Introduction
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm was endorsed at the UN World Summit 2005. However, despite the endorsement, ambiguities surrounding the status, meaning, and utility of R2P as a norm under the UN framework continue to persist.Footnote 1 Several reasons have been cited for these ambiguities, starting with the situations in which R2P would be applicable. This is in addition to the implementation challenges involved in building a sustainable society on the grounds of State sovereignty and non-intervention under the UN Charter’s Article 2(7). At the same time, challenges also arise in attributing responsibility to prevent, react, rebuild, and question the legitimacy of the steps taken under the R2P norm.Footnote 2 Further, there has been a tussle between the Global South and Global North regarding the credibility of the R2P norm. Scholars from the Global South have characterized it as Western hegemonic, imperialistic, or paternalistic.Footnote 3 By contrast, Global North scholars defend it as a universalistic concept that aims to build an inclusive and peaceful community.Footnote 4
While debates and uncertainties persist, the concept of R2P has brought to light a very significant issue—that is, whether the UNSC veto power is a right or a responsibility, along with the need to balance both. The roots of this issue have been laid down since the end of the Cold War, further intensifying the debate on the need to restrain the veto power.Footnote 5 The sentiment behind the veto as a responsibility is to ensure that the UNSC works efficiently and effectively to achieve the UN Charter’s purposes and principles under Chapter VII, which is to maintain international peace and security.
In recent times, the responsible use of the veto power by the P5Footnote 6 members for maintaining peace and security has been a matter of discussion in cases of mass atrocities, given the growing differences amongst the P5 members. The use of the veto power has also been at the forefront amidst threats of possible nuclear war, combined with the UNSC’s past failures related to the conflicts in RwandaFootnote 7 and KosovoFootnote 8 and claims that the UNSC’s composition is unrepresentative of the modern world. As a result, the extent to which the veto’s use has served the UN’s interests as a whole has been seriously questioned.
At the same time, critics of the Responsibility Not to Veto (RN2V) principle argue that if such a norm comes into effect, it will lead to excessive dependence on the Western powers to facilitate UNSC action to safeguard gross and systematic human rights violations.Footnote 9 In the absence of this, the interests of individual P5 States would lead to continued violations of human rights at the international level, resulting in violations of the principles of international peace and security under the UN Charter.
The Responsibility To Protect (R2P)
Every UN member endorsed the R2P principle in October 2005 under the World Summit Outcome Document (WSOD), ensuring that each State has the responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, as well as their incitement.Footnote 10 Given that the international community has witnessed several wars in recent times, creating a principle like R2P was highly needed to maintain international peace and security. Through this principle, if it is found that any State has manifestly failed to protect its population from the four above-listed crimes, the UN Member States must commit themselves to take collective action in a timely and decisive manner through the UNSC under the UN Charter.Footnote 11 Given the significance of this principle, it eventually led to the publication of a Secretary-General report in January 2009, “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect.”Footnote 12
Three R2P Pillars
Per this 2009 report, there are three pillars of R2P implementation. The first is the responsibility of each State to use necessary and proportional means to protect its population from the four aforementioned crimes, as well as their incitement. The second R2P pillar refers to the commitment of UN Member States to help each other exercise this responsibility. The pillar includes the obligation to help States build the capacity to protect their populations from the four denoted crimes and assist those struggling to deal with them. Lastly, the third pillar refers to the international community’s collective responsibility to respond through the UN in a timely and decisive manner under Chapters VI, VII, and VIII of the UN Charter, specifically in situations when national authorities are unable or unwilling to protect their populations from the four aforementioned crimes.
The rationale behind having R2P in place is that the aim of preventing mass atrocities deserves universal support. Further, the UNSC’s role per the WSOD formulation is highly significant, especially regarding the second and third pillars, as mentioned in the Secretary-General’s 2009 report. Indeed, the P5 countries have special responsibilities, both to take action to prevent or stop mass atrocities and not to block any UNSC steps taken under the UN Charter.Footnote 13 Defined in this manner, R2P represents an ambitious policy agenda that urgently needs implementation.
