. Animals are therefore not passive objects, but active subjects with the faculty of judgement. This calls for a rethinking of dominant human-centred assumptions that have historically been used to justify the exploitation of animals. This assertion directly confronts human exceptionalism, collapses the human–animal distinction and upholds the posthumanist idea of interconnectedness by destabilising the binary oppositions of human and animal. Horkheimer and Adorno critique the Western tradition of defining human dignity by contrasting human rationality with supposed animal irrationality.

Such an approach creates a binary between man and animal, making man a superior subject and animal an inferior object. Posthumanism defends “the end of ‘anthropolatry’, the assumption of human superiority and call for more respect and priority to be given to the interests of other species and life forms” (Braidotti, Reference Braidotti2013, p. 76). Aurobindo once commented, “Life is life- whether in a cat, or dog or man. There is no difference between a cat or a man. The idea of difference is a human conception for Man’s own advantage” (Purani, Reference Purani2007, p. 563). Living beings should be considered as “subjects-of-a-life” (Regan, Reference Regan2004). Haraway (Reference Haraway2013) also emphasised the importance of recognising and sharing suffering and pain within relationships between humans and “companion species.” This capacity to acknowledge shared vulnerability can foster a deeper sense of ethical responsibility and accountability. She has expanded the meaning of the term “species” beyond its traditional biological definition to encompass a broader network of relational connections: “(t)o be one is always to become with many” and “I am who I become with companion species” (pp. 19). For Haraway, humans and animals are mutually constitutive participants in shared worlds. It challenges anthropocentric assumptions of human independence and ontological superiority, instead foregrounding interdependence, care and responsibility. Barad’s (2017) concept of ‘intra-action’ further challenges the idea of the autonomous human subject or completely independent entities before entering into relationships; rather, they become constituted through their relations; therefore, one carries “an ethical obligation” (Barad, Reference Barad2007, p.178). For Braidotti (Reference Braidotti2013), subjectivity is also relational and processual.

Raja’s assertion “I possess a soul” (p. 11) in the text directly challenges Cartesian dualism, which separates res extensa (physical substance) from res cogitans (mental substance). This framework has traditionally denied non-human beings the capacity for thought or emotion, considering them purely physical beings or res extensa. Therefore, Narayan engages in negative dialectic with Descartes as he believes that animals should not be seen as automata or instinct-driven machines without inner lives. Posthumanist animal-focused educators have significantly challenged this anthropocentric attitude. Posthumanism is therefore “a progressive critique of anthropocentric dualities and even dismantles the species barrier” (Reference Nayar2014), which Nayar calls the ‘humanimal’ (Reference Nayar2014). As Wolfe outlines, the question of posthumanism does not lie in the mere rejection of the human but in the recognition that we are “human animals” (Wolfe, Reference Wolfe2010, p. xxv). This also dismantles the Aristotelian definition of man as a “rational animal” by giving Raja rational faculty, or in other words, by making him a “rational animal” too. Raja also asserts: “I lack only the faculty of speech. But if you could read my thoughts, you would be welcome to come in and listen to the story of my life” (Narayan, Reference Narayan1984, p. 12).

The category of the human has often relied on perceived biological differences to naturalise and sustain hierarchical systems of power, e.g., human speech is privileged as a tool of superior intelligence that the tiger lacks. Raja asserts that there is no difference between humans and animals as “subjects-of-a-life” (Regan, Reference Regan2004), with one exception: the inability of animals to communicate verbally, and this is something that separates human beings from the animals. Thus, the tiger’s introspective monologue dismantles anthropocentric perspectives by presenting the tiger as a self-aware, questioning subject. Again, Descartes’ Anthropocentric views on animals as mindless things have been directly challenged by eminent philosophers like Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1755/ Reference Rousseau2009) in his “Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Men.” He has argued that Animals should be considered as constituents of the natural order. It challenges Descartes’s assertion that only human beings possess minds and souls. For Descartes, the capacity for language distinguished humans from animals and established the grounds for human moral consideration. Animals, by contrast, were regarded as soulless automata, incapable of experiencing pain or suffering. Rousseau (Reference Rousseau2009) challenged this idea by arguing that even if animals are not rational like humans, they can still feel pain and suffering. Because of this shared ability to suffer, he believed that humans have a moral responsibility to treat animals with kindness and compassion (Rangarajan & Slovic, Reference Rangarajan and Slovic2018). However, Narayan moves one step further from Rousseau by giving the faculty of reason to Raja, whereas for Rousseau, there is only the capacity to suffer in animals, rather than the capacity to reason, since they are like humans in their ability to experience pain and pleasure. This aligns with the work of the animal ethicist Peter Singer in his book Animal Liberation (Reference Singer1975/2015), who also argues that humans and animals share a common trait, i.e., the capacity to suffer, which puts them on a scale of moral equivalence with humans. He also puts

