A law professor at the University of Colorado Law School and a former attorney-advisor from 1979 to 1981 (including the Carter and Reagan administrations) in the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), the office in the Department of Justice that is the principal legal advisor to the executive branch of government, Bruff has written an extraordinary book—nuanced, balanced, and meaty—or, more accurately, two books.
The first, the more important and the less technical of the two, well-written and tightly reasoned, covers roughly the first half of the book. The second, less important and more technical—as befits its subject matter—but equally well-written and even more tightly reasoned, covers six individual legal problems faced by the Bush Administration in the war on terrorists.
Drawing on literature (Shakespeare's Henry V and Robert Bolt's play A Man for All Seasons), American constitutional history, and legal ethics, Bruff articulates a standard—eminently warranted—by which to judge lawyers advising political figures in the executive branch on the legal implications of courses of action, be it action proposed (the ideal situation) or action already taken (a considerably less than ideal situation). In contrast to policy advice, not rooted in the law, the legal advisor has a range of objectives—those on which reasonable and learned students of the law would generally agree independent of particular results—lodestars to guide him or her to the best decision in light of the authorities, considerations of separation of powers, possible consequences, and basic issues of right and wrong. Legal materials include the Constitution (its text and judicial decisions construing it), congressional actions, statutes authorizing or limiting executive power, and actions taken by prior administrations during our national history, around which the judgment of the people has favorably coalesced. Nevertheless, as Robert Jackson—a former attorney general and Supreme Court justice who is a personal model for Bruff—aptly noted, “A judge, like an executive adviser, may be surprised at the poverty of really useful and unambiguous authority applicable to concrete problems of executive power” (Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 [1952]). Without controlling precedent, legal advisors find themselves thrown back on their legal “judgment,” a virtue called by the Greeks “wisdom” and by the scholastics “prudence.”
Showing that great literature often touches more deeply the human condition than do attempts to draw lessons from history, Bruff turns to Henry V. In the second scene, the mature Henry, no longer the impetuous Hal, friend of Falstaff, desiring to acquire the crown of France, for which he had an arguable claim, asks the archbishop of Canterbury for advice. We know from the first scene that the archbishop had a substantial conflict of interest, known to Henry: a bill in Parliament authorized the seizure of church lands to meet the costs of government. If Canterbury could but focus the king's thoughts on France, he might lose interest in church lands. In the midst of a long disquisition, designed to refute Salic law (inheritance could not pass through the female line, as did Henry's claim), which his enemies might cite against Henry's desire for the French crown, an impatient king interjects, “May I with right and conscience make this claim?” Posed with Shakespearean wit and economy, Henry's question is central to Bruff's project, and he repeats the theme of “right and conscience” throughout the book, including in his closing remarks (279). Appropriately for Bruff, a nation's chief executive joins “right,” a technical legal concept, with “conscience,” a matter of good faith, which is precisely what the king—ostensibly—demands of Canterbury, who, duly galvanized, puts aside all ambiguity and flatly tells the king to “stand for your own; unwind your bloody flag.” Thus, Henry got the advice that he wanted from a source he had reason to suspect might give it to him. Conceding that the advice might be legally right, but arguing it was not the advice, in conscience, the king needed, Bruff tenders a “good (and brave) counselor would have found a way to provide it” (9). Before turning to Bolt's A Man for All Seasons, Bruff concludes, “legal advisers are not wholly responsible for the fateful final decision, but they cannot be absolved from complicity in it” (11).
Bolt characterizes Saint Thomas More as an individual who ably maneuvered in the intellectual and political world, becoming a lawyer of renown and a friend of the king until fate pushed him to examine the core of his convictions. There, More stood strong despite the threat of a trial for treason if he denied the validity of Henry VIII's divorce from the barren Queen Catherine and his marriage to the presumed fertile Anne Boleyn, in the king's quest for a male heir to avoid a repetition of the War of the Roses. In Bolt's play, Wolsey, then Cardinal (and Lord Chancellor, a job that Wolsey loses to More), says, “explain how you … can obstruct … measures for the sake of your own, private, conscience.” More answers, “when statesmen forsake their own private conscience … they lead their country by a short route to chaos.” Eventually, Henry sacked Wolsey for his failure to get from the pope a dispensation to marry Boleyn, and Bolt later quotes Wolsey, “Had I but served my God with half the zeal I served my king, He would not in mine age have left me naked to mine enemies.” Henry then insisted, over More's reluctance, that More become chancellor. He did. But he demurred when asked to assent to the validity of Boleyn's marriage in light of his previous marriage; it cost him his head as “the king's good servant, but God's first.”