R2P Debates
Although the UN Member States unanimously endorsed the R2P principle in October 2005, debates continue about its scope, potential impact, and how it might be operationalized. In this context, the authors of this article examine recent efforts to turn R2P into a workable international agenda—namely, the Responsibility Not to Veto (RN2V). As discussed in the preceding section, the rationale behind the principle of RN2V is to persuade the P5 to come together to restrain their use of the veto in situations concerning mass atrocities. Sadly, this has not been the case, as potential rescuers, including willing States, regional organizations, and the broader international community, acting through the UN, have all been paralyzed in their efforts to respond effectively to crises. This obstruction has occurred either through the direct use of a P5 veto or the potential threat of using one. An example is Syria, where Russia’s and China’s repeated vetoes blocked resolutions aimed at holding the Assad regime accountable and enabling humanitarian interventions.Footnote 14
Thus, in simple terms, RN2V is an approach that urges the P5 not to use their veto power to block action in response to genocide and mass atrocities, thus furthering the implementation of the R2P agenda.Footnote 15 Seen in this light, RN2V must form part of a broader range of R2P-friendly measures to help prevent mass atrocities and rescue the victims of such crimes.
Responsibility Not To Veto (RN2V)
Pre-2005 Proposals
In 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) engaged the P5 States, along with French officials and representatives from various think tanks, to deliberate in Paris on the P5’s responsibility to protect.Footnote 16 This meeting’s agenda was to suggest reforms to the UNSC regarding the P5’s veto use, which drew inspiration from the European Union’s practice of constructive abstention vis-à-vis its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).Footnote 17 The CFSP aims to ensure peace, security, and international cooperation and facilitate respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
It has been argued that the RN2V principle would enable the UNSC to function effectively, as the P5 would refrain from using the veto, thus generating greater reliability, predictability, and credibility. For the UNSC, this has been a matter of debate in the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine, where Russia, as a P5 member, has vetoed any UNSC action, which is discussed in more detail later in the article.
To bring about relevant changes to the P5’s veto power, the French government submitted a proposal that would not involve any formal amendments to the UN Charter; instead, the reform would be based on the P5’s mutual consent to voluntarily suspend each nation’s veto right in cases involving mass atrocities.Footnote 18 According to this proposal, the right to decide on the existence of an R2P situation should be with the UN Secretary-General and be based on the request of at least fifty UN Member States. However, such a reference would not include cases where highly significant P5 national interests were at stake, thus avoiding the possibility of bias. Consequently, ICISS commissioners recommended that the P5 members agree not to apply their veto power in matters where their interests were not in question—specifically, for resolutions authorizing military intervention for human protection purposes for which there is otherwise majority support to enable the UNSC to function more effectively. Crucially, the discussion surrounding the RN2V idea continued from 2001 through the 2005 World Summit.
Post-2005 Proposals
As a result, three significant initiatives concerning voluntary restraint of the veto use in the case of mass atrocities have taken shape since 2005, starting with a French-Mexican initiative (the Accountability, Coherence, and Transparency [ACT] Group initiative) and the British government’s “gentlemen’s agreement.”Footnote 19 In 2013, France, Mexico, and twenty other small- and medium-sized UN members created the ACT Group to reform the UNSC’s internal functioning and harmonize it with those of different UN organs. The larger goal was to bring accountability, coherence, and transparency to the UNSC, enabling it to function effectively, efficiently, and legitimately.
In furtherance of its aim, the ACT Group created a Code of Conduct focusing on the UNSC’s action against genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The Code of Conduct’s aim is to support the UNSC in preventing or ending these types of crimes, which are prohibited under customary international law (CIL) and can constitute a threat to international peace and security. Interestingly, the pledge to adhere to the code includes the UNSC’s permanent and non-permanent members. Each UN Member State willing to abide by the pledge has the discretion to determine whether a situation requires the code’s application. In addition, the UN Secretary-General, in consultation with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect (OSAPG), would also evaluate the situation.
Coming to the British government’s “gentlemen’s agreement” on veto restraint, the proposal took the form of General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 267(iii) and emphasizes the dimension of the veto as a responsibility.Footnote 20 Through this resolution, the UNGA recommended that if there is no consensus, the P5 members must exercise the veto, considering the interest of the UN as a whole for a situation of grave importance and stating the grounds for categorizing the situation as being of vital significance.
Importance of the Responsibility Not to Veto (RN2V)
In the context of the discussion on the various veto restraint proposals, it is essential to understand the significance of ensuring RN2V. As discussed above, the question of the proper authority, or who should evaluate whether there is a mass atrocity and who should decide on the appropriate measure to be taken, is of paramount significance in the debates surrounding R2P, especially when the UNSC is blocked due to a P5 member’s use of the veto. Given that veto restraint proposals target the P5, those nations’ approaches to such proposals must be discussed here before delving into the issue of the appropriate authority.