Posthuman pedagogy in A Tiger for Malgudi emerges through the critique of anthropocentrism. Unlearning anthropocentrism is about learning to question the human-centred assumptions through which animals have been traditionally understood. For Midgley, anthropocentrism is nothing but “human chauvinism” (Reference Midgley1996, p. 105). Thus, Posthuman pedagogy can be understood as a process of unlearning anthropocentrism. Such unlearning requires humans to reassess their “relational deficits and injuries” toward other species (Braidotti, Reference Braidotti2019, p.48).

Unsettling anthropomorphism

Posthumanism can critique the tendency to project human behaviours and emotions onto animals. This is a common theme in animal fables, where animals are often anthropomorphised – given human traits, emotions and motivations. However, Narayan challenges this notion by presenting the tiger’s behaviour as fundamentally different from human actions and motivations. Haraway describes this as “nonmimetic caring” (Reference Haraway2013), a form of care that does not rely on mirroring or anthropomorphising the other, particularly animals. Posthumanism challenges the human tendency to understand or value other beings only insofar as they resemble or relate to human traits and experiences. It calls for an acknowledgement of difference rather than an attempt to erase and invites humans to engage with other species on their terms, respecting their unique modes of being without subsuming them into the human framework. Raja has asserted that animals also communicate like human beings; however, they cannot speak like human beings, and their language is quite different from human language since it is devoid of words, as Raja puts it:

Animals can express sentiments like “sympathy, abuse, irony, insult, love and hatred” (p. 13); however, their behaviour is fundamentally different from “human beings who talk all their waking hours, and even in sleep” (p. 13). Raja critiques human speech as excessive and compulsive rather than meaningful, but animals communicate only when necessary, and this inverts the human hierarchy by asserting that non-human modes of communication are more authentic. Agamben, who is influenced by Heidegger and Deleuze, argues that life sciences have rejected human dominance and the traditional view of nature that prioritises humans above other beings. Heidegger and Deleuze sought to “think the animal in an absolutely non-anthropomorphic way” (Agamben, Reference Agamben2004, pp. 39–40). Haraway (Reference Haraway2013) argues that “multispecies flourishing requires a robust nonanthropomorphic sensibility that is accountable to irreducible differences” (p. 90) where all species thrive together, cultivating ways of thinking and feeling that do not impose human categories, values or perspectives onto nonhuman entities. She refers to this as, “robust nonanthropomorphic sensibility” (p. 90). The text upholds the idea of responsibility to cultivate ecological literacy that respects the distinctiveness of other species. It implies that reducing animals and ecosystems to human terms constitutes not only an epistemological limitation but also an ethical failure. Consequently, animals and other species must be recognised as subjects with their own intrinsic value, and the narrative plays a very crucial role in shaping attitudes and behaviours that support distinctiveness and multispecies well-being. However, Narayan’s use of anthropomorphism in the novel has special significance towards the posthumanist capabilities of the novel. By giving Raja a voice and allowing him to narrate his experiences, the novel enables the readers to encounter the world from an animal perspective. It functions here as a literary strategy for making animal subjectivity perceptible and evoking empathy. It transforms the animal from an object to be known into a subject whose experience matters.

Theoretical and theological perspectives of speciesism

Speciesism is the assumption that humans occupy the pinnacle of creation, granting them the authority to dominate all other life forms. As such, it can be seen as a mode of anthropogenic thinking, having its origin in the human. This term was coined by the English philosopher Richard Ryder in a pamphlet called “Speciesism”.

Speciesism functions much like other forms of discrimination, such as racism or sexism, where one group is given greater moral worth simply because of its identity. For example, the feminist scholar Carol J. Adams (Reference Adams2010) aligns animal hunting and meat consumption with patriarchal systems and practices. “Men who decide to eschew meat eating are deemed effeminate; failure of men to eat meat announces that they are not masculine” (p. 57). Speciesism is therefore sustained by hierarchical thinking, animal oppression and control. Oakley (Reference Oakley, Lloro-Bidart and Banschbach2019) links speciesism with environmental education

This text serves as a very strong critique of the speciesist attitude of human beings, killing the cubs and their mother as trophies and for the skins is the evidence of a speciesist indifference toward the tigers. This speciesist attitude has its roots in Judeo-Christian scriptures that are anthropocentric. White critiques the Christian belief that “no item in the physical creation had any purpose save to serve man’s purposes” (Reference White1967, p. 1205) and also remarks that Christianity is “the most anthropocentric religion the world has ever seen” (White, Reference White1967, p.1205). For example, in Genesis, in the Bible, God tells man: Fill the earth and “subdue it: and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth.” (2013).