Bruff recognizes, as did both Henry and More, that “legal advisors can confer legitimacy on political actions.” But for the advice to have that effect, the advisor must provide it “from a stance of professional detachment, not sycophancy” (14). Wolsey lost sight of his own judgment of “right and conscience.” More did not. Wolsey died without honor. More became a saint.
Using those characters from fiction, or from life fictionalized, Bruff turns to the history of the relations of the presidents' lawyers to the presidents from George Washington to Jimmy Carter—in particular the relation of Robert Jackson to Franklin Delano Roosevelt—and evaluates them first in light of the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct. These provide that, in a counseling function, the counselor must “exercise independent professional … candid advice”; the rules, too, recognize that a counselor “may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social, and political factors that may be relevant to the client's situation” (73). Bruff recognizes, however, that lawyers in the OLC are not private lawyers, neither trial lawyers where courts constantly review their arguments nor counselors whose private legal advice to a corporation seldom comes into light of day. Rather, they are public lawyers who have a relation not only to the executive but also to the law itself. Bruff then reviews a list of ten canons—concentrating on five—offered by a list of distinguished former attorneys who served in the OLC in response to the reasoning appearing in some of the memoranda written under the Bush Administration. This review need not tarry with their baroque detail; they are better read than summarized (78–83). Finally, Bruff, as a preface to his examination of the advice lawyers gave to the Bush Administration, reviews competing views of executive power in light of Robert Jackson's justly famous concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure case noted above. Some are adherents to congressional supremacy, some executive supremacy, and a number seek a middle way. But Bruff allies himself with Jackson, who saw the question as a continuum between executive powers confirmed by congressional legislation (the highest end), through executive powers asserted by the executive but neither confirmed nor disputed by congressional legislation (the middle point), and executive power asserted in opposition to express congregational legislation (the lowest ebb). Thus, in Jackson's view, it all depends on the context. As Bruff puts it, “the framers created neither a monarch wielding broad prerogative like George III nor a nearly nonexistent executive as under the Articles of Confederation” (86).
The second half of Bruff's book carefully examines the advice given by President Bush's lawyers to him and his administration. After identifying the principal characters, the roles they played, and how they played them in the decision-making process, Bruff reviews in the war against terrorists (1) electronic surveillance by the National Security Agency without warrants, (2) indefinite detention of enemy combatants, (3) attempts to avoid the strictures of the Geneva Conventions, (4) military commissions for war crimes instead of federal courts or courts martial, (5) “enhanced interrogation techniques” (torture) to prevent terrorist attacks, and (6) the relation of legal advice that pushed the legal envelope on the treatment of prisoners to the abuses of Abu Ghraib. The second half is hardly a paean, but it is also hardly an unmitigated diatribe. While the critique is uniformly critical, it is still nuanced and even-handed. In fact, even when Bruff comes to a different conclusion, he notes that Bush's resolution of the issue (how to treat detainees, as governed by the Geneva Conventions or merely humane by executive order) was “debatable,” but supported by a “tenable claim of legal right” and in “good conscience”; and Bruff says that “History will judge its wisdom” (211). The burden of his criticism in each case is that the relevant legal advice was developed in secrecy by a small group of lawyers who had elite credentials but lacked experience in the complex world in which we live. They did not consult others (the legal bureaucracy in Justice or military lawyers in Defense) to make up for their lack of experience. When lawyers outside the small group gave advice, the inside lawyers ignored it or vilipended it, and when the legal opinions were reduced to paper and circulated in the executive branch as the government's view of the law, they uniformly adopted an extreme view of executive power without recognizing or giving due regard to the arguments and authorities to the contrary. And they were largely innocent of a careful consideration of the possible consequences of the advice. In sum, they lacked “right and conscience.” They compared dismally with the comparable views of a statesman-lawyer like Robert Jackson.
Bruff's book is not an easy read. This is so, not because Bruff has not written it lucidly, comprehensively, and comprehensibly—he has. It is because the issues are complex, and they call for, as Judge Learned Hand observed, “the intolerable labor of thought.” The legal answers that a lawyer may give in “right and good conscience” to political leaders in the war against terrorists are ultimately a matter of wisdom, prudence, or judgment, virtues sorely needed but largely lacking today in public life. Bruff's book is worth the read.