P5 Approaches
France is the only permanent UNSC member that has publicly supported RN2V. France initiated the RN2V proposal and signed the ACT’s Code of Conduct, reflecting its commitment to treating permanent UNSC membership as a responsibility and not a privilege.Footnote 21 France’s views have been substantiated through its acts. While addressing the UNGA’s 70th session, then-President François Hollande stated that France, to ensure peace and security, would never use its veto in cases of mass atrocities.Footnote 22 France’s actions have reflected an openness to addressing new ideas and leading the narrative on the RN2V proposal.
The UK has taken a path similar to France’s—that is, not using the veto in cases involving mass atrocities, which would otherwise impair any UNSC action to stop the commission of such atrocities and crimes against humanity. The UK has also signed the ACT’s Code of Conduct but not the French-Mexican proposal. The reason for this may be that the British government has emphasized the insertion of “credible” to ascertain the draft resolution’s veracity to decide whether the use of the veto power is required.Footnote 23 Overall, the UK is positively aligned with the idea of restraining the use of the veto in cases of mass atrocities.
Somewhere in between lies the US, which has officially been silent on RN2V. Although the US did accept R2P to the extent of military intervention and in the past has condemned the Chinese and Russian vetoes on the Syrian situation, its conduct during the ongoing Israel-Palestine dispute of vetoing any UNSC action on Israel has been a matter of grave concern. The US has not signed the French-Mexican proposal or the ACT’s Code of Conduct.
Meanwhile, China and Russia are on the other end of the spectrum. China is not seen as a supporter of RN2V, as it has vetoed any UNSC action in cases of mass atrocities (for example, Syria), which has defeated the purpose of maintaining peace and security. China has justified its actions based on State sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-intervention principles under the UN Charter’s Article 2(7). China’s approach to the veto can best be summed up as viewing it as a right that has been granted to the P5 members for their contributions to and sacrifices made during the two World Wars. Thus, China has not signed any of the RN2V initiatives.Footnote 24
Lastly, Russia, through its conduct in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, has made it clear that it does not support any restriction on veto use in cases of mass atrocities. Russia views the veto as an inherent right of the P5, which should be preserved since the UN system and UN Charter are based on that right. In addition, Russia posits that, through the veto, past violations committed against weaker States, such as the use of force against Kosovo in 1999 and Iran in 2003, were avoided. In the absence of a veto, violations increase manifold, as in the Libyan case. As a result, Russian representatives have not put their signatures on any of the RN2V initiatives.Footnote 25
In this context, it should be understood that the RN2V debates focus on two matters: the proper authority to determine the existence of R2P and the need to further develop the R2P principle. The question of appropriate authority itself entails several questions, including who should assess whether there is an R2P situation and who should decide what should be done in such a circumstance.
ICISS 2001 Proposal
Interestingly, the ICISS 2001 proposal, which is contained in its report titled “The Responsibility to Protect,” bifurcates the roles of assessment and decision-making. The proposal contains a separate chapter on proper authority—that is, which political, legal, and moral bodies should determine if R2P exists. According to the ICISS proposal, there is no better or more appropriate body than the UNSC to serve as the international community’s authority on R2P.Footnote 26 However, the proposal also suggests that alternative authorities should be involved if there is a situation wherein significant humanitarian or human rights issues are at stake. More specifically, ICSISS proposes that the UNGA and a regional organization serve as alternatives to the UNSC. The end goal is not to replace the UNSC or challenge its authority but rather to make it work more efficiently. The alternative authority, whether it be the UNGA or a regional organization, would assess if a situation qualifies as an R2P circumstance, decide whether any action should be taken, and if so, what action should be taken. Thus, to begin, the UNSC acts under the UN Charter’s Articles 24 and 39 and evaluates whether a given situation can be categorized as one of the four R2P mass atrocities (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, or ethnic cleansing). If so, the UNSC decides on the measure(s) that should be taken.
Further, the 2001 ICISS proposal suggests that it would be in the UNGA’s best interest to adopt a recommendation for intervention through an emergency special session concerning the so-called 1950 Uniting For Peace (U4P) resolution.Footnote 27 At the same time, it recommends collective intervention by regional organizations in cases of mass atrocities. For instance, the African Union, through Article 4(h) of its Constitutive Act, explicitly recognizes the right to intervene in Member States in cases of war crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity, thereby operationalizing the principle of collective intervention in a regional context.