Human interests are more important than those of nonhuman beings and position human beings at the top of the hierarchy or above the rest of creation, so they can “subdue it” and “have dominion” over all other species (2013). These are the narratives that legitimize and justify the human domination and exploitation of animals. Posthumanism reject “the myth of the human as the centre of the universe” and Critical posthumanism especially “rejects both human exceptionalism” or “the idea that humans are unique creature and human instrumentalism or that humans have a right to control the natural world” instead “it treats the human as co-evolving, sharing ecosystems with animals and other life forms” (Nayar, Reference Nayar2014). Critical posthumanism, therefore, debunks Protagoras’ pronouncement that “man is the measure of the universe” (Mallik & Batra, Reference Malik and Batra2014, p.161). Again, the exploitation of animals, along with women and the lower caste is legitimised in the orthodox Hindu theology also. Tulsidas’s Ramcharitmanas, for example, includes the frequently cited verse “Dhol ganwār śūdra paśu nārī, sakal tāṛanā ke adhikārī,” which is usually translated to mean that animals, drums…low castes and women are worthy of being beaten (Tulsidas, 2015). It upholds the ideas of multispecies intersectionalities and shared vulnerabilities among women, animals and lower castes in the patriarchal society that especially justifies the exploitation of certain sections. However, certain strands of Vedic and post-Vedic thought articulate a relational and interdependent understanding of existence that can challenge anthropocentric assumptions. According to Anantanand Rambachan, living beings have moral worth in themselves because they are believed to possess an ātman, an eternal, non-material soul (Rambachan, Reference Rambachan1989, p. 289). In Hindu theology, it is claimed that all “living entities in nature are identical and/or emanate from brahman also claim that non-living entities in nature are identical and/or emanate from brahman” (Framarin, Reference Framarin2012, p. 80). It challenges the hierarchy that places human beings above the rest of nature. If both living and non-living entities are considered emanations of brahman or god, then assigning greater ontological value exclusively to human life becomes difficult to sustain. Eliot Deutsch (Reference Deutsch1970) pointed out the Advaita Vedanta conception of the fundamental unity of existence by asserting that “everything in nature is interconnected” (p. 80) and that, at the deepest level, “fundamentally all life is one” (p. 82). Citing the Bhagavad Gītā, Lina Gupta (Reference Gupta and Adams1993) states, “all parts of Nature have an intrinsic value; as such, all of Nature should be treated with dignity, kindness, and righteousness” (Reference Gupta and Adams1993, p. 113). Hindu theological and philosophical traditions offer many examples of the relationship between humans and the more-than-human world as one of interconnectedness. Instead of viewing them as objects for human use, they are considered as embodiments of the divine, companions of deities, or their sacred vehicles in the Hindu theological tradition. The concept of avatāra or incarnation is specifically significant here. For example, Vishnu’s incarnations include animal and hybrid forms, Matsya, the fish; Kūrma, the tortoise; Varāha, the boar; and Narasimha, the half-human, half-lion. It complicates the hierarchical separation of human and nonhuman existence. O. P. Dwivedi argues, “veneration, respect, and acceptance of God in nature is required of Hindus in order to maintain and protect the natural harmonious relationship between human beings and nature” (Reference Dwivedi, Chapple and Tucker2000, p. 5). Therefore, Hindu thought should neither be reduced to anthropocentric hierarchy nor romanticised as an already-existing form of posthumanism. It contains competing possibilities that require critical examination. Narayan’s book provides a meeting point between modern posthumanist critiques and older Indic ideas of relationality. Hindu theology has been largely influenced by colonial, orientalist and patriarchal interpretations of religion and has perpetuated systems of castes, genders and human/animal dichotomies. Some interpretations of Hindu tradition have been greatly influenced by translation and interpretation during the colonial period. Niranjana (Reference Niranjana1992) has pointed out some key figures in the colonial construction of the ‘Hindu’. It is undeniable that William Jones was a seminal figure in establishing Orientalism as an academic discipline in India. His translations of Sanskrit texts were represented as academic attempts to revive ancient knowledge (Niranjana, Reference Niranjana1992). However, Niranjana (Reference Niranjana1992) argues that these translations were shaped by colonial assumptions. Jones believed that native interpreters were unreliable because they were influenced by tradition (Niranjana, Reference Niranjana1992). Thus, Orientalist scholarship functioned as a cultural foundation for colonial authority. William Ward’s writings have depicted the Hindu religion as morally corrupt and socially harmful (Niranjana, Reference Niranjana1992). He represented the evangelical dimension of colonial discourse. Ward highlighted practices like idol worship and caste discrimination, portraying these as examples of inferior cultures. These representations supported the missionary argument that Christianity was necessary for moral improvement. Therefore, a decolonial reading has to take into account both the internal plurality within these traditions and the historical conditions that allowed certain interpretations to gain dominance.

