Forgetting and reframing

Clausewitz wrote that ‘no one starts a war – or rather no one in his senses should do so – without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it’. ^{Reference Von Clausewitz2} Wars are declared by politicians, rather than generals, although they may be influenced or even decided by popular demands for military action. Yet modern leaders often appear to ignore Clausewitz’s principle and have engaged on campaigns where the goals are either unclear or unachievable given the challenges and resources available. Both the Russo-Ukrainian War and the conflict in Gaza fall into these categories. Without clarity of purpose and the appropriate forces and equipment, the likelihood of errors and casualties is greatly increased.

A growing readiness to resort to war before exhausting diplomatic initiatives may be a consequence of forgetting, and of the rise of leaders who have no personal experience of combat. Indeed, throughout Europe the number of veterans who have fought in wars has fallen progressively. James Callaghan, a Royal Navy lieutenant on HMS Queen Elizabeth, was the last UK Prime Minister to have been a combat veteran. Before him, many senior government figures had front-line experience. These included Winston Churchill, Clement Attlee, Anthony Eden and Harold Macmillan, veterans of the First World War, with Edward Heath, Lord Carrington, William Whitelaw and Denis Healey serving in the Second World War. This pattern of lost experience is also evident in the USA, where George H. W. Bush was the last President who fought in battle, while in Germany Helmut Schmidt was the most recent Chancellor with front-line military service.

During the 1960s and 1970s the UK military footprint, or the proportion of adults who had been members of the armed forces, was extensive. Based on the numbers who had served in the two World Wars and completed National Service, over 25% of the male population had military experience and a significant number had served in combat or combat support roles. ^{Reference Vinen3,Reference Vinen4} Furthermore, understanding of war and its destructiveness was not limited to veterans because civilians across Europe had been exposed to invasion, bombing, genocide and shortages of necessities, to the point of starvation in the Netherlands and Ukraine. Surrounded by evidence of war’s destructiveness, Western nations offered governmental and popular support for organisations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and United Nations, that sought to limit conflict through defensive alliances and peacekeeping operations. The value placed on such institutions has arguably been eroded as voters and leaders without direct knowledge of conflict are increasingly drawn from international issues towards intranational priorities.

Forgetting, or the loss of personal experience, has created an opportunity for populist leaders to reframe past wars to recruit and motivate supporters. During the 1990s, as Yugoslavia fractured and conflict broke out between different religious and ethnic groups, radical leaders drew on atrocities committed during the Second World War to instil fear and hatred in their militias. Bosnian Serbs, for example, were reminded of the Catholic and Muslim Croat death squads which, with the aim of creating an ethnically pure Croatian state, conducted mass killings in Serbian towns and villages. The Bosnian War of 1992–1995 was characterised by atrocities committed against Bosnian Muslims and Catholic Croats, termed ‘ethnic cleansing’, by the Bosnian Serb perpetrators.

Leaders and conflict

National politicians decide whether to go to war and when to seek a negotiated end to the fighting. Fearon found that, during the Cold War, successive US presidents endured long periods of attritional bargaining and even deadlock to settle issues over territory or the limitation of arms. The effort was proportional to the perceived future benefits of an agreement. To avoid the toll of war, leaders were willing to incur the costs of bargaining, lost trade and challenging diplomatic relations. ^{Reference Fearon5}