Even if RN2V cannot restrict the use of the veto in cases of mass atrocities, the fact that an additional authority would be involved in the form of the UNGA or a regional organization is an essential achievement for two significant reasons. First, it improves the UN’s credibility as an organization since the P5’s interests would not affect or influence the additional authority. When mass atrocities happen, the UNSC as a body may be blocked from performing its duty, and the ensuing perception may be that the UN as an organization has failed, as exemplified in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine crisis.Footnote 28 Moreover, by vesting this additional authority in either the UNGA or a regional organization, the P5’s inaction would be brought to light. This would help ensure fairness in the process, as the authority to ascertain the existence of an R2P situation and the authority to take action would not rest with the same actors.
Such a division would also advance the debate surrounding interventions the UNSC did not authorize. In addition, the UN Secretary-General and the Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect would play a vital role in advancing R2P through their reports. These reports, along with Member States’ input, offer important recommendations for enhancing R2P implementation and contribute to its normative development. Ultimately, there is a pressing need to reform the UNSC’s veto power in situations involving R2P. In this regard, the UNGA’s role becomes particularly significant, a subject explored in the following section.
The UNGA’s Role in the Veto Restraint Proposals
UN Resolution 377(v) (U4P)
The aforementioned U4P resolution, UN Resolution 377(v), was proposed in October 1950. The resolution had to be negotiated through the Soviet Union’s vetoes in the context of the Cold War. The USSR objected to the resolution’s preamble, which presents the UNSC veto as a responsibility rather than a right. The USSR also argued that the resolution itself violates the UN Charter’s Articles 11(2) and 24, which emphasize the UNSC’s role in maintaining international peace and security.
Ultimately, however, the UNGA adopted the U4P resolution on November 3, 1950.Footnote 29 The resolution provides that if the UNGA is not in session, the UNSC can call on the vote of any seven of its members or a majority of UN Member States to meet in an emergency special session. Thus, the UNSC can refer the matter to the UNGA, invoking the U4P resolution and convening an emergency special session called the “Uniting for Peace procedure.” The first such session occurred in response to the British and French vetoes exercised during the 1956 Suez Crisis.Footnote 30 The U4P resolution has been used in several other instances, underscoring the UNGA’s role in maintaining peace and security.
Notably, the U4P resolution’s vision is not solely for the UNGA to meet and discuss the reasons behind the UNSC’s use of the veto, which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) substantiated in its 2010 Kosovo Advisory Opinion.Footnote 31 In that case, the ICJ indicated that the U4P resolution reiterates the UNGA’s integral role when there is disunity among the P5 members—that is, to recommend remedial measures when there are threats to peace, breaches of peace, or acts of aggression.
UN Resolution 76/262
The impact of using a veto is universal, but its manifestations vary according to specific regions and jurisdictions. The role of the voices of all UN Member States through the UNGA cannot be denied. Even the UN Charter’s drafters emphasized the UNGA’s role of supervising the UNSC, explicitly stating that, when necessary, the UNSC should send special reports to the UNGA for consideration under the UN Charter’s Article 24(3).
In April 2022, in the context of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine crisis, Liechtenstein initiated Resolution 76/262, which three of the UNSC’s permanent members (the US, UK, and France) backed. Resolution 76/262 was essentially introduced for two main reasons: first, to enhance the UNSC’s accountability; and, second, to empower the UNGA to act more decisively and actively monitor and respond to instances where the UNSC’s veto power is exercised. Its larger purpose is to make the veto-holding States (the US, UK, Russia, China, and France) more cautious before striking down any UNGA resolution through their veto power. The UNGA passed Resolution 76/262 on April 26, 2022.
Under Resolution 76/262, when the UNSC exercises the veto power, the UNGA shall meet within ten working days to consider the matter that resulted in the veto. In addition, the UNSC is invited to submit a special report per the UN Charter’s Article 24(3) to the UNGA at least seventy-two hours before a discussion ensues on the exercise of the veto. Sadly, the UNSC has not invited the UNGA to participate per Resolution 76/262, and none of the UN Member States have taken steps to initiate a UNGA debate regarding that body’s request for a UNSC special report.
It is interesting to note the different purposes that the U4P resolution and Resolution 76/262 special sessions serve. As to the former, the UNGA’s power is immediate to make appropriate recommendations concerning a current UN-authorized military intervention. Even though the U4P resolution is not binding, its purpose is for the UNGA to take an active role in maintaining international peace and security in situations in which the UNSC has failed. In contrast, Resolution 76/262 only requires a meeting and considers the situation for which the veto power has been exercised.
The larger question regarding Resolution 76/262 is whether the veto initiative has enhanced the UNSC’s accountability to the UNGA, or if it is merely restating the formal procedure of requiring the P5 States to explain their vetoes to the UNGA. Furthermore, there is the question of whether the veto itself is legally justified under the purposes and principles of the UN Charter as outlined in Article 2.