Posthumanism “interrogates the hierarchic ordering – and subsequently exploitation and even eradication – of life forms” (Nayar, Reference Nayar2014). Citing Huggan and Tiffin, Rangarajan point out that:

The Enlightenment, with its focus on reason, individualism and human superiority, establishes a rigid divide between the civilised human and the savage animal. This essentialism, which positioned humans as the rational, moral centre of the universe, demanded the repression or control of everything deemed animalistic. Thus, issues like racism and otherness are deeply tied to the Enlightenment’s essentialist thinking, which often equates colonised peoples with animals to justify their subjugation. For instance, colonisers have persistently portrayed Indigenous peoples as animals and dehumanised them. Posthumanism seeks to break down the anthropocentric hierarchy and recognise the agency of non-human beings, and it challenges the idea that humanity occupies a privileged position over the rest of the natural world. Cavalieri argues that “speciesism was coined based on the models of racism and sexism. This term draws attention to the intrahuman prejudices that contemporary egalitarianism seeks to condemn” (Cavalieri, Reference Cavalieri2001, p. 70) and Nayar states that “Speciesism is a form of racism in which some forms of life are consigned to the margins to be exploited, brutalized, ignored, or eliminated” and it “positions the human as the dominant species that then controls, domesticates, oppresses, exploits, guards and pets non-human, animal species” (Reference Nayar2014, p. 96). It echoes Hitler’s claim of Aryan superiority, equating the exploitation and extermination of certain species to the atrocities faced by the Jews. Derrida argues, “Adorno takes things much further: for an idealist system, he says, animals virtually play the same role as Jews did for a fascist system” and also points out that the reference to Judaism can be stretched to suggest that the disdain for animals reflects a deeper, “idealistic hatred – one that also targets Jews” (Derrida, Reference Derrida2008, p. 103). This logic can be extended further to imply a similar contempt for femininity and even children. In this view, the act of causing harm to animals or demeaning them can be seen as a characteristic of masculinity, not only in the sense of being human (homo) but also in the sense of being male (vir) (pp. 103–104). He draws connections between antisemitism, misogyny and anthropocentric attitudes toward animals, particularly through the lens of idealist and patriarchal frameworks. Historically, Jewish identity has been marked as “other” within dominant cultural and religious discourses, often through associations with animality or perceived corporeality. In Western idealist traditions, where reason and spirit are elevated over the body and the material, Judaism has sometimes been cast as overly concerned with ritual and the physical, paralleling the way animals are dismissed as purely physical beings. Therefore, the mind and matter binary come into existence in the discourse of posthumanist animal studies. This binary has also been adopted in postcolonial and feminist discourses. Time and again, Narayan has deconstructed this mind-matter binary by presenting the tiger as a mindful creature.