Faced with uncertainty about war, US presidents relied on analogous examples to inform understanding and gauge the likely outcome of different courses of action. However, the selection of analogies was often flawed, characterised by surface commonalities and proximity, rarely the result of detailed assessments of relevance. ^{Reference Khong6} When critical differences were revealed or goals not achieved, leaders often continued to follow a core analogy, so strong was their belief in its efficacy. During the Vietnam War, for example, the USA embarked on the longest and heaviest aerial bombardment in history, encouraged by the successful bombing campaign against German manufacturing in the Second World War. However, the analogy had failed to account for the relatively undeveloped state of North Vietnam’s industry. Petrol and oil facilities could be dispersed and stored underground, whereas power disruptions had much less impact on the morale and economic viability of a rural economy than one reliant on the production of munitions. Military failures in Vietnam have been attributed to ‘groupthink’, in which a cohesive collection of decision-makers prioritised uniformity over dissent. To improve the flow of information available to leaders when US forces deployed to Iraq during the 2000s, a ‘polythink’ model was adopted. A higher level of dissent and divergence within a broader group of advisors was tolerated in the belief that pluralistic opinions and policy prescriptions would provide leaders with greater understanding. ^{Reference Mintz and Wayne7} However, Mintz and Wayne argue that diverse systems also produce errors. Leaders, presented with competing or incomplete advice, may fail to reach a decision, adopt a poor compromise or take advantage of the confusion to follow a policy that suits their personal goals rather than those of the nation. As a solution, they proposed a balanced model that incorporates the positive features of both types of thinking, although the challenge of managing the contrasting elements remains.

Recent events – the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the US bombing of Iran and Israeli strikes on Lebanon and Qatar – suggest that some leaders may have little tolerance for the diversity of opinion required for polythink, and that they are less likely to consider analogies that include observance of international law and conventions governing the conduct of war. If so, then their decisions are more likely to be unpredictable and risk the security of a rules-based international order.

War as a short-cut

The First World War demonstrated to political leaders that conflict produces significant change. The Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires fractured, and the war triggered the Russian Revolution. The states of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Finland and Lithuania achieved independence in a demonstration of the utility of war. The failure to achieve a lasting peace in Gaza and Ukraine demonstrates the scale of the challenge that faces leaders seeking a negotiated solution. Conversely, the Good Friday Agreement of April 1998, which ended 30 years of conflict, required a sustained effort by most of Northern Ireland’s political parties, together with the UK and Irish governments. The complex power-sharing deal included the decommissioning of weapons, prisoner releases, equality and human rights legislation and was ratified by referenda on both sides of the border. It demonstrated that sectarian violence rooted in deeply held enmities could be resolved by negotiation, but only with time, trust and understanding.

Although leaders may resort to war as an apparently swift means to solve political problems, the trend is for interstate conflict to become longer over time. Waterloo was essentially a 1-day battle; Gettysburg, the most intense battle of the American Civil War, took 3 days; the Somme offensive lasted for 4 months, and the Allied break-out at Normandy took 3 months, having been planned to take 3 weeks. ^{Reference Keegan8} The Second World War endured for 6 years, and the Iran–Iraq War lasted 8 years with large casualties on both sides. The implication is that, despite modern technology and well-trained troops, determined defenders retain an advantage on the battlefield. In February 2022, it was not expected that Ukraine would survive against the far larger Russian forces and yet, 4 years later, neither side seems close to an outright victory.

Willingness to fight wars

Although political leaders may be increasingly willing to consider war as a solution to problems, it does not follow that young people will enlist in the numbers required. Russia and Ukraine have faced challenges recruiting front-line troops for an enduring, attritional conflict. During the First World War, Britain raised the second largest volunteer force in history but high casualty rates forced the government to introduce conscription in 1916 to maintain numbers at the front. Some of the values that inspired volunteers in 1914, including imperialism and deference to a ruling class, no longer resonate today, creating a need to mobilise nations by other means. Henri Tajfel, a Polish social psychologist who had served in the French Army during the Second World War, argued that people develop a sense of who they are by reference to groups, those to whom they feel they belong and those towards whom they feel antipathy. ^{Reference Tajfel9} Populist leaders may seek to scapegoat nations or ethnic groups, combined with a process of ‘othering’ or dehumanising potential adversaries, to make war appear as a necessary or appropriate response.

Wars characterised by violations of international laws and high casualty rates suggest that leaders are increasingly willing to risk lives on the battlefield. The trend is in part a consequence of nations focusing on their immediate interests and an erosion of support for international peacekeeping and defensive military institutions. The Second World War had demonstrated the value of investing in deterrence, attritional diplomacy and social cohesion, not least because of their contribution to global health and well-being; that understanding may need to be rediscovered.