Even though it is unlikely that the UNSC’s mere submission of special reports to the UNGA would significantly restrict the P5’s use of the veto, especially in situations related to maintaining international peace and security under the UN Charter’s Chapter VII, the fact that these reports have not been requested beyond the standing invitation in Resolution 76/262 can be viewed as a reflection of the UNGA’s ignorance or lack of engagement. The UNGA’s failure to request such reports, despite their availability, points to a broader issue. This lack of active engagement undermines the potential for meaningful accountability or action regarding the veto and the UNSC’s overall functioning.
Russia and R2P: Two Opposite Poles
The concept of R2P has always been at loggerheads with Russia as a P5 State. In the 1990s, Russia opposed Western intervention in the internal affairs of the former Republic of Yugoslavia, falsely claiming that R2P violated State sovereignty.Footnote 32 Then, between 2001 and 2005, when the idea of R2P was taking shape, Russia neither opposed nor supported the rationale behind R2P. In 2008, Russia violated Georgia’s sovereignty when Russian forces supported pro-Russian militias in the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions, and despite being autonomous, they remain under de facto Russian control. Russia has also continued to breach Ukraine’s territorial integrity, labelling its 2022 invasion a special military operation and killing children and civilians in the name of preventing supposed genocide.Footnote 33 However, there have been no official International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) or International Criminal Court (ICC) reports of Ukrainian government-committed genocide in Ukraine’s Donbas region, for example, apart from reports of internal disturbances.
Russia’s continually defiant behavior undermines the international legal framework. In the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russia regularly used force, violating the UN Charter’s Articles 2(4) and 2(7) on non-intervention. Russia, in invading Ukraine, has violated all possible provisions applicable to a war fought between two States, including the Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War. Russia has also violated the non-intervention principle under the UN Charter’s Article 2(7), intending to assert its vision for Europe.
In sum, Russia’s attitude reflects a critical need to restrict the abuse of the veto power to build an inclusive and sustainable society, an issue that has resurfaced in the ongoing Ukrainian crisis and remains one of the international community’s foremost concerns. The UN, as an organization, is grappling with the unique challenge that Russia has posed, including claims of exclusive rights and privileges, a desire to reclaim a higher position in the international hierarchy due to its diminished reputation and influence, and a belief that these actions are essential for national prestige, security, and wealth.
Conclusion and the Way Forward
In this article, the authors have analyzed whether the principle of R2P can serve the UN’s purpose of maintaining international peace and security. The answer to this query is “yes and no.” Considering that the P5 members’ exercise of the veto power is often driven by political considerations rather than protecting international peace and security, initiatives to restrict the veto’s use could undoubtedly be helpful and should be considered along with much-needed structural reforms. However, without considering the UN organs’ historical role (for example, the UNGA’s), this aim seems less probable, including for issues involving humanitarian crises under the R2P principle. Although various initiatives have been proposed to restrict vetoes (for example, RN2V), dialogue on a common approach or framework is notably absent. Accordingly, implementing the R2P principle has faced claims of sovereignty and non-interference.
The 21st century has already seen questions raised about the UN’s credibility as an institution and the UNSC in particular, the latter failing to reflect the current geopolitical reality, with many unrepresented and underrepresented regions not involved in the highest levels of decision-making. The UNSC’s repeated failure to uphold its mandate of maintaining international peace and security, particularly under the UN Charter’s Chapter VII, underscores the urgent need for reform. In critical moments, such as the Rwandan genocide (1994), the atrocities committed in the Former Yugoslavia (1990s), and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, the UNSC has been rendered ineffective, largely due to the P5’s unchecked use of the veto power. These instances highlight the structural weakness in the current international legal order, where geopolitical interests often override humanitarian imperatives.
R2P and RN2V are both pivotal for advancing peace and justice through strengthening UN institutions, particularly the UNSC, by overcoming such systemic challenges as the use of the veto power. By preventing mass atrocities and obliging States and the international community to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, these frameworks will help build trust in global governance and help achieve access to justice and inclusive decision-making at the international level. The RN2V framework would enable timely humanitarian interventions, saving lives and preventing poverty, displacement, and environmental degradation resulting from protracted conflicts. If left unchecked, the veto power risks endangering international peace and cooperation, threatening the rule-based world order. Hence, the RN2V framework has the potential to ensure international peace and security by prioritizing collective security over geopolitical interests, promoting the rule of law, and holding appropriate institutions accountable.