Thinking otherwise

Raja’s journey from commodification to companionship is marked by his transformation in relationship with human beings. In the first section of the novel, under Captain’s ownership in the Malgudi circus, Raja is stripped of agency and reduced to a commodity. He is trained through violent, coercive methods like whipping and electric shocks. Raja’s encounter with the Master, an ascetic, marks the shift from commodification to companionship in the journey of his life, as he sees Raja as a soul and never tries to dominate or imprison him like others. When he is asked, “Have you not tied him(tiger) up, sir?” (Reference Narayan1984, p.141), and he then replies that “Certainly not, I live freely too … so there is no place in my system for any rope or chain or bond of any kind” (p. 141). This refusal to chain the tiger is a deliberate act that breaks from the traditional, speciesist mindset, where animals are often controlled, restrained and dominated for human benefit. It reflects an attempt to move beyond traditional species hierarchies. Here, companionship emerges through respect and spiritual connection, not utility. Kahn and Humes (Reference Kahn and Humes2009), name this “total liberation pedagogy”. He guides Raja gently, and they have a symbiosis. He upholds the idea that animals live not for people but with people. Yann Martel’s Life of Pi (Reference Martel2001/2004) also deals with the cohabitation of a man with a tiger on a lifeboat. Narayan uses this transformation to suggest that companionship is built on recognition of the other’s interiority, not domination. Spivak (Reference Spivak2003) provides the helpful concept of ‘planetarity’. “If we imagine ourselves as planetary subjects rather than global agents, planetary creatures rather than global entities, alterity remains underived from us” (Spivak, Reference Spivak2003, p. 73). If humans saw themselves as part of the planetary continuum rather than as global agents dominating ecosystems and species, then animal alterity (their otherness) would not be reduced to human-centred categories. Animals would be able to exist in their own difference, not as humanised objects. Thus, “planetarity” is “a state which demands a radical openness to pluralisation and a consideration of difference that exists beyond human ontologies” (Rangarajan & Slovic, Reference Rangarajan and Slovic2018). Animal alterity remains underived from us only when we stop measuring their worth through anthropocentric lenses. Here, the Master only embodies the planetary ethic and upholds the idea of ethical coexistence. Spivak’s idea of planetarity demands a radical openness to the plurality of life forms and a recognition of their intrinsic value beyond human-centric utility. Neoliberal globalisation seeks to commodify and instrumentalize all forms of life and especially animals, reducing them to units of exchange in a global capitalist economy. Where life is valuable only to the extent that it is profitable or productive. In the discourse of posthumanist animal studies, planetarity allows for a politicised and ethical critique of the global systems that commodify life. By embracing Raja as a companion, the Master embodies this planetary ethic and challenges the anthropocentric structures of dominance and control. Again, like animals, we are embodied beings subject to pain, illness, ageing and death. We share vulnerability with animals because we are injurable too, as pointed out by Captain’s death. Therefore, vulnerability is the condition of being susceptible to suffering and harm. This shared vulnerability unsettles the anthropocentric assumption that humans are ontologically distinct or superior. It demands an ethic of care as a “species activity that includes everything that we do to maintain, continue, and repair our “world” so that we can live in it as well as possible” (Toronto & Fisher, Reference Fisher and Tronto1990). If we are to secure the sustainability of our own lifeworld, we must also ensure the sustenance of others’ lifeworlds. In this sense, the narrative functions not merely as a story but as an educational framework that promotes environmental consciousness and sustainable modes of living.

Beneath the veil of care

The novel raises several critical questions about the ethics of care, species relations and the illusion of humane liberation. Whether Raja was truly liberated or whether the Master’s rescuing of Raja altruistically served as an extension of an anthropocentric system where the animal is reliant on the human to be rescued and still captive. The act of saving Raja remains embedded within an anthropocentric paradigm, one where humans retain the power to decide the fate, value and placement of non-human life. The Master functions not as a liberator from the human system, but rather as a repositioner within it. Raja’s agency remains suspended; he is not the subject of his freedom, but the object of someone else’s benevolence. His ultimate return to the zoo also poses the question of whether it is at all possible to deconstruct the anthropocentric speciesist structure. The answer is that, to some extent, it is impossible as it is impossible to “Remove man from the scene…” (Orwell, Reference Orwell1945/2012, p. 8). Again, Deconstruction is an inquiry into the impossible (Derrida, Reference Derrida1990). For Kompatsiaris, multispecies coexistence is also impossible to some extent, as he puts it:

Humans are, therefore, both perpetrators of harm and potential agents of justice. It raises questions about whether genuine posthuman ethics are possible within anthropogenic institutions. Nayar has argued for “a “distributed agency” to draw attention to the implications of a postanthropocentric conception of agency or a hybrid-agency in which multiple agents (human and nonhuman) convene to create historical change” (Nayar, Reference Nayar2024, p. 180). By decentring the human, it opens a conceptual space for posthuman ethics that recognises speciesism. Environmental educators are able to see the intersections where the domination of animals connects with the domination found in human societies and in the environment (Schlosser, Reference Schlosser2005) and this promotes social justice through an intersectional lens, especially by focusing on the relationship between humans and animals (e.g., Fawcett, Reference Fawcett, Stevenson, Brody, Dillon and Wals2014; Humes, Reference Humes2008; Pedersen, Reference Pedersen2011; Selby, Reference Selby1995, Reference Selby, Goldstein and Selby2000; Unti & DeRosa, Reference Unti, DeRosa, Salem and Rowan2003; Weil, Reference Weil2004). It encourages learners to move beyond human exceptionalism and recognise animals as beings with their own agency and value, not merely as resources or tools for humans.